Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

James Napier, the Director of the Middle School at the Orchard School, was not renewed for his contract in 2019 following orders from the new Head of School, Dr. Sherri Helvie. Napier, believing his termination was due to his sex, filed an employment discrimination suit against Orchard. After being rejected when he reapplied for his position, he added a retaliation claim to his lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Orchard on both claims. The court concluded that Napier had not presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Specifically, the court found that Napier failed to show that his sex was the reason for his termination and that there was no connection between his protected activity and the rejection of his reapplication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Napier did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Helvie's reason for terminating him—breaching her trust—was pretextual. The court noted that Helvie's explanation for the termination was consistent and credible. Additionally, the court found that Napier's retaliation claim failed because there was no evidence that his litigation was the but-for cause of Orchard's decision not to rehire him. The court concluded that the decision was based on Napier's past performance issues and the fractured relationship with Helvie. View "Napier v Orchard School Foundation" on Justia Law

Alisha Strife, a former U.S. Army service member with disabilities, requested that her employer, Aldine Independent School District (AISD), allow her service dog to accompany her at work. Strife's disabilities include PTSD and physical impairments, and her service dog, Inde, assists her with these conditions. Strife submitted her accommodation request on August 30, 2022, but AISD took six months to approve it, during which time Strife provided multiple medical documents supporting her need for the service dog.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Strife's claims for failure to accommodate and hostile work environment. The court also granted AISD's motion for summary judgment on Strife's claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference. The district court found that Strife did not suffer a physical injury during the six-month period and that she failed to allege a hostile work environment. The court also concluded that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not demonstrate that AISD's rationale was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, agreeing that Strife's allegations did not meet the standard for a hostile work environment. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference claims, finding that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not provide sufficient evidence of pretext.However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Strife's failure-to-accommodate claim. The court found that Strife had pled sufficient facts to suggest that AISD's six-month delay in granting her accommodation request could constitute a failure to accommodate her disability. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on this claim. View "Strife v. Aldine Independent School District" on Justia Law

Pamela McKenzie was shopping at a Walgreens in Houston in 2019 when she was detained on suspicion of shoplifting. A Walgreens employee called the police, suspecting McKenzie was the same person who had stolen from the store earlier that day. After reviewing surveillance footage, the police determined McKenzie was not the thief and released her. McKenzie claimed that other Walgreens employees had agreed she was not the thief, but the employee called the police anyway. She sued Walgreens for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior liability for employee negligence, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision (NHTS).The trial court denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which allows for early dismissal of legal actions based on the exercise of free speech. A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the trial court erred by not dismissing McKenzie’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability for employee negligence. However, it held that the NHTS claim was not subject to dismissal under the TCPA because it was not entirely based on the employee’s exercise of free speech rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply to McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The court concluded that McKenzie failed to meet her evidentiary burden to avoid dismissal, as she did not provide clear and specific evidence for each essential element of her NHTS claim. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, specifically for the dismissal of McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment was left undisturbed. View "WALGREENS v. MCKENZIE" on Justia Law

A former high school tennis coach was accused of inappropriate touching and harassment by students. The school district investigated and found no inappropriate touching or bullying but recommended the coach avoid touching players. After the investigation, the coach posted on social media, which was perceived as targeting former players. At a public school board meeting, two students expressed dissatisfaction with the investigation. The school district posted an unaltered video of the meeting online, placed the coach on paid administrative leave, and did not renew her contract. The coach requested the video be altered or removed, but the district refused.The coach filed claims of defamation and wrongful termination in violation of public policy against the school district. The Iowa District Court for Johnson County granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, finding the republication of the statements was protected by the fair-report privilege and that the coach failed to demonstrate a well-established public policy. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the fair-report privilege protected the school district's republication of the students' statements made at the public meeting, as the video was an accurate and complete report of an official proceeding. The court also found that the coach did not identify a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy that was violated by her termination. Thus, the defamation and wrongful termination claims were dismissed. View "Villarini v. Iowa City Community School District" on Justia Law

Lisa Barnhill, a white woman, sued the U.S. Attorney General, alleging racial and gender discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Barnhill claimed she faced discrimination from her African American supervisor and others while employed by the DEA. Some of her claims were dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and others were resolved on summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Barnhill's race and gender discrimination claims, finding she failed to allege facts showing discriminatory animus. The court also dismissed her retaliation claims related to promotion denials and a five-day suspension, concluding she did not plausibly allege a connection between her EEO proceeding and these adverse actions. However, the court allowed her retaliation claims related to a management review and temporary duty reassignment, as well as her hostile work environment claim, to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Barnhill's discrimination claims, agreeing she did not plausibly allege discriminatory animus. The court also affirmed the dismissal of her retaliation claims related to promotion denials and the suspension, finding no causal connection to her EEO proceeding. On summary judgment, the court found that the management review was initiated by a supervisor without discriminatory animus and that the temporary duty reassignment was justified by legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons. The court also concluded that Barnhill's hostile work environment claim failed because the adverse actions she experienced were responses to her own behavior, not severe or pervasive harassment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Barnhill failed to establish the necessary elements for her claims. View "Barnhill v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Tracy Turner, a railway conductor employed by BNSF Railway for fifteen years, failed two vision tests required by federal law in 2020. The first test was the Ishihara 14-plate clinical vision test, which Turner failed due to a color deficiency affecting his perception of red and green. At his request, Turner was given a second vision field test by BNSF’s medical examiner, which he also failed. Consequently, BNSF did not recertify Turner as a conductor, as required by federal regulations.Turner did not appeal the denial of his recertification through the Federal Railway Administration (FRA) administrative review process. Instead, he filed a disability-discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which provided him with a right-to-sue letter. Turner then sued BNSF, claiming that the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by not recertifying him due to his color deficiency. BNSF moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted the motion, ruling that Turner was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA and that his claim was precluded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Turner was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA because he failed to obtain the FRA-required certification and did not exhaust the available administrative remedies. The court emphasized that BNSF was bound by federal law and FRA regulations, which mandated the vision tests and certification process. Turner’s failure to pursue the FRA’s appeals process meant he could not establish an essential element of his ADA claim. View "Turner v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

Mone Yvette Sanders filed a class and representative action against her former employer, Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., alleging wage and hour claims under the Labor Code and a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court granted Edward Jones’s motions to compel arbitration of Sanders’s individual Labor Code and PAGA claims and stayed the representative PAGA cause of action pending arbitration. Sanders initiated arbitration, but Edward Jones failed to pay $54,000 in fees within 30 days as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Sanders then moved to vacate the order compelling arbitration and proceed in court.The trial court initially granted Sanders’s motion, finding section 1281.98 was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). However, after Edward Jones submitted new authority, the court reconsidered and denied Sanders’s motion, concluding section 1281.98 was preempted by the FAA. Sanders filed a petition for writ of mandate.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98, which allows an employee to withdraw from arbitration if the employer fails to pay fees within 30 days, is not preempted by the FAA. The court found that section 1281.98 furthers the FAA’s goal of expeditious arbitration and does not undermine the FAA’s objectives. The court also determined that the trial court, not the arbitrator, should decide whether there has been a default under section 1281.98.The Court of Appeal granted Sanders’s petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Sanders’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and allowing her to pursue her claims in court. The trial court was also instructed to consider Sanders’s motion for sanctions under section 1281.99. View "Sanders v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Kelly Rose, a former cashier at Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued her employer under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging violations of the “suitable seating” provisions of the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order. After a nine-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby, and judgment was entered accordingly. Rose appealed, but the judgment was affirmed. Subsequently, Hobby Lobby sought nearly $125,000 in litigation costs as the prevailing party, which the trial court ordered the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) to pay, despite the LWDA not participating in the litigation.The LWDA appealed the cost order, raising the issue of whether it could be held liable for litigation costs in a PAGA action where it did not participate. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that even if a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action is entitled to recover costs under the general cost recovery rule, those costs are not recoverable against the LWDA if it did not participate in the litigation. The court emphasized that the LWDA was not a party to the lawsuit and did not take any action until after the judgment was entered.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order requiring the LWDA to pay Hobby Lobby's litigation costs. The court held that the LWDA, as the real party in interest in a PAGA action, is not liable for costs if it did not intervene or participate in the litigation. The decision clarified that the LWDA's role in PAGA actions does not automatically make it liable for litigation costs incurred by a prevailing defendant. View "Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores" on Justia Law

Dyamond Davis, an employee at the Shapiro Development Center, informed her supervisor on May 12, 2017, that she needed to leave work due to pregnancy-related morning sickness. Her supervisor allowed her to leave, reminding her to complete the necessary paperwork. Davis was later granted FMLA leave retroactive to May, but DHS determined that part of her May 12 absence was unauthorized because it believed FMLA did not cover morning sickness and that Davis violated policies requiring the substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. Consequently, DHS terminated her employment. Davis appealed her termination unsuccessfully to the Illinois Civil Service Commission and then filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference. Another employee, Antionette Burns, joined the lawsuit with a similar claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Burns’s claim for lack of Article III standing and granted summary judgment in favor of DHS on Davis’s claim. The court found that Burns failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact and that DHS was entitled to rely on the medical certification provided by Davis’s doctor, which did not indicate a need for intermittent leave for morning sickness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Burns’s claim without prejudice, agreeing that she failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact. However, the court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding Davis’s FMLA claim. The court noted that morning sickness qualifies as a serious health condition under FMLA and that DHS was aware of Davis’s need for intermittent leave due to morning sickness. The court also found that DHS may have improperly applied its paid leave substitution policy, which could have led to Davis’s termination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for DHS on Davis’s claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Eric Moore, an employee of Industrial Demolition LLC, injured his hip while working at the Brayton Point Power Station demolition site in December 2019. Despite his injury, Moore was able to continue working with reasonable accommodations. He returned to work with a doctor's note outlining his limitations and requested accommodations from Industrial Demolition. Although initially allowed to work with restrictions, Moore's supervisor became hostile towards him, leading to Moore's termination after an argument over his job-related limitations and requests for accommodation.A federal jury in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that Industrial Demolition failed to accommodate Moore's injury and retaliated against him for requesting or using a reasonable accommodation. The jury awarded Moore $10,035 in damages. Both Moore and Industrial Demolition were dissatisfied with the result and sought to reverse or amend the judgment or to grant a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's verdict, finding that the jury's determination that Moore was retaliated against for requesting or using a reasonable accommodation was supported by sufficient evidence. The court also upheld the district court's decision to allow the jury to consider the NLRB settlement payment in calculating damages, rejecting Moore's argument that the settlement should be excluded as collateral source income. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Moore's motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of outrageous or egregious conduct by Industrial Demolition warranting punitive damages. View "Moore v. Industrial Demolition LLC" on Justia Law