Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed an order of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Board of Review through which Petitioner's permanent total disability (PTD) award previously granted was suspended and vacated. Petitioner challenged the Board's determination, upon a reopening of his PTD claim, that he was capable of gainful employment. Petitioner argued that his former employer, Lowe's, violated the statute that authorized the claim reopening because Lowe's was involved in the reevaluation process, and therefore, the order vacating his PTD award was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that notwithstanding statutory language that suggests otherwise, an order issued by the Board that modifies or vacates a previous award of PTD is not subject to challenge based on the involvement of a self-insured former employer in the reevaluation process, given that the participation of the self-insured former employer is clearly anticipated and authorized by the provisions of W. Va. Cod 23-4-16(d). View "Justice v. W. Va. Office Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court for a second time. Here the case was before the Court on a petition for writ of prohibition brought by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order requiring Roger Crandall, the president, CEO and chairman of Mass Mutual, to submit to deposition. The underlying lawsuits were part of a series of 412i retirement plan cases against multiple defendants, including MassMutual. Respondents alleged fraud and tax fraud in their complaints regarding annuities and pension plans that allegedly subjected Respondents to tax and compliance penalties and other collateral liabilities. In MassMutual I, the Court issued a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its orders that directed Crandall submit to deposition. In the instant appeal, MassMutual argued that the circuit court failed to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in MassMutual I in ordering its president to submit to deposition. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the circuit court and Respondents failed to follow the directive of the Court in MassMutual I, and therefore, the court was prohibited from enforcing its order requiring Crandall to submit to deposition. View "State ex rel. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against The Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corporation, Stella-Jones U.S. Holding Corporation, and Stella-Jones, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Defendants unlawfully terminated his employment based on his age. Finding that Defendants wrongfully terminated the employment of Plaintiff based on his age, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $2,133,990, which represented compensatory damages for lost back pay and front pay. Denying that age played any role in Plaintiff's termination, Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. Defendants submitted three assignments of error upon which they contended the motion for a new trial should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice " on Justia Law

Petitioners asked the circuit court to declare that the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board could not impose disability re-certification requirements of an amended statute and new rule upon them. The circuit court determined that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, therefore, dismissed the case. Petitioners appealed, contending the circuit court erred in not reaching the merits of their petition because the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable to the facts of their case. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly dismissed Petitioners' statute-based claims; but (2) Petitioners' rule-based and letter-based claims were properly before the circuit court. Remanded. View "Hicks v. Mani" on Justia Law

Petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a public highway construction contract awarded to Respondent, Nicewonder Contracting, Inc., by Respondent, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), violated state competitive bidding and prevailing wage laws. The circuit court dismissed ACT's action, finding it lacked standing to challenge the highway construction contract. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that ACT had representative standing to seek the declarations. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Court's opinion in ACT I did not completely decide the issue of ACT's standing and ordered that ACT join the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as a defendant in the action. The Supreme Court subsequently granted ACT's requested writ of prohibition because the circuit court did not give effect to the mandate of the Court in ACT I, holding (1) ACT, as a matter of law, had standing to prosecute its lawsuit; and (2) FHWA was not an indispensable party to the lawsuit.

Petitioner was employed by the West Virginia Division of Culture and History (Division) as an at will employee. Petitioner was later terminated from his employment. Petitioner filed a grievance with the Public Employees Grievance Board. An ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss and authorized the filing of an amended grievance. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended grievance, which a succeeding ALJ dismissed. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's grievance for failure to state a ground upon which relief may be granted, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by affirming the decision of the Board without a hearing before an ALJ; and (2) the second ALJ had authority to enter a dismissal order after the previous ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss.

This appeal was brought by Appellant following two separate orders of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Allied Warehousing Services, Inc., the Appellee, dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation fraud and common law fraud claims and granting summary judgment to Appellee, finding it to be a special employer of Appellant for the purpose of workers' compensation immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's workers' compensation and common law fraud claims because there was no basis to conclude that the alleged fraudulent conduct had any prejudicial effect on the decision of the ALJ regarding the suspension of Appellant's temporary total disability benefits; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's negligence claim on the basis that Appellee was Appellant's special employer, thus entitling Appellee to workers' compensation immunity from such a negligence claim.

Appellant Lola Watkins appealed a final order entered in the circuit court, which affirmed a decision by the ALJ of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board denying Appellant's grievance of her termination from employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's denial of Appellant's grievance was not clearly wrong, as (1) the ALJ properly concluded that the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence the basis for Appellant's termination; (2) Appellant was afforded adequate notice that the Board intended to present matters relating to her employment history at the grievance hearing; and (3) Appellant failed to make a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.

Defendant, Tudor's Biscuit World of America, appealed the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the court's order denying its motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against it in this workplace injury action. Tudor's asserted (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the "reasonable time" requirement set forth in W.V. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to its motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that such timeliness requirement was inapplicable to void judgments; and (2) the circuit court improperly applied and weighed the factors set forth in Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in denying its motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have properly set aside the default judgment, as (1) Tudor's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Parsons factors to the extent that such analysis resulted in its denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from default judgment, and therefore, to that extent, erred in denying Tudor's subsequent motion to alter or amend.

Plaintiff Angela Smith filed a complaint against her employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., alleging sexual harassment, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment, and negligent retention of an employee. The jury returned a verdict for Smith and awarded Smith $1,557,600 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court denied CSX's motion for post-trial relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by denying CSX's request for post-trial relief, as (1) Smith presented sufficient evidence to prove her hostile work environment claim; (2) the jury was instructed correctly on the law of retaliatory discharge; and (3) the evidence supported the jury's award of punitive damages.