Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Supreme Court
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Several Starbucks employees in Memphis, Tennessee, announced plans to unionize and invited a local news crew to their store after hours to promote their efforts. Starbucks fired multiple employees involved in the media event for violating company policy. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed an administrative complaint against Starbucks, alleging unfair labor practices. The Board's regional Director then filed a petition under §10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act seeking a preliminary injunction that would require Starbucks to reinstate the fired employees during the administrative proceedings. The District Court granted the injunction, applying a two-part test that asks whether there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices have occurred and whether injunctive relief is just and proper. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court held that when considering the NLRB’s request for a preliminary injunction under §10(j), district courts must apply the traditional four-factor test articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. This test requires a plaintiff to make a clear showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. The Court found that nothing in §10(j) displaces the presumption that these traditional principles govern. The Court rejected the Board's argument that statutory context requires district courts to apply the traditional criteria in a less exacting way. The Court concluded that the reasonable-cause standard substantively lowers the bar for securing a preliminary injunction by requiring courts to yield to the Board’s preliminary view of the facts, law, and equities. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney" on Justia Law

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The case involves the interpretation of Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which outlines procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. The petitioners, current and former delivery drivers for an on-demand delivery service operated by the respondents, filed a lawsuit alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. The respondents moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. The petitioners agreed that their claims were arbitrable but argued that Section 3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely. The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court held that when a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3 of the FAA compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit. The Court reasoned that the statutory text, structure, and purpose all point to this conclusion. The Court further explained that the FAA's structure and purpose confirm that a stay is required. The Court concluded that staying rather than dismissing a suit comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Smith v. Spizzirri" on Justia Law

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Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, a police officer in the St. Louis Police Department, alleged that she was transferred from her position in the Intelligence Division to a uniformed job in another department because of her gender. Despite maintaining her rank and pay, Muldrow's responsibilities, perks, and schedule were significantly altered. She filed a Title VII suit against the City of St. Louis, claiming that the transfer constituted sex discrimination with respect to her employment terms and conditions.The District Court granted the City summary judgment, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to show that the transfer caused her a "materially significant disadvantage." The courts ruled that since the transfer did not result in a reduction to her title, salary, or benefits and only caused minor changes in working conditions, Muldrow's lawsuit could not proceed.The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation of Title VII. The Court held that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant. The Court rejected the City's arguments based on statutory text, precedent, and policy, and vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, remanding the case for further proceedings under the correct Title VII standard. The Court clarified that Muldrow only needed to show some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions, not that the harm was significant. View "Muldrow v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

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Neal Bissonnette and Tyler Wojnarowski, distributors for Flowers Foods, Inc., a major producer and marketer of baked goods, sued the company for alleged violations of state and federal wage laws. Flowers Foods moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The key issue was whether the exemption from coverage under the FAA for any "class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" is limited to workers whose employers are in the transportation industry.The District Court dismissed the case in favor of arbitration, stating that for Bissonnette and Wojnarowski to be exempt from the FAA, they must be "transportation workers." The court concluded that their broader scope of responsibility under the Distributor Agreements belied the claim that they were primarily truck drivers. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision on the alternative ground that Bissonnette and Wojnarowski "are in the bakery industry." According to the Second Circuit, §1 of the FAA exempts only "workers involved in the transportation industries."The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the Second Circuit's interpretation. The Court held that a transportation worker does not need to work for a company in the transportation industry to be exempt under §1 of the FAA. The Court emphasized that the relevant question is what the worker does for the employer, not what the employer does generally. The Court vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Court did not express an opinion on any alternative grounds in favor of arbitration raised below. View "Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC" on Justia Law

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Trevor Murray worked as a research strategist at UBS, a securities firm. His job involved reporting on commercial mortgage-backed securities markets to current and future customers. Under SEC regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and reflected his own views. When two leaders of the CMBS trading desk pressured him to make his reports more supportive of their business strategies, Murray told his supervisor about it. The supervisor told Murray not to alienate the trading desk and to write what the business line wanted. He eventually recommended that Murray be removed from his position, despite having recently given him a strong performance review. When the CMBS trading desk did not accept Murray as a transfer, he was fired.Murray argued that he was terminated in violation of the whistleblower protection provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because UBS fired him in response to his internal reporting about fraud on shareholders. He prevailed at trial, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded for a new trial. It found that the whistleblower protection provision requires an employee to prove retaliatory intent, which a clarifying jury instruction had not properly indicated.The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, instead agreeing with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that the whistleblower protection provision does not impose this type of requirement. The Court acknowledged that a whistleblower must prove that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action against him, but it noted that the text of the statute does not include or refer to a requirement of proving retaliatory intent, which it treated as similar to “animus.” The Court noted that the statute contains a burden-shifting framework, requiring the whistleblower to show that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action, after which the employer must show that it would have taken the same action anyway. It found that a requirement of proving retaliatory intent would be incompatible with the burden-shifting framework. View "Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC" on Justia Law

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Groff, an Evangelical Christian who believes that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest, took a mail delivery job with the Postal Service (USPS). USPS subsequently began facilitating Amazon’s Sunday deliveries. To avoid working Sundays on a rotating basis, Groff transferred to a rural USPS station. After Amazon deliveries began at that station, Groff received progressive discipline for failing to work on Sundays. He eventually resigned. Groff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, asserting that USPS could accommodate his Sunday Sabbath practice “without undue hardship" to its business, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of USPS, reasoning that under Supreme Court precedent, “requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimis cost’ to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.”The Supreme Court vacated. Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantially increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. After tracing Establishment Clause and Title VII jurisprudence, the Court concluded that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Undue hardship is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of the business–a fact-specific inquiry. Courts must consider all relevant factors, including the accommodations at issue and their practical impact, given the nature, size, and operating cost of an employer. Impacts on coworkers are relevant only to the extent those impacts affect the conduct of the business. Title VII requires that an employer “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s practice of religion, not merely assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation. An employer must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship; other options must be considered. View "Groff v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

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Glacier delivers concrete using trucks with rotating drums that prevent the concrete from hardening. After a collective-bargaining agreement between Glacier and the Union for its drivers expired, the Union called for a work stoppage on a morning it knew the company was mixing substantial amounts of concrete, loading batches into trucks, and making deliveries. The Union directed drivers to ignore Glacier’s instructions to finish deliveries in progress. Several drivers who had already left for deliveries returned with loaded trucks. By initiating emergency maneuvers to offload the concrete, Glacier prevented significant damage to its trucks. All the concrete mixed that day became useless.Glacier sued the Union, alleging common-law conversion and trespass to chattels. The Union argued that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 157, protected the drivers’ conduct. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that the NLRA preempted Glacier’s tort claims.The Supreme Court reversed. The NLRA protects the right to strike but that right is not absolute; it does not shield strikers who fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect their employer’s property from foreseeable, aggravated, and imminent danger due to the sudden cessation of work. The risk of harm to Glacier’s trucks and concrete was foreseeable and serious; the Union executed the strike in a manner designed to achieve those results. Given the lifespan of wet concrete, Glacier could not batch it until a truck was ready to take it. By reporting for duty and pretending that they would deliver the concrete, the drivers prompted the creation of the perishable product and waited to walk off the job until the concrete was in the trucks. View "Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law

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The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) provides for collective bargaining between federal agencies and their employees’ unions and establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to investigate and adjudicate labor disputes, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Union represents federal civil-service employees (dual-status technicians) who work for the Ohio National Guard. After their prior collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) expired, the Guard, the Ohio Adjutant General, and the Ohio Adjutant General’s Department (petitioners) asserted that they were not bound by the FSLMRS. The Union filed a complaint with the FLRA. An ALJ concluded that the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard; the dual-status technicians had collective bargaining rights under the FSLMRS; and repudiating the CBA violated the FSLMRS. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision.The Supreme Court affirmed. A State National Guard acts as a federal agency for purposes of the FSLMRS when it hires and supervises dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. When the Guard employs dual-status technicians, it exercises the authority of the Department of Defense, an agency covered by the FSLMRS. The statutory authority permitting the Ohio Adjutant General to employ dual-status technicians as civilian employees in the federal civil service is found in 5 U.S.C. 2105(a)(1)(F). Dual-status technicians are ultimately employees of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and the petitioners are the Secretaries’ designees for purposes of dual-status technician employment. View "Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

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Hewitt filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which guarantees overtime pay to covered employees when they work more than 40 hours a week. From 2014-2017, Hewitt typically worked 84 hours per week on Helix's offshore oil rig, while on the vessel. Helix paid Hewitt a daily rate. Hewitt’s paycheck amounted to his daily rate times the number of days he worked. Hewitt earned over $200,000 annually.Helix argued that Hewitt was exempt from the FLSA as “a bona fide executive,” 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1). An employee is considered an exempt bona fide executive if the employee meets the “salary basis” test, which requires that an employee receive a predetermined and fixed salary that does not vary with the amount of time worked, the “salary level” test, and the job “duties” test.The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. Hewitt was not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay guarantee. A daily-rate employee does not fall within the main salary-basis provision of 29 CFR 541.602(a)--the employee regularly receives each pay period a predetermined amount, “not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.” A daily-rate worker is paid for each day he works and no others. Daily-rate workers, of whatever income level, qualify as paid on a salary basis under 29 CFR 541.604(b) only if an employer also provides a guarantee of weekly payment approximating what the employee usually earns. Reading 602(a) also to cover daily- and hourly-rate employees would subvert 604(b)’s strict conditions on when their pay counts as a “salary.” There is no simple income level test for the exemption. View "Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt" on Justia Law

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Washington enacted a workers’ compensation law that applied only to Hanford site workers who were “engaged in the performance of work, either directly or indirectly, for the United States.” The Hanford site, once used to produce nuclear weapons, is undergoing decontamination. Most workers involved in the cleanup process are employed by private companies under contract with the federal government; a few are state employees, private employees, and federal employees. As compared to Washington’s general workers’ compensation scheme, the law made it easier for Hanford's federal contract workers to establish entitlement to workers’ compensation, thus increasing workers’ compensation costs for the federal government. The Ninth Circuit upheld the law as within the scope of a federal waiver of immunity, 40 U.S.C. 3172.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Washington’s law facially discriminates against the federal government and its contractors; section 3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive immunity from discriminatory state laws, so Washington’s law is unconstitutional. While section 3172(a) says that “[t]he state authority charged with enforcing and requiring compliance with the state workers’ compensation laws . . . may apply [those] laws to all land and premises in the State which the Federal Government owns,” and “to all projects, buildings, constructions, improvements, and property in the State and belonging to the Government, in the same way, and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State,” the waiver does not “clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]” authorize a state to enact a discriminatory law that facially singles out the federal government for unfavorable treatment.The Court held that the case was not moot, despite Washington’s enactment of a new statute that, arguably, applies retroactively. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law