Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Bobby Messer, a lineman, came into contact with an energized electric transmission line and suffered severe injuries. Petitioners, Bobby and Amanda Messer, filed a complaint alleging that several defendants, including Hampden Coal Company, acted with deliberate intent, resulting in the injury to Bobby. Petitioners settled with or voluntarily dismissed all parties except Hampden. Before trial, Petitioners moved to strike a prospective juror for cause because he had stated opinions that potentially conflicted with those of the Petitioners' electrical engineering expert and possessed such professional education and experience in the field of electrical engineering that his presence upon the jury would have caused his opinions to unduly influence the jury's deliberations on the case's central issue. The circuit court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Hampden. The court subsequently denied Petitioners' motion for a new trial based on the court's refusal to strike the prospective juror for cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's decision to deny Petitioners' motion to excuse the potential juror for cause did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Petitioners' motion for a new trial

This case involved a decision by the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to provide a wage increase for current and newly hired employees in three counties that were part of its District 5 operations. Appellants, who worked in DOH's District 1 counties, filed administrative grievances contending that they were victims of unlawful discrimination because of DOH's failure to provide them with a wage increase. The West Virginia public employees grievance board and the circuit court found no merit to Appellants' contention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not provide the Court with a basis on which to find that the board's findings were arbitrary or capricious so as to represent an abuse of discretion.

Michelle Falquero was employed by the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) when she filed a grievance alleging (1) that she had been constructively discharged due to a hostile work environment which spurred her to tender a letter of resignation, and (2) that when her working conditions improved she was wrongly denied the opportunity to rescind the voluntary resignation even though DEP had not formally accepted it. The state Public Employee's Grievance Board found merit in Falquero's contention that her job at DEP should not have been terminated because she could and did rescind her voluntary resignation before DEP had accepted it and ordered DEP to reinstate Falquero with back pay. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) acceptance of a tender of resignation of public employment may occur when the employer (i) clearly indicates acceptance through communication with the employee, or (ii) acts in good faith reliance on the tender; and (2) because the evidence showed that acceptance of the resignation did not occur, the circuit court did not err in upholding the ruling of the Grievance Board.

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee ultimately received a permanent partial disability award for his back injury. Employee then sought a psychiatric consultation, which resulted in Employee being assessed with major depressive disorder. The claims administrator denied Employee's request to add depression as a compensable injury of his workers' compensation claim, and the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges and Workers' Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must get prior authorization from a claims administrator before seeking an initial psychiatric consultation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) W. Va. S.C.R. 85-20-12.5(a), which states that an initial psychiatric evaluation must be authorized by a claims administrator, is an invalid administrative regulation; (2) W. Va. C.S.R. 85-12-12.4 sets forth a three-step process that must be followed when a claimant is seeking to add a psychiatric disorder as a compensable injury in his or her workers' compensation claim; and (3) in the instant case, Employee did not receive the process that he was entitled to under section 85-12-12.4. Remanded.

When he was fifty-five years old, Plaintiff Albert Postlewait, Jr. applied for a job with the City of Wheeling as a mechanic. Although Plaintiff had the highest score on the City's application examination, the City instead hired an eighteen-year-old applicant. Plaintiff filed an age-discrimination lawsuit against the City, and the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The City filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that one of the jurors had not been forthright and truthful during voir dire. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's motion for a new trial was timely, and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion.

In 2003, the Division of Highways (DOH) let out a public highway construction contract to Nicewonder Contracting. The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT) filed a declaratory judgment action against the DOH and Nicewonder, alleging that the construction contract violated state and federal law because the DOH did not seek public bids for the project and there was no prevailing wage clause in the contract. Upon remand from the district court, the circuit court granted Nicewonder's motion for summary judgment, finding ACT lacked standing. The Supreme court reversed, holding that the appropriate standard to determine if an organization has representative standing to sue on behalf of its members is when the organization proves that (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The Court found that ACT met all three prongs and thus had representative standing to seek the declarations contained in its petition.

Appellants William and Denise Huggins filed a lawsuit against appellees sewer board, city, and mayor, alleging that a violation of the Workers' Compensation Act had occurred when Huggins' health insurance was terminated while he was off of work recovering from a compensable work-related injury, and, further, that he had been wrongfully terminated. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment with the lower court, alleging that the plaintiffs had no basis in law for their complaint. The circuit court granted the motion, and the appellants appealed. At issue was whether Huggins was terminated while off work and receiving temporary total disability benefits due to his compensable injury, or, instead, whether Huggins resigned from employment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that appellees terminated Huggins in violation of the anti-discrimination policies set forth in the Act. However, the circuit court's determination that Huggins was not entitled to punitive damages against the mayor was affirmed.

Jonathan Darby, who was employed by Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) as a school bus driver, was terminated when the BOE concluded that Darby had violated the BOE's sexual harassment policy. Darby appealed his termination. After considering the evidence, the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board hearing examiner ordered the BOE to reinstate Darby to his previous position. The BOE appealed. The circuit court reversed, determining that the hearing examiner held the BOE to the wrong burden of proof. Darby appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing examiner used the proper burden of proof in weighing the evidence; and (2) the circuit court improperly exceeded its scope of review, failed to give proper deference to the hearing examiner's factual findings, and wrongly substituted its own judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the hearing officer.