Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

An airport restaurant and bar manager sustained bilateral knee injuries in 2007 while lifting a beer keg at work. Her right knee required surgery, and she experienced ongoing pain, swelling, and functional limitations in both knees, which affected her ability to return to her previous job and participate in daily activities and hobbies. After vocational rehabilitation, she found sedentary work as a medical coder and biller. Multiple medical evaluations rated her right knee at 5% impairment and her left knee at 0% impairment, based on the AMA Guides.The Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Disability Compensation Division awarded her 7% permanent partial disability (PPD) for the right knee and 0% for the left knee. She appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB), seeking higher PPD percentages. LIRAB increased the awards to 8% for the right knee and 3% for the left knee, but its chair dissented, advocating for 20% and 5% respectively. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed LIRAB’s majority decision, finding that LIRAB had sufficiently explained its reasoning and properly considered her inability to return to her prior job.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and found that LIRAB’s findings and conclusions were insufficiently clear to allow meaningful appellate review. The court held that LIRAB’s decision was clearly erroneous and adopted the reasoning of the LIRAB chair’s dissent, awarding 20% PPD for the right knee and 5% for the left knee. The court also held that LIRAB improperly considered vocational rehabilitation and temporary total disability benefits in determining the PPD award. The ICA’s judgment and LIRAB’s decision were vacated in part, and the case was remanded to LIRAB to determine the compensation amount consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Noborikawa v. Host International" on Justia Law

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

A tenured English professor at a public university in Ohio, who identifies as transgender, became involved in discussions about leading the university’s Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality during a period of departmental restructuring. Although the professor expressed interest in directing the Center and was considered a strong candidate, the position was not open as the Center had gone dormant. The professor was offered a partial teaching load reallocation to help develop a new gender-studies major, but after a series of profanity-laden and disparaging social media posts targeting colleagues and administrators, the offer was rescinded. The professor also sought a tenure transfer to the main campus, which was denied by faculty committees after considering collegiality and departmental needs, with no discussion of gender identity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the university and individual defendants on all claims. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and concluded that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, including the professor’s unprofessional conduct and the department’s academic requirements. The professor appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings on claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and perceived-disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation, that the professor’s social media posts did not constitute protected speech on matters of public concern under the First Amendment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a perceived-disability claim. The court clarified that adverse employment actions under Title VII need only cause some harm, but found the university’s reasons for its decisions were not pretextual. View "GPat Patterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Christina Henry, a Licensed Practical Nurse at Southern Ohio Medical Center (SOMC), refused to comply with SOMC’s COVID-19 policy requiring either vaccination or weekly nasopharyngeal testing, citing religious objections. SOMC granted her a religious exemption from vaccination but denied her request for an exemption from all forms of COVID testing. Henry maintained that her religious beliefs prohibited her from undergoing any COVID test, including non-invasive methods, and proposed self-screening as an alternative. After continued refusal to test or vaccinate, SOMC placed her on unpaid leave. Henry did not request alternative testing methods during her leave and later declined to return to SOMC after the testing requirement was lifted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of SOMC. The court found that Henry’s communications to SOMC indicated she sought exemption from all COVID testing, not just nasopharyngeal testing. It held that accommodating her request would impose an undue hardship on SOMC by endangering vulnerable patient populations. The court also determined that even if Henry had requested saliva testing, this would still constitute an undue hardship due to delays in obtaining test results and reduced effectiveness. Additionally, the court found that Henry failed to show SOMC’s stated reasons for placing her on unpaid leave were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that Henry did not provide sufficient notice to SOMC of a limited objection to only certain types of testing and that either exempting her from all testing or providing saliva testing would impose an undue hardship on SOMC. The court also held that Henry failed to establish pretext in her retaliation claim. View "Henry v. Southern Ohio Medical Center" on Justia Law

Samantha Graf worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant Technician at Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association (MHHA). She alleged that during a lunch break on hospital grounds, a security guard employed by a third-party firm raped her. Graf reported the incident to hospital human resources, but after a limited investigation, HR concluded the sexual encounter was consensual. MHHA terminated Graf for violating hospital policy by having intercourse while on the clock and in an unauthorized area. Graf continued to communicate with the security guard after the incident, and both parties disputed the nature of their relationship and the encounter.Graf filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, asserting claims under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), as well as state tort claims. The district court dismissed several claims and one defendant, Shield and Buckler Security, Inc., on statute of limitations grounds. After summary judgment, only Graf’s retaliation claims under Title VII and THRA, and her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, proceeded to trial. Before trial, the district court ruled on the admissibility of evidence regarding Graf’s sexual history, allowing some communications with the security guard but excluding other evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The jury found in favor of MHHA on all counts, and judgment was entered against Graf.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Graf argued that the district court erred in requiring her to prove she did not consent to the alleged rape for her Title VII retaliation claim, and in admitting evidence of her sexual history. The Sixth Circuit held that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable and good-faith belief that the conduct opposed was unlawful, and that evidence regarding consent was relevant to this inquiry. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The judgment was affirmed. View "Graf v. Morristown-Hamblen Hospital" on Justia Law

Two former employees of a steel plant in Blytheville, Arkansas, brought claims against their employer, alleging racial discrimination, a racially hostile work environment, and retaliation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. One employee, who worked at the plant for nearly three decades, was terminated after a series of disciplinary incidents, including an altercation during an internal investigation and subsequent violations of workplace policies. The other employee, who resigned after several years, claimed he was subjected to disparate discipline and racially offensive remarks by supervisors, including an incident where a supervisor referred to himself as a “slave driver” and mimed cracking a whip.After the plaintiffs filed suit in Arkansas state court, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs amended their complaint, dropping federal claims and non-diverse parties, leaving only state law claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on all claims, finding insufficient evidence to support the allegations of discrimination, retaliation, or a hostile work environment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination or retaliation, as there was no evidence of similarly situated employees being treated more favorably or of a causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment actions. The court also found that the incidents cited did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment, particularly given the employer’s prompt and effective responses to reported incidents. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. View "Warren v. Nucor Corporation" on Justia Law

An employee at a substance abuse treatment provider alleged that a coworker subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, including sending explicit messages and images, visiting his home uninvited, and making lewd gestures. These actions occurred while the employee was on leave, and none took place at the workplace or during work hours. The employee reported the conduct to his employer’s acting program director and human resources representative. He was told that nothing could be done because the conduct occurred offsite. The HR representative also made a social media post and a sarcastic comment that the employee interpreted as mocking his complaint. The employee, distressed by the employer’s response and the prospect of further interaction with the coworker, resigned shortly after returning to work.The Superior Court of Kern County sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s second amended complaint, dismissing claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, among others. The court found that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and that the employer’s response did not constitute an adverse employment action or constructive discharge. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while the coworker’s conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be imputed to the employer under FEHA, the employer’s response to the employee’s complaint—specifically, its failure to act and the HR representative’s mocking conduct—could support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court also found that the claim for failure to prevent harassment was viable, as it depended on the underlying harassment claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of claims for discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, finding insufficient allegations of adverse employment action or employer knowledge of employee unfitness. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Two former employees of a fire alarm and sprinkler company provided fire alarm testing and inspection services on public works projects in New York. They alleged that their employer failed to pay them the prevailing wages required by New York Labor Law § 220, which mandates that workers on public works projects receive at least the prevailing rate of wages. The contracts between the employer and various public entities included clauses that either disclaimed the applicability of prevailing wage laws, were silent on the issue, or referenced prevailing wage rates. Many contracts also contained a provision shortening the statute of limitations for any action against the company to one year.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted partial summary judgment in favor of the employer on all prevailing wage-related claims. The court found that: (1) the contracts did not expressly promise to pay prevailing wages; (2) the one-year contractual limitations period barred the claims; and (3) fire alarm testing and inspection work was not covered by § 220’s prevailing wage requirement. The court also dismissed related quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims and later approved a class action settlement on other claims, with the prevailing wage claims reserved for appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, based on a 2009 New York State Department of Labor opinion letter and relevant precedent, fire alarm testing and inspection work is covered by § 220, entitling the plaintiffs to prevailing wages. However, the Second Circuit found New York law unsettled on whether a promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract (even if not expressly stated) and whether a contractual one-year limitations period is enforceable against workers’ third-party beneficiary claims. The court therefore certified these two questions to the New York Court of Appeals for resolution. View "Walton v. Comfort Systems" on Justia Law

An employee of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), represented by her union, was the subject of two union grievances: one alleging improper performance evaluations and another alleging bullying by her supervisor. While these grievances were pending, the employee also filed a separate lawsuit in federal district court, asserting claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, based on some of the same underlying events.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to WMATA, holding that the settlement agreement reached between WMATA and the union in the grievance process barred the employee’s Title VII lawsuit. The district court interpreted the settlement as an unambiguous release of all claims related to the grievances, including those raised in the federal lawsuit, and therefore did not address the merits of the Title VII claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the settlement agreement resolved only the union’s contractual grievance claims under the collective bargaining agreement and did not extend to the employee’s independent statutory claims under Title VII. The court emphasized that the agreement’s language was limited to the union grievances and did not reference the pending Title VII lawsuit or purport to waive those claims. The court also noted that any waiver of Title VII rights would require clear and unmistakable language, which was absent here. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. WMATA" on Justia Law

A brewing and bottling company in Puerto Rico sought to expand its operations and required a continuous, 24/7 work schedule. However, its existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union representing its employees limited work to five days and forty hours per week, generally excluding weekends. During negotiations for a successor CBA, the employer attempted to impose a six-day work schedule, contrary to the active CBA, and later placed the union president on unpaid leave after he exceeded his annual paid union leave hours. The union president had not requested additional unpaid leave, and the employer had not previously enforced this provision in a similar situation. The union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the employer committed three unfair labor practices: retaliating against the union president for protected activities, unilaterally changing a mandatory subject of bargaining by placing him on unpaid leave without a request, and implementing its final offer on work schedules without reaching a good-faith impasse. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The employer then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, while the NLRB sought enforcement of its order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and not reversible error. The court denied the employer’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The main holdings were that the employer’s actions constituted adverse employment actions motivated by anti-union animus, that the employer unlawfully changed a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that it improperly implemented its final offer without a good-faith impasse or an overall breakdown in negotiations. View "Compania Cervecera de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law