Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Brian Ranger, a maintenance worker for Alamitos Bay Yacht Club, was injured while performing his duties, which included hoisting and mooring vessels. On August 28, 2018, he slipped and fell while boarding a vessel, resulting in serious injuries. Ranger applied for state workers' compensation and subsequently sued the Club under general maritime law, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.The Los Angeles County Superior Court sustained the Club's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that Ranger failed to allege facts implicating federal admiralty jurisdiction. Although the court acknowledged the tort occurred on navigable waters, it found that Ranger did not demonstrate his fall posed more than a fanciful risk to maritime commerce. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision but on different grounds, holding that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) displaced general maritime law, making California’s workers’ compensation scheme Ranger’s exclusive remedy.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and concluded that the Court of Appeal erred. The court held that the 1984 amendments to the LHWCA, which exclude certain workers from federal workers' compensation if they are covered by state laws, did not abrogate general maritime remedies for those outside the LHWCA’s scope. The court also determined that California’s workers’ compensation exclusive-remedy provision could not deprive Ranger of his substantive federal maritime rights under the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to address unresolved issues, including whether Ranger’s claims properly invoked admiralty jurisdiction. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

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Gerry Serrano, a police officer for the City of Santa Ana, took a leave of absence to serve as president of the Santa Ana Police Officers Association. The Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that certain special pay additives Serrano received before and during his service as Association president could not be included in his pension. The Administrative Board of CalPERS and the Superior Court of Sacramento County affirmed the exclusion of most of these pay additives from Serrano’s pension. Serrano appealed, arguing that Government Code section 3558.8 mandates he cannot lose any compensation, including pensionable compensation, while serving as the Association president. He also challenged the specific exclusion of a confidential premium and holiday pay from his pensionable compensation.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Serrano’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which sought to vacate the Board’s decision and include all pay additives in his retirement calculation. Serrano then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that section 3558.8 did not require the compensation Serrano earned as a police sergeant to be entirely pensionable while he served as Association president. The court concluded that the confidential premium was not pensionable because it constituted nonpensionable overtime and did not meet the regulatory definition for the confidentiality premium. Additionally, the court found that Serrano’s holiday pay was not pensionable because he was not required to work on holidays, as required by the relevant regulation. The court’s decision was based on the interpretation of the Retirement Law and the specific definitions and requirements for pensionable compensation under that law. View "Serrano v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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John Lowry, a harbor patrol officer, suffered physical and psychiatric injuries, including PTSD, from a workplace accident. His psychiatrist deemed him unfit to return to work, and the Port San Luis Harbor District (the District) indicated that his only option was retirement. Lowry applied for disability retirement, but the District denied his application, stating insufficient information to determine disability. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) also denied his application, and the District terminated his employment, claiming he voluntarily resigned, which was later admitted to be untrue.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that Lowry was not eligible for relief under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) because he could not perform his essential job duties with or without reasonable accommodations. The court found that disability retirement does not qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of employment under FEHA.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the denial of disability retirement payments is not an adverse employment action under FEHA. Disability retirement payments serve as income replacement for employees who can no longer work and do not facilitate continued employment, job performance, or advancement opportunities. The court concluded that an individual who is not a qualified employee cannot bring a disability discrimination claim under FEHA for the denial of disability retirement payments. The judgment in favor of the District was affirmed. View "Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist." on Justia Law

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Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (Packers) employed Jose A. Parra Rodriguez (Parra) in California from April 2019 to July 2021. In February 2022, Parra filed a complaint against Packers under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), seeking civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code and California Code of Regulations. Packers moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Parra allegedly signed, which included a clause for binding individual arbitration. Parra opposed the motion, arguing he did not recall signing the agreement, his PAGA claims lacked an individual component, and the claims fell under exceptions to arbitration.The Superior Court of Imperial County held an evidentiary hearing and found Parra had signed the agreement. However, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, interpreting "current law" to mean the law as it stood in 2019, when Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC held PAGA claims were not subject to arbitration. The court concluded the parties had not agreed to arbitrate PAGA claims at all.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Packers argued that under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, Parra’s individual PAGA claim should be compelled to arbitration, and non-individual claims should be dismissed. Parra contended his complaint did not include individual PAGA claims, citing Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc., which held a plaintiff could forgo individual relief and bring a representative PAGA action.The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with Parra that his complaint did not assert individual PAGA claims. The court found that Parra had not sought individual PAGA relief and thus, there were no individual claims to compel to arbitration. The court did not address whether a PAGA action must include an individual claim, as this issue was not ripe for consideration in this appeal. View "Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services" on Justia Law

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Gary Waetzig, a former employee of Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., filed a federal age-discrimination lawsuit against the company. He later submitted his claims for arbitration and voluntarily dismissed his federal lawsuit without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). After losing in arbitration, Waetzig sought to reopen his dismissed lawsuit and vacate the arbitration award, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as the basis for reopening the case.The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado reopened the case, ruling that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a "final proceeding" under Rule 60(b) and that Waetzig made a mistake by dismissing his case rather than seeking a stay. The District Court also granted Waetzig's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Halliburton appealed, and the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not count as a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that a case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a "final proceeding" under Rule 60(b). The Court reasoned that a voluntary dismissal is "final" because it terminates the case and aligns with the definitions and historical context of the term "final." The Court also concluded that a voluntary dismissal qualifies as a "proceeding" under Rule 60(b), encompassing all steps in an action's progression. The judgment of the Tenth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Carmen Quintana-Dieppa, a 62-year-old Puerto Rican woman, worked for the Department of the Army since 1988 and served as a Child Youth and School Services Coordinator at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, since 2009. In 2014, she filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging national origin discrimination. While her complaint was pending, the Army conducted two investigations into her management style, finding that she fostered a toxic work environment. Consequently, she was reassigned to a nonsupervisory role in 2017. Quintana claimed this reassignment was discriminatory and retaliatory.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of the Army, finding no genuine issues of material fact. The court determined that Quintana failed to properly contest the Army's Statement of Facts according to Local Rule 56, and thus, the Army's facts were deemed admitted. The court concluded that Quintana did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, even if she had, she failed to show that the Army's reasons for her reassignment were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that Quintana did not meet her burden of showing that the Army's stated reasons for her reassignment were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The court noted that the Army's investigations provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the reassignment, and Quintana's arguments, including claims of hearsay and fabrication, were unsupported by the record. The court also found that the temporal proximity between her EEOC complaint and reassignment was insufficient to establish a causal link for retaliation. View "Quintana-Dieppa v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

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Claudia C. Conner, the plaintiff, was employed by the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission (OESC) as General Counsel and Chief of Staff. She was terminated in November 2021, at the age of over sixty, despite having satisfactory job performance and receiving a raise a month prior. Conner alleges that her termination was due to age and gender discrimination, and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment by a state vendor. She filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which issued a right to sue letter, leading her to file a lawsuit in the Oklahoma County District Court.The OESC moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Conner failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The District Court of Oklahoma County denied the motion, citing material conflicts between the GTCA and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The OESC then sought and was granted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that there are no material or irreconcilable conflicts between the GTCA and the OADA regarding the notice provisions. The court found that the GTCA's notice requirements apply to claims under the OADA. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Supreme Court emphasized that compliance with the GTCA notice provisions is a jurisdictional requirement for tort suits against governmental entities. View "CONNER v. STATE" on Justia Law

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Mark L. Sadler, a former employee of the United States Army, was suspended and then removed from his position for insubordination. Sadler claimed that these actions were retaliatory under the Whistleblower Protection Act and sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). He also requested sanctions against the government for the destruction of evidence. The Board denied both his motion for sanctions and his request for corrective action.The Merit Systems Protection Board initially dismissed Sadler’s first complaint, finding it did not sufficiently allege protected activity. For his second complaint, the Board acknowledged that Sadler engaged in protected whistleblower activity but concluded that the Army had shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions regardless of the protected activity. The Board also denied Sadler’s motion for sanctions, finding that the destruction of evidence was part of the Army’s ordinary procedures and did not warrant sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The court agreed that Sadler’s first complaint did not allege protected activity and that the Army had provided clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. The court also upheld the Board’s decision on the sanctions issue, agreeing that the destruction of evidence was part of routine procedures and did not meet the intent standard required for sanctions under Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "SADLER v. ARMY " on Justia Law

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Angelica Ramirez sued her former employer, Charter Communications, Inc., under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful discharge. Charter moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Ramirez during her onboarding process. The trial court found the agreement contained unconscionable provisions and refused to enforce it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the arbitration agreement to be a contract of adhesion and identified several substantively unconscionable provisions, including shortened filing periods for claims, improper allocation of attorney fees, and lack of mutuality in claims subject to arbitration. The court denied Charter's motion to compel arbitration. Charter appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the agreement contained multiple unconscionable provisions.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and concurred that three provisions were substantively unconscionable but remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to reconsider whether the unconscionable provisions could be severed from the agreement. On remand, the Court of Appeal concluded that severing the unconscionable provisions would not further the interests of justice. The court found that the agreement's central purpose was tainted with illegality and that the multiple unconscionable provisions indicated a systematic effort by Charter to impose arbitration in a manner that favored the employer. Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's refusal to enforce the arbitration agreement. View "Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

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Rosemary Morgan-Lee, a former employee of Therapy Resources Management, LLC (TRM), alleged that she was discharged in violation of the whistleblower protections under the False Claims Act (FCA) and the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act (RIWPA). Morgan-Lee claimed that her termination was due to her efforts to report fraudulent activities by TRM. The district court found that while she had engaged in some protected activity and TRM had general corporate knowledge of this, she failed to prove that her protected conduct was the but-for cause of her termination.The case was initially tried before a jury in 2017, resulting in a mistrial. The district court then conducted a four-day bench trial, during which it heard testimony from ten witnesses. The court ultimately ruled against Morgan-Lee, finding that her termination was due to unapproved absences and her refusal to provide specifics about the alleged fraudulent activities, rather than any retaliatory animus from TRM.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Morgan-Lee argued that the district court committed legal errors and that its factual findings were clearly erroneous. However, the appellate court found that many of her arguments were waived, unpreserved, or without merit. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court properly applied the law and that its findings, including the lack of but-for causation, were well-supported by the record. The appellate court also rejected Morgan-Lee's arguments regarding the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the causation standard, affirming the district court's use of the but-for causation standard as consistent with precedent. View "United States ex rel. Morgan-Lee v. Therapy Resources Management, LLC" on Justia Law