Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

People working part-time may qualify for weekly unemployment benefits, but must accurately report their income so the Indiana Department of Workforce Development can reduce their benefits accordingly. A claimant who knowingly fails to disclose earnings on a weekly application must repay all benefits received for that week and is subject to a civil penalty of 25% of that forfeited amount. Grashoff omitted her part-time income on 24 weekly applications. The Department determined that she knowingly violated the law and assessed a forfeiture and penalty totaling $11,190. An ALJ affirmed the sanction. Grashoff did not seek state judicial review but filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the sanction violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected the claim, classifying the entire forfeiture as remedial rather than punitive. The penalty is a punitive sanction subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny but is not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Grashoff conceded that the difference between the benefits she received and the smaller amount she would have received had she reported her income is purely remedial. The remaining forfeiture amount, even when considered together with the 25% penalty, is not a grossly disproportionate sanction for Grashoff’s knowing violations of the law. View "Grashoff v. Payne" on Justia Law

Dr. Bounds was hired for one year beginning in July 2019 as an at-will employee. In February 2020, Dr. Scott stated that Scott would recommend that Bounds's contract be renewed. Scott notified Bounds and others on March 24 that she would email approved contracts and that they had until March 31 to sign and return the contracts. Upon receiving the contract, Bounds noted that her vacation days had been reduced. Scott told Bounds to contact the Board. Later that day, Bounds became ill and was advised to quarantine for 14 days. Bounds testified that she made inquiries to the Board but never received a reply. On April 1, Scott telephoned Bounds, who had not returned the signed contract. Bounds replied that she wanted her attorney to review the agreement. Scott warned that the Board previously had released another administrator who did not sign her contract by the deadline. The following day, Scott advised Bounds that the Board had requested that her position be posted as vacant. On April 14, Bounds was notified that her position had been posted.Bounds filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the Board had deprived her of procedural due process by rescinding her contract and posting her position without notice or the opportunity to be heard. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Bounds did not have a property interest subject to due process protections. Bounds had no enforceable expectation as to her continued employment. View "Bounds v. Country Club Hills School District 160" on Justia Law

Brownsburg Community School Corporation requires its high school teachers to call all students by the names registered in the school’s official student database. Kluge, a teacher, objected on religious grounds to using the first names of transgender students to the extent that he deemed those names not consistent with their sex recorded at birth. After Brownsburg initially accommodated Kluge’s request to call all students by their last names only, the school withdrew the accommodation when it became apparent that the practice was harming students and negatively impacting the learning environment for transgender students, other students in Kluge’s classes and in the school generally, and the faculty.Kluge brought a Title VII religious discrimination and retaliation suit after he was terminated from his employment. The district court granted the school summary judgment, concluding that the school was unable to accommodate Kluge’s religious beliefs and practices without imposing an undue hardship on the school’s conduct of its business of educating all students and rejected Kluge’s retaliation claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Kluge’s accommodation harmed students and disrupted the learning environment. No reasonable jury could conclude that harm to students and disruption to the learning environment are de minimis harms to a school’s conduct of its business. View "Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, Trahanas began working as a technologist in Dr. Schwulst’s laboratory at Northwestern's School of Medicine. Trahanas claims Schwulst made demeaning remarks about her work, mental health, and sexual orientation and that her lab coworkers harassed her. Trahanas did not report the incidents. Trahanas received positive performance reviews from Schwulst, who recommended Trahanas for raises and promotion.Trahanas had been diagnosed with ADHD, depression, and anxiety and decided to take time off. She did not provide advance notice. On February 16, 2015, Trahanas did not report to work. She later emailed Schwulst. Trahanas was granted 12 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), When her leave expired, Northwestern informed Trahanas that failure to return to work or extend her leave would result in termination. She did not extend leave or return to work. Northwestern terminated her employment.Trahanas sued, asserting a hostile work environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Trahanas’s voluntary decision not to return to work or extend leave does not amount to a tangible employment action. The court noted Northwestern’s anti-harassment policy and that Trahanas “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities” to avoid harm. Trahanas cannot show that her leave played a motivating factor in Northwestern’s decision to terminate her employment. The court also rejected state law claims. View "Trahanas v. Northwestern University" on Justia Law

Crain, a Black woman, became the Chief of the Environmental Management Service at the VA Center in July 2014, subject to a year-long supervisory probationary period, with a GS-12 pay grade. Before Crain applied, she was told that if she successfully completed her probationary period, the Center would try to get the position’s pay grade increased to the GS-13 level. After Crain assumed the position, her supervisor added responsibilities to the role in an effort to justify a higher pay grade and asked Scaife, an HR classification specialist, to upgrade the role. Scaife concluded that she was unable to “justify anything higher than a GS-12.” Crain alleges that six White service chiefs’ pay grades were elevated to GS-13 or GS-14. During Crain’s tenure as Chief of EMS, several performance and behavior-related concerns arose.In June 2015, Crain was notified that she had failed to satisfactorily complete her supervisory probationary period and was being reassigned to a different role with the same salary. The memo identified multiple “performance-based deficiencies” as the basis for the decision. Months before her reassignment, Crain had initiated an EEOC complaint. After her reassignment, Crain sued under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the VA, rejecting Crain’s claims of disparate pay based on her race and that she was removed as Chief of EMS in retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. View "Crain v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit three times ordered Neises to bargain with the Union that represents its employees. After reaching numerous tentative agreements on articles to be included in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Neises retracted those tentative agreements without good cause. The NLRB sought to hold Neises in contempt. The court appointed a Special Master to resolve factual disputes. After more than a year of discovery, motions, and deliberation, the Master found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Neises should be held in contempt.The Seventh Circuit held Neises in contempt and imposed most of the NLRB’s proposed sanctions, including a $192,400 fine. Neises significantly violated an unambiguous command to bargain in good faith by retracting, without good cause, the aspects of the CBA to which it tentatively had agreed. The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Neises disobeyed a court order. The court rejected arguments that the NLRB did not have the authority to file the contempt petition and that the petition was not properly ratified; that the Report improperly decided that the parties reached tentative agreements; and that Neises did not violate an unambiguous command because the judgment and consent order do not use the phrase “in good faith” and such a phrase is too vague anyway. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Neises Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Xiong is Hmong and speaks English as a second language. He joined the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh as its Director of Affirmative Action in 2018, reporting to Kuether, Associate Vice Chancellor of Human Resources. Kuether found Xiong’s work to be of poor quality. Xiong gave Kuether a self-assessment as part of his annual performance review in which he claimed he was being paid less because he is Hmong. Kuether canceled his review meeting, declined to reschedule it, and did not share the final written performance review with him.When Xiong wanted to hire a compliance officer who had a law degree and would add diversity to the HR department, which was primarily white, Kuether questioned Xiong’s judgment. Xiong recalls Kuether saying “people of color are not a good fit.” Kuether denies saying anything like that. After multiple cross-accusations, Xiong demanded that he no longer report to Kuether. Xiong says he also raised concerns about the HR department’s hiring and promotion policies. The next day, Xiong was terminated for insubordination and poor work performance.Xiong sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the University. Because the University fired Xiong one day after his whistleblowing, a reasonable jury could infer that his termination was retaliatory. Employers often have mixed motives for adverse actions against employees. The existence of both prohibited and permissible justifications reserves the question for a jury. View "Xiong v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System" on Justia Law

Alley, working at Penguin Random House’s warehouse, was promoted to the management position of Group Leader. Penguin required all managers and supervisors to report sexual harassment allegations and provided clear instructions, including how to report anonymously. Alley received a copy of this policy and participated in training that referred to it. In 2019, Penguin employee Guzman informed Alley that Lillard was sexually harassing her. Alley conducted her own investigation. Haines, Guzman’s then-coworker and roommate, submitted a corroborating statement. Alley also contacted Pendleton, a former Penguin employee, who had stopped coming to work months earlier; Alley suspected it involved Lillard.Haines and another employee went to HR independently, reporting that Lillard was sexually harassing Guzman. Penguin investigated. Alley admitted that she already knew of Guzman’s allegations and that she had contacted Pendleton. She forwarded the statements from Guzman and Haines. Alley later alleged that she too had been sexually harassed by Lillard starting in 2015. Golladay, her former Group Leader, acknowledged that Alley had reported the harassment and that he did not report it. Golladay was not disciplined. Penguin terminated Lillard and demoted Alley.Alley sued, alleging retaliation under Title VII and breach of contract under Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims, Alley was demoted for her failure to report allegations as required by Penguin policy. She did not engage in statutorily protected activity. View "Alley v. Penguin Random House" on Justia Law

In May 2020 Rehm expressed concern that Haven was not doing enough to protect her and other employees from COVID. Dillett, Haven’s Director of Operations and co-owner, did not appreciate Rehm’s suggestions. Rehm sent a staff-wide email criticizing Dillett’s handling of COVID health risks. Dillett fired her. After Rehm complained to the NLRB, Dillett threatened legal action. An ALJ found that Haven had unlawfully terminated and threatened Rehm, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The Board ordered Haven to compensate Rehm for lost pay and expenses, offer to rehire her, notify her that it had removed references to her unlawful termination from her employee file, post notices of employee rights, and file a sworn certification of compliance.The Seventh Circuit summarily enforced that order in September 2021. Haven did not comply. In December 2022, the Seventh Circuit directed Haven to respond to the Board’s contempt petition. Haven disregarded a subsequent “show cause” order. The Seventh Circuit entered a contempt order, requiring Haven to pay a fine of $1,000, plus a fine of $150 per day for every day of the next week that Haven fails to comply, beginning on February 28, 2023. The daily fine will increase by $100 each day that Haven fails to comply beyond the next week. The court will forgive the fines if Haven files a sworn statement within seven days demonstrating full compliance. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Haven Salon + Spa, Inc" on Justia Law

Ross worked as a sales representative for First Financial until 2018. Ross sued First Financial and two of its senior executives for sales commissions he claimed he was owed. Under the terms of his employment contract, Ross could earn a commission both when a customer first leased an item from First Financial and then at the end of a lease term, if the customer either extended the lease or purchased the equipment outright. In early 2017, First Financial acted to reduce future commission rates. Ross argued that First Financial breached his contract by applying the new, lower commission rates to end-of-lease transactions that occurred after the change took effect if the leases originally began before the change.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The company’s commission payments to Ross were correct because commissions on end-of-lease transactions are not earned until the customer actually agrees to and pays for the new transactions. Although Ross was reluctant to accept the new plan, he still accepted it by continuing to work for First Financial under its terms. View "Ross v. First Financial Corporate Services, Inc." on Justia Law