Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Plaintiffs, former employees of a high-end fashion retailer in New York, allege that their regularly scheduled workweek included more than forty hours per week of work. Plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to an overtime premium under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law, and that their employer misclassified them as managerial employees and failed to pay them an overtime premium. The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims for failure to allege the specific number of hours they worked. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.   The Second Circuit vacated. The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately states a claim under the FLSA because it alleges that their regularly scheduled workweek exceeded forty hours of work and that the Plaintiffs were denied overtime as a result of being misclassified as managers. The court explained that various Plaintiffs have necessarily plausibly pleaded similar, if not identical, allegations about their regular schedule. In context, the individualized facts giving rise to each Plaintiff’s action – namely, when each Plaintiff worked the regular schedule at issue – are adequately and specifically alleged. View "Abbott v. Comme Des Garcons, Ltd." on Justia Law

At the request of Plaintiffs/cross-defendants, the trial court issued a prejudgment right to attach orders (RTAO) in the aggregate amount of $7,192,607.16 against their former employer, NMSI, Inc. Appealing the orders as authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(5),1 NMSI contends Plaintiffs failed to establish the probable validity of their claims because, contrary to the allegations in their first amended complaint, the agreements underlying their breach of contract causes of action had been modified through an exchange of emails, as well as by the parties’ subsequent conduct. NMSI also contends the amounts to be attached were not readily ascertainable, and the court erred in considering documents incorporated by reference into the applications for a writ of attachment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of the probable validity of Plaintiffs’ contract claims. The court explained that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the November 3, 2020 email does not show that “both Plaintiffs personally supervised the calculations of the Brea branch profit and loss figures . . . which reflected the modified profit-sharing model, which they then sent to and confirmed with NMSI’s accounting team,” and its further finding that the email did not confirm the modified revenue sharing agreement because it “failed to include the attachment with the cover email,” so “it cannot be determined from the November 2020 email what Plaintiffs were confirming.” The court held that the trial court did not err in determining the claims were for a fixed or readily ascertainable amount. View "Park v. NMSI, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintifff Pattyann Larsen filed employment discrimination and other claims against her former employer shortly after her debts had been discharged by the federal bankruptcy court, but she had failed to list those claims as assets in her bankruptcy case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the bankruptcy trustee—not plaintiff— was the real party in interest. The court then denied plaintiff’s motion to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff and dismissed the case based on its conclusion that plaintiff’s attempt to pursue this action in her own name was not an “honest and understandable mistake.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying substitution. THe Oregon Supreme Court reversed: under ORCP 26 A, a motion to substitute the real party in interest as the plaintiff, if granted, would require plaintiff to amend the complaint under ORCP 23 A. “We have interpreted the standard specified in that rule—leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’—to mean that leave to amend should be granted absent any unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party. The text, context, and legislative history of ORCP 26 A confirm that the standards governing leave to amend the pleadings under ORCP 23 A also apply in deciding whether to allow substitution of the real party in interest under ORCP 26 A.” Defendant did not contend that it would be unfairly prejudiced if the bankruptcy trustee were to be substituted as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court concluded that, because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, it abused its discretion in denying substitution and dismissing this case. View "Larsen v. Selmet, Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2018, Bianca Bouie was returning from her lunch break to her workplace, Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC, also known as University Childcare Center (“University Childcare”), when she looked away from the road to scroll through the contacts in her cell phone so that she could call her manager to report that she was running late. While Bouie was distracted, her car crossed the median and caused an accident with a truck that was driven by Andrea Cotton. Cotton filed a personal injury lawsuit against Bouie and later added University Childcare as a defendant, alleging, among other things, that Bouie was acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident and that University Childcare was therefore liable under the legal theory of respondeat superior. University Childcare moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, concluding, in pertinent part, that Bouie was not acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred. Cotton appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding that under the “special circumstances exception” to the general rule that employees do not act in furtherance of an employer’s business and within the scope of employment when they are commuting to and from work or when they are on a lunch break, and under two of its cases applying that “exception,” there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to the issue of liability under respondeat superior. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ “special circumstances exception,” as well as the multi-factor test the court developed for applying that “exception.” The Supreme Court also concluded that the two cases on which the Court of Appeals relied in applying the “special circumstances exception” used imprecise language regarding the respondeat-superior test, and the Supreme Court disapproved such language. In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case to that court so that it could apply the proper respondeat-superior test in the first instance. View "Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC v. Cotton" on Justia Law

Two people were killed while unclogging a machine at Darling Ingredients, Inc., a chicken rendering plant. When the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) investigated, it found that the plant’s “lockout/tagout” procedures did not “clearly and specifically outline” how to safely work on the machine, so it cited the plant’s owner. Darling challenged the citations before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.  After the trial, the ALJ ruled in favor of OSHA, finding that (1) Darling did violate Section 147; (2) the violation was a repeat; (3) it was serious; and (4) Darling waived any “independent employee misconduct” defense. Darling appealed all of these decisions, save for the serious classification.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Darling’s argument is flawed for a couple of reasons. First, there are steps that a worker can take besides waiting around. Second, doing nothing is doing something; if waiting was the right thing to do, there is no reason that Darling’s procedure could not say that. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of noncompliance, namely that Darling failed to “clearly and specifically outline the . . . rules and technique to be utilized for the control of hazardous energy. The court concluded that the ALJ’s determination that Darling had knowledge of its Section 147 violations is supported by the law and substantial evidence. View "Darling Ingredients v. OSHC" on Justia Law

This ERISA case concerns the National Football League’s retirement plan, which provides disability pay to hobbled NFL veterans whose playing days are over but who are still living with debilitating, often degenerative injuries to brains and bodies, including neurotrauma. The claimant, former NFL running back Michael Cloud, suffered multiple concussions during his eight-year career, leaving him physically, neurologically, and psychologically debilitated. After the Social Security Administration found him entitled to disability benefits, Cloud went back to the NFL Plan and sought reclassification to a higher tier of benefits. Cloud was awarded a higher tier but not the highest tier. Cloud again filed a claim to be reclassified at the most generous level of disability pay. The NFL Plan denied reclassification on several grounds. Cloud sued the NFL Plan. The district court ordered a near doubling of Cloud’s annual disability benefits. The district court awarded top-level benefits under the Plan instead of remanding for another round at the administrative.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court wrote that it is compelled to hold that the district court erred in awarding top-level benefits to Cloud. Although the NFL Plan’s review board may well have denied Cloud a full and fair review, and although Cloud is probably entitled to the highest level of disability pay, he is not entitled to reclassification to that top tier because he cannot show changed circumstances between his 2014 claim for reclassification and his 2016 claim for reclassification—which was denied and which he did not appeal. View "Cloud v. NFL Player Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' request for preliminary injunctive relief from the COVID-19 vaccine policy of Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, holding that remand was required.At issue was Executive Order No. 595, which the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the order, the Authority issued its own vaccine policy requiring all Authority employees to be fully vaccinated. Appellants, Authority employees, submitted timely requests for religious exemptions from the policy, but the requests were denied. Appellants brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming Appellees denied their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and also pleading state-law claims. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court's "likelihood of success" ruling was erroneous. View "Brox v. Woods Hole" on Justia Law

Defendants Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, LLP and its subsidiary, The Bank of New York Mellon (collectively, “BNYM”), retained Plaintiff as an independent contractor to work on an investment valuation project. Plaintiff developed the so-called Pauwels Model. At various times between 2014 and the end of his working relationship with BNYM in 2018, Plaintiff shared spreadsheets derived from the Pauwels Model with various employees and executives at BNYM. In 2016, BNYM retained Defendants Deloitte LLP, Deloitte Tax LLP, and Deloitte USA LLP (collectively, “Deloitte”) to take over the work that Plaintiff had been performing for BNYM. Plaintiff alleged that Deloitte used the spreadsheets to reverse engineer the Pauwels Model and was using the model to conduct the services it provided to BNYM. Plaintiff brought suit against BNYM and Deloitte, alleging, among other claims, that the Pauwels Model embodied a trade secret that they misappropriated.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. The court affirmed the remainder of the judgment. The court explained that misappropriation is not an element of a claim for unjust enrichment under New York law. Therefore, a plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment does not necessarily rise or fall with a claim of trade secret misappropriation. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s theory of liability is distinct from those underpinning Plaintiff’s claim for trade secret misappropriation, his claim for unjust enrichment should not have been dismissed as duplicative of his claim for trade secret misappropriation. View "Pauwels v. Deloitte LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a hospital nurse for St. Vincent’s Health System. After St. Vincent’s fired her, Plaintiff sued, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent’s, and Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, Plaintiff claimed she presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as to all her claims. She also claimed that the district court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to a “mixed-motive” retaliation claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim failed because there was no evidence of severe or pervasive harassment; Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) did nothing to undermine the application of McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims because but for causation still applies; Plainitff's retaliation claim cannot survive; and disparate-treatment claim fails because there is no evidence that race played a role in her termination. View "Cynthia Diane Yelling v. St. Vincent's Health System" on Justia Law

NCR's customer engineers (CEs) service NCR devices in the field, working remotely. NCR instructed CEs to work only during their official shifts, prohibited off-the-clock work, and required CEs to record their time in an electronic system. If a CE worked overtime—contrary to NCR guidance—the CE would be paid for the time only if she recorded it. Meadows worked as a CE from 2008-2019; when he recorded unauthorized overtime, he was paid for that time. When he did not record that time, he was not compensated.Meadows sued NCR under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, seeking compensation for his unrecorded overtime work. The district court held that Meadows’s off-the-clock activities were not part of his core responsibilities but were incidental. Under the FLSA, employers are required to compensate an employee’s performance of all principal activities but not incidental activities unless an exception applies, including if the employer elected to do so by contract or custom. The court stated that NCR could not escape liability by imposing a recording requirement on its custom of paying for incidental activities because NCR had constructive knowledge of those activities.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The FLSA does not mandate overtime pay for the performance of incidental activities—which an employer has chosen to remunerate by custom or practice—if the employee failed to comply with requirements for payment imposed by that custom or practice. View "Meadows v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law