Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A former federal employee alleged that her union mishandled an arbitration proceeding and discriminated against her based on sex and disability. She claimed that the union’s local president made unwanted sexual advances, disparaged her status as a nursing mother, and ultimately withdrew union support for her grievance against her employer. The employee filed several unfair labor practice (ULP) charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), some of which were dismissed as untimely, and also filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which issued her a right-to-sue letter. She then brought two lawsuits in federal district court: one alleging violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the union and its local, and another, pro se, alleging retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the union, its local, and two union officials.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both lawsuits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) precluded the employee’s claims, holding that her allegations were essentially claims for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which must be pursued exclusively through the FLRA’s administrative process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that the FSLMRS does not preclude federal employees from bringing Title VII and ADA claims against their unions in federal district court, even when the alleged conduct could also constitute a ULP. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to displace these specific statutory discrimination remedies with the FSLMRS’s more limited scheme. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FLSA retaliation claim, finding no indication that Congress intended for such claims against unions to proceed in district court alongside the FSLMRS process. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Title VII and ADA claims. View "Lucas v. American Federation of Government Employees" on Justia Law

A former employee of a Defense Commissary Agency store at Offutt Air Force Base alleged that he was denied reasonable accommodations for his disabilities, harassed, and discriminated against based on his race and gender. The employee’s father initially raised concerns with management about the employee’s need for support and mentioned a disability, but neither the employee nor his father specified the nature of the disability at that time. The employee later complained about work assignments, leave requests, and comments from supervisors, believing these actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. After resigning, he sought to engage in the reasonable accommodation process, submitting a form that listed several diagnoses, but it was later revealed that his father, not a medical professional, had completed the relevant sections.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment to the Secretary of Defense on all claims. The court found that the employee failed to provide sufficient evidence of a disability or to show that he had requested or been denied a reasonable accommodation. The court also determined that there was no evidence connecting alleged harassment to the employee’s race or gender, nor was there evidence of conduct severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the employee did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, nor did he make a facial showing necessary for a failure-to-accommodate claim. Additionally, the court concluded that the conduct alleged did not meet the threshold for a hostile work environment under Title VII, as it was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. The judgment in favor of the Secretary of Defense was affirmed. View "Yelder v. Hegseth" on Justia Law

Mary Herkert, an employee of the Social Security Administration (SSA) with multiple physical disabilities, requested a scheduled telework arrangement as an accommodation for her medical needs. After her request was denied and she indicated her intent to pursue equal employment opportunity remedies, Herkert was reassigned from her supervisory Branch Chief position to a non-supervisory management analyst role. Although the new position allowed her to telework as requested, Herkert contended that the reassignment was a demotion, resulting in a loss of supervisory authority, prestige, and advancement opportunities, despite no change in pay or benefits.After exhausting administrative remedies, Herkert filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the SSA Commissioner, holding that Herkert’s reassignment did not constitute a sufficiently “significant” adverse employment action because her pay and benefits remained unchanged. The court also found the reassignment to be voluntary, relying on Herkert’s acceptance of the new position and her expression of gratitude. On this basis, the court concluded that Herkert could not prevail on her discrimination, retaliation, or reasonable accommodation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, a plaintiff challenging a job transfer for discrimination need not show a “significant” change in working conditions, but only “some disadvantageous change.” The appellate court also found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Herkert’s reassignment was truly voluntary. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these clarified legal standards. View "Herkert v. Bisignano" on Justia Law

Lorri Bosse, a truck driver with a long work history, was employed by Sargent Corporation, where she typically worked fifty to seventy hours per week but was laid off each winter due to company policy, not by her own choice. Bosse would have preferred to work year-round, and some other drivers at Sargent did so. In 2015, she suffered a gradual work injury and filed for workers’ compensation benefits, having worked thirty out of the fifty-two weeks preceding her injury. Her annual earnings at Sargent were consistently lower than the annualized amount that would result from the statutory calculation method used by the administrative law judge (ALJ).After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ awarded Bosse benefits and calculated her average weekly wage (AWW) using the method in 39-A M.R.S. § 102(4)(B), which applies when an employee has worked fewer than 200 full working days in the year before injury. Sargent Corporation argued that this method produced an inflated AWW compared to Bosse’s actual earnings and that the fallback method in paragraph D should be used instead. The Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division remanded for further factual findings but ultimately affirmed the ALJ’s use of paragraph B, finding it fair and reasonable under the circumstances.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that, for employees who work more than 26 weeks but fewer than 200 days in the year before injury, paragraph B is generally the appropriate method for calculating AWW. The fallback method in paragraph D should only be used in exceptional circumstances where applying paragraph B would be unreasonable or unfair, such as when the employee’s part-time work was voluntary or the calculated AWW is grossly inflated for reasons not tied to future earning capacity. The Court found no error in the Board’s application of paragraph B in Bosse’s case. View "Bosse v. Sargent Corporation" on Justia Law

An employee of a California corporation, who was represented by a union and covered by two successive collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), brought two lawsuits in state court against her employer. She alleged violations of various California labor and business statutes, including claims for unpaid wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks, sick leave, wage statement inaccuracies, expense reimbursement, and retaliation. The CBAs included provisions regarding pay, leave, breaks, and a dispute resolution process for grievances.The employer removed both cases to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing that the employee’s claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which would create federal jurisdiction. The district court determined that only the claims related to untimely wage payments were preempted and thus converted to federal claims under § 301. These federal claims were dismissed because the employee had not exhausted the grievance procedures required by the CBAs. The court found that the remaining state law claims were not preempted, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, and remanded those claims to state court. The employer appealed the remand orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand orders because the district court’s remand was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the remaining state law claims were not preempted by § 301, as they arose from California statutes rather than the CBAs and did not require interpretation of the CBAs. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding the non-preempted claims to state court. The judgment was affirmed. View "RENTERIA-HINOJOSA V. SUNSWEET GROWERS, INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee of a dental supply company, suffered a traumatic brain injury and later filed a claim for long-term disability (LTD) benefits under her employer’s LTD plan, which was insured and administered by an independent insurance company. After her claim was denied, she left her job and entered into a separation agreement with her employer. This agreement included a broad release of claims against the employer and its “parents, subsidiaries, related or affiliated entities,” as well as their agents, including claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Before signing, the plaintiff sought clarification from her employer about whether the release would affect her ability to pursue her LTD claim against the insurer. The employer’s representatives assured her that the insurer was a separate, independent entity and that the agreement would not impact her ability to appeal the denial of her LTD claim.After the insurer denied her appeal, the plaintiff sued the insurer in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging violations of ERISA. The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the release in the separation agreement barred her claims. The district court agreed, holding that the insurer was covered by the release and that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived her ERISA claims against it. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, and the plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff did not knowingly and voluntarily release her ERISA claims against the insurer. The court emphasized the employer’s express assurances to the plaintiff that the release would not affect her LTD claim and found no evidence to create a genuine dispute on this point. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schuyler v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada" on Justia Law

Brian Flores, a current NFL coach, brought a putative class action against the National Football League and several of its member clubs, including the Denver Broncos, New York Giants, and Houston Texans, alleging racial discrimination under federal, state, and local law. Flores’s claims stemmed from his interviews and employment experiences with these teams, during which he alleged discriminatory hiring practices. His employment contracts with various NFL teams incorporated the NFL Constitution, which contains a broad arbitration provision granting the NFL Commissioner authority to arbitrate disputes between coaches and member clubs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration based on Flores’s employment agreements. The District Court granted the motion for claims against the Miami Dolphins, Arizona Cardinals, and Tennessee Titans, but denied it for Flores’s claims against the Broncos, Giants, Texans, and related claims against the NFL. The court found the NFL Constitution’s arbitration provision illusory and unenforceable under Massachusetts law, as it allowed unilateral modification by the NFL and lacked a signed agreement in one instance. The District Court also denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders. The Second Circuit held that the NFL Constitution’s arbitration provision, which vested unilateral substantive and procedural authority in the NFL Commissioner, did not qualify for protection under the Federal Arbitration Act and was unenforceable because it failed to guarantee Flores the ability to vindicate his statutory claims in an impartial arbitral forum. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion for reconsideration, concluding there was no abuse of discretion. View "Flores v. N.Y. Football Giants" on Justia Law

A registered nurse, who identified as a dark-skinned Salvadoran woman, was employed at an acute care hospital. After a night in which she took a prescribed opioid for shingles, she reported to work without notifying her supervisor of her medication use. On that day, two incidents occurred in which controlled opioids were improperly removed from the hospital’s secure medication dispensing system. Several coworkers observed that the nurse appeared disoriented, drowsy, and exhibited slurred speech. Following these observations and the missing medication, supervisors required her to undergo a fitness for duty exam and drug test, which was positive for opiates but later deemed explained by her prescription. The hospital conducted an internal investigation, reviewed security logs, and ultimately terminated her employment for suspected drug diversion, policy violations, and unsafe patient care.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on all claims. The nurse had alleged discrimination and retaliation based on color and national origin under Title VII, disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA, interference and retaliation under the FMLA, and violations of the Illinois Human Rights Act. The district court found that no reasonable factfinder could conclude the hospital’s actions were unlawful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The appellate court held that the nurse failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, as her conduct and observed behavior distinguished her from other employees. The court also found insufficient evidence to support her ADA, FMLA, and IHRA claims, concluding that the hospital’s actions were not shown to be motivated by unlawful animus or to have violated any statutory rights. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the hospital on all claims. View "Lohmeier v Gottlieb Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

A firefighter in Forrest City, Arkansas, was terminated after posting a provocative anti-abortion image on his personal Facebook page. The image, intended to express his pro-life views, was interpreted by some as racially insensitive, particularly because it included the caption “I can’t breathe!”—a phrase associated with protests following George Floyd’s death. After complaints from a retired fire supervisor and others, the firefighter deleted the post. However, the mayor placed him on administrative leave and, following a brief investigation, fired him, citing the public outcry and concerns about the city’s ability to provide public services. The firefighter, who had served over four years without prior incident, learned of his termination through a press release.The firefighter filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, alleging First Amendment retaliation against the mayor in both his individual and official capacities, and against the city for an alleged unwritten policy allowing officials to censor employee speech. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the mayor was entitled to qualified immunity and that there was no evidence of an unwritten policy justifying the official-capacity and policy-based claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the firefighter’s Facebook post addressed a matter of public concern and was made as a private citizen. The court found insufficient evidence of actual or reasonably predicted disruption to the fire department’s operations to justify summary judgment for the defendants. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claims against the mayor and the city, affirmed the dismissal of the unbridled-discretion claim, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Melton v. City of Forrest City, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Kevin Rhodes, a former employee of the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission, was terminated in December 2019 following an investigation into allegations of workplace misconduct, including the use of a racial slur. Rhodes filed grievances about his treatment during the investigation and, after his termination, brought charges of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. He subsequently received notices of right to sue and filed a lawsuit in circuit court alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Missouri Human Rights Act.A jury in the Circuit Court of Jackson County found in favor of the commission on the sex discrimination claim but ruled for Rhodes on his retaliation and hostile work environment claims, awarding him various damages. The circuit court applied a statutory damages cap and entered judgment accordingly. The commission moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the circuit court denied. Both parties appealed: Rhodes challenged the constitutionality of the damages cap, while the commission argued that Rhodes had not made a submissible case. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri due to the constitutional issues raised.The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the circuit court’s judgment was not final because it failed to address Rhodes’s requests for equitable relief and prejudgment interest. The court explained that a final judgment must dispose of all claims and forms of relief sought. Because the judgment did not resolve all aspects of Rhodes’s claims, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, declining to address the merits of the parties’ arguments. View "Rhodes v. Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission" on Justia Law