Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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The plaintiff, Joshua Young, an employee of the Colorado Department of Corrections, claimed that mandatory Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) training he was subjected to created a hostile work environment. Young resigned from the Department and filed a lawsuit claiming violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. He alleged that the training program violated Title VII by creating a hostile work environment and violated the Equal Protection Clause by promoting race-based policies. The district court dismissed both claims without prejudice. Young appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined Young's allegations and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Young's claims. The court found that while Young had plausibly alleged he was subjected to unwelcome harassment, he failed to adequately allege that the harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered the terms of his employment and created an abusive working environment.The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Young's equal protection claim, agreeing that Young lacked standing to pursue the claim since he was no longer employed by the Department of Corrections and had not asked for reinstatement as part of his equal protection claim.Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant Young leave to amend his complaint, noting that Young neither requested leave to amend in his briefing nor filed a separate motion to amend. View "Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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A company named Coreslab Structures was found to have violated several provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The court affirmed the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) findings that Coreslab had engaged in unfair labor practices, including unilateral changes to its pension and profit-sharing plans, discrimination against union members, interference with an employee's right to speak with union representatives, and withdrawal of recognition from the union.Coreslab, which produces bridge components and other structural materials at its facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, had recognized the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 627, AFL-CIO (the Union) as the bargaining representative of the company’s production and maintenance employees from 2004 until 2019. Starting in 2011, Coreslab made pension contributions only for hours worked by unit employees who were members of the Union, while providing annual profit-sharing payments to non-Union bargaining unit employees.The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that the Union lacked knowledge of the pension contribution/profit-sharing scheme until Coreslab informed the Union in September 2019. The court further held that Coreslab violated the NLRA by discriminating against union members and failing to bargain collectively with the Union. It also found that Coreslab's withdrawal of recognition from the Union was unlawful.However, the court found that the Board exceeded its statutory authority by ordering back-payments without offset and requiring Coreslab to retain the unlawfully-created profit-sharing program. The court remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Coreslab Structures v. NLRB" on Justia Law

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The case involves plaintiff-appellant Cassandra Kincaid, an assistant principal at Central Middle School in Kansas, who claimed that she was harassed by the Unified School District No. 500 in retaliation for her reporting a student-on-student sexual assault. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district. The court concluded that Kincaid did not satisfy her burden of creating a genuine dispute of material fact that the reasons given for the alleged material adverse actions against her were pretextual. The court examined various aspects of the case under Title VII and Title IX, which prohibit retaliation against individuals for complaining of sex discrimination. It considered numerous allegedly adverse employment actions, including two emails sent by the school principal, a request for Kincaid's transfer, and a letter of concern. The court concluded that none of the evidence Kincaid provided created a genuine dispute of material fact about pretext. View "Kincaid v. Unified School District No. 500, Kansas City, KS" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal of a case involving Charles Cline, who was terminated by Clinical Perfusion Systems, Inc. after a medical emergency led to an extended hospital stay. Cline brought forward disability discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the Oklahoma AntiDiscrimination Act (OADA); and age discrimination claims under the OADA. The court concluded that Cline was unable to establish a disability discrimination claim as he failed to plausibly allege that he could perform his job functions with a reasonable accommodation by his employer. The court also disagreed with the district court's dismissal of Cline's age discrimination claim, arguing that Cline had sufficiently alleged that age was a but-for cause of his termination. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Cline's disability discrimination claims, reversed the dismissal of his age discrimination claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cline v. Clinical Perfusion Systems" on Justia Law

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In a dispute between ORP Surgical, LLC (ORP), and Howmedica Osteonics Corp., also known as Stryker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling. ORP and Stryker, both involved in medical device sales, had a successful business relationship under two sales contracts, the Joint Sales Representative Agreement (JSRA) and the Trauma Sales Representative Agreement (TSRA). The relationship soured when Stryker terminated the JSRA and hired one of ORP's sales representatives, and later, when ORP terminated the TSRA, Stryker hired a dozen of ORP's representatives. The district court ruled in favor of ORP, finding that Stryker breached the sales contracts and owed ORP damages, attorneys’ fees, sanctions, and costs. On appeal, Stryker challenged the rulings on the breach of contract claims, the attorneys’ fees award, and the nominal damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holdings on the breach-of-contract claims but reversed its award of attorneys' fees under the indemnification provision. It also affirmed the award of nominal damages for Stryker's breach of the non-solicitation/non-diversion provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "ORP Surgical v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law

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Barbara Lindsay, the former Director of Workforce Development and Career Services at Emily Griffith Technical College (EGTC), sued Denver Public Schools (DPS) and Stephanie Donner, EGTC's Executive Director, for retaliation. Lindsay claimed that her termination was motivated by her opposition to racist comments made during the hiring process for the Executive Director position and her assistance to a candidate in filing employment discrimination charges. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of DPS and Donner. Lindsay appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to prove a causal relationship between Lindsay's protected activity (opposition to racist comments and assistance in filing discrimination charges) and her termination. The Court determined that there was no evidence that those who decided to terminate Lindsay's employment were aware of her protected activity. The court further noted that Lindsay failed to show that anyone at DPS knew that she had assisted in bringing discrimination charges before she was fired. Therefore, Lindsay's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for protected activities could not be substantiated. View "Lindsay v. Denver Public Schools" on Justia Law

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In a case involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan participant, Ian C., sought coverage for his son, A.C., to receive treatment at Catalyst Residential Treatment for mental health and substance abuse issues. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company (United), the claims fiduciary for the plan, initially covered the treatment but subsequently denied coverage. Ian C. appealed this denial internally, a process in which United upheld its original decision. Ian C. then took his case to federal district court, alleging that United's denial violated his right to a "full and fair review" of his claim under ERISA. The district court ruled in favor of United.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the court held that United's denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious, violating ERISA regulations guaranteeing a "full and fair review" of claims. In particular, the court found that United had failed to consider A.C.'s substance abuse as an independent ground for coverage in their decision to deny benefits, in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The court therefore reversed the district court's decision. View "C., et al. v. United Healthcare Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff, Robert Hampton, sued his former employer, the Utah Department of Corrections (UDC), alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act. Hampton, who was born without the second and fifth digits on both hands, claimed that UDC refused to accommodate his disability, treated him disparately based on that disability, and retaliated against him for requesting accommodation.Hampton, who had previously worked as a corrections officer in Arizona, was hired by UDC in 2016. He was required to qualify on UDC-approved firearms, including a Glock 17 handgun. Hampton requested an accommodation to use a different handgun, a Springfield 1911, due to difficulties he encountered in handling the Glock due to his disability. This request was denied, and Hampton was later terminated from his position.The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Hampton's failure-to-accommodate claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that Hampton’s request for a different handgun could be considered a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, and that the district court erred in determining that using a Glock handgun was an essential function of Hampton’s job based solely on the UDC’s firearms policy.However, the court affirmed the district court’s grants of summary judgment on Hampton’s claims of disparate treatment and retaliation. It found that Hampton had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his disability was a determining factor in his termination or that his reassignment to a different position constituted an adverse employment action. View "Hampton v. Utah Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Carlie Sherman, Anna Gozun, and Amanda Nash appealed a district court’s denial of class certification in a forced labor action against Trinity Teen Solutions (“Trinity”), a residential treatment center for adolescent girls, and its owners and operators (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs, now adults, were all sent to Trinity as minors by their parents. Trinity advertised itself as offering a wide range of therapies for troubled adolescent girls in a ranch environment and as taking a "tough love" approach, with its residents living in primitive conditions and working on the ranch as part of their treatment experience. Plaintiffs alleged that, during their residence at Trinity, they were forced to work long hours without pay under threat of serious harm. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of former Trinity residents, bringing three forced labor claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, and sought class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, proposing a putative class of “Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated persons who received treatment from [Trinity] and were subjected to the provision of ‘agricultural labor.’" The district court denied class certification, concluding Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality, typicality, and predominance requirements. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard to its analysis of Rule 23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Therefore, it vacated the district court’s order denying class certification and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Sherman, et al. v. Trinity Teen Solutions, et al." on Justia Law

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Randy Quint, John Linn, and Mark Molina (“Colorado Plaintiffs”) filed a class and collective action against Vail Resorts, Inc. alleging violations of federal and state labor laws (“Colorado Action”). Different plaintiffs filed similar lawsuits against a Vail subsidiary, which were pending in federal and state courts in California. After Vail gave notice that it had agreed to a nationwide settlement with some of the other plaintiffs, Colorado Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion asking the district court to enjoin Vail from consummating the settlement. The district court denied their motion, and Colorado Plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing the district court erred by: (1) applying the wrong standard in reviewing the report and recommendation ("R&R"); (2) holding the Anti-Injunction Act applied to an injunction against Vail rather than the state court; (3) declining to consider one exception to the Anti-Injunction Act; (4) holding a second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply; (5) failing to enforce the first-to-file rule; and (6) abstaining under the Colorado River doctrine. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Quint, et al. v. Vail Resorts" on Justia Law