Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

David Carter, who was 61 years old when he began working for the Missouri Department of Corrections, experienced repeated harassment from his supervisor, including disparaging remarks about his age and his medical condition, shingles. The supervisor’s conduct included denying Carter access to necessary tools and training, which worsened Carter’s health issues and ultimately led to his resignation. Carter subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act, claiming constructive discharge due to age and disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. In his petition, Carter sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, costs, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and equitable relief.A jury in the Circuit Court of Jackson County found in Carter’s favor, awarding him substantial damages for non-economic harm, back pay, future economic losses, and punitive damages. The circuit court initially entered judgment for the full amount of the jury’s award, then later amended the judgment to reduce the damages in accordance with the statutory cap under section 213.111.4. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs but did not address Carter’s requests for prejudgment interest or equitable relief in its final judgment.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case on appeal. The court determined that the circuit court’s judgment was not final because it failed to resolve Carter’s requests for prejudgment interest and equitable relief, and did not include a statement denying all other requested relief. As a result, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, without reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments regarding the damages cap, attorney fees, or the sufficiency of the evidence. View "Carter v. Missouri Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Three California-based truck drivers who worked for a national transportation company challenged the legality of their employer’s compensation system. The drivers alleged that the company’s pay plan, which combined hourly wages with a bonus based on certain activities, violated California’s Labor Code by failing to properly compensate for nonproductive time and by not reimbursing necessary business expenses, such as personal cell phone use. They also claimed the company failed to provide accurate wage statements and sought penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) and California’s Unfair Competition Law.After the case was removed from state court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied class certification and granted summary judgment to the employer on most claims. The court found that the pay plan qualified for a statutory “safe harbor” because it paid at least minimum wage for all hours worked, with additional bonuses for certain activities, and thus did not require separate compensation for nonproductive time. The court also found no evidence that the employer knew or should have known about any off-the-clock work. The only claims that proceeded to trial were for failure to reimburse business expenses. At trial, the jury found in favor of the employer, and the court entered judgment accordingly, also awarding costs to the employer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the employer’s pay plan met the requirements of California Labor Code § 226.2(a)(7)’s safe harbor, as it paid at least minimum wage for all hours worked and provided additional bonuses. The court also found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding off-the-clock work or wage statement violations, and it upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and award of costs. View "WILLIAMS V. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC." on Justia Law

Stella Paterakos, a white woman, worked as an Assistant Community Living Specialist for the City of Chicago. In 2020, after Crystal Warren, a black woman, became her supervisor, Paterakos was disciplined three times, resulting in suspensions of one, three, and five days. The cited reasons for discipline included violations of office policies, work assignments, and issues related to her use of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave. Paterakos admitted to much of the conduct underlying the suspensions but alleged she was singled out for harsh treatment due to her race. She also claimed that her third suspension interfered with or retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave. Additionally, she was temporarily assigned to a different office, which she argued was racially motivated.After her third suspension, Paterakos filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause, the FMLA, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims, finding no reasonable jury could conclude that the suspensions or the temporary assignment were motivated by race, age, or constituted unlawful FMLA interference or retaliation. Paterakos appealed, dropping her age discrimination claim but challenging the summary judgment on her Title VII, Equal Protection, and FMLA claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that no reasonable jury could find that the suspensions or assignment were based on race rather than documented performance issues. For the FMLA claims, the court held that the defendants’ honest belief that Paterakos was abusing her FMLA leave defeated her interference and retaliation claims. View "Paterakos v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

A newspaper requested records from a school district related to an investigation into allegations that a long-time employee had sexually harassed other employees. The district hired a law firm to conduct a Title IX investigation, which resulted in a report. The district and the employee entered into a settlement agreement ending his employment, with the district paying him a lump sum and a portion of his health insurance. The newspaper sought all documents related to the investigation and settlement, but the district repeatedly denied the requests, citing statutory exemptions for confidential and personnel records.The Superior Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case after the newspaper filed suit. The court granted the district’s request for in camera review of the records, conducted the review without counsel present, and ordered redacted records to be distributed. It found that some records were protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine and exempt under RSA 91-A:5, XII. The court also found that the remaining records, including the settlement agreement, were exempt as confidential or personnel files under RSA 91-A:5, IV. The court denied the newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, concluding the district had satisfied its obligations regarding records of payments to the employee.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that in camera review without counsel present is permissible when disclosure may cause an invasion of privacy. It affirmed that records protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine are exempt from disclosure without a balancing test. However, it found the lower court erred in applying the exemption for confidential and personnel files, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns if identifying information was redacted. The court also held that the district must disclose unaltered records of payments made to the employee and awarded attorney’s fees and costs for that violation. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Keene Publ'g Corp. v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Sandra Gardner, a member of the International Association of Machinists, sought to bring a lawsuit against her union and several of its officers, alleging that the General Secretary-Treasurer, Dora Cervantes, had misused union funds for personal travel, thereby breaching her fiduciary duty under federal law. Before filing suit, Gardner and other union members sent multiple letters to the union’s leadership demanding an accounting of the allegedly misappropriated funds and requesting that the union itself bring legal action against the implicated officers. The union responded by commissioning an independent accounting firm to investigate the claims, which ultimately found no evidence of wrongdoing. The union’s Executive Council, relying on this report, declined to take further action.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed Gardner’s verified application for leave to file suit under 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). The district court denied her application, concluding that Gardner had not satisfied the statutory “demand requirement” because the union had responded to her request by conducting an accounting and found no basis for further action. The court did not address whether Gardner had shown “good cause” to proceed with her claim, as required by the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Gardner had properly satisfied the demand requirement. The appellate court reasoned that Gardner’s letters clearly demanded both an accounting and that the union bring suit, and the union’s failure to initiate legal action meant the demand was not fully met. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Gardner’s application and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether Gardner has demonstrated good cause to proceed with her § 501 claim. View "Gardner v. International Association of Machinists" on Justia Law

Alex Kedas worked for the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) for over thirty years, primarily as a senior resident engineer. In 2016, Kedas complained to management and legal counsel that a female colleague was receiving better job assignments due to gender favoritism. After his complaint, Kedas received a counseling memorandum, a negative performance evaluation, and was denied a merit-based bonus. In subsequent years, he was assigned less significant projects and faced additional disciplinary actions. Kedas believed these actions were retaliatory and ultimately resigned in 2021, claiming constructive discharge due to an intolerable work environment.Kedas filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, alleging retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted partial summary judgment for IDOT, finding that only certain actions—specifically, the counseling memorandum, the negative performance review, the denial of a bonus, and the 2018 job assignments—could be considered materially adverse employment actions. However, the court then found no sufficient evidence of a causal link between Kedas’s protected activity and his 2018 job assignments or constructive discharge. The remaining claims proceeded to trial, where the jury found IDOT had retaliated by issuing the counseling memorandum but awarded no damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo. The appellate court held that Kedas failed to present sufficient evidence to support claims of constructive discharge or a causal connection between his protected activity and the 2018 job assignments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that no reasonable jury could find in Kedas’s favor on these issues. View "Kedas v Illinois Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

An employee was hired by a company and, as a condition of employment, signed an agreement requiring all employment-related claims to be resolved through arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The agreement specified that the employer would pay all arbitration costs except for certain fees. After the employee reported alleged workplace harassment and was subsequently terminated, he sued the employer in California Superior Court for retaliation and other violations. The employer moved to compel arbitration, which the court granted, and arbitration commenced. After about a year, the arbitrator issued invoices for fees, which the employer failed to pay within 30 days of receipt, as required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The employee then sought to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court, arguing the employer’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98.The Superior Court denied the employee’s motion, reasoning that the arbitrator had set a new due date for payment and the employer paid within 30 days of that date. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statutory 30-day deadline applied from the original invoice date and that the employer’s late payment resulted in a material breach, allowing the employee to withdraw from arbitration. The Court of Appeal also held that section 1281.98 was not preempted by the FAA.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether section 1281.98 is preempted by the FAA. The court held that section 1281.98 is not preempted, but clarified that the statute does not abrogate longstanding contract principles allowing relief from forfeiture for non-willful, non-grossly negligent, or non-fraudulent breaches. The court reversed the Court of Appeal’s order lifting the stay and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the employer’s late payment was excusable and whether the employee suffered compensable harm. View "Hohenshelt v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Three residents and taxpayers of a Minnesota school district challenged a provision in the collective bargaining agreement between the district and its teachers’ union. The agreement allowed teachers to take up to 100 days per year of paid leave to work for the union, with the union reimbursing the district for the cost of substitute teachers but not for the full salaries and benefits of the teachers on leave. The residents objected to the alleged political and campaign activities conducted by teachers during this leave and filed suit, claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Minnesota Constitution, and state labor law.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the case, finding that the residents lacked Article III standing. On an earlier appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the residents had adequately alleged municipal taxpayer standing at the motion to dismiss stage and remanded the case. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for lack of standing, concluding that the residents had not shown a sufficient injury in fact. The residents appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and held that two of the residents, as current municipal taxpayers, had Article III standing because they demonstrated that district funds were expended solely due to the challenged union leave policy. The court found that the expenditure of funds, even if partially reimbursed, constituted a direct injury to municipal taxpayers. The court also held that the intermingling of local, state, and federal funds in the district’s general fund did not defeat standing. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Huizenga v. ISD No. 11" on Justia Law

Dorothy Bivens worked as a territory sales representative for a company that manufactures and distributes cleaning products. During a visit to a client’s motel, the client locked the office door and propositioned her, making her uncomfortable. Bivens reported the incident to her supervisor, who reassigned the client so she would not have further contact. Around the same period, the company’s president decided to reduce staff due to cost concerns, targeting positions in low-revenue territories, including Bivens’s. She was subsequently terminated.After her termination, Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging a hostile work environment, retaliation for reporting harassment, and racial discrimination under both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court denied her motion to compel production of certain documents and granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims, finding insufficient evidence to support her allegations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The appellate court held that, under Title VII, an employer can only be held liable for harassment by a non-employee (such as a client) if the employer itself intentionally caused or was substantially certain harassment would occur, rejecting the negligence standard adopted by most other circuits and the EEOC. The court found no evidence that the employer intended for Bivens to be harassed. The court also found that Bivens’s retaliation claim failed because the decisionmaker who terminated her was unaware of her complaint, and her racial discrimination claim failed due to lack of evidence that she was singled out because of her race. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Bivens v. Zep, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs began experiencing respiratory issues at work, which she attributed to the building environment. Over several years, she requested various accommodations, including changes to her work schedule, relocation of her workstation, and the use of air purifiers. The Department provided some accommodations, but the employee found them ineffective. In 2012, she was diagnosed with breast cancer and submitted a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) form to request leave for treatment. Later, she learned that a union steward had been informed of her cancer diagnosis by a human resources manager, which she had not expected. After returning to work, she continued to request further accommodations, eventually being allowed to work from home full-time.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Department on all claims, including disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, unlawful disclosure of medical information, and retaliation or hostile work environment. The court found that the Department had provided reasonable accommodations, that there was no evidence of discrimination or retaliation, and that the employee had not shown a tangible injury from the alleged disclosure of her medical information.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The appellate court agreed that the Department had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the employee and that her dissatisfaction with the accommodations did not amount to a legal violation. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment on the unlawful disclosure claim, holding that requiring medical information for FMLA leave constituted an employer inquiry under the Rehabilitation Act, and that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether confidential medical information was improperly disclosed and whether the employee suffered a tangible injury as a result. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the unlawful disclosure claim. View "Mullin v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law