Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case is one of many arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff was hospitalized with a severe case of COVID-19 in the summer of 2020. She and her husband, Robert Kuciemba, claim he was exposed to the virus while working for Victory Woodworks and that he sickened Mrs. Kuciemba in their home. Plaintiffs sued Victory, alleging that the company’s actions “were a substantial factor in causing” Mrs. Kuciemba’s illness and that Victory is liable for negligently failing to protect its employees from the virus and flouting the public health regulations in place at the time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a diversity action. The panel certified two questions to the Supreme Court of California, which accepted certification and held that (1) California’s derivative injury doctrine—under which workers’ compensation benefits generally provide the exclusive remedy for third-party claims if the asserted claims are collateral to or derivative of the employee’s workplace injury—did not bar Mrs. Kuciemba’s tort claims against Victory; but (2) an employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members. Because Victory owed no duty of care to Mrs. Kuciemba, the panel affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the complaint. View "CORBY KUCIEMBA, ET AL V. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a police officer at the Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) in Honolulu, Hawaii. Prior to his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office alleging sexual and race discrimination, retaliation, and a proposed and later a formal termination. After he was terminated, Plaintiff attempted to file a mixed case appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), seeking to appeal the Army’s termination decision based on the affirmative defense of sexual orientation discrimination. The MSPB upheld Plaintiff’s termination and he filed suit in district court. He alleged that he had been subjected to discrimination based on his sexual orientation (bisexual) and race (Caucasian), retaliated against for protected conduct, and ultimately terminated from his employment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part and remanded. The panel held that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to consider the pre-termination claims. Neither the text nor the structure of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) supports the theory that the MSPB has pendent jurisdiction to decide factually related claims of discrimination associated with personnel actions outside the list of “particularly serious” actions set forth in 5 U.S.C. 7512. The panel affirmed the district court’s (1) determination that Plaintiff failed to exhaust before the MSPB any other theories of discrimination for his termination besides sexual orientation; (2) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim; and (3) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s CSRA claim, finding that substantial evidence supported the MSPB’s finding that Plaintiff regularly had sex at TAMC during work hours. View "STEVEN CROWE V. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, ET AL" on Justia Law

The owner and CEO of Southern Pines (Pat) recruited Kairys as Vice President of Sales to grow the company’s cryogenic trucking services. Soon after he started the job, Kairys required hip replacement surgery. Kairys had surgery and missed seven days of work. Southern was self-insured. Kairys’s surgery caused its health insurance costs to rise markedly. According to Kairys, after he returned to work, Pat’s brother (the VP) told him to “lay low” because Pat was upset. Four months later, Pat fired Kairys, claiming that Southern had “maxed out” its sales potential in cryogenic trucking. Weeks later, Souther hired a part-time worker in a hybrid role that included work that had been done by Kairys.Kairys sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and state laws. A jury rejected Kairys’s ADA and ADEA claims and returned an advisory verdict for Southern on the ERISA claim.The district court independently considered the ERISA claim and found that Kairys had proved retaliation for using ERISA-protected benefits and interfered with his right to future benefits. The court awarded Kairys $67,500 in front pay and $111, 981.79 in attorney fees. The Third Circuit affirmed. The judgment for Kairys on the ERISA claim was not inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on the other claims and was supported by sufficient evidence. View "Kairys v. Southern Pines Trucking, Inc" on Justia Law

In 2016 Martin Mariano, an employee of plaintiff L & S Framing Inc., was working on a residential house under construction when he fell from the second floor onto the concrete ground floor below, sustaining serious injuries. Following an investigation, real party in interest California Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation, which eventually included a serious accident- related citation for violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 1626(b)(5). Plaintiff appealed the citation. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the Division’s mid-hearing request to amend the citation to allege a violation of section 1632(b)(1), denied the Division’s post-hearing motion to amend to allege violation of section 1626(a)(2), and concluded the Division failed to prove the alleged violation of section 1626(b)(5). The Division filed a petition for reconsideration with the defendant California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Appeals Board). The Appeals Board concluded the ALJ improperly denied the two requests to amend and upheld the citation based on violation of both section 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2). Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court: (1) erred in permitting the Appeals Board to amend the citation; (2) incorrectly concluded sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) applied; and (3) incorrectly concluded section 1716.2 did not apply and did not supersede the other regulations on the facts of this case. The Court of Appeal surmised that second and third of these contentions depended on the question whether the specific location from which Mariano fell qualified as a floor opening (§ 1632(b)(1)) and/or a stairwell (§ 1626(a)(2)), or instead an “unprotected side[] or edge[]” (§ 1716.2(f)). After review, the Court affirmed, finding the Appeals Board properly allowed the Division to amend the citation, the Appeals Board reasonably deemed the location at issue to fall within the scope of sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) and that determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the Appeals Board properly determined section 1716.2 did not apply. View "L & S Framing Inc. v. Cal. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Nicole Woodworth was a registered nurse at Loma Linda University Medical Center (the medical center) from December 2011 to June 2014. In June 2014, she filed this putative class action against the medical center, alleging a host of wage and hour claims on behalf of herself and other employees. She later amended her complaint to add a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After several years of litigation, only her individual claim for failure to provide rest periods remained. The trial court had granted four motions for summary judgment in favor of the medical center, denied Woodworth’s motion for class certification, and denied her motion to strike putative class members’ declarations. Woodworth appealed those orders, which disposed of the putative class members’ claims, the PAGA claims, and all of her individual claims (apart from her claim about rest periods). The medical center moved to dismiss most of Woodworth’s appeal, but the Court of Appeal denied the motion, affirming the orders in large part. Specifically, the Court reversed in part the order denying class certification: the court erred with respect to Woodworth’s proposed wage statement class, which consisted of employees who received allegedly inaccurate wage statements. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider certification of that class. View "Woodworth v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Center" on Justia Law

Almost a decade ago, Huntsville, Plaintiff, a Texas firefighter, had gallbladder surgery. It did not go well, and ever since, Plaintiff has needed medication and treatment for complications. And for years, both the City and its fire department accommodated him. But in 2016, not long after his surgery, the City caught Plaintiff asking a fellow employee for his leftover prescription painkillers. Because such a request violated city policy, Huntsville placed Plaintiff on probation and warned that future violations could lead to his termination. The City placed Plaintiff on administrative leave and investigated. Two weeks later, it fired him. Plaintiff sued, claiming retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA, and discrimination under the ADA. Eventually, and over Plaintiff’s request for a Rule 56(d) continuance, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims. January appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that beyond temporal proximity, Plaintiff produced no evidence that Lunsford’s reasoning concerning his intoxication was false (such that he was not actually intoxicated at the time) or pretextual (such that Plaintiff’s protected activities were the real reason for his firing). The court explained that it has said temporal proximity isn’t enough. Nothing Plaintiff provides “makes the inferential leap to [retaliation] a rational one.” Because he failed to rebut this proffered justification for his termination, summary judgment was proper. View "January v. City of Huntsville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to haul freight for CTW Transportation Services. Two weeks later, CTW terminated the contract. On October 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint against CTW with the Department of Labor, alleging that his contract was terminated in violation of 49 U.S.C. Section 31105(a) for reporting safety violations. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ordered discovery to close on May 25 and set trial for July 27. At his deposition on March 30, Plaintiff testified that his attorney had not produced all the documents he had given him. Once in federal court, Plaintiff reasserted his Section 31105(a) retaliation claim. CTW moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the dismissal. The court explained that in finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the district court did not find that pre-May 5 conduct alone caused the delay. Instead, it relied almost exclusively on Plaintiff’s conduct after May 5, 2011. For example, Plaintiff’s failure to prepare the case for trial and his “heaping personal insults on the ALJ” all occurred in August and September. Such conduct could not have caused the Secretary’s failure to meet the 210-day deadline. CTW argues that we can still affirm because Plaintiff engaged in bad-faith conduct before May 5. But because the district court did not specifically find that pre-May 5 conduct alone caused the Secretary to miss the deadline, its order dismissing the case must be vacated. View "Avery Wilson v. CTW Transportation Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received his third citation for Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”). As a term of his probation, Plaintiff, an alcoholic, was required to attend weekly substance abuse classes. Some of these classes conflicted with shifts that Plaintiff was scheduled to work as an operator at a plant owned by Defendant-Appellee La Grange Acquisitions, L.P. Plaintiff informed his supervisors that he was an alcoholic and that several of the court-ordered substance abuse classes would conflict with his scheduled shifts. When Plaintiff was unable to find coverage for these shifts, La Grange, citing this scheduling conflict, terminated Plaintiff. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Plaintiff sued La Grange under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for intentional discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of La Grange on all three claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the evidence does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether the given reason for his termination was pretextual, that is, “false or unworthy of credence.” Nothing in the record supports such a finding. There is no dispute that, while La Grange may have been able to do more to find coverage for the shifts Plaintiff needed to miss, La Grange did attempt to coordinate coverage for him and, while partially successful, eventually, these efforts failed. It was only at this point when some of Plaintiff’s shifts were left uncovered, that La Grange dismissed Plaintiff. Given this context, no reasonable jury could find that La Grange’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—the shift conflict—for Plaintiff’s suspension and termination was pretext for discrimination. View "Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions" on Justia Law

This is a putative class action by three truck drivers against their employer, Domino’s Pizza. The court previously affirmed the district court’s denial of Domino’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that because the drivers were a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” their claims were exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) by 9 U.S.C. Section 1.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Domino Pizza’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action brought by three Domino truck drivers, alleging violations of California labor law. The panel stated that its prior decision squarely rested upon its reading of Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), which concerned Amazon delivery drivers. The panel found no clear conflict between Rittmann and Saxon and nothing in Saxon that undermined the panel’s prior reasoning that because the plaintiff drivers in this case, like the Amazon package delivery drivers in Rittmann, transport interstate goods for the last leg to their final destinations, they are engaged in interstate commerce under Section 1. View "EDMOND CARMONA, ET AL V. DOMINO'S PIZZA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking to recover long-term disability benefits. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Reliance’s cross-motion. Reliance appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The court explained that the cases cited do not demonstrate that Reliance has a history of biased claims administration. Nor do they show some other systemic flaw in its claims review process that affected Reliance’s review of Plaintiff’s claim. On the other hand, Reliance does not argue that it maintained structural separations to minimize its conflict of interest. Therefore, the conflict of interest, in this case, deserves “some weight,” but the court concluded that it does not indicate that Reliance abused its discretion. The court wrote that substantial evidence supports Reliance’s decision, and neither the decisional delay in this case nor the purported conflict of interest leads us to conclude that Reliance abused its discretion. View "Melissa McIntyre v. Reliance Standard Life" on Justia Law