Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law

In 2018, a worker, Thomas Lazalee, filed a claim for benefits after suffering a right thumb injury and carpal tunnel syndrome, for which he underwent surgery. His employer, Wegman's Food Markets, Inc., did not challenge the claim and compensated Lazalee at the temporary total disability rate. In 2019, Lazalee was diagnosed with similar injuries to his left hand, and again, Wegman's compensated him at the temporary total disability rate. Lazalee then requested a hearing to amend the previous award to include these additional injuries.At the hearing, Wegman's accepted liability but sought to cross-examine Lazalee's doctor regarding the degree of impairment during Lazalee's most recent period out of work. The Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) denied this request, ruling that Lazalee's 11.2-week absence was not excessive. This decision was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board and the Appellate Division, with the latter finding that Wegman's request to cross-examine the doctor was disingenuous because it came after Wegman's had already paid Lazalee at the total disability rate until his return to work, and was based solely on the employer's counsel's interpretation of the medical reports without any credible medical evidence to the contrary.However, the New York Court of Appeals reversed these decisions, holding that under the rules of the Workers' Compensation Board, if an employer wishes to cross-examine an attending physician whose report is on file, the referee must grant an adjournment for such purpose. The court found that the WCLJ did not have the discretion to deny Wegman's request for cross-examination made at the hearing before the WCLJ had rendered a decision on the merits. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division with instructions to remand to the Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings in accordance with the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "Matter of Lazalee v Wegman's Food Mkts., Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerns an appeal by the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (the "Department") against a jury's verdict in favor of Lawanna Tynes, a former employee. Tynes had sued the Department for race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, after she was terminated from her position as the superintendent of the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center. The Department argued on appeal that Tynes failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as required under the evidentiary framework set by the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green case, because the comparator employees she presented were not similarly situated in all material respects.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court ruled that the Department's focus on the McDonnell Douglas framework and the adequacy of Tynes's comparators missed the ultimate question in a discrimination case, which is whether there is enough evidence to show that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination. The jury found that the Department had intentionally discriminated against Tynes, and the Department did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for that conclusion on appeal. Therefore, the Department's arguments regarding the adequacy of Tynes's comparators and the insufficiency of her prima facie case were irrelevant and did not disturb the jury's verdict.The Department also challenged the jury's verdict on Tynes's § 1981 claim, arguing that her complaint did not adequately plead the § 1981 claim and that she did not prove that race was a but-for cause of her termination. However, the appellate court found that the Department had forfeited both arguments because it failed to challenge the district court's authority to allow an amendment to the pleadings during the trial under Rule 15(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and did not argue that Tynes failed to prove that race was a but-for cause in its post-trial motion.Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Tynes on both her Title VII and § 1981 claims. View "Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice" on Justia Law

Kevin Cantwell worked for Flex-N-Gate for 28 years during which he sustained numerous work-related injuries. He was awarded permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for these injuries under the law as it existed before February 1, 2014, referred to as Title 85. After this date, workers' compensation claims were governed by a new law, Title 85A, under the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA). Cantwell sustained three more injuries after the enactment of AWCA and was again awarded PPD benefits. However, the Workers' Compensation Commission denied payment of these benefits based on their interpretation of Section 46(H) of the AWCA, which limited the total weeks of PPD benefits to 350.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, in this case, disagreed with the Commission's interpretation. The court determined that the 100% limitation on PPD benefits under Section 45(C)(1) of the AWCA controls over the number of weeks when awarding compensation for PPD. This is particularly applicable where a claimant has compensable awards for job-related injuries that occurred both before and after February 1, 2014. The court vacated the Commission's order in each case and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "CANTWELL v. FLEX-N-GATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns a firefighter, Matthew Vann, who was injured when a bus driver, Louis Yu, drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose, causing it to break off from a fire engine and strike Vann. Vann sued the City and County of San Francisco and Yu for negligence. The trial court dismissed the case, sustaining the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. The court ruled that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as Vann was receiving workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the incident.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court rejected Vann's argument that the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), which employed Vann and Yu respectively, were separate legal entities akin to separate businesses within a multi-unit corporate enterprise. The court reasoned that the SFFD and the SFMTA were not independent entities but were merely parts of the same entity, the City and County of San Francisco. Consequently, the City was the employer of both Vann and Yu. Therefore, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, workers' compensation was Vann's exclusive remedy against the City as his employer and against Yu as his coemployee. View "Vann v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the appellant, Christopher Ounjian, claimed that his employer, Globoforce, Inc., retaliated against him and forced him to resign after he objected to their unlawful conduct. Ounjian filed a suit alleging constructive discharge and sought damages under the Florida Private Whistleblower Act and Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The district court dismissed the complaint, stating that Ounjian failed to allege facts constituting a constructive discharge under the Florida Private Whistleblower Act and failed to allege damages cognizable under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's ruling, stating that the alleged instances of criticism, improper disclosure of personal information, and the withdrawn demotion threat did not meet the high bar for stating a constructive discharge claim. The court also stated that the company's actions were not compelling enough to force a reasonable employee to resign. The court further stated that the company's alleged improper sales practices were not a result of Ounjian's objections, thus negating any causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action required by the Florida Private Whistleblower Act.Regarding the claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the court ruled that while Ounjian did allege deceptive or unfair actions in the conduct of trade or commerce, the damages he sought resulting from the loss of his employment were not cognizable under the Act. As such, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. View "Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Michael W. Langeman, a former Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), appealed against the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. Langeman was terminated from his position after an investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) revealed his mishandling of the investigation into sexual abuse allegations against USA Gymnastics Physician Lawrence Gerard Nassar. Langeman claimed that his termination violated his constitutional rights protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He argued that his termination violated a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued employment and deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his reputation, thereby damaging his future employment in law enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with Langeman's arguments. The court held that Langeman failed to sufficiently plead deprivation of a property interest or liberty interest without due process. The court found that the FBI had explicitly retained the discretion to summarily terminate employees, and this did not create a legitimate property interest sufficient to state a claim under procedural due process. As for Langeman's claim of deprivation of a liberty interest, the court found that Langeman did not establish that any allegedly defamatory conduct accompanied his dismissal from government employment.Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Langeman’s complaint for failure to state a claim. It also found that Langeman could not demonstrate a clear right to relief for his mandamus claim due to his deficient due process allegations, therefore mandamus relief was not available to him. View "Langeman v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit examined claims by Colleen M. Johnson against her former employer, Midwest Division-RBH, LLC (Belton Regional Medical Center), her supervisor Patrick Avila, and her replacement Nicole Pasley. Johnson had been on medical leave for nine months due to heart-related issues when she informed Belton Regional that she could not give a return date. The next day, the company terminated her employment. Johnson sued under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), claiming age and disability discrimination, and also brought common law claims for emotional distress, defamation, and property damage. The district court dismissed the common law claims and granted summary judgment on the MHRA claims.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court rejected Johnson’s argument that her common law claims were not preempted by the MHRA, ruling that the MHRA provided the exclusive remedy for claims arising out of an employment relationship and that she had fraudulently joined the Missouri defendants to prevent removal. The court also found that Johnson could not establish a prima facie case of age or disability discrimination under the MHRA because she did not provide evidence that her age or disability was the “determinative influence” on her termination. Instead, the court concluded that Johnson was fired due to her refusal to provide a date when she would return from medical leave, not because of her age or disability. Finally, the court ruled that Johnson had waived her argument of constructive discharge by failing to provide meaningful legal analysis in her opposition to summary judgment. View "Johnson v. Midwest Division - RBH, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Lorenzo Dominguez, who was a former employee of Better Mortgage Corporation, alleged that the company violated federal and state wage-and-hour laws, primarily by failing to pay overtime to him and other mortgage underwriters. Upon being sued, Better Mortgage attempted to reduce the size of the potential class and collective action by persuading employees to agree not to join any collective or class action and to settle their claims individually. The district court found that Better Mortgage's communications were misleading and coercive. As such, the court nullified the new employment agreements, release agreements, and ordered the company to communicate with current and former employees about wage-and-hour issues only in writing and with prior approval.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order imposing a communication restriction on Better Mortgage, considering the company's appeal timely due to a motion to reconsider the restriction, thus tolling the time to file the notice of appeal. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction to review the communication restriction and found it both justified and tailored to the situation created by the employer’s misleading and coercive communications. However, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the employer’s appeal from the district court’s order nullifying agreements between the employer and current and former employees. The appellate court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the nullification order because the issue was raised in an interlocutory appeal and did not fit any exception that would allow for review. View "DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The case involves Strategic Technology Institute, Inc. ("STI") and the National Labor Relations Board. STI had a contract to maintain engines and propellers for the U.S. Air Force from August 2017 until July 2020. During this time, STI's employees at a Little Rock facility began discussing unionizing. In response to this, Tyler Boyd of STI fired 17 employees — three on September 27, 2019, and fourteen on October 9, 2019. The administrative law judge and the Board found that these terminations violated subsections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in their right to engage in union activities and from discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.STI petitioned for a review of the Board's order, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the order, and remanded the case. The court found that there was no substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the terminations were motivated by anti-union animus. The court noted that the only evidence of STI's knowledge of the union activities were two phone calls informing Tyler Boyd that the employees were considering unionizing and the timing of the firings. The court held that this was not sufficient to establish that STI acted with an anti-union motive when it terminated the employees. The court also found that the Board's reliance on the "small plant doctrine" to infer employer knowledge of union activity was not applicable in this case since there was no other evidence indicating a likelihood that Boyd knew of the union activities. Furthermore, the court held that the Board erred in finding that STI's reasons for the firings were pretextual because they were based on legitimate factors such as performance, attendance, and interpersonal skills. The court concluded that the General Counsel failed to meet its burden of providing substantial evidence that STI harbored anti-union animus and that the terminations were motivated by animus. Consequently, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Strategic Technology Institute v. NLRB" on Justia Law