Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Levine, an African-American woman, applied for the position of supervisor of customer services at the main post office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Levine had then worked for USPS for over 27 years, in a variety of positions. USPS did not select Levine for the position. Instead, it hired a white employee, Peare, whom Levine alleges was significantly less qualified than Levine. USPS disputes Levine’s allegations that the failure to hire her was racially discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting various factual disputes. Levine met her burden of producing enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury that USPS’s proffered reasons for not promoting her may have been a mere pretext for racial discrimination, so USPS was not entitled to summary judgment. The parties dispute the position’s requirements. Levine possesses three post-secondary degrees and has had seven different awards from USPS. Peare’s formal academic training ended with high school and she had worked for USPS for nearly eight years. Levine provided abundant evidence that she is arguably more qualified for the position than Peare. USPS’s reliance on Peare’s purportedly superior interview warrants similar scrutiny as does USPS’s contention that Peare had more relevant experience than Levine. View "Levine v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Smucker’s is a federal contractor that supplies food items to the federal government. In 2021, by Executive Order, President Biden directed all federal contractors to “ensure that all [their] employees [were] fully vaccinated for COVID-19,” unless such employees were “legally entitled” to health or religious accommodations. The order made contractors “responsible for considering, and dispositioning, such requests for accommodations.” In September 2021, Smucker’s notified its U.S. employees that it would “ask and expect” them to “be fully vaccinated.” A month later, in the face of “deadlines in the federal order,” Smucker’s announced a formal vaccine mandate with exemptions based on “sincerely held religious beliefs.”The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought religious exemptions, then sued Smucker's under the First Amendment's free-exercise guarantee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. When Smucker’s denied the exemption requests, it was not a state actor. Smucker’s does not perform a traditional, exclusive public function; it has not acted jointly with the government or entwined itself with it; and the government did not compel it to deny anyone an exemption. That Smucker’s acted in compliance with federal law and that Smucker’s served as a federal contractor, do not by themselves make the company a government actor. View "Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co." on Justia Law

Based on nominations, UC awarded “triumph cords” to graduating students who had overcome adversity. UC did not vet the nominees and unintentionally awarded a cord to a convicted sex offender. Goldblum, UC’s Title IX coordinator, told her supervisor, Marshall, that she would investigate how UC evaluated admissions applications from convicted sex offenders and address the controversy in the student newspaper. Goldblum forwarded a letter to Marshall, who ordered Goldblum not to submit anything until Marshall coordinated with other University officials. The administration had authorized Dean Petren to address the controversy. Marshall told Goldblum that Petren would issue UC’s response. Marshall also identified problems with the letter’s content. Goldblum texted Marshall that she intended to submit the letter and accept “any repercussions.” Marshall texted: “Please do not send.” Goldblum sent the letter, which was never published. Marshall reported Goldblum’s insubordination. During an investigation, UC discovered additional infractions: Goldblum repeatedly ignored Title IX complaints, criticized her colleagues in front of her staff, and missed reporting deadlines. UC allowed Goldblum to resign in lieu of termination.Goldblum sued UC for unlawful termination under Title VII and Title IX. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. UC had legitimate nonretaliatory reasons to fire Goldblum, who has not produced “sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject” UC’s proffered reasons. Her letter was not “protected activity.” No reasonable juror could conclude that UC’s work-performance rationale was not based in fact. View "Goldblum v. University of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Stryker develops, manufactures, and sells spinal implants and products, and employed Abbas from 2013-2022. Abbas purports to have worked exclusively within Stryker’s finance department. Stryker claims that Abbas worked in various roles, including in sales. Abbas regularly used significant amounts of Stryker’s confidential information and trade secrets and supported Stryker’s litigation efforts. Abbas entered into confidentiality, noncompetition, and nonsolicitation agreements with Stryker when he commenced his employment, and again in 2022.Alphatec competes with Stryker. Stryker alleges that Alphatec "systematically misappropriate[s] Stryker[’s] confidential information, trade secrets, customer goodwill, and talent” and is litigating against Alphatec and former Stryker employees in several cases. Abbas resigned from Stryker to take a newly-developed position with Alphatec, a sales role, “crafted to protect Stryker’s confidential information.” Stryker sued for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction on behalf of Stryker. The district court crafted the injunction to preserve the status quo, reserving the possibility that other prospective jobs might be consistent with Abbas's employment agreement. It is not an impermissible industry-wide ban. Stryker is likely to succeed on the merits, based on findings that Abbas worked for Stryker in both sales and finance; Abbas had unfettered access to Stryker’s most sensitive sales and financial information, Stryker’s sales representatives, and key customer decision-makers; the Alphatec position involved work similar to the work Abbas performed for Stryker; and Abbas supported Stryker on litigation matters. View "Stryker Employment Co., LLC v. Abbas" on Justia Law

Hrdlicka, a white female, began working for GM in 1989, sculpting vehicle models. In 2017, Hrdlicka was transferred to the Design Academy. She unsuccessfully requested a transfer back to the Sculpting Department. Hrdlicka began regularly missing work and arriving late and missed crucial work related to her responsibilities for the internship program. The reasons that Hrdlicka gave for being absent or tardy were often not related to her own health and sometimes did not contain any explanation. She never saw a doctor. Hrdlicka’s 2019 performance review noted her decreased performance because of her attendance. Hrdlicka’s attendance problems did not abate. Hrdlicka missed several “critical” days in August. Hrdlicka was given an Attendance Letter, stating the consequences of continued attendance issues and explaining how to seek accommodations if needed. Hrdlicka did not inquire into any of the listed options and was terminated for repeatedly violating the Attendance Letter. Hrdlicka filed an internal appeal, stating that, prior to her termination, she “notified HR of [her] depression,” which she “perceive[d] to be directly related to the work environment.”While her ultimately unsuccessful appeal was pending, Hrdlicka was diagnosed with Persistent Depressive Disorder and a brain tumor that was surgically removed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her suit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and race and sex discrimination under Title VII. View "Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Milman worked as an attorney at Fieger. On March 13, 2020, all schools and daycare facilities closed due to COVID-19. Fieger began exploring remote work. Milman was scheduled to work from home on Wednesday, March 18. Over the weekend, Milman e-mailed Harrington, a partner at the Firm, requesting to work from home on Monday and Tuesday. She noted that her children’s daycare facility was closed and her concerns about her son’s heightened vulnerability to COVID-19 as a result of his bout with RSV—a dangerous respiratory infection that put him in the hospital for five days. Harrington advised her to take paid time off (PTO) on those two days. On Monday, Governor Whitmer issued an executive order that banned gatherings of more than 50 people. Milman’s son developed symptoms resembling COVID-19. She contacted Human Resources and offered to take unpaid leave. HR responded that she could work from home for the remainder of the week. Later that day, HR e-mailed Milman a letter, signed by Fieger, that terminated her employment for failure to come into work on Thursday.Milman sued, alleging violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601(b)(1)–(5). The district court dismissed Milman’s FMLA claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Milman’s request for leave was protected—even if she ultimately was not entitled to it. Milman plausibly attempted to engage in the process contemplated under FMLA. View "Milman v. Fieger & Fieger, P.C." on Justia Law

KDE, a thoroughbred racehorse training and care operation, has four locations in Texas, New York, and Kentucky. KDE employed 120-150 employees, including hotwalkers, responsible for walking and bathing the horses to cool them down, and grooms, who prep the horses for training. The hotwalkers work every day of the week from 5:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. Some hotwalkers work additional hours every other day, typically from 3:00-4:30 p.m. On average, the hotwalkers work 44.25 hours per week. Grooms also work every day of the week, usually, from 5:00-11:00 a.m. and from 3:00 p.m. to approximately 4:30 p.m. Grooms typically work between 48.5-52.5 hours per week. Most of the employees did not submit timesheets for the additional hours worked, while others submitted inaccurate time sheets; it is impossible to determine how many hours each employee worked. The Department of Labor (DOL) sought an injunction and damages for KDE’s alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, for failing to pay employees the federal minimum wage, for failing to pay employees overtime wages, and for failing to keep adequate and accurate employment records.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of DOL on the overtime claims. The district court’s grant of summary judgment on the willfulness issue in favor of KDE was inappropriate; genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether KDE willfully failed to pay its employees in compliance with the FLSA. View "Walsh v. KDE Equine, LLC" on Justia Law

Blount who is Black, worked for Stanley for 21 years, most recently as a forklift operator. Blount was warned multiple times against using his phone on the plant floor, in violation of safety policies. On January 31, 2018, Taylor reported that Blount was driving a forklift toward her with “neither of his hands on the wheel” because he was manipulating his smartwatch. Blount offered no explanation. Stanley credited Taylor’s account and took steps to terminate Blount. Blount’s union interceded and Blount signed a last-chance agreement, which provided that any additional safety violations within two years would result in Blount’s immediate termination. A few months later Taylor reported seeing Blount using his cell phone in his lap while sitting on an idling forklift. Blount denied the conduct. Stanley, after an investigation, fired him. Blount’s union withdrew a grievance when Blount refused to provide his phone records. As a separate matter, Blount had filed an EEOC complaint in 2015 that was dismissed in 2016.Blount sued under Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging that he was fired because of his race and in retaliation for his 2015 EEOC complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment. Stanley offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason—serious safety violations—for firing Blount, which was not a pretext for intentional discrimination. Blount’s proferred comparators, white employees who were not terminated, were not similarly situated. There was no evidence connecting Blount’s protected conduct and his termination. View "Blount v. Stanley Engineering Fastening" on Justia Law

Kirkland, a Maryville patrol officer, used her Facebook account to criticize the county sheriff. She belittled his public speaking abilities and referred to his supporters as “brainwashed minions.” Kirkland had previously worked as a Sheriff’s Office corrections officer. Kirkland had previous disciplinary issues. Kirkland’s supervisors became concerned that her posts would undermine the Department’s relationship with the Sheriff’s Office and asked her to stop. They also reprimanded her for other behavioral issues. Following Kirkland’s Facebook post claiming the sheriff had excluded her from a training event because she was female and opposed his reelection, Maryville fired Kirkland.Kirkland sued, citing First Amendment retaliation, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor. Although the statements were made in Kirkland’s capacity as a private citizen and Maryville did not show Kirkland made the post with knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, its falsity, the balance of interests favored the city. The court noted the heightened need for order, loyalty, and efficiency in law enforcement. The city has “legitimate and powerful interests” as a law enforcement agency in preserving its working relationship with the Sheriff’s Office that outweigh Kirkland’s speech rights. View "Kirkland v. City of Maryville" on Justia Law

In 2013, Render started as a line worker at FCA. FCA terminated his employment in 2015, for attendance infractions. Render filed a union grievance and FCA conditionally reinstated him in April 2017, with a one-year probationary period. Under his Conditional Reinstatement Letter, FCA could terminate him if he incurred two unexcused tardies or one unexcused absence during that year. About six months after his reinstatement, Render applied for intermittent leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, to manage his major recurrent depression and anxiety disorder. The letters conditionally approving the leave gave Render conflicting instructions about how to call in to use his FMLA leave days. Render believed that he had to call a 1-800 number and report his absence. He “didn’t realize there was a second number.”Render’s subsequent attempts to call in and use his FMLA leave did not satisfy his supervisors. He was terminated for violating his Reinstatement Letter by incurring three tardies and two absences. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Render’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. Render’s notice to FCA met FMLA requirements. Render established a prima facie retaliation claim. . Render raised sufficient facts showing that FCA’s nondiscriminatory reason for his termination (noncompliance with FCA’s policies) was pretextual. View "Render v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law