Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed by a staffing company and assigned to work at a warehousing and logistics firm, performing duties as a materials handler and forklift operator. He filed a class action and a separate representative action alleging various wage and hour violations, including claims for unpaid minimum wages, waiting time penalties, and civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The two cases were consolidated. The plaintiff and his direct employer had entered into an arbitration agreement, which referenced the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules but did not explicitly state that the arbitrator would decide issues of arbitrability.The defendants moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual claims, dismiss class allegations, and stay judicial proceedings. They argued that the arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and that the AAA rules incorporated into the agreement delegated arbitrability issues to the arbitrator. The plaintiff opposed, asserting exemption from the FAA as a transportation worker and arguing that certain claims, including those under PAGA and for unpaid wages, were not arbitrable under California law. The trial court found the FAA did not apply, applied California law, and held that the agreement did not clearly and unmistakably delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court compelled arbitration of some claims but allowed others, including minimum wage and PAGA claims, to proceed in court.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that, in the context of a mandatory employment arbitration agreement, mere incorporation of AAA rules without explicit language in the agreement is not clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court also held that claims for waiting time penalties based on minimum wage violations and all PAGA claims were not arbitrable under California law when the FAA does not apply. View "Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of more than 80 former at-will employees of a nonprofit healthcare system in Washington were terminated after refusing to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination mandate issued by their employer, which was in response to an August 2021 proclamation by the state’s governor requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated. The employees alleged that, at the time, only an “investigational” vaccine authorized for emergency use was available, and they claimed their rights were violated when they were penalized for refusing it. They also argued they were not adequately informed of their right to refuse the vaccine.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington first dismissed all claims against the governor, then dismissed the federal claims against the healthcare system, and denied the employees’ motions for leave to amend and reconsideration. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against the healthcare system.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that none of the employees’ statutory or non-constitutional claims, which were based on various federal statutes, regulations, agreements, and international treaties, alleged specific and definite rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also found that the employees’ constitutional claims failed: the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim was foreclosed by Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho; the procedural due process claim failed because at-will employment is not a constitutionally protected property interest; and the equal protection claim failed because the mandate survived rational-basis review. The court further held that amendment of the federal claims would be futile and upheld the district court’s dismissal of the state law claims against the governor and its decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against the healthcare system. View "Curtis v. Inslee" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an hourly licensed attorney document reviewer, worked for a legal document review company with offices in Minnesota. In 2019, the company changed its overtime policy, eliminating premium overtime pay and stating that employees would be paid only their base rate for all hours worked. In 2020, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated employees, alleging that the company failed to pay required overtime wages, in violation of the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act (MPWA), the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA), and the Minnesota Wage Theft Act (MWTA). The company subsequently paid the plaintiff and other affected employees all claimed overtime wages and liquidated damages, but the parties disagreed about the availability of statutory penalties.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. The court did not address whether the employer had violated the statutes, as the parties had stipulated that the only remaining dispute concerned penalties. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that he was entitled to statutory penalties and injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court held that only the Commissioner of Labor and Industry, not individual employees, may seek average daily wage penalties under the MPWA. Regarding the MFLSA claim, the court found that, because the plaintiff had received all owed wages and liquidated damages, and because penalties are payable to the Commissioner, there was a question of mootness and standing. The court vacated the summary judgment on the MFLSA claim and remanded for the district court to determine its jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal of the MWTA claim and the denial of injunctive relief, finding no statutory basis for penalties and that the request for injunctive relief was not properly before the court. View "Cohen v. Consilio, LLC" on Justia Law

Three former employees of a large convenience store chain alleged that they were denied the opportunity to apply for a promotion to West Coast regional director because of their age. All three had strong performance records and had expressed interest in advancement. When the position became available in early 2020, the company did not announce the vacancy or solicit applications, as it had done in the past. Instead, it selected a younger candidate, who had previously served as a regional director in another area, without giving the plaintiffs a chance to apply. At the time, the plaintiffs were in their mid-50s, while the selected candidate was 45.After the plaintiffs filed suit in California state court, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because they had not applied for the position. The court also found that, even if a prima facie case existed, the employer had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, and the plaintiffs had not shown that this reason was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that, when an employer does not announce a vacancy or solicit applications, plaintiffs are not required to show that they applied for the position to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The court also clarified that, although a ten-year age difference is the usual threshold for a “substantial” age gap, plaintiffs can overcome a smaller gap by providing evidence that age was a significant factor in the employer’s decision. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of pretext and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CALDRONE V. CIRCLE K STORES INC." on Justia Law

An employee suffered a back injury while working as a loader and material handler, which required him to lift heavy objects. After the injury, he received medical treatment and was placed on a weight restriction but continued working for the same employer at a slightly higher wage. Later, he voluntarily left that job for personal reasons and obtained new employment at higher wages. The employee eventually filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and medical evaluations determined he had a permanent impairment to his back.A deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found that the employee had an 8% functional impairment and, applying the “industrial method,” determined the employee had a 15% loss of earning capacity, awarding permanent partial disability benefits accordingly. The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed this decision. The employer and its insurance carrier sought judicial review, arguing that the benefits should have been calculated based on functional impairment rather than loss of earning capacity. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the petition for judicial review, agreeing with the commissioner’s use of the industrial method. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the industrial method was appropriate and that substantial evidence supported the finding of a 15% loss of earning capacity.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and held that, under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v), when an employee with a nonscheduled injury returns to work or is offered work at the same or greater earnings as at the time of injury, compensation must be based solely on the employee’s functional impairment, not on loss of earning capacity. The court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for calculation of benefits based on functional impairment. View "Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee, brought a lawsuit against his employer alleging multiple claims of discrimination and harassment. The employer successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the parties. During the arbitration, the arbitration provider issued an invoice for fees, which the employer attempted to pay electronically on the last day of the statutory 30-day deadline. However, due to a processing delay, the payment was not received by the provider until three days after the deadline.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the employer’s failure to ensure the arbitration fees were received within the 30-day period constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The court vacated its prior order compelling arbitration, returned the case to court, and awarded the plaintiff $1,750 in sanctions for expenses incurred in bringing the motion. The plaintiff then sought over $300,000 in attorney fees and costs under section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1), which allows recovery of all fees and costs associated with an abandoned arbitration. The trial court granted only a reduced amount, reasoning that the plaintiff was entitled only to fees and costs for work rendered useless by the termination of arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, considered the impact of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310. Hohenshelt held that federal law preempts a strict application of section 1281.98, and that forfeiture of arbitral rights occurs only if the failure to pay fees is willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent. The appellate court determined that the employer’s late payment was not willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1). The order awarding attorney fees and costs was reversed. View "Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC" on Justia Law

Jay Gould served as CEO of Interface, Inc., a carpet manufacturer. After an incident at an annual sales meeting in which Gould allegedly became intoxicated and verbally abused an employee, Interface’s board of directors terminated his employment for cause. This followed a prior warning and an investigation by King & Spalding LLP, which corroborated the allegations. Under Gould’s employment agreement, termination for cause resulted in significantly reduced compensation compared to termination without cause.Gould filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging breach of contract and arguing that Interface’s determination of cause was made in bad faith. Interface moved for summary judgment, asserting that the contract gave it absolute discretion to determine cause, or, alternatively, that it had acted in good faith. Gould’s arguments in the district court focused on the company’s alleged lack of good faith, contending that the investigation was a sham. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment to Interface, finding both that the company had absolute discretion and, alternatively, that Gould had not shown bad faith. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Gould’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, ruling that Gould had waived a new argument that Interface had no discretion to determine cause.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Gould advanced the new theory that Interface had no discretion to determine cause under the contract. The Eleventh Circuit held that this theory was a new issue, not a subsidiary argument, and that Gould had forfeited it by failing to raise it in the district court. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that Gould’s remaining claims did not warrant reversal. View "Gould v. Interface, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of nurses directly employed by the City and County of San Francisco, represented by their union, brought a class action alleging that the City failed to comply with Labor Code section 512.1, which requires public sector healthcare employers to provide meal and rest breaks and pay premiums for missed breaks. The nurses claimed that since the law’s effective date, the City had not provided the required breaks or compensation. The City and the union had previously negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that set out meal and rest break provisions and remedies for missed breaks, but the nurses argued these did not satisfy the new statutory requirements.The Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, sustained the City’s demurrer, agreeing with the City’s argument that section 512.1 did not clearly apply to charter cities like San Francisco. The court did not address the City’s alternative constitutional argument regarding home rule authority. The nurses appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory language defining “employer” in section 512.1 was ambiguous as to whether it included charter cities and counties such as San Francisco. The court found that neither the statutory text, legislative history, nor legislative findings demonstrated a clear intent by the Legislature to override charter city home rule authority or to apply section 512.1 to charter cities. The court also noted that when the Legislature intends to regulate charter cities, it does so explicitly, which was not the case here. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that section 512.1 does not apply to the City and County of San Francisco. View "Levy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After a theft occurred at a licensed marijuana-growing facility in Adelanto, California, the employer, Kavry Management, LLC, required several employees, including Steven McDoniel, to take a polygraph test. McDoniel, who was not advised of his right to refuse the test, took and “failed” two polygraph examinations. He was subsequently terminated from his position, with evidence indicating the termination was due to the polygraph results. McDoniel experienced significant emotional distress and concern for his reputation in the industry following his discharge.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed McDoniel’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defamation, and violations of Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5. The court granted summary adjudication for the employer on the defamation and PAGA claims, and on punitive damages, but allowed the wrongful termination and Labor Code claims to proceed. At trial, the jury found Kavry liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and for violating Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5, awarding McDoniel $100,000 in noneconomic damages. The court also imposed a penalty for the personnel records violation and awarded McDoniel attorney fees under section 432.6.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that an employer’s violation of Labor Code section 432.2—requiring or demanding an employee to submit to a polygraph test as a condition of continued employment—supports a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court affirmed the jury’s award of noneconomic damages. However, it reversed the attorney fee award, finding that section 432.6 did not apply retroactively to McDoniel’s employment, which ended before the statute’s effective date. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general statute and found McDoniel forfeited his claim for fees under PAGA. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "McDoniel v. Kavry Management" on Justia Law

An employee of a large retail company alleged that, during her six-week employment at a California store, she was denied meal and rest breaks, not paid for overtime, did not receive proper wage statements, and was required to use her personal cell phone for work without reimbursement. She filed suit in state court, asserting individual, putative class, and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claims for violations of California’s Labor Code. The company removed the case to federal court.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed several of the plaintiff’s class claims and denied class certification for the remaining class claim. The plaintiff continued to pursue her individual and PAGA claims. Shortly before trial, the parties settled the individual claims for $22,000 under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, with the plaintiff dismissing her PAGA claims without prejudice. The settlement allowed the plaintiff to seek reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for work performed on her individual claims, as permitted by law. The district court awarded the plaintiff $297,799 in attorneys’ fees and $14,630 in costs, after she voluntarily reduced her fee request by nearly half to exclude time spent on class certification and legal assistants’ work.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the section 998 settlement agreement did not preclude the plaintiff from seeking attorneys’ fees for work on related claims under the standard set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, as long as those claims were intertwined with her individual claims. However, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide a clear explanation for the fee award. The court vacated the fee award and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation for any future fee determination. View "Alvarado v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law