Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In a workers' compensation appeal, the trial court denied the worker-employee's proposed instruction, which would inform the jury that it must give special consideration to the (opinion) testimony of his attending physician. The trial court ruled against the worker. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial on an unrelated basis (holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it refused the worker's request to revise the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' (Board) erroneous finding regarding the location of his injury). However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court correctly rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether it was error to refuse to give the special consideration instruction. The Court held the instruction should have been given. View "Clark County v. McManus" on Justia Law

Bart Rowley Sr. was injured while driving a truck for work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) denied Rowley's claim because it determined that Rowley was injured while committing a felony: possession of a controlled substance. The Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, barred payment of workers' compensation under that circumstance. Rowley filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board). After considering testimony from several witnesses, an industrial appeals judge (IAJ) found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Department's decision and ordered the Department to approve Rowley's claim. The Department challenged that order four times: in an appeal before a three-member board panel, at superior court, at the Court of Appeals, and finally to the Washington Supreme Court. Every lower court affirmed the IAJ's decision that Rowley was entitled to benefits. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding on the applicable evidentiary standard, the Supreme Court also agreed that Rowley was entitled to benefits. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Rowley" on Justia Law

Farmworkers filed a class action lawsuit against four corporate defendants. Two questions of Washington law were certified to the Washington Supreme Court, arising from this suit: The first question implicated RCW 19.30.010(2)'s definition of a "farm labor contractor." The second question implicated RCW 19.30.200, which imposed joint and several liability for Farm Labor Contractor Act (FLCA) violations. The certified questions required the Supreme Court to decide whether defendant-appellant NW Management and Realty Services Inc. was a "farm labor contractor" under RCW 19.30.01 0(2) and, if so, whether the other defendants "knowingly use[ d]" its services under RCW 19.30.200 (There is no dispute that NW was unlicensed at all times relevant to this case). The plain language of the FLCA compels the Washington Court to answer yes to both certified questions. View "Saucedo v. John Hancock Life & Health Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Brian Long sued his former employer, Bo Brusco and Brusco Tug & Barge Inc. (Brusco), alleging wrongful termination in retaliation for opposing Brusco's discriminatory conduct against another employee. The underlying facts were disputed, and centered on Brusco's response to Long's having hired as a deckhand Anthony Morgan, an individual who had a prosthetic leg. Long appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial based on a claim of juror misconduct. As the trial court explained in its order denying Long's motion for a new trial, "it was repeatedly conveyed to the jury that whether or not, in hindsight, Mr. Morgan was discriminated against was not their concern; rather, their focus should begin with the question of whether or not Mr. Long, at that time, had a reasonable belief that Mr. Morgan was being discriminated against." The question before the Washington Supreme Court was whether the juror declarations Long submitted in support of his motion describe actual misconduct by jurors or instead reveal matters that inhere in the verdict. The Court concluded the declarations expose the jury's deliberative process behind closed doors and cannot be considered to impeach the verdict. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court and the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Long was not entitled to a new trial. View "Long v. Brusco Tug & Barge, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Campbell quit his job as a school teacher in anticipation of accompanying his wife to Finland on her Fulbright grant. Campbell applied for unemployment benefits for the months between his resignation in June 2010 and his family's planned departure in February 2011. His request was denied because the Department of Employment Security determined that Campbell did not qualify for benefits as claimed under RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii), known as the "quit to follow" provision. On appeal, the superior court reversed, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the agency action. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Campbell's resignation from his job seven months before the planned relocation was not reasonable as contemplated by the statute. View "Campbell v. Dep't of Emp't Sec." on Justia Law

Appellants James Kumar, Ranveer Singh, Asegedew Gefe, and Abbas Kosymov brought a class action lawsuit against their employer, Gate Gourmet Inc., alleging two common law torts and two violations of Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). The lawsuit stemmed from Gate Gourmet's employee meal policy, which barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch (for security reasons), leaving only employer-provided food for the employees to eat. According to plaintiffs, the policy forced them to work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs. The meals ostensibly consist of one vegetarian and one meat-based main dish. The employees alleged that Gate Gourmet used animal by-products in the "vegetarian" option, and despite switching to turkey for a meat-based option, the company reverted to using a beef/pork mixture in violation of others' religious dietary restrictions. The complaint, therefore, alleged that Gate Gourmet deceived "putative class members [to] unknowingly eat[ing] food forbidden by their beliefs," and that class members "have faced the choice of eating food forbidden by their sincerely held beliefs or not eating. Those that did consume meals, they argued, suffered offensive touching due to their contact with food prohibited by their beliefs, and suffered distress as a result." The trial court granted in full Gate Gourmet's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, finding that the WLAD contained no requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations for their employees' religious practices. The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review and reversed. The Court held that the WLAD created a cause of action for failure to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practices. With regard to plaintiffs' tort claims, the Court found the trial court dismissed them at the pleading stage, and the tort claims went without analysis. "In light of this fact and in light of Washington's relatively liberal standard for stating a cognizable claim," the Court remanded the case back to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc." on Justia Law

The certified questions in this case centered on whether, the exemption of nonprofit religious organizations from the definition of "employer" under Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), violates article I, section 11 or article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. Larry Ockletree sued his former employer, Franciscan Health System (PHS), challenging the termination of his employment after he had a stroke. Ockletree, who is African-American, claimed that his termination was the result of illegal discrimination on the basis of race and disability. FHS removed the suit to federal court and moved to dismiss Ockletree's claims. FHS argued that it was exempt from WLAD as a nonprofit religious organization. Ockletree challenged the validity of the religious employer exemption under the state and federal constitutions. The district court certified questions to this court asking whether the religious employer exemption violated Washington's article I, section 11 establishment clause or its article I, section 12 privileges and immunities clause. The Washington Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative. View "Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on "Loudon v. Mhyre," (756 P.2d 138 (1988)), and whether it applied to a plaintiff's nonparty, treating physician when such physician is employed by a defendant. Specifically, the Court was asked whether Loudon barred ex parte communications between a physician and his or her employer's attorney where the employer is a corporation and named defendant whose corporate attorney-client privilege likely extends to the physician. To protect the values underlying both the physician-patient and the attorney-client privileges, the Supreme Court adopted a modified version of the "Upjohn" test: an attorney hired by a defendant health care provider to investigate or litigate an alleged negligent event may conduct privileged ex parte communications with a plaintiff's nonparty treating physician only where the communication meets the general prerequisites to application of the attorney-client privilege, the communication is with a physician who has direct knowledge of the event or events triggering the litigation, and the communications concern the facts of the alleged negligent incident. The attorney-client privilege protects the privileged communications only - not the facts transmitted in those communications. Facts are proper subjects of investigation and discovery, even if they are also the subject of privileged communications. View "Youngs v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

Petitioners Lawrence Hill, Adam Wise, and Robert Miller represented a class of employees who worked for an armored car company Garda CL Northwest, Inc. They brought a wage and hour suit against the company, citing violations of the Washington Industrial Welfare Act, and the Washington Minimum Wage Act. After several months of litigation, Garda moved to compel arbitration under the terms of a labor agreement. The trial court granted the motion, but ruled that the employees could arbitrate as a class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order to compel arbitration, but that the employees must arbitrate individually notwithstanding the class certification. Both sides appealed the appellate court decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the arbitration clause was unconscionable, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Hill v. Garda CL Northwest. Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court dismissed Appellant Richard Piel's suit against the City of Federal Way, finding that the existence of statutory remedies authorized under state law prevented him from establishing the "jeopardy prong" of his common law claim for wrongful termination. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to better explain the jeopardy analysis and harmonize its recent decisions in "Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc." and "Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc." with "Smith v. Bates Technical College." The "Smith" decision recognized that an employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement may bring a common law claim for wrongful termination based on the public policy provisions of RCW 41.56, notwithstanding administrative remedies available through the Public Employees Relations Commission. "Korsland" and "Cudney" did not alter "Smith's" holding. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Piel v. City of Federal Way" on Justia Law