Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A Concord police officer discovered her firearm missing from the station’s lockers in 2013. Investigation revealed that another officer, the plaintiff, had mistakenly taken the firearm while transporting a prisoner to a hospital. The plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts about when she realized the mistake, telling supervisors she noticed it at the station, while her partner reported she only realized it at the hospital. An internal affairs investigation found the plaintiff’s statements lacked credibility and concluded she had lied to colleagues and supervisors about the incident. The police chief sustained these findings, terminated her employment, and submitted her name for inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), formerly known as the “Laurie List.”The plaintiff appealed her termination to the City of Concord’s Personnel Appeals Board, which upheld the decision, finding her lacked credibility. She then filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging gender discrimination and wrongful termination, which was settled. The settlement required the City to remove documents related to the incident from her personnel file and maintain them in a separate investigative file, and to report her departure as a negotiated resignation.Years later, the plaintiff sued the City and the New Hampshire Department of Justice in Superior Court, seeking removal of her name from the EES under RSA 105:13-d. She argued the alleged misconduct was immaterial, the records were no longer in her personnel file, and her inclusion on the EES was unwarranted given the passage of time. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that RSA 105:13-d governs EES inclusion and applies to “personnel information,” not just personnel files. The court found the plaintiff’s untruthfulness constituted potentially exculpatory evidence and that it was reasonably foreseeable her misconduct could be admissible to impeach her credibility if she were called as a witness in a future case. View "Doe v. Concord Police Department" on Justia Law

A labor union representing Chicago public school employees, along with one of its members, alleged that a nonprofit organization dedicated to limiting union power contributed money to recruit and promote candidates in a union election, in violation of federal law. The union claimed that the nonprofit’s actions interfered with the union’s internal election process and would continue to do so in future elections. The plaintiffs brought suit under a federal statute prohibiting employer expenditures to promote candidates for union office, as well as under Illinois law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, considered the case after the nonprofit moved to dismiss. The district court found that the relevant federal statute did not provide an express or implied private right of action for the type of pre-election relief the plaintiffs sought. The court reasoned that the statute’s enforcement mechanism required union members to exhaust internal remedies and then file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who could bring a civil action if warranted. The court also dismissed the state-law claims, as they depended on the dismissed federal claims. The plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action—express or implied—for individuals or unions to enforce the statutory prohibition on employer expenditures in union elections. Instead, the statute’s exclusive enforcement mechanism is through post-election complaints to the Secretary of Labor. The court distinguished this provision from another section of the statute that expressly allows private pre-election suits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, v Educators for Excellence, Inc." on Justia Law

Anton’s Services Inc. was a subcontractor on two public works projects in San Diego: the Torrey Pines Road Project and the Voltaire Street Project. On both projects, Anton’s classified its workers under the “Tree Maintenance” prevailing wage category, paying them accordingly. The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) investigated and determined that Anton’s work was construction-related and should have been classified under the “Laborer (Engineering Construction)” category, which carries a higher prevailing wage. Additionally, Anton’s failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, including submitting contract award information, employing the required ratio of apprentices, and requesting apprentices from local committees.After the DLSE issued civil wage and penalty assessments for both projects, Anton’s challenged these findings in administrative proceedings before the Director of Industrial Relations. The parties submitted stipulated facts and documentary evidence. The Director affirmed the DLSE’s assessments, finding Anton’s had misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was liable for penalties and liquidated damages. The Director also found Anton’s violations were willful, given its prior record and lack of prompt correction.Anton’s then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of San Diego County through a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court, applying the substantial evidence standard, upheld the Director’s decision and rejected Anton’s attempt to introduce extra-record evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the administrative record for substantial evidence. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Anton’s misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was properly assessed penalties and liquidated damages. The court clarified that liquidated damages are owed until wages are actually paid to workers, not merely withheld by a contractor. The judgment was affirmed. View "Anton's Services v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Two former service technicians at an auto dealership in Simi Valley alleged that their employer’s compensation plan violated California labor laws. The dealership had previously paid technicians on a piece-rate basis, but switched to an hourly pay plan in December 2014, compensating technicians at double the minimum wage for all hours recorded on a biometric time clock, with additional “flag bonus pay” for certain tasks. The plaintiffs claimed they were not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime and rest periods, and brought claims under the Labor Code, the Unfair Competition Law, and the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) on behalf of themselves and other employees.The Superior Court of Ventura County initially ordered arbitration, but withdrew the case from arbitration at the plaintiffs’ request. Both parties filed motions for summary adjudication regarding the legality of the pay plan, which the court denied, finding triable issues of fact. After a bench trial, the court found the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof, noting that their evidence was insufficient and lacked specific examples to support their claims. Judgment was entered in favor of the employer on all claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the dealership’s hourly pay plan did not violate the “no borrowing rule” established in Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, nor did it violate Labor Code section 226.2. The court found that technicians were paid at least double the minimum wage for all hours worked and that any bonus pay was in addition to, not a substitute for, hourly wages. The court also affirmed judgment for the employer on the PAGA claim, finding the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate evidence or an adequate record to support their allegations. The judgment was affirmed. View "Mora v. C.E. Enterprises" on Justia Law

A dancer who regularly performed at a Portland strip club called Sassy’s alleged that the club’s owners and managers misclassified dancers as independent contractors, thereby violating wage and hour provisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). After the dancer filed a lawsuit regarding these alleged violations, one of the club’s partners, who also managed another club called Dante’s, canceled the dancer’s scheduled performance at Dante’s, explicitly citing the lawsuit as the reason. The dancer then amended the complaint to include a claim that this cancellation constituted unlawful retaliation under the FLSA.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision only provides a private right of action for retaliation committed by a current employer, and thus the dancer needed to have been employed by Dante’s at the time of the alleged retaliatory act. The court also found that the wage-related claims were time-barred and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision does not require the retaliator to be the plaintiff’s current employer, nor does it require the plaintiff to have been employed by the retaliator at the time of the alleged retaliation. Instead, the statute covers retaliation by any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the dancer was an employee of Sassy’s under the “economic realities” test and whether the cancellation of the performance constituted retaliation. The court also reinstated the state law claims for further proceedings. View "HOLLIS V. R&R RESTAURANTS, INC" on Justia Law

A company operating stevedoring services at the Port of Mobile, Alabama, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union representing longshore workers. The agreement included a no-strike provision and outlined procedures for resolving disputes, including arbitration. After an alleged strike by union members, the company filed a lawsuit in state court seeking a temporary restraining order and later damages for breach of the no-strike provision. The state court issued a restraining order, ending the strike within days. The union subsequently removed the case to federal court, where the company amended its complaint to seek damages, asserting that all conditions precedent for judicial action had been met.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, the union moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the dispute should be resolved through the arbitration process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement permitted the company to seek monetary damages in court for violations of the no-strike provision. The union then filed an interlocutory appeal of the order denying arbitration, while the underlying damages action remained pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the Federal Arbitration Act’s provision for interlocutory appeals does not apply to collective bargaining agreements covering workers engaged in interstate commerce, such as longshoremen. The court also found no basis for jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act or the collateral-order doctrine. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the district court’s order in place and expressing no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute. View "APM Terminals Mobile, LLC v. International Longshoremen's Association" on Justia Law

Several individuals, representing a class, challenged a health insurance company’s refusal to cover gender-affirming care for transgender individuals diagnosed with gender dysphoria. The company, acting as a third-party administrator for employer-sponsored, self-funded health plans, denied coverage for such treatments based on explicit plan exclusions requested by the employer sponsors. Some plaintiffs also alleged that they were denied coverage for treatments that would have been covered for other diagnoses, such as precocious puberty, but were denied solely because of the concurrent diagnosis of gender dysphoria.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified the class and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court rejected the company’s arguments that it was not subject to Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act because its third-party administrator activities were not federally funded, that it was merely following employer instructions under ERISA, and that it was shielded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court also found that the exclusions constituted sex-based discrimination under Section 1557.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the company is subject to Section 1557, that ERISA does not require administrators to enforce unlawful plan terms, and that RFRA does not provide a defense in this context. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s analysis of sex-based discrimination was undermined by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in United States v. Skrmetti, which clarified the application of sex discrimination standards to exclusions for gender dysphoria treatment. The Ninth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider whether, under Skrmetti, the exclusions at issue may still constitute unlawful discrimination, particularly in cases involving pretext or proxy discrimination or where plaintiffs had other qualifying diagnoses. View "PRITCHARD V. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the City of Boise suffered injuries during a traffic stop in 2019, including a right hip injury, which the employer accepted and compensated. Later, the officer developed left hip pain, and her physician initially stated it was unrelated to the work accident, but later opined it was likely related. Disputes arose over medical records and scheduling independent medical examinations (IMEs). The employer, relying on prior Idaho Supreme Court precedent, sent a letter purporting to suspend compensation when the officer did not attend an IME, though the Idaho Industrial Commission later found that no actual suspension occurred. The officer continued to receive salary and some benefits, while her left hip surgery was covered by private insurance.After the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc., which held only the Commission could order suspension of benefits for failure to attend an IME, the officer sought a declaratory ruling from the Commission regarding retroactive application of Arreola. While that petition was pending, the employer filed a complaint with the Commission to adjudicate issues about the officer’s entitlement to benefits and IME compliance. The officer then filed a second petition, arguing that only employees, not employers, could file such complaints under Idaho’s worker’s compensation law.The Idaho Industrial Commission denied both petitions. It found the first petition was moot because the officer’s benefits were never actually suspended and Arreola applied only prospectively. The Commission denied the second petition on the merits, holding it had jurisdiction to accept complaints from employers under Idaho Code section 72-707 and its own rules.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the Commission’s denial of the first petition, finding no justiciable controversy. However, it set aside the denial of the second petition, holding that only employees may file complaints to request hearings on claims for compensation or income benefits under Idaho Code section 72-706, and the Commission exceeded its powers by allowing employer-initiated complaints in such matters. View "Coronado v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

Two police associations negotiated collective bargaining agreements with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the City of Las Vegas to designate certain dates—specifically Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth—as paid holidays in addition to those recognized by Nevada statute. These agreements provided for increased holiday pay on those days. The Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which is responsible for collecting retirement contributions based on employees’ regular compensation, refused to collect contributions on the additional holiday pay for these negotiated holidays, arguing that only holidays listed in Nevada’s statutory list qualified.The associations filed an action for declaratory relief in the Eighth Judicial District Court, seeking to compel PERS to collect retirement contributions on the negotiated holiday pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the associations, ordering PERS to collect the appropriate employer contributions for holiday pay on Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth. PERS appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case de novo, as it involved questions of statutory interpretation and no disputed facts. The court held that, under the plain language of NRS 288.150(2)(d) and NRS 286.025, PERS is required to collect retirement contributions on all holiday pay negotiated in collective bargaining agreements, not just those for statutory holidays. The court also determined that Juneteenth became a legal holiday in Nevada in 2021 following the federal declaration, and contributions for that holiday are required retroactively to 2022, when it was included in the agreements. The court rejected PERS’s arguments regarding its authority and potential conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS. OF NEV. VS. LAS VEGAS MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASS'N" on Justia Law

A long-term employee of a county government began experiencing workplace difficulties after a new supervisor was assigned. The employee alleged that the supervisor engaged in repeated, unwelcome comments about her appearance and closely monitored her, behavior corroborated by coworkers. After reporting the supervisor’s conduct to union representatives, who then informed higher management, the employee was subjected to increased scrutiny, including a performance improvement plan, a written warning, and public criticism of her work. The employee filed internal and external complaints alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Following these events, her health deteriorated, leading her to take medical leave and ultimately retire early.The Utah Labor Commission’s Antidiscrimination and Labor Division initially found no reasonable cause for her claims. On appeal, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing but was replaced by another ALJ, who dismissed her claims. The Labor Commission Appeals Board reviewed the case, reinstated her retaliation claim using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and remanded for a damages determination. The Board and ALJ denied her request for attorney fees, citing a Utah Supreme Court decision, Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, as precluding such awards. Both parties appealed aspects of the Board’s decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, which adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern standard for “adverse action” in retaliation claims, upheld the retaliation finding, and ruled that attorney fees could be awarded but not assessed for reasonableness.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case. It held that the Burlington Northern standard—defining adverse action as conduct likely to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge—applies to retaliation claims under the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. However, the court found the Board had not applied this standard or made sufficient factual findings, so it remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also clarified that the McDonnell Douglas framework is a procedural device, not a set of claim elements, and that the Labor Commission may award and assess the reasonableness of attorney fees. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Christensen v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law