Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a dispute between Gregory Garrabrants, the CEO of BofI Federal Bank (BofI), and Charles Matthew Erhart, a former internal auditor at BofI who acted as a whistleblower. Erhart copied, transmitted, and retained various documents he believed evidenced possible wrongdoing, some of which contained Garrabrants' personal and confidential information. Garrabrants sued Erhart for accessing, taking, and subsequently retaining his personal information. A jury awarded Garrabrants $1,502 on claims for invasion of privacy, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized access to computer data.However, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The court found that the trial court made prejudicial errors in its jury instructions. Specifically, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that bank customers have an unqualified reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents disclosed to banks. The trial court also erred in instructing the jury that Erhart's whistleblower justification defense depended on proving at least one legally unsupported element. The instructions given for Penal Code section 496 misstated the law by defining “theft” in a manner that essentially renders receiving stolen property a strict liability offense. Furthermore, the special instruction on Penal Code section 502 erroneously removed from the jury’s consideration the foundational issue of whether Garrabrants “owned” the data about him residing in BofI’s computer systems such that he could pursue a civil action under the statute. The court concluded that, in light of the record evidence, there is a reasonable possibility a jury could have found in Erhart’s favor on each of Garrabrants’ claims absent the erroneous instructions, making them prejudicial. View "Garrabrants v. Erhart" on Justia Law

Amy Shumway was employed as a receptionist at Evans Chiropractic in Idaho. Her employment was terminated by Dr. John Hitchcock, one of the owners, for insubordination. Following her termination, Shumway applied for unemployment benefits. Her application was initially approved by an Appeals Examiner from the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) who found Shumway eligible for benefits despite her termination for insubordination. On appeal by Evans Chiropractic, the Industrial Commission affirmed the decision, but on different grounds. Evans Chiropractic then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.In the Supreme Court, Evans Chiropractic argued that Shumway should not be eligible for benefits because her employment was terminated for job-related misconduct, namely her refusal to meet with Dr. Hitchcock for discussions about her behavior at work. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the Commission erred in its application of the law. The Court noted that the Commission had focused on Shumway's subjective reasons for not meeting with Hitchcock, rather than the employer's expectations. The Court found that Hitchcock directly communicated his expectation for Shumway to meet with him and that her refusal to do so constituted insubordination, which is a form of job-related misconduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision and held that Shumway was ineligible for unemployment benefits as a matter of law. View "Shumway v. IDOL" on Justia Law

The case in question was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The plaintiff, Christine Boardman, was the former president of Local 73, a regional affiliate of the Service Employees International Union (International). The International imposed an emergency trusteeship on Local 73 due to internal conflict and removed Boardman from her position. In response, Boardman sued under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, alleging that the trusteeship was a pretextual retaliation for her protected speech.The court agreed with the defendants' argument that the trusteeship was necessary to restore order and democratic procedures within Local 73, given the intense infighting between Boardman and Secretary-Treasurer Matthew Brandon. The court reasoned that this constituted a valid purpose for the trusteeship under the Act, which allows trusteeships to be established for purposes including "restoring democratic procedures."The court rejected Boardman's claim that the trusteeship was retaliatory, arguing that even if there was animus between Boardman and the International's President, Mary Kay Henry, this did not negate the valid purpose for the trusteeship. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that Boardman was treated differently from other union members who also engaged in protected speech. The court's decision affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Boardman v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case where Deborah Lightner, a former employee of Catalent CTS (Kansas City), LLC, alleged age discrimination and retaliation under Missouri law. Lightner had received multiple promotions during her employment, but after several employees left citing her management style, her performance was rated poorly. After raising concerns about age discrimination in an email, Catalent removed the option of a performance improvement plan (PIP), offering only a demotion or severance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Catalent.Upon review, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the age discrimination claim, as Lightner failed to show that Catalent's justifications were a pretext for discrimination. However, the court reversed the judgment on the retaliation claim. The court found that the timing of Catalent's removal of the PIP option within 48 hours of Lightner's complaint, combined with text messages from Catalent management, created a sufficient inference of retaliation. Here, the close temporal proximity was deemed sufficient to support a reasonable inference of a causal relationship. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lightner v. Catalent CTS (Kansas City)" on Justia Law

Barbara Lindsay, the former Director of Workforce Development and Career Services at Emily Griffith Technical College (EGTC), sued Denver Public Schools (DPS) and Stephanie Donner, EGTC's Executive Director, for retaliation. Lindsay claimed that her termination was motivated by her opposition to racist comments made during the hiring process for the Executive Director position and her assistance to a candidate in filing employment discrimination charges. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of DPS and Donner. Lindsay appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to prove a causal relationship between Lindsay's protected activity (opposition to racist comments and assistance in filing discrimination charges) and her termination. The Court determined that there was no evidence that those who decided to terminate Lindsay's employment were aware of her protected activity. The court further noted that Lindsay failed to show that anyone at DPS knew that she had assisted in bringing discrimination charges before she was fired. Therefore, Lindsay's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for protected activities could not be substantiated. View "Lindsay v. Denver Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas handled a case in which a nurse claimed her employer, Scott & White Memorial Hospital, wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting potential child abuse or neglect to the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), which is considered a protected conduct under Section 261.110(b) of the Texas Family Code.The nurse, Dawn Thompson, had previously received two written reprimands for violating the hospital's personal-conduct policy. On the third occasion, she disclosed a child patient's protected health information to a school nurse without the parents' authorization. This was considered by the hospital as a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a breach of the patient's rights. Consequently, Thompson was terminated.Thompson filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting that her termination was in violation of Family Code Section 261.110(b), which protects professionals who report child abuse or neglect in good faith from adverse employment actions.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Section 261.110 imposes a "but-for causation" requirement, which means that the protected conduct must be such that without it, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when it did. In this case, the court found that Thompson would have been terminated when she was due to her HIPAA violation, regardless of her report to CPS. Therefore, the court rejected Thompson's retaliation claim and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the hospital. View "SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa was asked to interpret and apply three provisions of the Iowa Code relating to workers' compensation. The plaintiff, Corey Tweeten, worked on his father's farm and sustained a right arm injury on July 25, 2017. He filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on January 21, 2020, more than two years after the incident. The defendants, his father's farm and their insurance carrier, appealed a district court order partially granting Tweeten's claim.The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret three provisions of the Iowa Code: (1) whether a compromise settlement between a claimant and the Second Injury Fund precludes further benefits from the employer, (2) whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and (3) how amendments to the Iowa Code affect reimbursement for independent medical examinations.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the compromise settlement between Tweeten and the Second Injury Fund did not bar Tweeten's claims against his employer and their insurance carrier. The Court reasoned that the compromise settlement concerned a dispute over whether a previous injury triggered the Second Injury Compensation Act, separate from the claim against the employer for the current injury. Therefore, the compromise settlement did not bar the separate and distinct claim against the employer.Regarding the second issue, the Court ruled that the discovery rule as previously applied by the courts did not survive the 2017 revisions to the relevant section of the Iowa Code. The Court held that the two-year statutory period begins to run when the employee knows or should know that an injury is work-related, without regard to whether the injury is also serious enough to be compensable. As such, the plaintiff's claim was time-barred, as he knew he had a right-arm injury that was work-related more than two years before he sought benefits.Finally, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for the independent medical examination under Iowa Code section 85.39, since the injury for which he was examined was not compensable.The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tweeten v. Tweeten" on Justia Law

In this case, Scott Olson, an employee of BNSF Railway Company, sued the company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, seeking damages for injuries he sustained in a workplace accident. A jury found in favor of Olson and awarded him significant damages. The railway company appealed, alleging three specific instances of error by the district court. The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals, which had granted a new trial, and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the railway company did not properly preserve its challenge to the verdict form for appeal, as the company had failed to object to the form until after the jury returned its verdict. The court also ruled that the district court did not err by allowing Olson to present new negligence claims during the trial that were not alleged in the pleadings or identified during discovery, as the company was clearly on notice that Olson alleged that the company failed to reasonably train all employees as one of the specific allegations of negligence at trial. Lastly, the court found that the company was not prejudiced by Olson's counsel's alleged misconduct during his rebuttal closing argument. View "Olson v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff, Christina Littler, a bus driver for a school district, appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Ohio Association of Public School Employees (OAPSE), a union she had joined. Littler had filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging the wrongful deduction and retention of union dues. She claimed that she had withdrawn her union membership and therefore her dues deduction authorization too, but OAPSE had continued to deduct dues from her paycheck. On remand from an earlier appeal, the district court held that Littler had failed to show that OAPSE was a state actor under § 1983, and thus granted OAPSE summary judgment on Littler’s § 1983 claim.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that Littler had failed the first prong of the "state action" test under § 1983, as she could not show that the alleged deprivation was caused by any governmental policy or decision. Instead, the conduct she complained about was inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement and violated her agreement with OAPSE. This conduct was attributed to a private actor—OAPSE—acting contrary to any rule of conduct imposed by the state, and therefore could not be attributed to the state. The court also rejected Littler's argument that the deprivation was caused by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the school district’s compliance with the union’s request to withhold dues from her paycheck. Instead, the court held that the specific conduct complained about was OAPSE’s failure to process Littler’s withdrawal pursuant to the membership application and remove her name from the deduction list. This was not governed by a state-imposed rule of conduct but rather by a private individual or organization’s policy. Thus, the court concluded that the challenged conduct could not be fairly attributable to the state. View "Littler v. Ohio Ass'n of Pub. Sch. Emps." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that detained workers at a privately owned and operated immigration detention center are considered "employees" under Washington's Minimum Wage Act (MWA), and are thus entitled to receive the state's minimum wage for their work. The court rejected arguments from the detention center operator, The GEO Group, that the detained workers should be exempt from the MWA because they resided and slept at their place of employment. The court also disagreed with GEO's claim that the MWA's government-institutions exemption applied to the detainees because the facility was operated under contract with the federal government. The court found the government-institutions exemption only applies to detainees in public, government-run institutions, and not in privately owned and operated facilities. Finally, the court ruled that a damages award to one party (a class of detainees) does not prevent another party (the State of Washington) from seeking equitable relief in the form of an unjust enrichment award. The case stemmed from lawsuits brought by the State and a class of detainees alleging that GEO's practice of paying detainees less than Washington's minimum wage violated the MWA. After a lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, GEO appealed, leading to the certification of questions to the Washington Supreme Court. View "Nwauzor v. The GEO Grp., Inc." on Justia Law