Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two Utah corporations, 3484, Inc. and 3486, Inc., created by film producer David Wulf to produce Hallmark movies. The companies shared personnel, including Jennifer Ricci and Brett Miller, who were responsible for various production roles. In April 2021, drivers employed by 3484 contacted a union representative to discuss organizing. Ricci questioned driver April Hanson about union activity and asked her to keep the conversation confidential. Later, Miller warned driver Roy Brewer that production would move to Canada if the drivers organized. The drivers went on strike, and after the strike, 3486 refused to reinstate them, alleging misconduct.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the Employers committed unfair labor practices, including unlawful interrogation and threats, and ordered remedies. The Employers argued that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the Board's procedures and remedies were unauthorized or violated their constitutional rights. The Employers filed a petition for review, and the NLRB filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings, except for the finding that 3484 unlawfully interrogated Hanson. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Employers' constitutional challenges and 3486's challenge to the Board's statutory authority because these arguments were not preserved for appellate review. The court granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement, except for the finding related to Hanson's interrogation, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "3484, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a former principal of a charter school, Emily Roseberry, who alleged that the school district superintendent, Pauline Harvey, overstepped her authority in violation of Alaska statutes and the governing charter school contract and bylaws. Roseberry was fired after making complaints about Harvey’s conduct to the superintendent, the board of education, and an independent commission. Roseberry initially filed suit in federal court, raising federal civil rights claims and a state whistleblower claim. The federal court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state whistleblower claim.Roseberry then filed suit in state court, bringing the whistleblower claim and three additional state-law claims: intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent supervision, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion. The superior court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Roseberry appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that Roseberry’s state claims were not barred by issue and claim preclusion. The court held that the federal court’s dismissal of Roseberry’s First Amendment claim did not preclude her whistleblower claim because the definitions of “matter of public concern” under the First Amendment and the Alaska Whistleblower Act are different. The court also held that Roseberry’s additional state-law claims were not barred by claim preclusion because the federal court would likely have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, given that it had already declined to exercise jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Roseberry v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

Danette Hester, a Special Agent for the IRS in Iowa, applied for a Criminal Investigator position in Georgia but was not hired. After filing a discrimination complaint, the IRS proposed her termination for alleged misconduct. Hester sued, claiming discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, and Hester appealed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on all counts. Hester, a 53-year-old Black woman, alleged retaliation and race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court found that Hester did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hester met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination but failed to show that the IRS's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her was pretextual. The court noted that the IRS limited the hiring to one position due to an upcoming reorganization and that the selected candidate had qualifications Hester lacked, such as fluency in Spanish.Regarding age discrimination, the court found that the four-year age difference between Hester and the selected candidate was not significant enough to support her claim. For the retaliation claim, the court held that Hester did not establish a causal connection between her discrimination complaint and the proposed termination, as the seven-month gap was insufficient to infer causation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Hester failed to provide evidence that the IRS's reasons for its actions were pretextual or that her age, race, or sex played a role in the decision not to promote her. View "Hester v. U.S. Department of Treasury" on Justia Law

Charlene Carter, a flight attendant for Southwest Airlines, was terminated after sending graphic anti-abortion messages to the president of the flight attendants' union, Audrey Stone. Carter, a pro-life Christian, opposed the union's leadership and its participation in the Women's March, which she viewed as supporting abortion. After an arbitrator found that Southwest had cause to terminate Carter under its corporate policies, Carter sued Southwest and the union, claiming her termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Railway Labor Act (RLA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of Carter, finding that Southwest and the union had discriminated against her based on her religious beliefs and practices. The court permanently enjoined Southwest and the union from interfering with the religious expression of any Southwest flight attendant and held Southwest in contempt for failing to comply with its judgment. Both Southwest and the union appealed, and Carter cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of Southwest's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Carter's belief-based Title VII claim and RLA retaliation claim, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for Southwest. The court affirmed the judgment against Southwest on Carter's practice-based Title VII claims and the dismissal of Carter's RLA interference claim. The court also affirmed the judgment against the union on all claims but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded for additional proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the contempt order against Southwest. View "Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company" on Justia Law

BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (BlueCross) is an insurer and fiduciary for an ERISA-governed group health insurance plan. A plan member in New Hampshire sought coverage for fertility treatments, which BlueCross denied as the plan did not cover such treatments. The Commissioner of the New Hampshire Insurance Department initiated an enforcement action against BlueCross, alleging that the denial violated New Hampshire law, which mandates coverage for fertility treatments. BlueCross sought to enjoin the state regulatory action, arguing it conflicted with its fiduciary duties under ERISA.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied BlueCross's request for relief and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. The court found that the Commissioner’s enforcement action was against BlueCross in its capacity as an insurer, not as a fiduciary, and thus was permissible under ERISA’s saving clause, which allows state insurance regulations to apply to insurers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the Commissioner’s action was indeed against BlueCross as an insurer, aiming to enforce New Hampshire’s insurance laws. The court noted that ERISA’s saving clause permits such state actions and that BlueCross could not use its fiduciary duties under ERISA to evade state insurance regulations. The court also referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward, which established that state insurance regulations are not preempted by ERISA when applied to insurers. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that ERISA did not shield BlueCross from the New Hampshire regulatory action. View "BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee v. Nicolopoulos" on Justia Law

Trenton Johnson, an employee of Concorp, Inc., was injured while performing maintenance work at Exide Technologies, Inc.'s plant in Kansas City, Missouri. Johnson fell into a vat of molten lead while replacing a belt on a conveyor, resulting in severe burns. He subsequently sued Exide for negligence in Missouri state court.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, where the parties engaged in discovery and briefed the issue of whether Johnson's exclusive remedy was under Missouri's workers' compensation system. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Exide, concluding that Johnson's claim was indeed limited to workers' compensation benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court examined whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Exide and Johnson under Missouri's workers' compensation statute. The court applied the means/control test and the statutory-employee status test. It found that Concorp, not Exide, had the means/control relationship with Johnson. However, the court determined that Johnson was a statutory employee of Exide because his work was performed under a contract and in the usual course of Exide's business.The Eighth Circuit held that Johnson's exclusive remedy for his injuries was through Missouri's workers' compensation system, and Exide was immune from the negligence claim. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Exide. View "Johnson v. Exide Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenneth Ray Jr. died from asphyxiation due to an industrial accident involving nitrogen gas. His widow, Sharmel Culver, was awarded death benefits and subsequently applied for an additional award, alleging that Ray’s employer, TimkenSteel Corporation, violated specific safety requirements (VSSR). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied the application, finding that the specific safety requirements did not apply because nitrogen gas is not considered "toxic" or a "poison."Culver sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which determined that the commission abused its discretion. The court issued a limited writ, directing the commission to reconsider the VSSR analysis, concluding that nitrogen gas, in the concentration present in the elevator-control room, was toxic and thus fell under the applicable safety regulations.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the additional award. The court found that the commission’s decision was supported by some evidence, including expert testimony and industry literature indicating that nitrogen gas is not inherently toxic. The court emphasized that the regulations in effect at the time of Ray’s death defined "air contaminants" as including only "toxic" gases, and the evidence did not support a finding that nitrogen gas met this definition. The court concluded that the commission’s interpretation of the regulations was reasonable and that the Tenth District erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the commission. View "State ex rel. Culver v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Amazon.com Services LLC appealed the "constructive denial" of its motion for injunctive relief from two administrative proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The case involves Amazon's fulfillment center in Staten Island, New York, where the Amazon Labor Union (ALU) won an election to represent over 8,000 employees. Amazon filed objections alleging interference by ALU and the NLRB's Regional Office, leading to two NLRB cases: one concerning the election and another regarding Amazon's refusal to bargain with ALU.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed Amazon's request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent declaratory and injunctive relief to avoid harm from the alleged unconstitutional proceedings. Amazon argued that the structure of the NLRB proceedings violated the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied Amazon's request for a temporary restraining order, finding that Amazon had not established a substantial threat of irreparable harm. The court also granted but stayed the NLRB's motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of New York.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court found that Amazon did not act diligently in seeking expedited relief and failed to establish a legitimate basis for urgency. The court noted that Amazon did not repeatedly request swift review or a ruling by a specific date until the day before its deadline to respond to the NLRB's summary judgment motion. The court concluded that the district court did not effectively deny Amazon's motion for injunctive relief by failing to rule by September 27, 2024. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Amazon.com v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Mone Yvette Sanders filed a class and representative action against her former employer, Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., alleging wage and hour claims under the Labor Code and a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The trial court granted Edward Jones's motions to compel arbitration of Sanders's individual claims and stayed the representative PAGA cause of action. Sanders initiated arbitration, but Edward Jones failed to pay $54,000 in fees within 30 days as required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Sanders then moved to vacate the order compelling arbitration and proceed in court.The trial court denied Sanders's motion, finding section 1281.98 preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Sanders filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98 is not preempted by the FAA, as it furthers the goal of expeditious arbitration. The court also rejected Edward Jones's contention that the arbitration agreement required the arbitrator to decide whether Edward Jones was in default. The court found that section 1281.98 vests the employee with the unilateral right to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court upon the drafting party's failure to timely pay fees. The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Sanders's motion to vacate the order compelling arbitration and granted the petition for writ of mandate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of Sanders's request for monetary sanctions. View "Sanders v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of DENSO International America, Inc., alleged that the company's 401(k) Plan overpaid for recordkeeping and administrative services, breaching the fiduciary duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). They claimed that the Plan's fiduciaries failed to use their significant bargaining power to negotiate lower fees, resulting in excessive costs compared to similar plans.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, stating that it failed to provide the necessary "context specific" facts to support an ERISA overpayment-for-recordkeeping-services claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently detail the types and quality of services provided to the Plan compared to those provided to other plans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a breach of the duty of prudence because they failed to provide specific details about the services received by the Plan and how they compared to those received by the comparator plans. The court emphasized that a meaningful benchmark is necessary to evaluate whether the fees were excessive relative to the services rendered. The court also noted that general allegations about the fungibility of recordkeeping services and the bargaining power of mega plans were insufficient without specific context.The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint did not meet the required pleading standards and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "England v. DENSO International America, Inc." on Justia Law