Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Five employees of the Glenwood Resource Center (GRC), a residence for individuals with severe intellectual and developmental disabilities, left their jobs during a period when the superintendent conducted unauthorized experiments on residents. These experiments included excessive hydration to reduce pneumonia and behavioral health experiments without consent. The plaintiffs, who had different roles and left under various circumstances, sued the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) and other officials, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, among other claims.The Iowa District Court for Mills County dismissed all claims except for the wrongful discharge claim, which was later dismissed on summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify a clearly defined public policy that was violated by their discharge. The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that their discharge violated a clearly defined public policy. The statutes cited by the plaintiffs, Iowa Code sections 225C.1(2) and 230A.101(1), were deemed too general to support a wrongful discharge claim. Additionally, the court concluded that Iowa Code section 70A.28, which provides remedies for state employees who face retaliation for whistleblowing, is the exclusive remedy for such claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were essentially whistleblower claims and that they had not appealed the summary judgment on their section 70A.28 claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Brodie v. Foxhoven" on Justia Law

Several estates filed a lawsuit against Tyson Foods Inc. and several of its corporate executives and plant supervisors, alleging gross negligence and fraud after four former workers at Tyson Foods’ pork processing plant in Waterloo died from COVID-19. The plaintiffs claimed that Tyson failed to implement adequate safety measures and misled workers about the risks of COVID-19, leading to the workers' deaths.The Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County dismissed the case, concluding that Iowa’s Workers’ Compensation Act (IWCA) provided the exclusive remedy for the estates’ claims, thus lacking subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead gross negligence to fall within an exception to the IWCA and that the claims were improperly "lumped" together without specifying each defendant's duty or claim.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded gross negligence against the executive and supervisor defendants, thus falling within the IWCA’s exception. The court found that the petition provided fair notice of the claims and that the allegations met the elements of gross negligence: knowledge of the peril, knowledge that injury was probable, and a conscious failure to avoid the peril. The court also held that the fraudulent misrepresentation claims against the supervisor defendants were not preempted by the IWCA, as intentional torts fall outside its scope.However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the corporate defendants, Tyson Foods and Tyson Fresh Meats, as the IWCA’s exclusivity provisions barred any direct tort claims against employers. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the breach-of-duty claims against Adams and Jones due to waiver. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Mehmedovic v. Tyson Foods Inc." on Justia Law

Sergeant John Babcock, a member of the Newton police department, was transferred from his position as a traffic sergeant with regular daytime hours to a night shift sergeant position. This transfer occurred after Babcock had been actively involved in union activities, including disputes with the police chief, David MacDonald. Despite receiving an eight percent pay increase as stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Babcock's new position required him to work irregular nighttime hours, weekends, and holidays, which he claimed negatively impacted his family life.The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (CERB) reviewed the case after the union filed a charge of prohibited practice, alleging that the transfer was retaliatory. The hearing officer initially found that while the transfer was an adverse employment action and the union had established a prima facie case of retaliation, the city had rebutted this by producing evidence of Babcock's insubordination and misconduct. The hearing officer concluded that the city's reasons for the transfer were legitimate and dismissed the complaint.Upon appeal, the CERB disagreed with the hearing officer's conclusion, finding that the city failed to produce evidence that Babcock's misconduct was the reason for his transfer. The CERB determined that the transfer was indeed retaliatory and ordered that Babcock be reinstated to his previous position.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the CERB's decision. The court held that Babcock's transfer constituted an adverse employment action despite the pay increase, as it resulted in a material disadvantage in the terms and conditions of his employment. The court also concluded that a generally good work record is not a necessary element to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The city's failure to produce evidence linking Babcock's misconduct to the transfer decision meant that the union's prima facie case of retaliation remained unrebutted. View "City of Newton v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

Winston R. Anderson, a former Intel employee, brought a putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against the trustees of Intel Corporation’s proprietary retirement funds. Anderson alleged that the trustees breached their fiduciary duty of prudence by investing in hedge funds and private equity funds, and their duty of loyalty by steering retirement funds to companies in which Intel Capital had already invested.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Anderson’s claims, concluding that he had not plausibly alleged a breach of either the duty of prudence or the duty of loyalty. The court found that Anderson failed to provide a meaningful benchmark to compare the performance of Intel’s funds and did not plausibly allege a real conflict of interest for the duty of loyalty claim. Anderson was granted leave to amend his complaint, but the district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Anderson did not state a claim for breach of ERISA’s duty of prudence because he failed to provide a sound basis for comparison, as the funds he compared to Intel’s funds had different aims, risks, and potential rewards. The court also held that Anderson did not state a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty because he did not plausibly allege a real conflict of interest, only the potential for one. The court emphasized that ERISA requires prudence based on the methods employed by fiduciaries, not the results achieved, and that generalized attacks on hedge funds and private equity funds as a category are insufficient to state a claim. View "Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4 and 5. Plaintiffs had signed written agreements waiving their right to a meal period for shifts between five and six hours, which they could revoke at any time. They argued that these prospective waivers allowed Vicar to circumvent statutory meal break requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective meal period waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the waivers were enforceable as they were revocable and there was no evidence of coercion or unconscionability. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court examined the text of section 512 and the wage orders, as well as their legislative and administrative history. It concluded that the Legislature and IWC did not intend to prohibit prospective written waivers of meal periods for shifts between five and six hours. The court noted that the IWC had historically viewed prospective written waivers as protective for both employees and employers. The court also found that the case of Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court did not support Plaintiffs' arguments, as it did not address the timing or circumstances under which a meal period can be waived.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the prospective written waivers signed by Plaintiffs were valid and enforceable under section 512 and the applicable wage orders. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating" on Justia Law

Tiara Yachts, Inc. hired Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) to administer its self-funded healthcare benefits plan. Tiara Yachts alleges that BCBSM systematically overpaid certain claims, thereby squandering plan assets, and then profited from these overpayments through a program that clawed back the overpayments and kept a portion of the recovered funds. Tiara Yachts sued BCBSM under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), claiming breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted BCBSM's motion to dismiss, holding that Tiara Yachts had not plausibly alleged that BCBSM acted as an ERISA fiduciary. The court also held that ERISA’s remedial provisions could not provide the relief Tiara Yachts sought.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Tiara Yachts plausibly alleged that BCBSM acted as an ERISA fiduciary by exercising control over plan assets when it overpaid claims and by exercising discretion over its compensation through the Shared Savings Program (SSP). The court found that BCBSM’s control over the claims-processing apparatus and its ability to profit from overpayments through the SSP indicated fiduciary status.The Sixth Circuit also held that Tiara Yachts could seek recovery on behalf of the plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) and could seek equitable relief, such as restitution and disgorgement, under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The court concluded that Tiara Yachts’ claims for restitution and disgorgement were equitable in nature and that the complaint plausibly alleged that BCBSM retained specific funds from the SSP, satisfying the traceability requirement for equitable relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Tiara Yachts, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan" on Justia Law

J.H. participated in an employee welfare-benefit plan insured by Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company, with her son, A.H., as a beneficiary. After seeking benefits for A.H.'s yearlong stay at a mental-health treatment center, Anthem denied coverage, and Plaintiffs' appeal to Anthem was unsuccessful. Over a year after their final appeal through Anthem was decided, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to recover benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the action, concluding it was time-barred under a provision of the Plan that required civil actions under ERISA § 502(a) to be brought within one year of the grievance or appeal decision. Plaintiffs argued that another sentence in the Plan set a three-year limitations period, creating an ambiguity that should be interpreted in their favor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the two provisions were not inconsistent and both applied. The court explained that the one-year limitations period for § 502(a) actions and the three-year limitations period for other actions were distinct and could both be applicable. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that Plaintiffs' action was time-barred as it was filed beyond the one-year limitations period specified in the Plan. View "J.H. v. Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, La Kimba Bradsbery and Cheri Brakensiek, sued their former employer, Vicar Operating, Inc., alleging that Vicar failed to provide the required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4 and 5. The plaintiffs had signed a written agreement waiving their right to a meal period for shifts between five and six hours, which they could revoke at any time. They argued that these prospective waivers allowed Vicar to circumvent statutory meal break requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective meal period waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the waivers were enforceable as they were revocable and there was no evidence of coercion or unconscionability. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the prospective written waivers of meal periods for shifts between five and six hours were consistent with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Orders Nos. 4 and 5. The court found that the legislative and administrative history supported the validity of such waivers, noting that the IWC had long viewed prospective written waivers as protective of both employees and employers. The court also concluded that the case of Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court did not require a contrary result, as it did not address the timing or form of meal period waivers. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2021, the Cook County Health and Hospitals System implemented a policy requiring all personnel to be fully vaccinated against infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Exemptions were allowed for disability, medical conditions, or sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs, who are healthcare employees or contractors, requested religious exemptions, which were granted. However, the accommodation provided was a transfer to unpaid status pending termination, with a limited time to find a non-existent remote position. Plaintiffs argued this was religious discrimination violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois previously denied plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions against the vaccine mandates, including Cook County’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this denial, rejecting the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the mandate. On remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint but were denied permission to add a claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act until after the court ruled on the County’s motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the second amended complaint, considering it a facial challenge, which had already been ruled upon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs waived their as-applied challenge by not raising it in the district court or their opening brief on appeal. The court also noted that plaintiffs conceded they no longer sought injunctive relief and did not pursue a facial challenge. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claim. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint to include the Illinois RFRA claim. The court criticized the plaintiffs' counsel for poor advocacy and procedural errors. View "Lukaszczyk v Cook County" on Justia Law

Saul Arellano, a roofer, was injured while working on a construction project for Sunrise Homes, Inc. He fell from a roof without fall protection equipment and sustained multiple injuries. Arellano received worker’s compensation benefits through Sunrise Homes after it was discovered that his direct employer did not carry worker’s compensation insurance. Subsequently, Arellano filed negligence and negligence per se claims against Sunrise Homes, arguing that his injuries fell under the “unprovoked physical aggression” exception to Idaho’s worker’s compensation exclusive remedy rule.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison County, granted summary judgment in favor of Sunrise Homes. The court concluded that Arellano failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that his claims fell within the statutory exception to the exclusive remedy rule. Specifically, the court found no genuine issues of material fact that Sunrise Homes knew injury or death was substantially likely to occur due to the lack of fall protection equipment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in applying the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard at the summary judgment stage. However, upon de novo review, the Supreme Court found that Arellano did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Sunrise Homes’ knowledge that injury was substantially likely to occur. The court also rejected Arellano’s arguments that the 2020 amendments to Idaho Code section 72-209(3) codified a more lenient standard or reduced the burden of proof for plaintiffs. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Sunrise Homes and awarded costs on appeal to Sunrise Homes. View "Arellano v. Sunrise Homes, Inc." on Justia Law