Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the final award of the labor and industrial relations commission affirming and adopting an administrative law judge's award of permanent total disability benefits to Jannie Harper under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, holding that the commission's decision was supported by competent and substantial evidence.Harper filed a claim for workers compensation against Springfield Rehab and Health Center and Premier Group Insurance Company Corvel Enterprise Company (collectively, Springfield Rehab). The commission awarded Harper permanent and total disability benefits, finding that Harper suffered a compensable injury arising from a workplace accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the commission's final award of permanent total disability compensation and future medical care. View "Harper v. Springfield Rehab & Health Care Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that Maryann Gray's applications for review were timely filed pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.480 and overruling Hawthorn Children's Psychiatric Hospital's motion to strike, holding that the Commission did not err in finding that Gray's applications were timely filed.Gray, a registered nurse at Hawthorn, filed applications for review of the denial of her claims for injuries sustained during her employment. After a hearing, the Commission found Gray timely filed her applications and affirmed the denial of benefits as to a 2012 injury but ordered Hawthorn to pay Gray partial permanent disability benefits for 2013 and 2014 injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in finding that Gray's applications were timely filed under section 287.480. View "Gray v. Hawthorn Children's Psychiatric Hospital" on Justia Law

Above All Termite & Pest Control ("Above All") employed Henry Keim as a salaried pest-control technician and provided him with an employer authorized vehicle for work use. Above All’s policy limited the quantity of supplies technicians could keep in their authorized vehicles overnight. When technicians needed to replenish supplies, Above All authorized them to drive their vehicles to Above All’s shop instead of driving directly to a worksite, to retrieve whatever they required, and then to go from the shop to the scheduled sites. On the morning of the accident, Keim clocked in, received his schedule, and concluded that his vehicle lacked sufficient supplies. On his way to the shop for supplies, Keim sustained injuries in a car accident. The Judge of Compensation dismissed Keim’s claim petition with prejudice, concluding that Keim was merely commuting to work when he sustained injuries. The Appellate Division applied the “authorized vehicle rule” and reversed the dismissal order. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court, finding Keim was “in the course of employment” under the “authorized vehicle rule” at the time of the accident because Above All authorized a vehicle for him to operate and his operation of that identified vehicle was for business expressly authorized by Above All. View "Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) operates schools for military families. Smithson has worked as a DODEA science teacher since 2004. Smithson’s medical conditions include migraines, intracranial hypertension, affective disorder, vertigo, and ADHD. These conditions, with the required medications, have caused her problems with balance, walking, driving, breathing, vision, speech, and memory. In 2010, Smithson first obtained accommodations–an occasional flexible start time and permission to be seated during part of the teaching day. In 2014-2016, Smithson's requests for additional accommodations were largely granted. Principal Villareal's response to Smithson’s request for a flexible duty reporting time of up to two hours was, “The employee is approved to use sick leave for any absence from school up to two hours, barring any undue hardship to the school schedule.” Later, Smithson indicated that she would be late every day but would arrive before her first instructional section. Smithson then used sick leave as needed. During the pandemic, Smithson began to work from home, full-time, in DODEA’s Virtual School.Smithson sued under the Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate when she was required to use a half-day of sick leave whenever she arrived late. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of DODEA. In-person attendance was an essential function of Smithson’s position and her need to miss up to two hours each morning demonstrated that she could not perform this essential function. A frequent two-hour delay at the beginning of the school day is not the same as an infrequent 15-minute delay, as permitted under her original accommodation. View "Smithson v. Austin" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division reversing the decision of Supreme Court granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and enjoining enforcement of New York City Administrative Code 10-181, which makes criminal the use of certain restraints by police officers during an arrest, holding that Administrative Code 10-181 does not violate the New York Constitution on either preemption or due process grounds.After Administrative Code 10-181 became law Plaintiffs - law enforcement unions - commenced this action seeking a declaration that the local law was unconstitutional because it was field and conflict preempted by a combination of state laws and that it was void for vagueness and seeking to enjoin the law's enforcement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of section 10-181. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 10-181 was a valid exercise of the City's municipal law-making authority because the legislature has not preempted the field; and (2) Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their vagueness challenge. View "Police Benevolent Ass'n of City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court granting in part Petitioners' combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to challenge Local Law No. 2 and its transfer of police disciplinary authority to the Police Accountability Board (PAB), holding that the appellate division did not err.In 2019, the City of Rochester approved Local Law No. 2 creating the PAB, a body of nine residents of the City granted the exclusive authority to "investigate and make determinations respecting" any police officer accused of misconduct, including the power to impose disciplinary sanctions such as dismissal if the officer is found guilty. Because these disciplinary procedures deviated from the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then in effect, Petitioner commenced this action challenging Local Law No. 2's transfer of police disciplinary authority to the PAB. The Court of Appeals held that the portion of the local law addressing police discipline exceeded the City's authority under the Municipal Home Rule Law and was invalid. View "Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Boucher appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Moultonborough's (Town) motion to dismiss. He contended that: (1) the court erred in finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under RSA 41:48 (Supp. 2022); and (2) he has stated a claim for which relief may be granted. Plaintiff served as a police officer for the Town for nineteen years, mostly in a full-time capacity. At the time he filed his complaint, he most recently held the rank of sergeant. Up until the final four months of his employment, no formal disciplinary actions had been taken against him while employed by the Town’s police department. Due to his past involvement in assisting local officers to form a union, and his previous support of a candidate for police chief that the Board of Selectmen (Board) opposed, plaintiff believed the Board did not support him. In early 2020, the police chief retired and was replaced by an interim police manager “who was under the direct control of the [Board].” Shortly thereafter, plaintiff became “the subject of serial internal investigations orchestrated by” the interim manager and the lower-ranking officer “for simply attempting to conduct the ordinary business of a police Sergeant.” In total, plaintiff was subjected to four investigations over six weeks. According to plaintiff, the interim manager’s conduct “was very clearly aimed at undermining and isolating him.” In May 2021, plaintiff filed suit alleging one count of “Constructive Termination in Violation of RSA 41:48.” The court reasoned that if plaintiff “considers himself a terminated officer in violation of RSA 41:48, even if only constructively, it logically follows that he is required to follow the procedures contained within RSA 41:48.” The Town represented at oral argument that there were several processes plaintiff could have followed to attempt exhaustion, including requesting a hearing before the Board, articulating the issue to the Board, or “engaging” with the Board informally. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found none of these processes were set forth in the plain language of RSA 41:48. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court erred in its dismissal of plaintiff's case, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boucher v. Town of Moultonborough" on Justia Law

Tesla requires its employees to wear uniforms to minimize damage to vehicles throughout the production process. When employees wore union t-shirts instead, Tesla informed them they were violating the uniform policy and threatened to send them home. The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL CIO (“Union” or “UAW”), filed an unfair labor practice charge, and a divided National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”) ruled that Tesla was infringing on its employees’ rights to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”). Tesla petitioned for review, claiming that the Board’s decision irrationally made all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The NLRB cross-applied for enforcement.   The Fifth Circuit granted Tesla’s petition for review, denied the NLRB’s application for enforcement, and vacated the Board’s decision. The court agreed with Tesla that the NLRA does not give the NLRB the authority to make all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The court explained that the Team Wear policy—or any hypothetical company’s uniform policy—advances a legitimate interest of the employer and neither discriminates against union communication nor affects nonworking time. And a prohibition is a greater infringement than is a restriction. Therefore, by treating any restriction as per se equivalent to a prohibition, the NLRB has failed to balance—or even strike a reasonable accommodation of—the employer’s and employees’ rights. View "Tesla v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in this lawsuit alleging disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and other claims, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Plaintiff filed this action claiming disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act (RA), hostile work environment under the RA and Americans with Disabilities Act, retaliation in violation of Title VII, and failure to accommodate under the RA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the VA on all counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that 5 U.S.C. 8461(d) did not bar its review of Plaintiff's claims at summary judgment; (2) did not err in rejecting Plaintiff's preclusion claim; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Dixon-Tribou v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Fitschen was diagnosed with advanced cancer and stopped working. In 2000 the Social Security Administration (SSA) found Fitschen eligible for disability benefits. Fitschen returned to work in 2001 but continued to receive benefits for a nine-month “trial work period,” 42 U.S.C. 422(c)(4). After that period, he could continue to work and receive benefits for another 36-month period if his wages did not exceed the level at which a person is deemed to be capable of engaging in substantial work activity. The SSA's 2003 review determined that Fitschen had engaged in substantial work and should not have received benefits for much of 2002-2003. The SSA notified him of his overpayment liability but his benefits continued because he had again ceased substantial work. Fitschen again returned to work in 2004 but did not report the change. The SSA initiated another review in 2007 and suspended his benefits. The SSA may waive recovery of overpayments if the recipient was without fault.In 2019 the Commissioner of Social Security found Fitschen liable for an overpayment of $50,289.70 and declined to waive recovery. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the SSA was procedurally barred from recovering the overpayment because it failed to comply with its “reopening” regulation; the overpayment assessment did not “reopen” Fitschen’s initial eligibility determination or any later determination concerning the continuation or recomputation of his benefits. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Fitschen was at fault. View "Fitschen v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law