Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Staff nurses employed by the City and County of San Francisco alleged that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not paying them time-and-a-half for overtime work. The City argued that the nurses were exempt from this requirement under the FLSA's professional-capacity exemption, claiming that the nurses were paid on a salary basis. The nurses contended that they were paid on an hourly basis, as their annual compensation was divided into hourly rates and they were paid only for hours worked.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the annual pay figures published in the salary ordinance provided definitive evidence that the nurses were compensated on a salary basis. The court found the nurses' hourly pay rates to be an administrative tool and dismissed the nurses' claims of improper pay deductions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred by relying on the salary ordinance and not examining how the nurses were actually paid. The proper focus for the salary basis test is whether an employee receives a predetermined amount of compensation on a weekly or less frequent basis. The court found that material factual questions remained regarding whether the City satisfied the salary basis test in practice. Specifically, the court noted discrepancies in the payroll data that suggested the nurses might not have received their predetermined compensation in certain pay periods. The court also found that the City did not provide evidence of reimbursing the nurses for any improper deductions, which precluded the use of the "window of correction" defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings to resolve these factual issues. View "SILLOWAY V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jose Emilio Ronderos, applied for a job with USF Reddaway, Inc. and Yellow Corporation (collectively, "Reddaway") and was required to sign an arbitration agreement as part of the application process. Ronderos later filed employment-related claims against Reddaway, alleging age and disability discrimination, retaliation, and other violations under California law. Ronderos claimed that the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Reddaway's motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, involved significant oppression, and contained a substantively opaque cost-splitting provision. The court also found that the agreement was substantively unconscionable due to its one-sided filing provision and preliminary injunction carve-out, which unfairly favored Reddaway. The district court declined to sever the unconscionable provisions and enforce the remainder of the agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. It held that the agreement involved significant oppression and some surprise, making it procedurally unconscionable. The court also found that the one-sided filing provision and preliminary injunction carve-out were substantively unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sever the unconscionable provisions and affirmed the denial of Reddaway's motion to compel arbitration. View "Ronderos v. USF Reddaway, Inc." on Justia Law

Noncitizen laborers were brought into the United States to work for construction subcontractor defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fraudulently applied for B-1 employment visas, which cost less than the petition-based visas they should have applied for, thereby violating the False Claims Act (FCA). Additionally, one plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the Trafficking Victims Prevention Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) by threatening prosecution and suing him to coerce other workers to continue working.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The court held that the defendants did not have an "established duty" to pay for the more expensive visas because they never applied for them, thus no legal obligation existed under the FCA. The court also dismissed the TVPRA claim, finding that the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants' actions coerced him to provide any labor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the defendants had no "established duty" to pay for the more expensive visas since they did not apply for them, and thus did not violate the FCA. The court also upheld the dismissal of the TVPRA claim, concluding that the plaintiff did not state a claim because the defendants' actions did not coerce him to provide any labor. The court's main holding was that potential liability for applying for the wrong visas does not constitute an "established duty" to pay under the FCA, and that the TVPRA claim failed because the plaintiff was not coerced into providing labor. The decision was affirmed. View "LESNIK V. ISM VUZEM D.O.O." on Justia Law

Curtis Rookaird, represented by Paul Parker, was terminated by BNSF Railway Company after performing an air-brake test, which he argued was a protected activity under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). Rookaird claimed his termination was retaliatory. Initially, a jury found in Rookaird’s favor, but the Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider whether the air-brake test contributed to BNSF’s decision to terminate him. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of BNSF, concluding that while the air-brake test contributed to the termination, it did so "very little."The district court found that BNSF had conceded the air-brake test contributed to Rookaird’s termination but ruled that BNSF was entitled to an affirmative defense by showing the test contributed minimally. The court also upheld BNSF’s evidentiary rulings, excluding certain testimony and admitting comparator evidence. Rookaird appealed, arguing the district court misapplied the FRSA and erred in its evidentiary rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it vacated the district court’s judgment on the affirmative defense issue. The Ninth Circuit held that under the FRSA, an employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated the employee absent the protected activity, not merely that the protected activity contributed "very little" to the decision. The case was remanded for the district court to determine if BNSF met this burden, given that the air-brake test could not contribute even in part to the termination decision. View "Parker v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Five corporate jet pilots worked for Sands Aviation, LLC and Las Vegas Sands Corp., earning between $125,000 and $160,000 annually. Their primary duties included ensuring the safety of passengers, crew, and aircraft, which involved complex decision-making and discretionary actions. The pilots were required to be on call for pop-up flights, typically scheduled 24 hours in advance, and had to respond to flight notifications within 30 minutes. Despite being on call, they engaged in various personal activities and secondary employment.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Sands. The court found that the pilots were highly compensated employees performing primarily non-manual labor and making significant discretionary decisions, thus exempting them from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime requirements. Additionally, the court determined that the pilots' on-call time did not constitute work requiring overtime pay because they could freely engage in personal activities during this time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the pilots were exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements as highly compensated employees performing non-manual labor and making significant discretionary decisions. The court also held that the pilots' on-call time did not count as work for overtime purposes, as they were free to engage in personal activities and there was no agreement suggesting that on-call time was compensable. Thus, the pilots did not meet the 40-hour workweek threshold for overtime pay. View "KENNEDY V. LAS VEGAS SANDS CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A group of non-convicted individuals detained in Alameda County’s Santa Rita Jail filed a lawsuit against Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, Alameda County, and Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern. The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay under California’s Labor Code for work performed without pay for Aramark while detained. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that the plaintiffs' compensation was governed by the California Penal Code, which allows counties to pay prisoners at rates below minimum wage.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the minimum wage and overtime claims, holding that the California Penal Code did not preclude non-convicted detainees working for a private company from the protections of the Labor Code. The district court allowed the plaintiffs' claims to proceed, leading the defendants to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and certified a question to the California Supreme Court regarding whether non-convicted detainees working for a private company in county jails have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under the California Labor Code. The California Supreme Court responded that such detainees do not have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code. The court clarified that section 4019.3 of the California Penal Code applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial detainees, and does not depend on the identity of the employer.Based on the California Supreme Court's response, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' minimum wage and overtime claims. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims failed under the current law and reversed the district court's decision. View "RUELAS V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA" on Justia Law

A staff psychologist at a federal prison discovered that a corrections lieutenant operated an Instagram account with sexually offensive content, some of which targeted her. When she reported this to prison leadership, her complaints were dismissed, and the lieutenant's posts became more aggressive. Despite her repeated complaints, the prison's response was slow and ineffective, leading her to feel unsafe and eventually leave her job.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the psychologist had not shown an objectively hostile work environment and that the prison had taken reasonable remedial actions. The court limited its consideration to five specific posts and determined that these did not occur within the physical workplace.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred by not considering the totality of the circumstances, including the broader context of the harassment and the prison's inadequate response. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that evidence of sexually harassing conduct, even if not expressly targeting the plaintiff, and non-sexual conduct that could be seen as retaliatory or intimidating, should be considered. The court also rejected the notion that only conduct occurring inside the physical workplace is actionable, especially given the prevalence of social media. The court found that the plaintiff had raised triable issues of fact regarding the hostile work environment and the prison's failure to take prompt and effective remedial measures. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "OKONOWSKY V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Danny Lopez, an airline fuel technician, filed a wage-and-hour lawsuit under California law against his employer, Menzies Aviation (USA), Inc. Lopez alleged that Menzies violated state requirements for meal periods, rest periods, overtime wages, minimum wages, and other employment conditions. Menzies sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Lopez signed as part of his employment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Lopez, as a transportation worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, was exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under 9 U.S.C. § 1. The court reasoned that Lopez’s role in fueling airplanes used in interstate and foreign commerce was integral to the transportation process, thus qualifying him for the exemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a fuel technician who places fuel in planes used for foreign and interstate commerce is a transportation worker engaged in commerce. The court emphasized that such a worker plays a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders. The court clarified that there is no requirement for the worker to have hands-on contact with goods or be directly involved in their transportation to fall within the FAA exemption. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lopez was exempt from the arbitration requirements of the FAA and affirmed the district court’s denial of Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. View "LOPEZ V. AIRCRAFT SERVICE INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law

A former transportation security officer (TSO) with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) alleged that his termination was an act of retaliation under Title VII. The TSA terminated his employment for failing to cooperate in an investigation into whether he received illegal compensation for serving as a personal representative during internal agency investigations. The plaintiff argued that this reason was a pretext for retaliation due to his prior complaints to the TSA’s Equal Employment Office (EEO) about a hostile work environment and denial of Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the TSA’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual. The court noted that the temporal proximity between the plaintiff’s last EEO complaint and his termination (56 days) was not enough to establish pretext, especially given the concurrent timing of the plaintiff’s noncooperation with the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the 56-day gap between the plaintiff’s final EEO complaint and his termination was insufficient by itself to show pretext. The court also noted that the timing of the plaintiff’s noncooperation with the investigation supported the TSA’s stated reason for termination. Additionally, the court found that other circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext. The court concluded that the TSA had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment and affirmed the summary judgment. View "KAMA V. MAYORKAS" on Justia Law

Alexander Behrend, a Work Practice Apprentice (WPA) at the San Francisco Zen Center, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Behrend, who lived and worked at the Center, performed various tasks including meditation, cleaning, cooking, and maintenance. He argued that his role was not ministerial because it involved mostly menial work and did not include teaching or leading the faith.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the San Francisco Zen Center. The court found that Behrend's role fell within the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which exempts religious organizations from certain employment laws in relation to their ministers. The court determined that Behrend’s duties, although menial, were integral to the Center’s religious mission and practice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applied to Behrend’s role as a WPA. The court emphasized that the exception is broad and includes roles that are essential to carrying out a religious organization’s mission, even if they do not involve teaching or leadership. The court concluded that Behrend’s work was a vital part of Zen training and practice, thus fitting within the ministerial exception. The court rejected Behrend’s argument that only those with key roles in preaching and transmitting the faith qualify for the exception, noting that precedent supports a broader application. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, upholding the application of the ministerial exception. View "BEHREND V. SAN FRANCISCO ZEN CENTER, INC." on Justia Law