Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Augustina Dean, a former elementary school teacher, filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) in Hawaii, asserting she had suffered a work-related injury. The Director of the DLIR, however, found that Dean did not suffer a work-related injury. Dean appealed this decision to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board (LIRAB). The LIRAB reversed the Director's decision and ordered a new hearing. Following the new hearing, the Director awarded Dean $2,424.24 for "1% permanent partial disability of the whole person," and "medical care, services and supplies as the nature of the injury may require." Dean appealed this decision to the LIRAB, but the LIRAB refused to hear the case, arguing that Dean had missed the appeal deadline by one day.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) sided with the LIRAB, affirming its decision to dismiss Dean's appeal as untimely. The ICA relied on the precedent set in Kissell v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Appeals Bd., which declared that the time for filing a written notice of appeal is mandatory. Dean, still self-represented, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii vacated the ICA's summary disposition order. The court held that the LIRAB, the agency rejecting an appeal as untimely based on the Department’s “sent” date, must have direct evidence that the decision was sent on that date. In this case, the LIRAB did not have sufficient evidence. The court concluded that the Department did not offer adequate evidence that it mailed its decision on the date it claimed. Therefore, Dean may appeal to the LIRAB. The court remanded the case to the LIRAB to address the merits of Dean's appeal. View "Dean v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Logan-Mingo Area Mental Health, Inc., the employer, and David M. Lester, the employee. Lester had a preexisting impairment from a 1999 workers’ compensation claim for injuries to his lumbar and thoracic spine, which resulted in a 20% Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) award. In 2017, Lester fell off a ladder at work, sustaining additional injuries to his lumbar and thoracic spine, along with injuries to his cervical spine, left shoulder, right knee, and left knee. The dispute arose over the method of apportioning Lester's preexisting impairments when determining his PPD award for the 2017 injuries.The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (OOJ) affirmed the claims administrator's decision to grant Lester an additional 2% PPD award, resulting in a total 10% PPD award for the 2017 claim. This decision was based on a method of apportioning preexisting impairments suggested by Dr. Thaxton, who reviewed Lester's records. Lester appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR), which reversed the OOJ's decision and granted a 19% PPD award based on a different method of apportionment suggested by Dr. Guberman, who performed an independent medical evaluation of Lester. Logan-Mingo, the employer, appealed the BOR's decision.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the BOR's decision and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the OOJ's decision. The court held that when a claimant has preexisting, definitely ascertained impairments to multiple body parts and then sustains new compensable injuries that affect the previously impaired body parts, the proper method for apportioning the preexisting impairments is to first determine the claimant’s total, unapportioned whole-person impairment using the Combined Values Chart of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Then, the total amount of the claimant’s preexisting impairment that has been definitely ascertained must be deducted from the total, unapportioned whole-person impairment to calculate the amount of the claimant’s Permanent Partial Disability award. The court found that the BOR erred by granting Lester a 19% PPD award that was based on Dr. Guberman’s erroneous apportionment method. View "Logan-Mingo Area Mental Health, Inc. v. Lester" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a former coal miner, Richard McLain, who developed a serious lung condition after working underground for nearly two decades. McLain filed a claim under the Black Lung Benefits Act, alleging that his years of mine work had left him totally disabled from a pulmonary perspective. His former employer, Old Ben Coal Company, had been liquidated through bankruptcy, so Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the surety guaranteeing Old Ben’s debts under the Act, contested liability on the coal company’s behalf.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined that McLain was disabled within the meaning of the Black Lung Benefits Act. The ALJ's decision was based on a thorough review of the medical record and a set of medical findings regarding how to distinguish between lung disorders arising from coal dust and those arising from tobacco smoke. Old Ben appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review Board, arguing that the ALJ erroneously treated the 2001 preamble as if it were binding law and made factual findings unsupported by the medical record. The Review Board affirmed the benefits decision in full.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the decision of the Benefits Review Board, emphasizing the broad discretion ALJs enjoy when evaluating competing medical theories, the weight ALJs may properly attribute to the perspective of the Department of Labor on such issues, and the significant deference owed to ALJs’ medical findings and scientific judgments on appeal. The court found no error in the ALJ's application of a regulatory preamble or in the factual findings that were challenged by Old Ben. View "Safeco Insurance/Liberty Mutual Surety v. OWCP" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by the Department of Corrections (DOC) against a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff P. Mark Potanas under the State Employee Whistleblower Act. Potanas, a former superintendent of Southern State Correctional Facility (SSCF), claimed that the DOC fired him in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. These activities included notifying the state about potential savings on a building renovation project and advocating for more mental health staff at SSCF. The DOC argued that Potanas did not engage in any "protected activity" under the Act, and thus, the trial court should have granted its request for judgment as a matter of law.The trial court denied the DOC's motion, finding that Potanas's report of potential waste and his complaints about mental health staffing were sufficient to meet the definition of "protected activity" under the Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Potanas, leading to the DOC's appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, agreeing with the DOC that Potanas did not engage in protected activity under the Whistleblower Act. The court held that the Act does not encompass reports about the possibility of future waste and that reporting on a known problem or disagreeing about how to resolve a known problem is not protected activity. The court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the jury’s verdict and enter judgment for the DOC. View "Potanas v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Education Association Stateside Region (FEA-SR), a teachers' union, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The parties were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when they reached an impasse. The Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) was called in to resolve the remaining issues. The FSIP issued an order resolving the impasse, but FEA-SR refused to sign the agreement, arguing that the FSIP lacked jurisdiction to resolve certain issues. FEA-SR filed an arbitral grievance claiming that the Department of Defense's submission of the agreement for agency head review without FEA-SR's signature violated the contractual ground rules and constituted bad faith bargaining.The arbitrator found in favor of FEA-SR, concluding that the Department of Defense had committed unfair labor practices by cutting negotiations short and submitting an unexecuted agreement for agency head review. The FLRA, however, set aside the arbitrator's award, finding that the arbitrator could not review whether the FSIP had jurisdiction over the disputed issues and that the agreement was "executed" when the FSIP issued its order.FEA-SR petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FLRA's decisions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because the FLRA's decisions involved an unfair labor practice. However, on the merits, the court rejected FEA-SR's claims and denied the petition for review. The court agreed with the FLRA that the arbitrator lacked authority to review the FSIP order and that the agreement was executed when the FSIP issued its order. View "Federal Education Association Stateside Region v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Three employees of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) alleged that their supervisors retaliated against them for whistleblowing on CBP's noncompliance with the DNA Fingerprints Act of 2005. The employees claimed that their supervisors failed to promote them and dismantled their division within the CBP. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dismissed their appeal, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The MSPB determined that the employees had not "nonfrivolously" alleged that their supervisors' actions were "personnel actions" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the MSPB's decision. The court found that while there may be a high bar for succeeding on the merits before the MSPB, its jurisdictional bar is low, and the employees' claims cleared that lower bar. The court held that the employees' allegations, if true, could establish that their supervisors took a "personnel action" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). The court concluded that the MSPB had jurisdiction to hear the employees' appeal. View "Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Ververka, who was employed as an administrator at a veterans home operated by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (CalVet). Ververka alleged that CalVet terminated him in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, which prohibits retaliation against whistleblowing employees. He claimed that he was dismissed for reporting safety and health issues at the home and potential violations of federal law. The jury found that while Ververka made protected disclosures that were contributing factors in CalVet's decision to remove him, CalVet was not liable as it proved it would have made the same decision for non-retaliatory reasons.After the trial court entered judgment for CalVet, Ververka moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the analysis in Harris v. City of Santa Monica, a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) case, did not extend to section 1102.5 claims, which are evaluated under the procedures set forth in section 1102.6.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division One, Ververka contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment. He argued that an employer’s “same decision” showing under section 1102.6 precludes only an award of damages and backpay and an order of reinstatement, and as a result, he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The court disagreed with Ververka's interpretation of section 1102.6 and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, dismissing CalVet’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that if the employer satisfies its burden at the second step in making a same decision showing, the employer is not liable regardless of whether the employee made an initial showing that his or her protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in the adverse employment action. View "Ververka v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Capen, a former employee of Saginaw County, Michigan, sued the county and Robert V. Belleman, the county's Controller and Chief Administrative Officer, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Capen claimed that his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was scheduled for two fitness-for-duty evaluations. The evaluations were ordered after a co-worker reported that Capen had threatened to kill other employees. Capen was subsequently placed on paid administrative leave and later terminated for failing to participate in an "interactive process" meeting to identify potential reasonable accommodations for his work, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that Capen lacked a constitutionally protected interest, that he received the process he was due, and that Belleman was entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Capen's ability to refuse his fitness-for-duty evaluations did not constitute a protected interest under the Due Process Clause. The court noted that while the evaluations were stressful and deeply personal for Capen, he failed to demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated. The court also observed that compelling circumstances justified the county's decision to require the evaluations, given the reported threats of violence. View "Capen v. Saginaw County, Michigan" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Connecticut and the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO. The plaintiff, the state, sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating a union member to his employment as the director of student conduct at a state university. The defendant union sought to confirm the award. The grievant’s employment had been terminated in connection with a domestic dispute involving his wife. The university conducted its own investigation and subsequently informed the grievant that his employment was being terminated as a result of his off-duty conduct. The union contested the grievant’s discharge, and an arbitration hearing was held. The arbitrator concluded that the university did not have just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment and ordered his reinstatement.The state contended that the award violated public policy. The trial court rendered judgment granting the state’s application to vacate the award and denying the union’s motion to confirm the award, from which the union appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the arbitration award reinstating the grievant to his position of director of student conduct violated public policy. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the union’s motion to confirm the award and to deny the state’s application to vacate the award. View "State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty" on Justia Law

Samantha Howard, a pharmacist with Type I diabetes and hypoglycemic unawareness, began working at Bothwell Regional Medical Center, operated by the City of Sedalia, Missouri. Howard requested to keep food and drink at her desk, which was granted. Later, she requested to bring a service dog into the pharmacy to help her manage her diabetes. Bothwell denied this request, citing potential risks of contamination. Unable to agree on an alternative accommodation, Howard resigned and filed a lawsuit alleging that Bothwell's failure to make a reasonable accommodation violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The jury ruled in favor of Howard, awarding her compensatory and emotional damages. Bothwell appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. The court found that the case was governed by its recent decision in Hopman v. Union Pac. R.R., which clarified the definition of "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA. The court concluded that Howard failed to identify any employer-sponsored benefit or program to which she lacked access due to the absence of her service dog. The court ruled that providing a service dog at work so that an employee with a disability has the same assistance the service dog provides away from work is not a cognizable benefit or privilege of employment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Bothwell. View "Howard v. City of Sedalia, Missouri" on Justia Law