Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for a violation of specific safety requirements (VSSR) award, holding that there was no error.Appellant suffered a work-related hand injury while working for Employer and requested an award in addition to her workers' compensation benefits, alleging that her injury was a result of Employer's VSSR violation. The Commission found that Appellant did not commit a VSSR and denied the request for an additional award. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motion for an oral argument, holding that some evidence in the record supported the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Levitin v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from her tenured professorship at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims, holding that res judicata barred her Section 1983 claims and that she failed to state Title VII and EPA claims.   The Ffith Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff alleges that TSU investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Plaintiff discriminated, that defendant “threw her hair into Plaintiff’s face in the law school lobby,” and that defendant yelled at Plaintiff that she couldn’t park in a church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal disputes between the parties. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation was not even on school property. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant “has made comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their context. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege conduct by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge claim. Further, the court held that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim. View "Sacks v. Texas Southern University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought two actions against KeyPoint Government Solutions: a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA) on behalf of KeyPoint employees nationwide, and a state-law putative class action on behalf of California employees. They alleged KeyPoint violated the FLSA through policies requiring employees to work uncompensated overtime and also violated certain provisions of California’s wage-and-hour laws. On appeal, KeyPoint argued: (1) the district court erred in denying KeyPoint’s motion to compel arbitration of California state-law claims by some California Plaintiffs; and (2) the district court erred in certifying under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 of the California employee class. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the district court’s denial of KeyPoint’s motion to compel arbitration, vacated the court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, and remanded for further proceedings. "The district court did not distinguish Plaintiffs’ meal- and rest-break claims from Plaintiffs’ off-the-clock claims. It analyzed only KeyPoint’s allegedly unlawful policy and assumed that the policy could 'prohibit[] Plaintiffs from taking required meal and rest breaks.' This was insufficient. ... The court abused its discretion in failing to perform claim-specific analysis. We vacate the district court’s Rule 23 class certification so that the district court can properly consider predominance." View "Brayman, et al. v. Keypoint Government Solutions" on Justia Law

The People filed suit alleging Uber and Lyft violated the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 (UCL)) by misclassifying California rideshare and delivery drivers as independent contractors, depriving them of wages and benefits associated with employee status, thereby harming workers, competitors, and the public. The suit sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitution under the UCL and injunctive relief under Assembly Bill 5, Labor Code 2786. The court of appeal affirmed a preliminary injunction under Assembly Bill 5. Proposition 22 subsequently altered the standards for determining whether app-based drivers are independent contractors. The parties stipulated to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The Labor Commissioner filed separate actions against Uber and Lyft, pursuant to her Labor Code enforcement authority, alleging misclassification of drivers.The two direct enforcement actions were coordinated. Uber and Lyft moved to compel arbitration of those actions to the extent they seek “driver-specific” or “ ‘individualized’ ” relief, such as restitution under the UCL and unpaid wages under the Labor Code. The motions did not seek arbitration of the requests for civil penalties and injunctive relief; they relied on arbitration agreements the defendants entered into with drivers. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motions. The People and the Labor Commissioner are not parties to those arbitration agreements. View "In re Uber Technologies Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

A Mississippi circuit court granted law firm Campbell DeLong, LLP, a declaratory judgment against a former partner of the firm, Britt Virden, who had alleged breach of contract, among other claims. Virden appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court found that Virden’s prewithdrawal claims were not precluded by a signed agreement, which only came into operation in the event of death, termination, withdrawal, or retirement of a partner. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the appellate and circuit court judgments and remanded the case for the circuit court to allow Virden an opportunity to maintain an action against his former firm for breach of an implied contract regarding partner compensation. View "Virden v. Campbell Delong, LLP, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals officer limiting the reopening of Appellant's claim to the lumbar spine and affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that the appeals officer properly determined that the reopening of Appellant's claim was warranted only as to the lumbar spine.Although Appellant was previously treated for injuries to several parts of her body, including her head and back, she sought to reopen her claim due to the worsening condition of her lumbar spine. The appeals officer ordered that Appellant's claim be reopened for the lumbar spine only, and Appellant sought judicial review. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer properly limited the reopening of the claim to the lumbar spine. View "Olvera v. Wynn Las Vegas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Robyn Young's motion to dismiss this action brought by Granite School District regarding settlement proceeds Young had received for industrial injuries, holding that the Labor Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the factual questions at the heart of this reimbursement dispute.Young, a special education teacher, sought workers' compensation for injuries she received at the hands of her students. An administrative law judge awarded Young benefits, finding that Young was permanently and totally disabled and that Young did not have to reimburse Granite with funds she received from a legal settlement she had obtained against medical debt collectors for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Granite then initiated suit for reimbursement from Young under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. The district court granted Young's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it dismissed Granite's complaint because the Workers' Compensation Act assigned the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute. View "Granite School District v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board determining that Richard Lane's notice to his former employer, Tennco Energy, Inc., that he was asserting a subsequent claim against it was timely, holding that there was no error.In 2019, Lane filed a coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) claim against Tennco Energy, Inc. An administrative law judge dismissed the claim after determining that Lane had failed to give timely notice of the claim pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.316(2). The Board reversed, concluding that a prior CWP claim that Lane had previously settled against a former employer had no bearing on Lane's duty to notice Tennco when he asserted a subsequent claim against it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that remand was required for additional findings of fact under this opinion. View "Tennco Energy, Inc. v. Lane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the denial of Francisco Rodarte's motion to reopen and reversing the ruling that Rodarte's shoulder claim was barred due to failure to join, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Rodarte sustained two work-related injuries while working for BlueLinx Corporation - a knee and ankle injury in 2016 and a shoulder injury in 2018. In Rodarte and BlueLinx ultimately entered into a settlement agreement for Rodarte's knee and ankle injuries. BlueLinx denied Rodarte's shoulder claim, however, concluding it was barred pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270 due to Rodarte's failure to join it to the 2016 claim. Rodarte moved to reopen the 2016 claim, which the chief administrative law judge denied. Thereafter, an administrative law judge dismissed the shoulder claim. The Board affirmed the denial of the motion to reopen and reversed the dismissal of the shoulder claim. The court of appeals affirmed the Board's ruling on the motion to reopen but reversed its determination that Rodarte's shoulder claim was not barred for failure to join. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in its rulings. View "Rodarte v. Bluelinx Corp." on Justia Law

BD LaPlace, LLC, doing business as Bayou Steel (Bayou Steel), operated a steel mill in LaPlace, Louisiana. Without giving The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) notice, Bayou Steel terminated Plaintiffs’ employment and closed the LaPlace mill where they worked. Seeking to recover under the WARN Act, Plaintiffs initially filed a putative class action complaint against Bayou Steel in Delaware bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs dismissed that action and filed the instant class action in federal district court. Rather than suing their employer Bayou Steel, Plaintiffs sued Bayou Steel BD Holdings II, LLC and Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC(a private equity firm that advised the fund that owned BD Holdings II). Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, which the district court denied. Defendants sought summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging both the denial of their jury demand and the summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that there is no right to a jury trial under the WARN Act. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BD Holdings II. But the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BDCM because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether BDCM exercised de facto control over Bayou Steel’s decision to close its LaPlace steel mill and order Plaintiffs’ layoffs. The court explained that if BDCM “specifically directed” the closing of the mill without proper notice, the company may be liable for Bayou Steel’s WARN Act violation even absent the other factors. View "Fleming v. Bayou Steel" on Justia Law