Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Angela Midthun-Hensen and Tony Hensen sought insurance coverage for therapies for their daughter K.H.'s autism from Group Health Cooperative between 2017 and 2019. The insurer denied coverage, citing a lack of evidence supporting the effectiveness of speech therapy for a child K.H.'s age and sensory-integration therapy for autism at any age. The family's employer-sponsored plan only covered "evidence-based" treatments. After several medical reviews and appeals upheld the insurer's decision, the parents sued, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and state law regarding autism coverage.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin ruled in favor of the insurer, finding no violations of state law or ERISA. The plaintiffs then focused on their claim that the insurer's actions violated the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA), which mandates equal treatment limitations for mental and physical health benefits. They argued that the insurer applied the "evidence-based" requirement more stringently to autism therapies than to chiropractic care, which they claimed lacked scientific support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the insurer's reliance on medical literature, which varied in its recommendations based on patient age, was permissible under the Parity Act. The court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the insurer's treatment limitations for mental health benefits were more restrictive than those applied to "substantially all" medical and surgical benefits, as required by the statute. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' focus on a single medical benefit was insufficient to prove a violation of the Parity Act. View "Midthun-Hensen v. Group Health Cooperative of South Central, Inc.," on Justia Law

A group of employees sued their employer, Metalcraft of Mayville, for not paying them for time spent working just before or after their shifts. The employees alleged that Metalcraft's timekeeping system, which allowed clocking in up to 15 minutes before and after shifts, did not accurately reflect the time they worked. They claimed that adjustments to their clock-in times were made even when they performed compensable work during these periods.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin decertified the collective action in April 2020, leading to 24 additional cases being filed and consolidated. Nine cases were dismissed for various reasons, and the district court granted summary judgment to Metalcraft in the four selected cases, ruling that the employees' evidence was speculative and insufficient. The remaining 12 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their cases, acknowledging that the summary judgment ruling likely determined their claims. Metalcraft then moved for sanctions against the plaintiffs' counsel, arguing that the lawsuits were frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court's denial of sanctions. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had enough factual and legal support for their claims to avoid sanctions. The court noted that FLSA claims can be based on reconstructed memories when an employer's record-keeping is inadequate. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' legal arguments regarding the Portal-to-Portal Act and the de minimis doctrine were not baseless. The appellate court emphasized that the standard for summary judgment is different from the standard for Rule 11 sanctions and that the plaintiffs' failure to win on summary judgment did not make their cases frivolous. Therefore, the denial of sanctions was affirmed. View "Farina v. Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc." on Justia Law

Jason Beckner, employed by Commercial Air, Inc., was injured while working on a construction site in Zionsville, Indiana. Commercial Air had rented a crane and operator from Maxim Crane Works, L.P. for a day to lift roof trusses. Beckner claimed that the crane operator, Emmitt Pugh, caused his injury through negligent operation. Beckner and his wife sued Maxim Crane for negligence, asserting vicarious liability.The case was initially filed in Indiana state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana based on diversity jurisdiction. Maxim Crane moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act barred the suit because Pugh was a co-employee of Beckner. The district court denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment in favor of Maxim Crane, ruling that Pugh was also employed by Commercial Air, making the Worker’s Compensation Act Beckner’s exclusive remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Pugh was an employee of Commercial Air. The court noted conflicting evidence about who controlled Pugh’s work and whether Commercial Air believed it employed Pugh. The court applied both the seven-factor test from Hale v. Kemp and the ten-factor test from Moberly v. Day, concluding that factual disputes precluded summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these factual issues. View "Beckner v. Maxim Crane Works, L.P." on Justia Law

Irma Leibas, a correctional officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections (DOC), has pre-existing medical conditions requiring workplace accommodations, including up to three additional breaks per shift. After the DOC denied her request for these accommodations, Leibas sued, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Leibas’s accommodation and discrimination claims. However, upon reconsideration and after both parties supplemented the record, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Leibas was not a qualified individual under the ADA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court examined whether Leibas could perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. The court found that maintaining the safety and security of the DOC is an essential function of a correctional officer. Leibas’s requested accommodation of additional breaks, including rest periods, was deemed unreasonable given the unpredictable and violent environment of the DOC, which requires officers to be able to stand for long periods and respond to emergencies without delay. The court also noted that the DOC’s staffing shortages and the need for continuous coverage further complicated the feasibility of Leibas’s requested accommodations.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Leibas did not provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that she could perform the essential functions of her position with the requested accommodations. View "Leibas v. Dart" on Justia Law

Christine Bube and Connie Hedrington, both registered nurses, worked for Aspirus, Inc., a non-profit hospital system. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Aspirus mandated that all employees receive the COVID vaccine, allowing exemptions for religious reasons. Bube and Hedrington applied for religious exemptions, citing their Catholic faith and beliefs about bodily integrity and health. Aspirus denied their requests and terminated their employment in December 2021.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed Bube and Hedrington’s Title VII claim, reasoning that their accommodation requests did not sufficiently tie their objections to specific religious beliefs or practices. The court concluded that their objections were primarily about personal autonomy and vaccine safety, rather than religious beliefs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an employee seeks accommodation because of their religion when their request is plausibly based at least in part on some aspect of their religious belief or practice. Applying this standard, the court found that Bube’s and Hedrington’s requests were indeed based in part on their religious beliefs. The court emphasized that Title VII’s broad definition of religion requires a hands-off approach to defining religious exercise. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bube v. Aspirus Hospital, Inc" on Justia Law

Two healthcare workers, Megan Passarella and Sandra Dottenwhy, employed by Aspirus Health in Wisconsin, sought religious exemptions from the company's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Passarella cited her Christian belief that her body is a temple of the Holy Spirit and expressed concerns about the vaccine's safety. Dottenwhy also referenced her Christian faith, stating that her body is a temple and expressing distrust in the vaccine's development and long-term effects. Both were denied exemptions and subsequently terminated.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed their Title VII claims, ruling that their objections were based on medical judgment rather than religious conviction. The court found that the plaintiffs did not articulate any religious belief that would prevent them from taking the vaccine if they believed it was safe.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that an employee's request for accommodation is based on religion if it is plausibly connected to their religious beliefs or practices, even if it also includes non-religious reasons. The court emphasized that Title VII's definition of religion is broad and includes all aspects of religious observance and practice. The court found that both Passarella's and Dottenwhy's exemption requests were at least partially based on their religious beliefs, making them sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine the sincerity of the plaintiffs' beliefs and whether Aspirus could reasonably accommodate them without undue hardship. View "Dottenwhy v. Aspirus, Inc." on Justia Law

Paula Emerson, a former Cook County Corrections Officer, was terminated in 2019 after being on disability leave since 2012 due to anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Emerson claimed her termination was in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim in 2014 and a Title VII lawsuit against Cook County and its employees, which she lost. She alleged that the same attorneys represented the County in both her workers' compensation proceedings and the Title VII case, and discussed her cases with those responsible for her termination.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Emerson's initial complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing her to amend it. Emerson's amended complaint was also dismissed with prejudice for failing to cure deficiencies. The court found that filing a workers' compensation claim was not a protected activity under the ADA and that Emerson did not adequately allege that her workers' compensation claim caused her termination. Emerson's request for limited discovery was denied due to lack of specific allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Emerson's complaint did not plausibly allege that her workers' compensation claim caused her termination, noting the five-year gap between the claim and her firing. The court also upheld the denial of Emerson's discovery request, deeming it speculative, and found no abuse of discretion in denying her Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as she presented no new evidence or manifest error of law or fact. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Emerson v. Dart" on Justia Law

Stanford Clacks, an African American truck driver, was employed by Kwik Trip, Inc. and experienced racial harassment from fellow employees. During his training, Clacks was harassed by two trainers, Tom Roerkohl and Brett Nechkash, who used racial epithets and made derogatory remarks. Clacks reported these incidents to his supervisor, Sean Clements, but did not initially specify the racial nature of the harassment. After completing his training, Clacks continued to face sporadic racial harassment, including receiving a racially charged note from Nechkash. Clacks went on voluntary pandemic leave in March 2020 and later reported the harassment to Kwik Trip’s Human Resources department, prompting an investigation that led to the termination of the offending employees. Kwik Trip offered Clacks his job back or a severance package, both of which he declined.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of Kwik Trip on all claims. The court applied the sham-affidavit rule to exclude parts of an affidavit Clacks submitted in opposition to summary judgment, finding it contradicted his earlier deposition testimony. The court found that Clacks did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims of a hostile work environment and retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the sham-affidavit rule and that Clacks did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims. Specifically, the court found that Kwik Trip took reasonable steps to address the harassment once it was reported and that Clacks did not suffer an adverse employment action as he was offered his job back. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find Kwik Trip liable for a hostile work environment or retaliation. View "Clacks v. Kwik Trip, Incorporated" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as charged. RiverStone appealed, and the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the NLRA by denying a union steward’s presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing picket signs, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ regarding the discipline and discharge of the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, stating that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusions. The court agreed that RiverStone violated the NLRA by denying the union steward’s presence, requiring the signing of the hiring list, removing picket signs, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the court also upheld the NLRB’s decision that RiverStone did not unlawfully discipline and discharge the union member, as the company followed its disciplinary policy. The court denied both RiverStone and Local 150’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. Additionally, the court denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another union member to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the Act as charged. RiverStone appealed to the NLRB, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying a union steward’s presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ’s finding that RiverStone unlawfully disciplined and discharged the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s order. The court denied the petitions for review from both Local 150 and RiverStone and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The court found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying the union steward’s presence, requiring the signing of a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the court agreed with the NLRB that RiverStone did not unlawfully discipline and discharge the union member. The court also denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB. View "Grove v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law