Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) operates schools for military families. Smithson has worked as a DODEA science teacher since 2004. Smithson’s medical conditions include migraines, intracranial hypertension, affective disorder, vertigo, and ADHD. These conditions, with the required medications, have caused her problems with balance, walking, driving, breathing, vision, speech, and memory. In 2010, Smithson first obtained accommodations–an occasional flexible start time and permission to be seated during part of the teaching day. In 2014-2016, Smithson's requests for additional accommodations were largely granted. Principal Villareal's response to Smithson’s request for a flexible duty reporting time of up to two hours was, “The employee is approved to use sick leave for any absence from school up to two hours, barring any undue hardship to the school schedule.” Later, Smithson indicated that she would be late every day but would arrive before her first instructional section. Smithson then used sick leave as needed. During the pandemic, Smithson began to work from home, full-time, in DODEA’s Virtual School.Smithson sued under the Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate when she was required to use a half-day of sick leave whenever she arrived late. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of DODEA. In-person attendance was an essential function of Smithson’s position and her need to miss up to two hours each morning demonstrated that she could not perform this essential function. A frequent two-hour delay at the beginning of the school day is not the same as an infrequent 15-minute delay, as permitted under her original accommodation. View "Smithson v. Austin" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division reversing the decision of Supreme Court granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and enjoining enforcement of New York City Administrative Code 10-181, which makes criminal the use of certain restraints by police officers during an arrest, holding that Administrative Code 10-181 does not violate the New York Constitution on either preemption or due process grounds.After Administrative Code 10-181 became law Plaintiffs - law enforcement unions - commenced this action seeking a declaration that the local law was unconstitutional because it was field and conflict preempted by a combination of state laws and that it was void for vagueness and seeking to enjoin the law's enforcement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of section 10-181. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 10-181 was a valid exercise of the City's municipal law-making authority because the legislature has not preempted the field; and (2) Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their vagueness challenge. View "Police Benevolent Ass'n of City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court granting in part Petitioners' combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to challenge Local Law No. 2 and its transfer of police disciplinary authority to the Police Accountability Board (PAB), holding that the appellate division did not err.In 2019, the City of Rochester approved Local Law No. 2 creating the PAB, a body of nine residents of the City granted the exclusive authority to "investigate and make determinations respecting" any police officer accused of misconduct, including the power to impose disciplinary sanctions such as dismissal if the officer is found guilty. Because these disciplinary procedures deviated from the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then in effect, Petitioner commenced this action challenging Local Law No. 2's transfer of police disciplinary authority to the PAB. The Court of Appeals held that the portion of the local law addressing police discipline exceeded the City's authority under the Municipal Home Rule Law and was invalid. View "Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Boucher appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Moultonborough's (Town) motion to dismiss. He contended that: (1) the court erred in finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under RSA 41:48 (Supp. 2022); and (2) he has stated a claim for which relief may be granted. Plaintiff served as a police officer for the Town for nineteen years, mostly in a full-time capacity. At the time he filed his complaint, he most recently held the rank of sergeant. Up until the final four months of his employment, no formal disciplinary actions had been taken against him while employed by the Town’s police department. Due to his past involvement in assisting local officers to form a union, and his previous support of a candidate for police chief that the Board of Selectmen (Board) opposed, plaintiff believed the Board did not support him. In early 2020, the police chief retired and was replaced by an interim police manager “who was under the direct control of the [Board].” Shortly thereafter, plaintiff became “the subject of serial internal investigations orchestrated by” the interim manager and the lower-ranking officer “for simply attempting to conduct the ordinary business of a police Sergeant.” In total, plaintiff was subjected to four investigations over six weeks. According to plaintiff, the interim manager’s conduct “was very clearly aimed at undermining and isolating him.” In May 2021, plaintiff filed suit alleging one count of “Constructive Termination in Violation of RSA 41:48.” The court reasoned that if plaintiff “considers himself a terminated officer in violation of RSA 41:48, even if only constructively, it logically follows that he is required to follow the procedures contained within RSA 41:48.” The Town represented at oral argument that there were several processes plaintiff could have followed to attempt exhaustion, including requesting a hearing before the Board, articulating the issue to the Board, or “engaging” with the Board informally. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found none of these processes were set forth in the plain language of RSA 41:48. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court erred in its dismissal of plaintiff's case, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boucher v. Town of Moultonborough" on Justia Law

Tesla requires its employees to wear uniforms to minimize damage to vehicles throughout the production process. When employees wore union t-shirts instead, Tesla informed them they were violating the uniform policy and threatened to send them home. The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL CIO (“Union” or “UAW”), filed an unfair labor practice charge, and a divided National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”) ruled that Tesla was infringing on its employees’ rights to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”). Tesla petitioned for review, claiming that the Board’s decision irrationally made all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The NLRB cross-applied for enforcement.   The Fifth Circuit granted Tesla’s petition for review, denied the NLRB’s application for enforcement, and vacated the Board’s decision. The court agreed with Tesla that the NLRA does not give the NLRB the authority to make all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The court explained that the Team Wear policy—or any hypothetical company’s uniform policy—advances a legitimate interest of the employer and neither discriminates against union communication nor affects nonworking time. And a prohibition is a greater infringement than is a restriction. Therefore, by treating any restriction as per se equivalent to a prohibition, the NLRB has failed to balance—or even strike a reasonable accommodation of—the employer’s and employees’ rights. View "Tesla v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in this lawsuit alleging disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and other claims, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Plaintiff filed this action claiming disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act (RA), hostile work environment under the RA and Americans with Disabilities Act, retaliation in violation of Title VII, and failure to accommodate under the RA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the VA on all counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that 5 U.S.C. 8461(d) did not bar its review of Plaintiff's claims at summary judgment; (2) did not err in rejecting Plaintiff's preclusion claim; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Dixon-Tribou v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Fitschen was diagnosed with advanced cancer and stopped working. In 2000 the Social Security Administration (SSA) found Fitschen eligible for disability benefits. Fitschen returned to work in 2001 but continued to receive benefits for a nine-month “trial work period,” 42 U.S.C. 422(c)(4). After that period, he could continue to work and receive benefits for another 36-month period if his wages did not exceed the level at which a person is deemed to be capable of engaging in substantial work activity. The SSA's 2003 review determined that Fitschen had engaged in substantial work and should not have received benefits for much of 2002-2003. The SSA notified him of his overpayment liability but his benefits continued because he had again ceased substantial work. Fitschen again returned to work in 2004 but did not report the change. The SSA initiated another review in 2007 and suspended his benefits. The SSA may waive recovery of overpayments if the recipient was without fault.In 2019 the Commissioner of Social Security found Fitschen liable for an overpayment of $50,289.70 and declined to waive recovery. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the SSA was procedurally barred from recovering the overpayment because it failed to comply with its “reopening” regulation; the overpayment assessment did not “reopen” Fitschen’s initial eligibility determination or any later determination concerning the continuation or recomputation of his benefits. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Fitschen was at fault. View "Fitschen v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

California State University’s (CSU) hired Plaintiff as the director of university communications of California State University at Northridge’s Marketing and Communications Department (the Department). The VP testified that after speaking with employees while investigating complaints against Plaintiff, he determined that Plaintiff could not be an effective department leader because he disregarded CSU’s direction regarding professionalism; staff could not work with him; and subordinates were intimidated and threatened by him. Plaintiff filed a complaint against CSU alleging gender, race, color, and sexual orientation discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); race, gender, and sexual orientation harassment; and failure to prevent harassment and discrimination. CSU filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. The trial court entered the order granting summary judgment to Defendants and Plaintiff appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. The court explained that CSU established a legitimate reason for the termination. Moreover, the court held that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that creates a dispute of material fact as to pretext. Similarily, the court explained that Plaintiff has not established a dispute of fact regarding whether CSU’s internal investigation was pretextual. The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to produce substantial evidence of any bias in the E&D investigation, and his statistical evidence is not probative of discriminatory motive. Further, Plaintiff’s evidence of CSU’s commitment to diversity does not create a triable issue of discriminatory motive. View "Martin v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff class participates in “403(b)” retirement plans administered by Cornell University (“Cornell”). Plaintiffs brought this suit against Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries alleging a number of breaches of their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Plaintiffs appealed from entry of judgment in Defendants’ favor on all but one claim, which was settled by the parties. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged: (1) the dismissal of their claim that Cornell entered into a “prohibited transaction” by paying the plans’ recordkeepers unreasonable compensation, (2) the “parsing” of a single count alleging a breach of fiduciary duty into separate sub-claims at the motion to dismiss stage, (3) the award of summary judgment against Plaintiffs for failure to show loss on their claim that Defendants breached their duty of prudence by failing to monitor and control recordkeeping costs, and (4) the award of summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims that Cornell breached its duty of prudence by failing to remove underperforming investment options and by offering higher-cost retail share classes of mutual funds, rather than lower-cost institutional shares.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ prohibited transactions claim and certain duty-of-prudence allegations for failure to state a claim and did not err in granting partial summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining duty-of-prudence claims. In so doing, the court held as a matter of first impression that to state a claim for a prohibited transaction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)(1)(C), it is not enough to allege that a fiduciary caused the plan to compensate a service provider for its services. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

The LSBA is a mandatory bar association. Attorneys are required to join and pay fees to the organization as a condition of practicing law in the state. Plaintiff has been a member in good standing of the LSBA since 1996. Upset that he was forced to associate with and contribute to certain causes, Plaintiff sued the LSBA, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and its justices (collectively, “the LSBA”) in 2019. He claimed that compulsory membership in the LSBA violated his rights to free speech and association. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the proper remedy. The court explained that although it takes no position on the proper injunctive or declaratory relief. The court also rendered a preliminary injunction preventing the LSBA from requiring Plaintiff to join or pay dues to the LSBA pending completion of the remedies phase. The court wrote that because the LSBA engages in non-germane speech, its mandatory membership policy violates Plaintiff’s rights to free speech and free association. Additionally, Plaintiff is entitled to a limited preliminary injunction for the same reasons as the plaintiffs in McDonald. View "Boudreaux v. LA State Bar Assoc" on Justia Law