Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Specht, employed as a New York City fire marshal, alleged that after he refused to file a false report concerning the circumstances of a fire he was investigating and publicly discussed misconduct on the part of his supervisors, he was the subject of retaliation. The fire had resulted in serious damage to a building where a motion picture was being filmed and the death of a firefighter. Sprecht had reported a tentative conclusion that the fire was caused by the movie crew. He was reassigned after he refused to comply with instructions to report a faulty boiler as the cause. Specht sued, alleging First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and other claims. The district court dismissed the suit.The Second Circuit reversed in part Specht alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim but failed to state a New York State Civil Service Law claim or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Sprecht’s report to the Department of Investigation, his meeting with the District Attorney’s office, and his communications with local press touched on matters of public concern. Specht’s refusal to file a false report and his complaints to outside agencies constituted speech as a citizen, rather than only as a public employee. View "Specht v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that, for Copyright Act purposes, the screenwriter Victor Miller was an independent contractor of the film production company Manny, Inc., in 1979, when Miller wrote the screenplay for the landmark horror film Friday the 13th, released in 1980. Manny argues primarily that Miller's membership in the Writers' Guild of America, East, Inc. (WGA), and Manny's participation in the producers' collective bargaining agreement with the WGA in the same period establish that Miller was Manny's employee for Copyright Act purposes.The court concluded that copyright law, not labor law, controls the "work for hire" determination here. The court explained that because the definition of "employee" under copyright law is grounded in the common law of agency and the Reid framework and serves different purposes than do the labor law concepts regarding employment relationships, there is no sound basis for using labor law to override copyright law goals. Furthermore, there was no error in the district court's refusal to treat Miller's WGA membership as a separate Reid factor. The court applied the Reid factors and concluded that Miller was an independent contractor when he wrote the screenplay and is therefore entitled to authorship rights. The court also concluded that the notice of termination that Miller gave under section 203 of the Copyright Act is effective as to Manny and its successors. The court found that the Companies' remaining arguments did not provide a basis for reversal and thus affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Miller. View "Horror Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

Datalink and its president appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government on its claim to collect back wages on behalf of a native of Iceland and former Datalink employee. The back wages were owing to the employee under federal law governing the H-1B visa program. On appeal, defendants contend that the Government may not use the procedures of the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) to collect the unpaid wages.The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, holding that the Government may not rely on the FDCPA to collect back wages on the employee's behalf. The court agreed with defendants that an administrative award of back wages is not an amount "owing to the United States" under the FDCPA, and overruled NLRB v. E.D.P. Medical Computer Systems, Inc., 6 F.3d 951 (2d Cir. 1993), as wrongly decided and inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the FDCPA. View "United States v. Bedi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CSX, for unlawful retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), alleging that he was terminated because he engaged in protected activity by "reporting, in good faith, a hazardous safety or security condition."The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CSX, concluding that the district court erred in determining that plaintiff's belief that the subject of his report – pressure from supervisors to make false entries in work reports causing employees undue stress and distraction from their duties – concerned a "hazardous safety or security condition" was objectively unreasonable. Rather, the court concluded that the FRSA's protection of reports made "in good faith" requires only that the reporting employee subjectively believe that the matter being reported constitutes a hazardous safety or security condition, regardless of whether that belief is objectively reasonable. The district court also erred in determining that, in any event, only physical conditions subject to the railroad's control could constitute such a condition. The court explained that the statutory text suggests no reason to confine the meaning of "hazardous safety or security condition" to encompass only physical conditions. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ziparo v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its decision and order requiring the Companies to reinstate a former employee and to comply with their collective bargaining obligations with the Union. This case arose from a long-pending labor dispute between the Union and three closely related corporations doing business in Newark: Newark Electric, Newark 2.0, and Colacino.Although the court agreed with the Companies that the Board's original complaint was invalid, the court rejected their challenge to its ratification by the NLRB's General Counsel and concluded that the Board's order may be enforced. The court also concluded that the Board's determination that the Companies were a single employer and alter egos is supported by substantial evidence. The court found persuasive the Companies' further argument that Colacino's termination of its Letter of Assent with the Union also needed Newark Electric's obligations toward the Union. Finally, the court found that substantial credible evidence supports the Board's conclusion that Colacino Industries violated section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act when it terminated the employee. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Electric Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of Connecticut-based franchisees, in which they allege that their franchise agreement misclassifies franchisees as independent contractors rather than employees. Plaintiffs claim that the collection of franchise fees violates the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-71e, and the Connecticut anti-kickback statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-73.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act claim and grant of summary judgment on the anti-kickback claim. The court concluded that the district court correctly applied the principles set forth by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Geysen v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 142 A.3d 227, 234 (Conn. 2016), and Mytych v. May Dep't Stores Co., 793 A.2d 1068, 1072 (Conn. 2002), in concluding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act. The court explained that, even if plaintiffs should have been classified as employees under Connecticut law, Mytych forecloses their section 31-71e claim. Likewise, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Jani-King on plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. Finally, the court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify proposed questions of law to the Connecticut Supreme Court. View "Mujo v. Jani-King International, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review challenging the Board's dismissal of the union's unfair labor practice charges against ADT, alleging that ADT violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain before implementing a mandatory six-day workweek for nearly all technicians at its facilities in Albany and Syracuse, New York.The court agreed with the union that the Board erred in construing the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) by failing to give effect to scheduling provisions that limit ADT's rights to mandate overtime. The court concluded that the CBAs did not allow ADT to unilaterally impose a mandatory six-day workweek and that ADT violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain before implementing the change. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded for further consideration. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated by his former employer for violating company policies prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, he filed suit alleging that the stated basis for his termination was pretext and that the real reason he was fired was age discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).Although on a Rule 12(c) motion the district court should not have weighed the plausibility of competing allegations in the movant's pleading or considered evidence extrinsic to the non-movant's pleading, the court affirmed the district court's judgment because plaintiff's complaint failed to plead that either his age or protected speech was a but-for cause of his termination. Likewise, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails for similar reasons. View "Lively v. WAFRA Investment Advisory Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Black firefighters who suffer from a skin condition that causes pain and sometimes scarring when they shave their facial hair, filed suit alleging that the FDNY discriminated against them in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and various other laws. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from the FDNY's refusal to offer them a medical accommodation to the department's grooming policy. The policy requires firefighters to be clean shaven in the areas where an oxygen mask or "respirator" seals against their skin.The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their ADA claim, holding that the OSHA regulation, 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(g)(1)(i)(A), unambiguously prohibits plaintiffs' proposed accommodation and that a binding federal regulation presents a complete defense to an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim. Furthermore, plaintiffs waived the issue of alternative accommodation because they failed to raise it until their reply brief on appeal. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' Title VII disparate impact claim mirrors their ADA claim and meets a similar fate. The court explained that, although plaintiffs have made a prima facie case, the FDNY has conclusively rebutted that case by showing that complying with the respiratory-protection standard is a business necessity. Just as in the ADA context, the court concluded that Title VII cannot be used to require employers to depart from binding federal regulations. Nor can the court agree with plaintiffs that the FDNY's failure to consistently enforce the respiratory-protection standard means that complying with the regulation is not a business necessity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Bey v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant with the Binghamton Police Department, filed suit against the City, the City's mayor, and two Department officials, alleging that he was racially harassed by members of the Department and retaliated against for voicing concerns about discrimination.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim because the complaint does not support an inference that he was punished for engaging in protected speech. Although the complaint does not "enumerate" a claim for discrimination alongside the cause of action for retaliation, the court found that plaintiff does identify a discrimination claim. In this case, the introduction of the complaint specifies that plaintiff brings a "claim for discriminatory conduct based on Hispanic origin . . . pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Furthermore, the complaint includes numerous factual allegations sufficient to notify defendants that plaintiffs seeks redress for discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part for further proceedings. View "Quinones v. City of Binghamton" on Justia Law