Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor reasonably determined that the cited workplace conditions were subject to regulation under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards, rather than the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The court noted that the Secretary's reasonable determination regarding which conditions are to be regulated by MSHA and which by OSHA was entitled to substantial deference. In this case, the ALJ gave no deference whatsoever to the Secretary's decision to issue the citations for the Bag Plant violations under the authority of OSHA, but rather imposed his own interpretation of what the Mine Act covered. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Secretary of Labor v. Cranesville Aggregate Cos." on Justia Law

Claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, are subject to arbitration. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that he was denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA. Plaintiff's employment contract contained a clause requiring arbitration of any dispute arising out of the contract. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of a claim under the FLSA and dismissing the complaint for violations of the Act. The court held that plaintiff's remaining contentions lacked merit. View "Rodriguez-Depena v. Parts Authority, Inc." on Justia Law

Unpaid interns in this case were not "employees" of Hearst for the purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL). The Second Circuit applied the "primary beneficiary" test in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. and considered the seven non-exhaustive considerations specific to the context of unpaid internships. The court held that the facts of this case permit inferences that support Hearst with respect to certain Glatt factors, and inferences that support particular interns with respect to other factors. Such mixed inferences did not foreclose a ruling on summary judgment. The court agreed with the district court, which weighed all factors under the totality of the circumstances, and concluded that the interns were not "employees" for the purposes of the FLSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Hearst. View "Wang v. The Hearst Corporation" on Justia Law

LIAAC petitioned for review of the Board's order determining that LIAAC violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by promulgating an unlawful confidentiality agreement and by terminating an employee for his refusal to sign the unlawful confidentiality agreement. The Second Circuit enforced the order and held that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) when it terminates an employee for refusing to sign an unlawful employment document. The court disposed of the remaining issues on appeal in a summary order. View "NLRB v. Long Island Ass'n for AIDS Care, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over subcontracting clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between the Carpenters' Union and various construction companies and construction managers. The clauses effectively barred subcontracting of construction work with non-Carpenter affiliates. Ironworkers alleged that the Carpenters have used these subcontracting clauses to expand the scope of work assigned to the Carpenters Union to include work traditionally assigned to the Ironworkers. The district court granted summary judgment to the Carpenters. The Second Circuit held that the Carpenters have met the requirements of the construction industry proviso of Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, but that, on this record, there were factual disputes that precluded a decision on whether the conduct fell within the non‐statutory exemption to antitrust liability. The court explained, to demonstrate that the disputed subcontracting practices were sheltered by the non‐statutory exemption (and thus to defeat the Ironworkers' antitrust claim completely), the Carpenters must show that these practices furthered legitimate aims of collective bargaining, in a way that was not unduly restrictive of market competition. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment as to the Sherman Act claim; affirmed as to the unfair labor practices claim; and remanded. View "Conn. Ironworkers Employers Assoc. v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

The duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act does not necessarily preempt the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) for claims of discrimination filed by a union member against a labor organization when the labor organization is acting in its capacity as a collective bargaining representative (as distinguished from when it is acting in its capacity as an employer). The Second Circuit held that the Act's duty of representation does not preempt the NYSHRL either on the basis of field preemption or as a general matter on the basis of conflict preemption. Accordingly, the court reversed the declaratory judgment of the district court and denied Local's cross-appeal for injunctive relief. View "Figueroa v. Foster" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's determination that plaintiff asserted claims only under federal law, its dismissal of claims against the individual defendants, and its dismissal of plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. At issue in this appeal was whether a pro se litigant forfeits her claims under New York state and local discrimination law where she has alleged facts supporting such claims, but fails to check a blank on a form complaint indicating that she wishes to bring them. The court held that such a bright-line rule runs counter to the court's policy of liberally construing pro se submissions, and that plaintiff's complaint in this case should have been read by the district court to assert claims under New York state and local discrimination law as well as under federal law. The court addressed the balance of plaintiff's claims on appeal in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "McLeod v. The Jewish Guild for the Blind" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in favor of defendants, agreeing with plaintiff that the district court wrongly instructed the jury that "but for" causation applied to Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claims. The court held that FMLA retaliation claims of the sort plaintiff brought here were grounded in 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) and a "motivating factor" causation standard applied to those claims. The court also held that the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in admitting and permitting the adverse inferences to be drawn in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former principal of a Roman Catholic school, filed suit alleging that she was terminated on the basis of unlawful gender discrimination and retaliation. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that the ministerial exception barred plaintiffʹs employment‐discrimination claims because in her role as principal she was a minister within the meaning of the exception. The court explained that, although her formal title was not inherently religious, the record clearly established that she held herself out as a spiritual leader of the school, and that she performed many significant religious functions to advance its religious mission. View "Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retired officers of Booz Allen, filed suit alleging that they were improperly denied compensation when, after their retirement, Booz Allen sold one of its divisions in the Carlyle Transaction. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claims on the ground that Booz Allen's stock-distribution program was not a pension plan within the meaning of ERISA, and denial as futile leave to amend to "augment" the ERISA claims with new allegations; affirmed the dismissal of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims on the ground that they were barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c); but vacated the district court's judgment to the extent it denied Plaintiff Kocourek leave to amend to add securities-fraud causes of action. The court remanded for the district court to consider his claims. View "Pasternack v. Shrader" on Justia Law