Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Lake Elmo Bank fired Plaintiff after receiving a report that she sexually harassed another employee. Plaintiff sued the Bank, claiming her termination was based on sex in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. Sections 363A.08, subd. 2(2) and (3). She also sued the Bank and the reporting employee for defamation. On both claims, the district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, the court explained that even assuming the complainant was not credible about some details, the Bank had sufficient information to reasonably believe that Plaintiff violated the harassment policy. The details at issue here are not significant enough to convince a jury that the Bank’s explanation was an attempt to cover up a discriminatory motive for Plaintiff’s termination.   Further, the court explained that here, unlike the employee in Bahr, the complainant’s complaint focused on only the conduct related to the harassment. There is also no evidence that the complainant, unlike the employee in Bahr, made any knowingly false statements or expressed an improper motive for making the complaint. In her interview, the complainant said that as a remedy, she sought to be moved off the teller line, away from Plaintiff, or switched to a different location. There is no evidence to show that the complainant made her statements causelessly and wantonly to injure Plaintiff’s employment. View "Heidi Nelson v. Lake Elmo Bank" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs’ petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The court held the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law.the voters of Los Angeles County (County) amended the County charter by enacting Measure J. The charter amendment adopted by Measure J requires the County Board of Supervisors (Board) to annually allocate at least 10 percent of the County’s locally generated unrestricted revenues in the general fund to direct community investment (such as youth programs, job training, rental assistance, and affordable housing) and alternatives to incarceration (including health, mental health, and substance use disorder programs). The charter amendment also specifically prohibits Measure J funds from being allocated to any carceral system or law enforcement agency. Immediately after Measure J’s enactment, a coalition of County employee unions and two individuals filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor (auditor), and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The trial court granted the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court wrote that because the charter amendment enacted by Measure J defines a “power of the County’s “governing bod[y]” (the Board)—and because it concerns “[t]he performance of functions required by statute” (adopting a budget)—it is a permissible exercise of the County’s authority to amend its charter. Further, contrary to Plaintiffs' contentions, the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law. Measure J thus is enforceable, and the court, therefore, reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Coalition of County Unions v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Massey took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiff and vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

Agnes Cramer petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits for the alleged physical and mental injuries she sustained after suffering an electrical shock and falling from a ladder while working for Transitional Health Services of Wayne, which was insured by American Zurich Insurance Company. Plaintiff claimed that as a result of the shock and fall, she injured her right shoulder and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and non-epileptic seizures. The magistrate denied benefits for plaintiff’s PTSD/non-epileptic seizure claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence that the disability was work-related. Applying the four-factor test set forth in Martin v. Pontiac Sch Dist, 2001 ACO 118, the magistrate concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof that her employment contributed to or accelerated her mental injuries. The magistrate also denied wage-loss benefits on the basis that, although plaintiff was physically disabled from the injury to her shoulder, there was no evidence that plaintiff had made a good-faith effort to secure other employment. The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission affirmed in part magistrate’s denial of benefits, reversing the denial of wage-loss benefits for plaintiff’s shoulder injury. Both parties appealed; the Court of Appeals denied defendants’ application for lack of merit in the grounds presented. The appeals court remanded the matter to the Board of Magistrates for a determination of whether plaintiff was entitled to a discretionary award of attorney fees on unpaid medical benefits. Plaintiff appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted review, limited to two issues: (1) whether the four-factor test in Martin was at odds with the principle that a preexisting condition is not a bar to eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits and conflicts with the plain meaning of MCL 418.301(2); and (2) assuming that Martin provides the appropriate test, whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the commission’s conclusion that the magistrate properly applied Martin. Ultimately the Court determined the magistrate erred in its application of Martin to their decision. The magistrate’s findings were vacated. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cramer v. Transitional Health Services" on Justia Law

Kimmons was diagnosed with early cataracts in the center of his vision that might qualify for surgery. An optometrist recommended that Kimmons avoid driving at night. Kimmons lived in Racine and was working at Charter’s Milwaukee call center, a one-hour drive away. Kimmons’ shift ended at 9:00 PM, so he asked Charter to modify his work schedule. Charter allowed him to start at 10:00 AM and end at 7:00 PM but for only 30 days. Kimmons asked to extend his modified schedule while he tried to move closer to the workplace. Charter’s internal policy permitted work-schedule changes, but Charter summarily denied this request, stating that “assistance with your commute” is “not required under the ADA." Kimmons tried other options for commuting without success.Kimmons filed an EEOC charge under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5). The district court granted Charter summary judgment, finding that Kimmons did not need any accommodation to perform an essential job function. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that there is no bright-line rule as to when an employee’s disability interferes with essential job attendance or whether particular accommodations are reasonable but, if a qualified individual’s disability substantially interferes with his ability to get to work and attendance at work is an essential function, an employer may sometimes be required to provide a commute-related accommodation, if reasonable under the circumstances. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After serving in the United States Navy, Plaintiff became eligible to receive education benefits under the G.I. Bill, which he used to pursue a bachelor’s degree. Plaintiff also sought tuition assistance from his employer, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), under the company’s Employee Education Program, but OPPD denied Plaintiff’s request because his G.I. Bill benefits fully covered his tuition expenses. Plaintiff sued, claiming that OPPD’s denial of company-provided tuition assistance based on his receipt of G.I. Bill benefits amounted to unlawful discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The district court granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff y has “failed to present sufficient evidence to make” the requisite “threshold showing” that his status as a military veteran was “a motivating factor” in OPPD’s decision to deny him EEP benefits. His discrimination claim under USERRA thus fails, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor. View "Andrew Kelly v. Omaha Public Power District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed rom the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of TrialCard, Inc. (“TrialCard”) on employment claims she brought under Mo. Stat. Section 213.055.1 (“MHRA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence is likewise insufficient to establish TrialCard’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. This Court has noted that “me too” evidence of other discrimination victims can be relevant because “an employer’s past discriminatory policy and practice may well illustrate that the employer’s asserted reasons for disparate treatment are a pretext for intentional discrimination. Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence, however, is insufficient because she has not shown that these individuals received the same discipline under the same circumstances from the same person. Further, the court explained that Cigna repeatedly reached out to Plaintiff and her therapist about obtaining medical certification. Because Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support her FMLA claim, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of TrialCard. View "Lakeitha Boston v. TrialCard, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are food service managers employed by the Independent School District 191 in Burnsville, Minnesota. In 2015, Plaintiffs signed a contract to join the union that represents service workers in the school district, the School Service Employees International Union Local 284. These contracts authorized the school district to deduct monthly union dues from the union member’s paycheck and to send those dues to Local 284 on the union member’s behalf. The employees terminated their membership in the union in March 2020 and later sued the school district and Local 284. They alleged that the deduction of dues from their paychecks violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and also contravened Minnesota law. At issue on appeal is whether a school district and a labor union violated the free speech rights of union members by deducting union dues from employee paychecks.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the school district’s employees failed to state a claim, and the court, therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing the action. The court explained that the employees’ argument mischaracterizes their choice: they were “faced with a constitutional choice—whether or not to join” the union. They chose to join the union and authorize the school district to deduct dues from their paychecks. They did so in exchange for the benefits of union membership, and they “assumed the risk that subsequent changes in the law could alter the cost-benefit balance of their bargain.” View "Pollyanna Burns v. School Svc Emp Union Local 284" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal of the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the Nebraska Police Standards Advisory Council denying Appellant admission into the basic officer certification training at the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and therefore, so did this Court.Appellant sought judicial review of the decision of the Council upholding the denial by the Director of the Training Center of Appellant's application for entrance into basic training for failure to meet the minimum requirements for admission. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant's petition because he failed properly to make the Director a party to the proceedings for review. View "Swicord v. Police Standards Advisory Council" on Justia Law