Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of his Title VII discrete act and hostile work environment claims against the Federal Aviation Administration. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s claims were properly dismissed. The court first concluded that Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which requires that a claimant initiate an administrative review of his employment discrimination claim within 45 days of the allegedly discriminatory conduct. Further Plaintiff failed to point to any particular discrete and actionable unlawful employment practice that occurred in the 45 days before he initiated an administrative review of his claims. The continuing violation doctrine does not allow Plaintiff to pursue alleged incidents of unlawful practices that occurred before the 45-day period, as the doctrine is inapplicable to discrete act claims. Second, as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that his employer’s alleged failure to train him or the other alleged incidents of hostile behavior in the workplace was motivated by hostility to his race, color, or national origin. View "Tassy v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Workers at Amazon’s JFK8 fulfillment center and members of their households (together, “Plaintiffs”) challenge workplace COVID-19 policies, practices, and procedures at JFK8. Their suit against Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC (together, “Amazon”) asserted causes of action under New York law for public nuisance, breach of the duty to protect the health and safety of employees under New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) Section 200, violation of NYLL Section 191 for failure to pay, on time and in full, COVID-19 sick leave under New York’s COVID-19 sick leave law, and injunctive relief against future violations of NYLL Section 191.   The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ public nuisance and NYLL Section 200 claims without prejudice under the primary jurisdiction doctrine dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ NYLL Section 191 claims, concluding that COVID-19 leave payments are not “wages” as defined by Section 191.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ public nuisance and NYLL Section 191 claims; and vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ NYLL Section 200 claim and remanded to the district court for further proceedings on that claim. The court rejected Amazon’s contention that the court should partially dismiss the appeal. The court agreed with Plaintiffs that the district court wrongly applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine to their public nuisance and NYLL Section 200 claims. Ultimately, however, only their Section 200 claim survives. The court held Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for public nuisance under New York law because they do not allege a special injury and Section 11 of the New York Workers’ Compensation Law does not preclude injunctive relief under NYLL Section 200. View "Palmer v. Amazon" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor brought a petition seeking review of a final order issued on December 31, 2020 by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission found the phrase “stored in tiers” in the second sentence of 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.176(b) did not apply to pallets of merchandise located in a Walmart Distribution Center in Johnstown, New York.   The Secretary argued that the Commission erred in finding Section 11 1910.176(b) inapplicable to Walmart’s tiered storage system because it unambiguously includes material placed or arranged one above another in tiered storage racks, such as the system used at the Distribution Center. Alternatively, the Secretary also argued that if the Court found the regulation ambiguous, the Court should defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded finding that the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation was reasonable. The court explained that the Commission’s cramped definition ignores other types of tiers, including seating arrangements at sporting events and music venues with layers of seats that are independently supported and placed one over the other with gaps between them. There is nothing inconsistent in the remaining language of the standard that militates against an interpretation that shelves can be tiers. Here, the pallets stored on the selective racking became unstable and merchandise on the pallets fell. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Secretary’s competing interpretation of the language of the standard is reasonable. View "Martin J. Walsh v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs deliver baked goods by truck to stores and restaurants in designated territories within Connecticut. They brought an action in district court on behalf of a putative class against Flowers Foods, Inc. and two of its subsidiaries, which manufacture the baked goods that the plaintiffs deliver. Plaintiffs allege unpaid or withheld wages, unpaid overtime wages, and unjust enrichment pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and Connecticut wage laws. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the case.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration and dismissing the case. The court explained that it concludes that an individual works in a transportation industry if the industry in which the individual works pegs its charges chiefly to the movement of goods or passengers, and the industry’s predominant source of commercial revenue is generated by that movement. Here, because Plaintiffs do not work in the transportation industry, they are not excluded from the FAA, and the district court appropriately compelled arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement. View "Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action complaint against Cellular Sales of New York, LLC and Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc. (“Cellular”) for unfair wage deductions, unpaid compensable work, untimely commissions, unjust enrichment, and failure to pay minimum wage and overtime under the FLSA and New York Labor Law. Essentially, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants misclassified them as independent contractors instead of employees as defined by the FLSA and [New York Labor Law], thus depriving them of employee benefits required by law.   Cellular appealed the district court’s order granting attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs. Cellular argued that (1) the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs’ successful minimum wage and overtime claims were sufficiently intertwined with their unsuccessful unfair wage deduction, unpaid compensable work, and untimely commissions claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law; and (2) regardless of whether the claims were intertwined, that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the attorney’s fees award by only 40 percent given Plaintiffs’ relative lack of success. 
 The Second Circuit affirmed. The could be explained that Plaintiffs brought wage-and-hour statutory claims that clearly arise from a common nucleus of operative fact regarding their time working for Cellular. Thus, the district court’s finding that the discovery involved in litigating the unpaid overtime wage claims is inseparable from the discovery involved in the unfair wage deductions, unpaid compensable work, or untimely commissions claims is well supported.  Further, the court affirmed the attorney’s fee awards explaining that fee awards are reviewed under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. View "Holick v. Cellular Sales" on Justia Law

The case concerned the scope of the audit authority of a multi-employer employee benefit fund covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The New York State Nurses Association Benefit Fund (the “Fund”) sought an audit of the Nyack Hospital’s (the “Hospital’s”) payroll and wage records. The Hospital objected, claiming that the Fund had the authority to inspect only the payroll records of employees the Hospital identified as members of the collective bargaining unit. The district court held that the Fund was entitled to the records of all persons the Hospital identified as registered nurses but not to the records of any other employees.   The Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court reversed to the extent the district court granted the Hospital’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the Fund’s motion for summary judgment. To the extent the district court granted the Fund’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Hospital’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the court affirmed. The court held that the audit sought by the Fund was authorized by the Trust Agreement and that the Hospital did not present evidence that the audit constituted a breach of the Fund’s fiduciary duty under ERISA. Accordingly, the audit was within the scope of the Fund trustees’ authority under the Supreme Court’s decision in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559 (1985). View "New York State Nurses Association Benefits Fund v. The Nyack Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a former bus driver for Defendant Maine-Endwell Central School District (the “School District”), appealed the dismissal of his complaint by the district court. Plaintiff contends that the School District violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for speech he purports to have made in his capacity as a union leader. In his complaint, however, Plaintiff merely alleged that he had argued with a School District mechanic – and later, a few School District officials – over the frequency with which bus safety issues should be reported. He did not allege that the School District’s existing policy permitted unsafe buses to remain on the roads, nor did he allege that daily reporting would improve public safety.   The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege that he engaged in speech protected under the First Amendment. The court explained that the specific details of Plaintiff’s complaint suggest that Plaintiff’s arguments with fellow School District personnel were had in his capacity as a School District employee, not as a private citizen. Plaintiff’s primary argument to the contrary boils down to a series of assertions that he was speaking in his capacity as a union official. But even assuming these assertions are entitled to be assumed true, the court has expressly rejected any categorical rule that when a person speaks in his capacity as a union member, he speaks as a private citizen Accordingly, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not support a plausible inference that he spoke as a citizen, or that he spoke on a matter of public concern. View "Shara v. Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist.," on Justia Law

The case concerns the extent of an employer’s obligation to provide accommodations to a job applicant with a disability under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (incorporating the standard set forth in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act) and under generally parallel state and city law. Plaintiff alleged that MTA Bus discriminated against him on the basis of his disability when it denied him the assistance of an American Sign Language interpreter for its knowledge-based pre-employment examination. The district court ruled that Plaintiff must show that he was “otherwise qualified” for the Assistant Stockworker position to maintain his Rehabilitation Act claim and that, at summary judgment, Plaintiff had not met this requirement.The Second Circuit affirmed. The court first considered whether an applicant who cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is “otherwise qualified” for the desired employment position can survive summary judgment on a failure-to-accommodate claim arising from the employer’s pre-employment testing protocols. Second, the court examined whether Plaintiff made such a showing as to the Assistant Stockworker position that he sought.The court explained that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff—entirely independent from his hearing impairment—did not have the experience required to qualify for the desired position. MTA Bus put forth evidence that Defendant was not qualified for the Associate Stockworker position and Defendant has failed to identify any material facts in rebuttal. View "Williams v. MTA Bus Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that UBS Securities, LLC and UBS AG (together “UBS”) fired him in retaliation for reporting alleged fraud on shareholders to his supervisor. Plaintiff sued UBS under the whistleblower protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A, and he ultimately prevailed at trial.   The Second Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded to the district court for a new trial. The court explained that the district court did not instruct the jury that a SOX anti-retaliation claim requires a showing of the employer’s retaliatory intent. Section 1514A prohibits publicly traded companies from taking adverse employment actions to “discriminate against an employee . . . because of” any lawful whistleblowing act. 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A(a). Accordingly, the court held that this provision requires a whistleblower-employee, like Plaintiff, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer took the adverse employment action against the whistleblower-employee with retaliatory intent—i.e., an intent to “discriminate against an employee . . . because of” lawful whistleblowing activity. The district court’s legal error was not harmless. View "Murray v. UBS Securities" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”), sued the MTA under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), alleging that the MTA negligently failed to provide him with a safe workplace when it sent him on patrol in a vehicle without a prisoner compartment. A jury found the MTA liable and awarded Plaintiff damages. The MTA moved for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that it is immune from liability pursuant to the governmental function defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because it lacked expert testimony. The district court denied that motion, holding that the governmental function defense does not apply in FELA cases.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the FELA does not abrogate the governmental function defense, and therefore the defense is available in FELA cases. Though the governmental function defense was available for the MTA to assert, the MTA failed to show that the defense barred liability in this case. Here, the defense did not apply on the merits in this case, however, because the MTA has failed to show that it performed a discretionary governmental function when committing the allegedly negligent acts. Additionally, the court held that expert testimony was not required in this case. Further, the court could not say that the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict for Plaintiff was legally insufficient. View "Ojeda v. MTA" on Justia Law