Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A long-serving postal employee applied for two higher-level postmaster positions in New Hampshire. At the time of her applications, she was 58 years old and had significant experience. For the first position, she was interviewed by her supervisor but was not selected; instead, a 36-year-old man was chosen, with the supervisor citing his greater relevant experience. Several months later, she applied for a second position, was again interviewed by the same supervisor, and was again passed over in favor of a man, this time 53 years old. During the second interview, the supervisor remarked that the office had never had a female postmaster and questioned whether the applicant had the energy for the job. The applicant believed she was denied both promotions due to her age and sex, and she pursued administrative remedies before filing suit.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire granted summary judgment to the employer, the United States Postal Service, on all claims. The court found that the employer had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions and that no reasonable jury could find those reasons to be pretextual. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to both the age and sex discrimination claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the summary judgment decision de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the age discrimination claims, holding that the plaintiff had waived any argument for a more lenient causation standard and that, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, no reasonable jury could find pretext. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim related to the first promotion. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim regarding the second promotion, finding that the supervisor’s comments during the interview created a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext and discriminatory motive. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Warner v. Steiner" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term employee of a brewery, suffered two work-related back injuries, the second of which led to significant physical restrictions. The brewery accommodated him with light duty work for a period, but when such work was no longer available, he was placed on leave and later participated in a transitional work program. The plaintiff requested the creation of a new position to accommodate his restrictions, which the brewery declined. After his restrictions were lifted, he returned to his original position. During his employment, the plaintiff also applied unsuccessfully for other internal positions and was later suspended following allegations of inappropriate workplace conduct. He was offered a choice between a last chance agreement and a severance package, ultimately declining both and leaving the company.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust or timely exhaust administrative remedies for certain claims, and for others, lacked evidence to establish pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court’s findings regarding the adequacy of his EEOC charge and the sufficiency of his evidence for disability and age discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, as it was neither explicitly included in his EEOC charge nor reasonably related to the facts alleged, and was also untimely. The court further held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or pretext for his remaining ADA, state law disability, and age discrimination claims. The court also found that the plaintiff forfeited his Title VII and motion for reconsideration arguments by failing to adequately brief them. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed in full. View "Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc." on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Defense Logistics Agency in Hawaii, who had served in the National Guard and developed post-traumatic stress disorder, alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After a series of workplace incidents, the agency suspended him indefinitely, citing concerns about his access to sensitive information. The employee claimed that the agency failed to provide reasonable accommodations and improperly deemed him a direct threat.The employee filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, which eventually led to a final agency decision (FAD) against him. The agency transmitted the FAD and related documents electronically using a secure system, but made several errors in providing the necessary passphrase to decrypt the document. As a result, the employee’s attorney was unable to access the FAD for several weeks, despite repeated requests for assistance and clarification. The attorney finally received an accessible, decrypted copy of the FAD by email on December 5, 2022. The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 88 days later. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense, finding the complaint untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the initial electronic transmission, and denied equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the 90-day limitations period for filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act did not begin until the attorney received effective notice of the agency’s decision, which occurred when he received the decrypted FAD on December 5. Alternatively, the court held that equitable tolling was warranted because the attorney diligently sought access to the FAD and was prevented by extraordinary circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "ASUNCION V. HEGSETH" on Justia Law

Two individuals applied for jobs at a retail liquor store chain in Washington after a new state law required employers to include wage and benefit information in all job postings. Both applicants submitted their applications through a third-party website, Indeed.com, where the postings did not include the required pay information. One of the applicants also interviewed in person and discussed pay with the store manager but ultimately declined a job offer. Both individuals then filed a class action lawsuit, seeking statutory damages for the employer’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements.The case was initially brought in King County, Washington. The employer argued that the plaintiffs were not the type of “job applicants” the law was intended to protect, asserting that only those with a genuine or “bona fide” interest in the job should be eligible for remedies. The parties disagreed on the meaning of “job applicant” under the Washington Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (EPOA). The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, faced with this dispute, certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court, asking what a plaintiff must prove to be considered a “job applicant” under the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that, under RCW 49.58.110(4), a person qualifies as a “job applicant” if they apply to a specific job posting, regardless of their subjective intent or whether they are a “bona fide” or “good faith” applicant. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute does not require proof of genuine interest in the position, and that the legislature intentionally omitted such a requirement. The court’s answer clarified that subjective intent is irrelevant for eligibility to seek remedies under the EPOA. View "Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC" on Justia Law

A small business that imports and sells shea butter hired an individual in 2017 to provide communication, marketing, and sales support, particularly focusing on social media. The individual worked under a contract that labeled her as an independent contractor, but after the contract expired, she continued to perform a mix of social media, event, and administrative tasks. She stopped working regularly for the business in September 2018. A dispute arose over unpaid wages, with the individual claiming she was owed for work performed, and the business asserting that she was paid for all work under the terms of the contract.The Office of Wage-Hour (OWH) initially determined that the business owed the individual back wages, liquidated damages, and a statutory penalty. The business appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), arguing that the individual was an independent contractor. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the individual was an employee, not an independent contractor, and awarded damages. On the first petition for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the individual worked in both capacities—sometimes as an employee and sometimes as an independent contractor—and remanded for OAH to determine the hours worked in each capacity and adjust the damages accordingly. On remand, the ALJ used a percentage-based approach to allocate hours and payments between employee and independent contractor work, ultimately awarding the individual approximately $26,550 in unpaid wages and damages, plus a statutory penalty.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reviewing the case again, affirmed the OAH’s amended final order. The court held that under the current D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, employees may pursue claims for disputed wages even if the employer paid conceded wages. The court also held that, due to inadequate recordkeeping by the employer, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to disprove the employee’s evidence regarding hours worked and payments received. View "Shea Yeleen Health & Beauty, LLC v. Office of Wage-Hour" on Justia Law

A former sales representative for a pharmaceutical company alleged that the company engaged in an aggressive campaign to market one of its drugs, Vraylar, for uses not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), specifically for substance abuse and major depressive disorder (MDD). The representative, who was responsible for promoting the drug to medical providers, claimed that the company trained its sales force to encourage off-label prescriptions and incentivized providers to prescribe Vraylar for these unapproved uses. He further asserted that he faced adverse employment actions, such as loss of promotion and increased workload, after raising concerns internally about the legality and compliance of these marketing practices.After the representative filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the government declined to intervene. The plaintiff then amended his complaint, dropping his direct fraud claim and proceeding solely on a theory of retaliation under 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff’s internal complaints to the company focused on regulatory noncompliance rather than fraud against the government, and thus did not put the employer on notice of protected activity under the FCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, to state a claim for FCA retaliation, an employee must plausibly allege that the employer was on notice that the employee was attempting to prevent fraud against the government, not merely regulatory violations. Because the plaintiff’s communications only referenced regulatory and policy concerns, and did not suggest government fraud, the court found the notice requirement unmet. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Lewis v AbbVie Inc." on Justia Law

Reginald Brown, who was serving as interim police chief in Monroe, Louisiana, was dismissed from the Monroe Police Department following his handling of an excessive force complaint against officers. The incident involved a body camera recording showing an officer kicking a suspect, Timothy Williams, during an arrest. Brown was informed of the complaint and took immediate steps, including placing officers on administrative leave and notifying city officials. However, questions arose regarding the timing of Brown’s decision to request the Louisiana State Police to conduct the criminal investigation, particularly whether the delay was influenced by an upcoming mayoral election. Subsequent internal reviews included an interrogation and a polygraph examination, which Brown was found to have failed, leading to allegations of dishonesty and improper delay for personal benefit.Brown appealed his termination to the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, which, after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, found cause for discipline but determined that termination was excessive. The board reduced the penalty to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The City of Monroe appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court, which reinstated Brown’s termination, finding his conduct egregious and the board’s reduction arbitrary. Brown then appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, which reversed the district court and reinstated the board’s ninety-day suspension, holding that the district court lacked authority to modify the board’s disciplinary decision once it found the board acted in good faith for cause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. The court clarified that judicial review of the board’s disciplinary decisions is limited to determining whether the board acted in good faith for cause, and courts may not modify the board’s chosen discipline if that standard is met. The Supreme Court held that the board’s decision to reduce Brown’s discipline was reasonably supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "MONROE MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD VS. BROWN" on Justia Law

A professional musician employed by the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra was placed on furlough in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In December 2020, she developed severe symptoms, including dizziness and tinnitus, after contracting COVID-19, which rendered her unable to perform. She was rehired by the orchestra in September 2021 but soon went on sick leave because her symptoms persisted. In February 2022, she applied for long-term disability benefits under her employer’s group policy, stating that her last day of work was in March 2020 and that her disability began in December 2020.The insurance company denied her claim, reasoning that she was not an “active, full-time employee” at the time her disability began, as required by the policy. The claimant appealed internally, submitting new information that she had returned to work in September 2021 but was again unable to perform due to her illness. The insurer treated this as a fundamentally different claim, maintaining its denial and advising her to file a new application based on the later date.She then filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that she was not eligible for benefits based on her initial application and that her new information constituted a separate claim for a different loss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the claimant was not eligible for benefits for a disability beginning in December 2020, and that her subsequent information regarding a September 2021 onset constituted a new claim, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review. View "Moratz v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Eight firefighters employed by a regional fire and rescue agency in Washington State requested religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued in August 2021 by the state’s governor, which required healthcare providers to be vaccinated. The fire agency, which provides emergency medical and fire services to a large population, including a state prison, allowed employees to seek religious accommodations. After reviewing the requests and consulting with union representatives, the agency determined it could not accommodate unvaccinated firefighters in their roles without imposing an undue hardship on its operations, citing health and safety concerns, operational burdens, and potential financial risks. The firefighters were offered the option to use accrued leave or take a leave of absence, with the possibility of returning if the mandate changed.The firefighters sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Washington Law Against Discrimination for failure to accommodate their religious beliefs. The district court assumed the firefighters had bona fide religious objections but found that accommodating their requests would impose an undue hardship on the agency, given the increased risk of COVID-19 transmission, the large number of exemption requests, and the inadequacy of proposed alternatives such as masking and testing. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the fire agency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the standard clarified in Groff v. DeJoy, an employer demonstrates undue hardship when the burden of accommodation is substantial in the context of its business. The court found that the fire agency had shown substantial health, operational, and financial costs associated with accommodating the exemption requests, and that the proposed alternatives were insufficient. The summary judgment for the agency was affirmed. View "PETERSEN V. SNOHOMISH REGIONAL FIRE AND RESCUE" on Justia Law

A special education teacher with a long and distinguished career in an Illinois public school district was involuntarily transferred from one elementary school to another at age 52. After the transfer, she alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment at her new school. She claimed that she was assigned a disproportionate number of challenging students, unfairly criticized, denied adequate classroom support, and intimidated by an administrator. She believed these actions were motivated by her age, although she acknowledged that no one made any explicit age-related remarks.After she filed a complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The district court found that she had not produced evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the alleged harassment was either objectively hostile or based on her age.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court assumed, without definitively deciding, that hostile work environment claims are cognizable under the ADEA. However, it held that the teacher failed to present sufficient evidence that any of the conduct she experienced was motivated by age-based animus. The court found her assertions to be speculative and unsupported by direct or circumstantial evidence. As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that there was no reasonable basis to infer age-based workplace harassment under the ADEA. View "Blumenshine v. Bloomington School District No. 87" on Justia Law