Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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This case involves two consolidated appeals from the Western District of Michigan and the Southern District of Ohio. The dispute revolves around how pizza delivery drivers should be reimbursed for the cost of using their personal vehicles for work. The delivery drivers argued that they should be reimbursed according to a mileage rate published by the IRS, while the employers contended that a “reasonable approximation” of the drivers’ expenses sufficed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with both parties. The court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay each employee a wage of not less than $7.25 an hour. If the employer requires an employee to provide tools for work, the employer violates the Act if the cost of these tools cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid under the Act.Applying these standards, the court rejected the employers' argument that a “reasonable approximation” of a delivery driver’s cost of providing his vehicle is always sufficient reimbursement. Similarly, the court also rejected the drivers' argument that they should be reimbursed using the IRS standard-mileage rate for business deductions, as this rate is a nationwide average and does not accurately reflect an individual employee's actual costs.The court vacated the district courts’ decisions and remanded for further proceedings, suggesting that a potential solution could be a burden-shifting regime similar to those in Title VII cases. View "Bradford v. Team Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this consolidated appeal involving two cases from the Western District of Michigan and the Southern District of Ohio, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled on how pizza-delivery drivers should be reimbursed for the cost of using their vehicles for work. The main dispute lay in the reimbursement method: the Michigan court sided with the drivers, stating they should be reimbursed based on a mileage rate published by the IRS, while the Ohio court agreed with the employers, stating a "reasonable approximation" of the drivers' costs suffices. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with both courts and vacated their decisions.The central issue involved the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requirement that employers pay each employee at least a minimum wage. The court found that if an employer required a minimum-wage employee to provide his own "tools" for work (in this case, their own vehicles), the employer must reimburse them for 100% of the cost of doing so. The court emphasized that the FLSA mandates that each employee be paid at least the specified minimum wage, not a "reasonable approximation".The court also disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that they should be reimbursed using the IRS's standard-mileage rate for business deductions, as it is a nationwide average and does not consider the individual costs of each driver. The court emphasized that the statute entitles a minimum-wage employee to reimbursement of actual costs incurred on the employer's behalf, neither more nor less. The case was remanded back to the lower courts for further proceedings. View "Parker v. Battle Creek Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case concerns a dispute involving the Producers Service Corporation (PSC), an oilfield services company, and several of its current and former employees. The employees alleged that PSC failed to pay them a lawful overtime premium for all hours worked over forty per week. PSC argued that it paid its employees in accordance with a Belo plan, a statutory exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that allows employers to pay a fixed salary to employees who work fluctuating hours. The district court found that PSC could not establish one of the prerequisites to a valid Belo plan because its employees worked irregular schedules not by necessity, but due to factors within PSC’s control, and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the employees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that PSC presented evidence creating a genuine dispute of fact as to the reason behind the employees' irregular schedules. Not all irregular schedules were due to scheduled time off, and PSC provided a plausible explanation for the weeks that employees worked fewer than forty hours despite taking no time off: swings in demand for its services. As such, the matter was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Producers Service Corp." on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was faced with the claims of Cameron Cooper, an employee with Tourette Syndrome, who sued his former employer, Coca-Cola Consolidated, Inc. (CCCI), under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Cooper's Tourette Syndrome caused him to involuntarily utter racist and profane words. He alleged that CCCI failed to provide him with reasonable accommodations and constructively discharged him by forcing him into an undesirable position.Cooper had been working as a delivery merchandiser for CCCI, a role which required excellent customer service. However, his condition led to complaints from customers due to his use of offensive language. CCCI attempted various accommodations, including having Cooper work alongside another employee and ultimately transferring him to a warehouse position with no customer contact. Cooper claimed that CCCI could have accommodated him by assigning him to a non-customer-facing delivery route.The court held that providing excellent customer service was an essential function of Cooper's job and, given his condition, he could not perform this function without an accommodation. The court further held that Cooper's proposed accommodation (assigning him to a non-customer-facing delivery route) was not objectively reasonable because the suggested delivery route did involve customer contact and there were no other non-customer-facing routes available at the time. Additionally, the court found that the warehouse position offered by CCCI was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.As to the constructive discharge claim, the court held that Cooper failed to show that CCCI deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing him to quit. The court concluded that CCCI provided Cooper with reasonable accommodations each time he requested, thus, there was no evidence to support a constructive discharge claim.The court affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of CCCI. View "Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC" on Justia Law

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Stephen Caudle, a truck driver for Hard Drive Express, Inc., sued his employer alleging that he was fired in retaliation for attempting to report unlawful employment practices. The case focuses on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), with Caudle arguing that his firing was a response to his complaints about Hard Drive's failure to reimburse him for time and money spent on repairs. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of the employer, interpreting Caudle's complaints as related only to Hard Drive's paid-time-off policy, and therefore not protected under FLSA or WPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that there was a genuine factual dispute about whether Caudle's complaints were about vacation pay or the company's failure to compensate him for repairs. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that Caudle's complaints could have put the company on notice of potential violations of the FLSA, and therefore his firing could be seen as a violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA and Michigan WPA. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Caudle v. Hard Drive Express, Inc." on Justia Law

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Chinyere Ogbonna-McGruder, an African American professor, alleged that her employer, Austin Peay State University (APSU), and her supervisors engaged in racial discrimination and created a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her when she opposed their unlawful conduct. She also claimed that her supervisors violated her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim. The court ruled that Ogbonna-McGruder failed to sufficiently allege that the harassment she experienced was severe or pervasive, a necessary element of a hostile work environment claim. The court also found that she did not sufficiently allege that any adverse employment actions were motivated by discriminatory animus, and that she did not adequately assert that the conduct forming the basis of her §1983 claim violated a specific constitutional provision. View "Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ." on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Adroit Medical Systems, Inc., Grazyna Gammons, Kelley Patten, and Gene Gammons. The plaintiff, Scott Gammons, alleged that his father and stepfamily, who controlled the family business, Adroit, were diverting company funds for personal use without accounting for tax consequences. He claimed that after he reported their financial misdeeds to the IRS, they fired him. Scott brought an action under federal and state whistleblower statutes and state common law.The court found that while Scott’s reporting of alleged financial malfeasance to the IRS was protected conduct and may have contributed to his termination, the defendants had clear and convincing evidence that they would have fired Scott due to his attempted hostile takeover of the company, irrespective of his whistleblowing. Scott had obtained an emergency conservatorship over his father, Gene, which he used to control the family business. When the conservatorship was dissolved, the defendants regained control and promptly fired Scott.Scott also brought claims under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA) and state common law. The court found that Scott failed to show that the defendants’ legitimate reason for terminating him was pretextual. The court also rejected Scott’s state common law claims, holding that the individual defendants were immune from tortious interference claims as they were acting within their corporate capacities and did not personally benefit from Scott’s termination. View "Gammons v. Adroit Medical Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Brent Mattingly, an employee of R.J. Corman Railroad Services, LLC (“Corman Services”), suffered injuries while repairing a bridge owned and operated by Memphis Line Railroad (“Memphis Line”). Mattingly filed a lawsuit seeking recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), which covers employees of common carriers by railroad. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that Mattingly was not employed by a common carrier, a prerequisite for FELA coverage.On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected Mattingly’s argument that Corman Services, his employer, was a common carrier because it was part of a “unitary” railroad system managed by Corman Group. The court held that Corman Services' bridge repair and construction services did not provide an inextricable function for Memphis Line’s common carrier services and thus, did not qualify as a common carrier under FELA. The court further rejected Mattingly’s assertion that he was a “subservant” of a common carrier. The court found that Mattingly failed to demonstrate that Memphis Line, a common carrier, controlled or had the right to control the daily operations of Corman Services, as required to establish a master-servant relationship under common law.The court also held that Mattingly's claims regarding discovery issues were unpreserved for appeal, as he did not adequately inform the district court of his need for discovery in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). View "Mattingly v. R.J. Corman R.R. Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff, Christina Littler, a bus driver for a school district, appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Ohio Association of Public School Employees (OAPSE), a union she had joined. Littler had filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging the wrongful deduction and retention of union dues. She claimed that she had withdrawn her union membership and therefore her dues deduction authorization too, but OAPSE had continued to deduct dues from her paycheck. On remand from an earlier appeal, the district court held that Littler had failed to show that OAPSE was a state actor under § 1983, and thus granted OAPSE summary judgment on Littler’s § 1983 claim.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that Littler had failed the first prong of the "state action" test under § 1983, as she could not show that the alleged deprivation was caused by any governmental policy or decision. Instead, the conduct she complained about was inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement and violated her agreement with OAPSE. This conduct was attributed to a private actor—OAPSE—acting contrary to any rule of conduct imposed by the state, and therefore could not be attributed to the state. The court also rejected Littler's argument that the deprivation was caused by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the school district’s compliance with the union’s request to withhold dues from her paycheck. Instead, the court held that the specific conduct complained about was OAPSE’s failure to process Littler’s withdrawal pursuant to the membership application and remove her name from the deduction list. This was not governed by a state-imposed rule of conduct but rather by a private individual or organization’s policy. Thus, the court concluded that the challenged conduct could not be fairly attributable to the state. View "Littler v. Ohio Ass'n of Pub. Sch. Emps." on Justia Law

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In 2011, the automaker FCA transferred the work that plaintiffs (engineers) had previously performed at FCA’s company headquarters to a new location. The plaintiffs filed a grievance with their union, UAW, in 2016. UAW failed to pursue it. In 2017, plaintiffs filed essentially the same grievance, but UAW again did not pursue it. By this time, plaintiffs had learned of a massive bribery scheme involving FCA and UAW; they believed that those bribes had affected the 2011 job-relocation process and UAW’s treatment of their grievances. In 2018, plaintiffs filed the same grievance again. Nearly two years later, UAW found the grievance meritorious.Plaintiffs sued FCA, UAW, and individual defendants in 2020, raising claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims as untimely under the LMRA’s six-month limitations period. Plaintiffs pursuing a hybrid LMRA claim must sue once they “reasonably should know that the union has abandoned” their claim. Plaintiffs learned of their RICO injuries as early as 2011 and learned of the bribery allegations in 2017 but waited until 2020 to file their complaint, with no explanation for the delay. View "Baltrusaitis v. United Auto Workers" on Justia Law