Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In a workers' compensation case, an employee was injured and sought compensation from her employer and its insurance carrier. The employee failed to provide her expert witness's evidence in a timely manner, serving them only two weeks before the arbitration hearing began. The employer and its insurance carrier objected, arguing that this late submission of evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner agreed with the employer and excluded the evidence. This decision was affirmed by the commissioner, but was later reversed on judicial review by the district court. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. However, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the commissioner’s decision to exclude untimely evidence was entitled to deference. The court found that the commissioner did not abuse his discretion by excluding the untimely evidence since the employee had disregarded multiple deadlines and submitted the reports only about two weeks before the hearing. Moreover, the reports were not from the employee’s treating physicians and the vocational report reached a conclusion that no other expert in the case shared. Therefore, the supreme court vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court decision, and remanded the case back to the district court to enter a judgment affirming the commissioner's decision to exclude the untimely evidence. View "Hagen v. Serta/National Bedding Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In this California case, Gary Garner, the plaintiff, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against BNSF Railway Company, alleging that his father's exposure to toxic levels of diesel exhaust during his four-decade employment with BNSF caused his father's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and subsequent death. Garner retained several experts to opine on whether diesel exhaust and its constituents are capable of causing cancer, including non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and whether the father's workplace exposure to diesel exhaust was a cause of his cancer. However, the trial court granted BNSF's motions in limine to exclude Garner's three causation experts from trial. The trial court found that the science the experts relied on was inadequate and there was too great an analytical gap between the data and their opinions. As a result, Garner's wrongful death lawsuit was dismissed before trial.Garner appealed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Garner's experts. The court held that the trial court's gatekeeping role is not to choose between competing expert opinions, and it does not involve weighing the persuasiveness of an expert's opinion, substituting its own opinion for the expert’s opinion, or resolving scientific controversies. The court found that Garner's experts used their scientific judgment and expertise to evaluate the available data and determine whether to draw an inference of causation, which is a matter of informed judgment, not scientific methodology. The court reversed the orders and judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter new orders denying BNSF's motions in limine. View "Garner v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Brent Mattingly, an employee of R.J. Corman Railroad Services, LLC (“Corman Services”), suffered injuries while repairing a bridge owned and operated by Memphis Line Railroad (“Memphis Line”). Mattingly filed a lawsuit seeking recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), which covers employees of common carriers by railroad. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that Mattingly was not employed by a common carrier, a prerequisite for FELA coverage.On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected Mattingly’s argument that Corman Services, his employer, was a common carrier because it was part of a “unitary” railroad system managed by Corman Group. The court held that Corman Services' bridge repair and construction services did not provide an inextricable function for Memphis Line’s common carrier services and thus, did not qualify as a common carrier under FELA. The court further rejected Mattingly’s assertion that he was a “subservant” of a common carrier. The court found that Mattingly failed to demonstrate that Memphis Line, a common carrier, controlled or had the right to control the daily operations of Corman Services, as required to establish a master-servant relationship under common law.The court also held that Mattingly's claims regarding discovery issues were unpreserved for appeal, as he did not adequately inform the district court of his need for discovery in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). View "Mattingly v. R.J. Corman R.R. Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Gregory Kelly, the former Town Manager of Abingdon, Virginia, sued the Town for discrimination, retaliation, interference, and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Kelly alleged that he suffers from anxiety, depression, and high blood pressure, and these conditions worsened due to a hostile work environment created by the elected Mayor and Town Council. He further alleged that, despite his efforts to seek accommodations for his disabilities, the Town failed to engage in a meaningful dialogue to determine appropriate accommodations, and instead escalated its pattern of harassment.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Kelly's discrimination and interference claims, along with its ruling that a letter Kelly sent to the Town in January 2018 was not an ADA accommodation request. The court reasoned that although Kelly had informed the Town of his disabilities and it was aware of them, the January 2018 letter, despite being titled "Accommodations Requests," did not make it clear that Kelly was seeking accommodations for his disabilities. The requests in the letter were not connected to Kelly's disabilities and were more related to general workplace issues. Therefore, the letter did not trigger the Town's duty to engage in an interactive process to determine appropriate accommodations under the ADA.The Court also found that Kelly failed to state a claim for ADA discrimination. He did not provide any facts suggesting that the Town had a discriminatory motive or that his disability was a "but-for" cause of his constructive discharge. The Court further held that Kelly failed to state a claim for ADA interference, as he did not allege that the Town engaged in behavior to prevent him from exercising his ADA rights or that the Town had a discriminatory motive. View "Kelly v. Town of Abingdon" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between Gregory Garrabrants, the CEO of BofI Federal Bank (BofI), and Charles Matthew Erhart, a former internal auditor at BofI who acted as a whistleblower. Erhart copied, transmitted, and retained various documents he believed evidenced possible wrongdoing, some of which contained Garrabrants' personal and confidential information. Garrabrants sued Erhart for accessing, taking, and subsequently retaining his personal information. A jury awarded Garrabrants $1,502 on claims for invasion of privacy, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized access to computer data.However, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The court found that the trial court made prejudicial errors in its jury instructions. Specifically, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that bank customers have an unqualified reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents disclosed to banks. The trial court also erred in instructing the jury that Erhart's whistleblower justification defense depended on proving at least one legally unsupported element. The instructions given for Penal Code section 496 misstated the law by defining “theft” in a manner that essentially renders receiving stolen property a strict liability offense. Furthermore, the special instruction on Penal Code section 502 erroneously removed from the jury’s consideration the foundational issue of whether Garrabrants “owned” the data about him residing in BofI’s computer systems such that he could pursue a civil action under the statute. The court concluded that, in light of the record evidence, there is a reasonable possibility a jury could have found in Erhart’s favor on each of Garrabrants’ claims absent the erroneous instructions, making them prejudicial. View "Garrabrants v. Erhart" on Justia Law

Amy Shumway was employed as a receptionist at Evans Chiropractic in Idaho. Her employment was terminated by Dr. John Hitchcock, one of the owners, for insubordination. Following her termination, Shumway applied for unemployment benefits. Her application was initially approved by an Appeals Examiner from the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) who found Shumway eligible for benefits despite her termination for insubordination. On appeal by Evans Chiropractic, the Industrial Commission affirmed the decision, but on different grounds. Evans Chiropractic then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.In the Supreme Court, Evans Chiropractic argued that Shumway should not be eligible for benefits because her employment was terminated for job-related misconduct, namely her refusal to meet with Dr. Hitchcock for discussions about her behavior at work. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the Commission erred in its application of the law. The Court noted that the Commission had focused on Shumway's subjective reasons for not meeting with Hitchcock, rather than the employer's expectations. The Court found that Hitchcock directly communicated his expectation for Shumway to meet with him and that her refusal to do so constituted insubordination, which is a form of job-related misconduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision and held that Shumway was ineligible for unemployment benefits as a matter of law. View "Shumway v. IDOL" on Justia Law

The case in question was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The plaintiff, Christine Boardman, was the former president of Local 73, a regional affiliate of the Service Employees International Union (International). The International imposed an emergency trusteeship on Local 73 due to internal conflict and removed Boardman from her position. In response, Boardman sued under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, alleging that the trusteeship was a pretextual retaliation for her protected speech.The court agreed with the defendants' argument that the trusteeship was necessary to restore order and democratic procedures within Local 73, given the intense infighting between Boardman and Secretary-Treasurer Matthew Brandon. The court reasoned that this constituted a valid purpose for the trusteeship under the Act, which allows trusteeships to be established for purposes including "restoring democratic procedures."The court rejected Boardman's claim that the trusteeship was retaliatory, arguing that even if there was animus between Boardman and the International's President, Mary Kay Henry, this did not negate the valid purpose for the trusteeship. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that Boardman was treated differently from other union members who also engaged in protected speech. The court's decision affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Boardman v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case where Deborah Lightner, a former employee of Catalent CTS (Kansas City), LLC, alleged age discrimination and retaliation under Missouri law. Lightner had received multiple promotions during her employment, but after several employees left citing her management style, her performance was rated poorly. After raising concerns about age discrimination in an email, Catalent removed the option of a performance improvement plan (PIP), offering only a demotion or severance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Catalent.Upon review, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the age discrimination claim, as Lightner failed to show that Catalent's justifications were a pretext for discrimination. However, the court reversed the judgment on the retaliation claim. The court found that the timing of Catalent's removal of the PIP option within 48 hours of Lightner's complaint, combined with text messages from Catalent management, created a sufficient inference of retaliation. Here, the close temporal proximity was deemed sufficient to support a reasonable inference of a causal relationship. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lightner v. Catalent CTS (Kansas City)" on Justia Law

Barbara Lindsay, the former Director of Workforce Development and Career Services at Emily Griffith Technical College (EGTC), sued Denver Public Schools (DPS) and Stephanie Donner, EGTC's Executive Director, for retaliation. Lindsay claimed that her termination was motivated by her opposition to racist comments made during the hiring process for the Executive Director position and her assistance to a candidate in filing employment discrimination charges. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of DPS and Donner. Lindsay appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to prove a causal relationship between Lindsay's protected activity (opposition to racist comments and assistance in filing discrimination charges) and her termination. The Court determined that there was no evidence that those who decided to terminate Lindsay's employment were aware of her protected activity. The court further noted that Lindsay failed to show that anyone at DPS knew that she had assisted in bringing discrimination charges before she was fired. Therefore, Lindsay's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for protected activities could not be substantiated. View "Lindsay v. Denver Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas handled a case in which a nurse claimed her employer, Scott & White Memorial Hospital, wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting potential child abuse or neglect to the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), which is considered a protected conduct under Section 261.110(b) of the Texas Family Code.The nurse, Dawn Thompson, had previously received two written reprimands for violating the hospital's personal-conduct policy. On the third occasion, she disclosed a child patient's protected health information to a school nurse without the parents' authorization. This was considered by the hospital as a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a breach of the patient's rights. Consequently, Thompson was terminated.Thompson filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting that her termination was in violation of Family Code Section 261.110(b), which protects professionals who report child abuse or neglect in good faith from adverse employment actions.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Section 261.110 imposes a "but-for causation" requirement, which means that the protected conduct must be such that without it, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when it did. In this case, the court found that Thompson would have been terminated when she was due to her HIPAA violation, regardless of her report to CPS. Therefore, the court rejected Thompson's retaliation claim and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the hospital. View "SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law