Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Randy Quint, John Linn, and Mark Molina (“Colorado Plaintiffs”) filed a class and collective action against Vail Resorts, Inc. alleging violations of federal and state labor laws (“Colorado Action”). Different plaintiffs filed similar lawsuits against a Vail subsidiary, which were pending in federal and state courts in California. After Vail gave notice that it had agreed to a nationwide settlement with some of the other plaintiffs, Colorado Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion asking the district court to enjoin Vail from consummating the settlement. The district court denied their motion, and Colorado Plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing the district court erred by: (1) applying the wrong standard in reviewing the report and recommendation ("R&R"); (2) holding the Anti-Injunction Act applied to an injunction against Vail rather than the state court; (3) declining to consider one exception to the Anti-Injunction Act; (4) holding a second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply; (5) failing to enforce the first-to-file rule; and (6) abstaining under the Colorado River doctrine. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Quint, et al. v. Vail Resorts" on Justia Law

This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law

The case at hand is about whether Plaintiff was retaliated against by her former employer, Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants, Inc. (“APC”), and the company that contracted with her employer, Centurion of Florida, LLC (“Centurion”) (together, “Defendants”), for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged four counts. Centurion and APC both moved for summary judgment on all counts. The district court granted summary judgment on three of them. The district court directed the clerk to enter a final judgment on the three resolved counts, and it certified that the fourth count satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) for immediate interlocutory review, should either party file an appropriate application with the Eleventh Circuit. At issue is whether the district court’s certification was proper as to Plaintiff’s direct appeal and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) have been met as to Centurion’s cross-appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the answer to both questions is not and dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that there are substantial reasons to delay resolving Plaintiff’s appeal of her whistleblower counts against APC. Plaintiff’s whistleblower counts against Centurion and APC are identical. It makes good sense that appeals of an order dismissing those counts should be heard together. But because there is no final judgment against Centurion, the court wrote that it lacks the power to adjudicate those counts against Centurion at this time. View "Ronda Scott v. Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants Inc, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Plaintiff's application to vacate an arbitration award rendered in favor of Defendant and granting Defendant's motion to confirm the award, holding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy any of the legal standards required for reversal of the trial court's judgment.Defendant filed an arbitration complaint asserting claims of breach of contact, breach of fiduciary duty, and common-law fraud. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an application to vacate the award. The trial court denied the application to vacate and granted Defendant's motion to confirm the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arbitrator gave Plaintiff the full and fair hearing to which he was entitled under governing law, public policy, and the parties' arbitration agreement; and (2) the arbitrator properly applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to prevent Plaintiff from asserting counterclaims or defenses, contesting the allegations, and viewing the evidence against him. View "Ahmed v. Oak Management Corp." on Justia Law

The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation to Granite Construction Company/Granite Industrial, Inc. (Granite Construction) for allegedly violating three regulations relevant here. One was that the company required its employees to wear masks without first providing a medical evaluation to determine their fitness to wear them. And the Division alleged the company violated two other regulations because it exposed its employees to dust containing a harmful fungus— namely, Coccidioides, the fungus that causes Valley fever—and failed to implement adequate measures to limit this exposure. After Granite Construction disputed these allegations, an administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the Division’s claims. The ALJ reasoned that no credible evidence showed that Granite Construction required its employees to wear masks and no reliable evidence showed that Coccidioides was present at the worksite. But after the Division petitioned for reconsideration, the Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Board) reversed on these issues and ruled for the Division. The trial court later denied Granite Construction’s petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking to set aside the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeal reversed: the Court agreed insufficient evidence showed its employees were exposed to Coccidioides. But the Court rejected its additional claim that it allowed (rather than required) its employees to wear masks, finding sufficient evidence supported the Board’s contrary ruling on this point. View "Granite Construction Co. v. CalOSHA" on Justia Law

Catholic Health System of Long Island (“CHS”) brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of its motion to dismiss a qui tam action brought by a former employee (“Relator”) on behalf of the United States and the State of New York under the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), and the New York False Claims Act (“NYFCA”). According to Relator, CHS and certain of its affiliates falsely certified their compliance with federal law, in violation of the FCA and NYFCA, when they submitted Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims without disclosing their ongoing violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b(a)(4) (the “Benefits Conversion Statute”). After the Department of Justice and the New York Attorney General declined to intervene in the suit, the district court denied CHS’s motion to dismiss these claims but granted its motion to certify an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) on the grounds that the case presented an issue of first impression.   The Second Circuit reversed. The court held that the Benefits Conversion Statute is not violated where, as here, the recipient of a reimbursement payment is under no obligation to utilize the funds in any particular way, Relator has failed to plead an FCA or NYFCA claim. The court explained that because the Medicare and Medicaid payments at issue here were reimbursements for services already provided, with no forward-looking conditions that they be used in any particular way, Defendants’ alleged conduct did not violate the Benefits Conversion Statute. Relator’s claims based on section 1320a-7b(a)(4) therefore fail as a matter of law. View "U.S. ex rel. Quartararo v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc." on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs, former employees of a high-end fashion retailer in New York, allege that their regularly scheduled workweek included more than forty hours per week of work. Plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to an overtime premium under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law, and that their employer misclassified them as managerial employees and failed to pay them an overtime premium. The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims for failure to allege the specific number of hours they worked. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.   The Second Circuit vacated. The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately states a claim under the FLSA because it alleges that their regularly scheduled workweek exceeded forty hours of work and that the Plaintiffs were denied overtime as a result of being misclassified as managers. The court explained that various Plaintiffs have necessarily plausibly pleaded similar, if not identical, allegations about their regular schedule. In context, the individualized facts giving rise to each Plaintiff’s action – namely, when each Plaintiff worked the regular schedule at issue – are adequately and specifically alleged. View "Abbott v. Comme Des Garcons, Ltd." on Justia Law

At the request of Plaintiffs/cross-defendants, the trial court issued a prejudgment right to attach orders (RTAO) in the aggregate amount of $7,192,607.16 against their former employer, NMSI, Inc. Appealing the orders as authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(5),1 NMSI contends Plaintiffs failed to establish the probable validity of their claims because, contrary to the allegations in their first amended complaint, the agreements underlying their breach of contract causes of action had been modified through an exchange of emails, as well as by the parties’ subsequent conduct. NMSI also contends the amounts to be attached were not readily ascertainable, and the court erred in considering documents incorporated by reference into the applications for a writ of attachment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of the probable validity of Plaintiffs’ contract claims. The court explained that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the November 3, 2020 email does not show that “both Plaintiffs personally supervised the calculations of the Brea branch profit and loss figures . . . which reflected the modified profit-sharing model, which they then sent to and confirmed with NMSI’s accounting team,” and its further finding that the email did not confirm the modified revenue sharing agreement because it “failed to include the attachment with the cover email,” so “it cannot be determined from the November 2020 email what Plaintiffs were confirming.” The court held that the trial court did not err in determining the claims were for a fixed or readily ascertainable amount. View "Park v. NMSI, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintifff Pattyann Larsen filed employment discrimination and other claims against her former employer shortly after her debts had been discharged by the federal bankruptcy court, but she had failed to list those claims as assets in her bankruptcy case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the bankruptcy trustee—not plaintiff— was the real party in interest. The court then denied plaintiff’s motion to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff and dismissed the case based on its conclusion that plaintiff’s attempt to pursue this action in her own name was not an “honest and understandable mistake.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying substitution. THe Oregon Supreme Court reversed: under ORCP 26 A, a motion to substitute the real party in interest as the plaintiff, if granted, would require plaintiff to amend the complaint under ORCP 23 A. “We have interpreted the standard specified in that rule—leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’—to mean that leave to amend should be granted absent any unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party. The text, context, and legislative history of ORCP 26 A confirm that the standards governing leave to amend the pleadings under ORCP 23 A also apply in deciding whether to allow substitution of the real party in interest under ORCP 26 A.” Defendant did not contend that it would be unfairly prejudiced if the bankruptcy trustee were to be substituted as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court concluded that, because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, it abused its discretion in denying substitution and dismissing this case. View "Larsen v. Selmet, Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2018, Bianca Bouie was returning from her lunch break to her workplace, Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC, also known as University Childcare Center (“University Childcare”), when she looked away from the road to scroll through the contacts in her cell phone so that she could call her manager to report that she was running late. While Bouie was distracted, her car crossed the median and caused an accident with a truck that was driven by Andrea Cotton. Cotton filed a personal injury lawsuit against Bouie and later added University Childcare as a defendant, alleging, among other things, that Bouie was acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident and that University Childcare was therefore liable under the legal theory of respondeat superior. University Childcare moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, concluding, in pertinent part, that Bouie was not acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred. Cotton appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding that under the “special circumstances exception” to the general rule that employees do not act in furtherance of an employer’s business and within the scope of employment when they are commuting to and from work or when they are on a lunch break, and under two of its cases applying that “exception,” there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to the issue of liability under respondeat superior. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ “special circumstances exception,” as well as the multi-factor test the court developed for applying that “exception.” The Supreme Court also concluded that the two cases on which the Court of Appeals relied in applying the “special circumstances exception” used imprecise language regarding the respondeat-superior test, and the Supreme Court disapproved such language. In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case to that court so that it could apply the proper respondeat-superior test in the first instance. View "Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC v. Cotton" on Justia Law