Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A high school student, Adrianna Wadsworth, filed a lawsuit against her principal, Andrew Cavanaugh, a school social worker, Chuck Nguyen, and the school district, MSAD 40/RSU 40, alleging constitutional violations and a Title IX claim. Wadsworth claimed that Cavanaugh sexually harassed her, Nguyen failed to protect her, and the school district was indifferent to the harassment.The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed some of Wadsworth's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on others. The court dismissed the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen, finding no control over Cavanaugh. It also granted summary judgment to Cavanaugh on the substantive due process claim, concluding that non-physical harassment did not violate Wadsworth's right to bodily integrity. The court found that Wadsworth's equal protection claim against Cavanaugh was valid but granted him qualified immunity. Nguyen was granted summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim, as his conduct did not shock the conscience. The court also granted summary judgment to MSAD on the § 1983 municipal liability claim, finding no deliberate indifference, and on the Title IX claim, concluding that the assistant principals did not have actual knowledge of the harassment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's decision on the substantive due process claim against Cavanaugh but reversed the summary judgment on the equal protection claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Cavanaugh's conduct was severe and pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen and the summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the Title IX claim against MSAD, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the assistant principals had actual knowledge of the harassment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Wadsworth v. MSAD 40/RSU 40" on Justia Law

In this wage-and-hour class action, the plaintiffs, employees of ACE American Insurance Company (ACE), alleged that ACE misclassified them as exempt employees and failed to provide benefits required for nonexempt employees under state law. The plaintiffs also added claims under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for the same alleged violations. The plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements as a condition of their employment, which required them to submit employment-related legal claims to arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted ACE's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the case pending arbitration. However, neither party initiated arbitration. The plaintiffs then moved to lift the stay, arguing that ACE was required to initiate arbitration and had waived its right to arbitrate by failing to do so. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that ACE's inaction was inconsistent with its right to arbitrate and lifted the stay.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs, not ACE, were required to initiate arbitration under the terms of the arbitration agreements. The agreements specified that the party wanting to start the arbitration procedure should submit a demand, and in this context, it referred to the plaintiffs who had employment-related legal claims. The court concluded that ACE did not breach the arbitration agreements or waive its right to arbitration by failing to initiate the process. Consequently, the trial court's order lifting the stay was reversed, and ACE was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Arzate v. ACE American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. (JLL) provides building management services. In 2023, the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39, AFL-CIO (Union) sought certification as the bargaining representative for JLL's Maintenance II and III technicians at an Amazon facility in Napa, California. The Union and JLL agreed to a stipulated election, which was approved by the NLRB's Regional Director. The election was held on May 17, 2023, and all four eligible employees voted in favor of Union representation. JLL refused to bargain with the Union and filed an objection to the election, claiming misconduct by the Board Agent overseeing the election.The Regional Director dismissed JLL's objections, finding them meritless, and certified the election. JLL appealed to the NLRB, which denied the appeal. JLL continued to refuse to bargain, leading the Board's General Counsel to file a complaint. In March 2024, the NLRB issued a summary judgment against JLL, finding that the company violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union. The Board ordered JLL to bargain with the Union.JLL then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reiterating its claim that the election should be set aside. The Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the Regional Director's decision to certify the election without a hearing was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court held that JLL's objections did not raise substantial and material factual issues that would justify setting aside the election. Consequently, the court denied JLL's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement of its order requiring JLL to recognize and bargain with the Union. View "Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case involves Tarlochan Sandhu, who worked for various public agencies as a finance and accounting professional and was a member of CalPERS, receiving retirement benefits upon his retirement in 2011. After retiring, Sandhu was hired by Regional Government Services (RGS) in 2015, which assigned him to work for several cities. RGS considered Sandhu its employee, providing him with benefits and paying him, while the cities paid RGS for his services. CalPERS determined Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities, violating postretirement employment rules, and the trial court upheld this determination.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case, where Sandhu challenged CalPERS’s decision, arguing he was not a common law employee and that the decision was based on underground regulations. The trial court applied its independent judgment, finding the evidence supported CalPERS’s determination that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court found the cities had the right to control Sandhu’s work, which is the principal test for an employment relationship, and that several secondary factors also supported this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the common law test for employment applies and that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court also found that Sandhu forfeited his argument regarding underground regulations by not properly raising it in the trial court. The judgment was affirmed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "Sandhu v. Bd. of Admin. of CalPERS" on Justia Law

Black Hills Adventure Lodging (BHAL) manages rental cabins in the Black Hills and hired Stephanie Hammer to clean these cabins. After her relationship with BHAL ended, Hammer applied for reemployment assistance benefits, which BHAL contested, claiming she was an independent contractor. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined Hammer was an employee and ordered BHAL to pay into the unemployment compensation fund based on her wages and those of others similarly situated. The circuit court affirmed this decision, and BHAL appealed.The ALJ found that Hammer was free to accept or decline cleaning jobs, was not trained or supervised by BHAL, and provided her own cleaning supplies and transportation. Despite these findings, the ALJ concluded that Hammer was not free from BHAL's control and was not customarily engaged in an independently established trade. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ's decision.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that BHAL did not exercise control over Hammer's work, as she had the freedom to accept or decline jobs, set her own hours, and provide her own supplies. However, the court found that Hammer was not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, as she did not provide cleaning services to others, did not advertise her services, and was wholly dependent on BHAL for work.The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision that Hammer was an employee of BHAL and that BHAL must contribute to the unemployment compensation fund for her wages. However, the court reversed the decision that BHAL was liable for wages paid to "others similarly situated" to Hammer, as each individual's employment status must be determined based on their unique relationship with BHAL. The case was remanded for the circuit court to vacate that portion of the Department's decision. View "Black Hills Adventure Lodging, LLC v. South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation" on Justia Law

Samuel Murray, a motor-vehicle operator for the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS), was wrongfully terminated after taking leave due to an injury sustained at work. In September 2020, DYRS was ordered to reinstate Mr. Murray and awarded him back-pay with benefits. Mr. Murray did not initially request interest on the back-pay. In February 2021, he petitioned the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA) to reopen his case for enforcement of the back-pay and benefits, which had not yet been provided, and for the first time sought accrued interest on the back-pay.The OEA Administrative Judge (AJ) ruled that OEA had the authority to award interest on back-pay and ordered DYRS to pay Mr. Murray prejudgment interest. DYRS sought review in the Superior Court, which reversed the AJ's decision, holding that the AJ did not have jurisdiction to grant interest on the back-pay award. The Superior Court reasoned that the AJ's jurisdiction was limited to correcting the record, ruling on attorney fees, or processing enforcement petitions, and Mr. Murray's request for prejudgment interest fell outside these parameters.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that D.C. Code § 1-606.03(c) clearly precluded Mr. Murray's belated request for prejudgment interest, as it was made over three months after the back-pay award became final and did not fall within the AJ's limited post-award jurisdiction. The court also noted that it did not address whether OEA has the authority to award prejudgment interest when timely requested or whether post-judgment interest could be part of enforcing an award not promptly paid. View "Murray v. District of Columbia Dep't of Youth and Rehabilitation Services" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a former employee, sustained a work injury in 1999 and entered into a settlement agreement in 2002, which included a lump sum payment for permanent partial disability and ongoing medical care for his left hip. In 2003, the Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DCD) denied further treatment for the petitioner’s low back pain but allowed continued treatment for his left hip. The last payment of compensation was made in 2005.The petitioner applied to reopen his workers' compensation claim in 2017, but the Director denied the application, citing the eight-year statute of limitations under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 386-89(c). The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) affirmed the Director’s decision, with a majority opinion stating that the petitioner had the burden of proof to show his application was timely and a concurring opinion stating that the employer had the burden of proof to show the application was untimely.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the LIRAB’s decision, concluding that the petitioner did not provide substantial evidence to support his reopening application and that the claim was properly closed in 2007.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the eight-year period in HRS § 386-89(c) is a statute of limitations, and thus, the employer has the burden of proof to show that an application for reopening a claim is untimely. The court concluded that the employer met this burden, as the last payment was made in 2005, and the petitioner’s application to reopen was filed nearly twelve years later. The court also affirmed that the workers' compensation case was properly closed in 2007. Consequently, the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal was affirmed. View "Webb v. OSF International, Inc." on Justia Law

Derek Kramer, the plaintiff, joined American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP) in 2018 and later participated in the AEP Executive Severance Plan. In 2020, AEP terminated Kramer’s employment due to his executive assistant’s misuse of a company credit card and Kramer’s alleged interference with an investigation into his company-issued cell phone. Kramer applied for severance benefits under the Plan, but AEP denied his claim, citing termination for cause. Kramer appealed the decision, but the Plan’s appeal committee upheld the denial.Kramer then filed an ERISA action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking benefits and alleging interference. He also demanded a jury trial. The district court struck his jury demand, limited discovery to procedural claims, and denied his motion to compel the production of documents protected by attorney-client privilege. The court ultimately granted judgment in favor of AEP and the Plan, finding that the denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the Plan was a top-hat plan exempt from ERISA’s fiduciary requirements, thus the fiduciary exception to attorney-client privilege did not apply. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to strike Kramer’s jury demand, citing precedent that ERISA denial-of-benefits claims are equitable in nature and not subject to jury trials. Finally, the court found that the district court correctly applied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard in reviewing the denial of benefits and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of AEP and the Plan. View "Kramer v. American Electric Power Service Corp. Executive Severance Plan" on Justia Law

Xerox Corporation filed a petition under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for injunctive and declaratory relief against Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United (the Union). After the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Xerox and the Union expired, Xerox terminated retiree benefits. The Union argued that Xerox could not unilaterally terminate vested benefits and sought to enforce the expired agreement’s arbitration provision. Xerox sought to stay and enjoin arbitration.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York granted Xerox’s petition, concluding that the Union’s grievance was not arbitrable under the expired CBA. The district court reasoned that the Union failed to identify language in the agreement that could be understood to have promised vested benefits beyond the agreement’s expiration. Additionally, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents barred an interpretation that benefits had vested.On appeal, the Union argued that the district court erred. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Union. The appellate court found that the Union identified language that could be reasonably understood as guaranteeing benefits beyond the contract’s expiration or as constituting deferred compensation. Furthermore, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents did not conclusively bar an interpretation that benefits had vested. To discern the parties’ intent, the appropriate trier of fact would need to consult extrinsic evidence.Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Xerox Corporation v. Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United" on Justia Law

Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with Technology Credit Union (TCU) before starting his job in 2020. The agreement required both parties to submit any employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. Vo was later terminated and sued TCU for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination. TCU moved to compel arbitration, but Vo opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable because it did not allow for prehearing third-party discovery.The Santa Clara County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable because it did not permit third-party discovery, relying on Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. The court denied TCU's motion to compel arbitration, leading TCU to appeal the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court found that while the agreement was procedurally unconscionable, it was not substantively unconscionable. The court noted that the JAMS Rules incorporated into the agreement allowed the arbitrator to order additional discovery, including third-party discovery, if necessary. The court emphasized that the agreement should be interpreted to allow adequate discovery to vindicate statutory claims, as clarified in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded with instructions to grant TCU's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and not unconscionable. View "Vo v. Technology Credit Union" on Justia Law