Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Claimant Fran Rancourt appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision granting the request of the carrier, AIM Mutual — NH Employers Ins. Co., for a reduction of the claimant’s benefits from the Temporary Total Disability (TTD) rate to the Diminished Earning Capacity (DEC) rate. At the time of her injury, the claimant was employed as the “vice president of academic and community affairs” for the Community College System of New Hampshire (CCS). The injury occurred when the claimant slipped on ice, hitting her head. She was taken to the hospital where she received 11 staples to close a wound in her head. Three months later, the claimant was assessed by Dr. Glassman, an independent medical examiner, who recommended “partial duty modified work part-time” and physical therapy, and that the claimant see a concussion specialist. He concluded that claimant did “not have the ability to return to full duty work at this time,” but opined that “she could be evaluated for partial duty work, working three to four hours a day, two to three days a week.” In July 2019, claimant was visiting a friend in Maine when she fell stepping into a boat. As a result of the fall, the claimant severely injured her left hamstring, resulting in surgery. She reported that the fall was a result of problems with her depth perception related to her head injury. In March 2020, Glassman performed another independent medical examination to evaluate the extent of claimant’s continuing disability. Glassman reported that claimant continued to suffer from “postconcussion syndrome” as a result of the work injury in 2017. He concluded that claimant “has not returned to her pre-accident status” and “still has ongoing deficits and ongoing symptoms.” He reported that claimant feels about “60% improved,” and that, while “she is being seen by neuro-optometry and speech therapy,” she “has reached maximum medical improvement” for her post-concussion syndrome. It was his opinion that “no further treatment is indicated for the date of injury of November 20, 2017.” In May 2020, the carrier requested a hearing, pursuant to RSA 281-A:48 (2010), seeking to reduce or terminate the TTD indemnity benefits claimant had been receiving. The hearing officer granted the carrier’s request to reduce benefits as it related to claimant’s changed condition. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Rancourt" on Justia Law

Appellant, a former employee of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”), asserts that ODNI violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”),by delaying her leave request and not hiring her for a permanent position. The district court determined that Appellant failed to meet her burden of proof to demonstrate that she was not selected for the permanent position “by reason of” ODNI’s FMLA interference.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that t the record supports the district court’s finding that Appellant’s non-selection for the permanent position was the result of the hiring official’s poor impression of Appellant as a prospective employee and Appellant’s attendance problems prior to the FMLA interference. View "Hannah P. v. Avril Haines" on Justia Law

Ponderay Police Department Officer Michael Watkins injured his knee while chasing a suspect. Because Watkins was injured during the performance of his duties as a police officer, he was eligible to receive his full base salary during the period of his disability under the Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Act. Rather than receive payments under the Act, Watkins accepted worker’s compensation benefits from the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Nearly a year later, Watkins filed a complaint against the City of Ponderay seeking payment of his full base salary. The Commission fashioned a remedy which required the City to pay Watkins his full base salary, but reduced that amount by the worker’s compensation payments Watkins had already received. Watkins appealed, arguing the Commission failed to follow the Act and exceeded its authority by ordering that the City receive a credit for benefits Watkins received. Finding the Commission erred in ordering the City receive a credit for the worker's compensation benefits, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. View "Watkins v. City of Ponderay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's action alleging that defendant Massachusetts Coastal Railroad LLC (MCR) paid him less than the prevailing wage on State public works projects, holding that the trial court did not err.In their motion to dismiss, MCR and its managing officer (together, Defendants), argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10501 preempted the Prevailing Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 26-27H, and therefore, the Commonwealth was precluded from enforcing the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendants failed to show that the Prevailing Wage Act was preempted; and (2) Plaintiff's allegations plausibly suggested a right to relief under the Act. View "Marsh v. Mass. Coastal Railroad LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court in the underlying action originally brought by Peter Marcus against the American Contract Bridge League (ACBL), where Marcus was formerly employed, holding that the district court erred in part.In the underlying amended complaint, Marcus and his co-plaintiffs sought unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a), and Marcus asserted that he was wrongfully discriminated and retaliated against for requesting his claimed pay. The district court entered summary judgment for certain plaintiffs and, as to Marcus's retaliation claim, entered summary judgment for ACBL. The First Circuit reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) erred in denying Plaintiffs' motion to substitute a party; (2) correctly granted judgment in favor of ACBL on Marcus's retaliation claim; (3) erred in granting judgment with respect to the FSLA overtime claims of certain plaintiffs; and (4) otherwise did not err. View "Marcus v. American Contract Bridge League" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of a decision of a hearing examiner with the Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System for the City of Baltimore denying Petitioner's request for line-of-duty disability retirement, holding that the petition was untimely.Petitioner, a police officer, sustained an injury during a car accident that occurred while he was responding to an emergency call. A copy of the hearing examiner's decision denying line-of-duty disability retirement but granting him non-line-of-duty disability retirement. At issue was whether former Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera's administrative tolling order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic applied to Defendant's case. The circuit court concluded that the extension applied only to deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks' offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. The appellate court certified the question of whether the fifteen-day extension applied to all cases whose statute of limitations and deadlines related to initiation expired between those dates. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the fifteen-day extension under the administrative tolling orders applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks' offices between the relevant dates. View "In re Hosein" on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered three questions certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in this suit brought against Catholic Relief Services-United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (CRS), which follows the teaching that marriage is between one man and one woman.The district court ruled (1) CRS violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by revoking Plaintiff's dependent health insurance because he was a man married to another man; and (2) Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his federal Equal Pay Act claim. The court then ordered the parties to confer and file proposed questions of law with respect to the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA), Md. Code Ann., State Gov't 20-606, and the Maryland Equal Pay for Equal Work Act (MEPEWA), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. 3-304. The Supreme Court answered (1) the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in MFEPA does not itself also prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, which is separately covered under MFEPA; (2) MEPEWA does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination; and (3) MFEPA's religious entity exemption applies with respect to claims by employees who perform duties that directly future the core mission of the religious entity. View "Doe v. Catholic Relief Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Maryland Tort Claims Act's (MTCA), Md. Code Ann. State Gov't (SG) 12-104(a)(1), waiver of sovereign immunity as to a "tort action" does not extend to federal statutory claims.Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants, her former employer and supervisor, regarding her termination from Morgan State University (MSU). Because Plaintiff included claims of retaliation in violation of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 41 U.S.C. 4712, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 11-5, 1553 Defendants removed the suit to federal district court. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the matter with directions to address whether Maryland has waived state sovereign immunity against federal whistleblower claims by enacting the MTCA. The district court answered the question in the negative. The Supreme Court answered an ensuing certified question by holding that "a tort action" under the MTCA does not include federal statutory claims. View "Williams v. Morgan State University" on Justia Law

Two companies filed a lawsuit in federal court against two of their former employees, who had served in executive positions. The former executives responded by suing the companies in Florida state court. They later moved for summary judgment in the federal action. While that motion was pending, the companies moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of their federal action, which the executives opposed. The district court granted the companies’ motion for voluntary dismissal, and it denied the executives’ request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the federal lawsuit to that point. On remand, the district court again granted the voluntary dismissal. The executives moved to alter or amend that judgment and be awarded fees and costs immediately, which the court denied. The executives appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court sufficiently protected the executives from the prejudice of duplicative litigation by essentially inviting them to move for payment of their costs and fees if the companies ever refiled their federal lawsuit. The court adequately explained its reasoning for granting the dismissal without prejudice on that condition. In all aspects of the decision, the court acted within its discretion. View "Emergency Recovery, Inc., et al v. Bryan Hufnagle, et al" on Justia Law