Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued his former employer, the Maryland Military Department, and related entities, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court dismissed Holloway’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim and reversed the dismissal of his unlawful termination and retaliation claims. The court reasoned that to state a claim for unlawful termination, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his employer discharged him because of his race. Here, Plaintiff alleged facts crucial to raise the inference of a Title VII violation “above a speculative level.”   Next, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. The court held that Plaintiff’s claim passes muster at the pleading stage.   However, the court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he was subject to an abusive or hostile work environment based on his race or protected activity. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that one episode of yelling and pounding the table is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish an abusive environment. View "Charles Holloway v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

AirFacts, Inc. sued a former employee for breaching several provisions of his employment agreement and misappropriating trade secrets. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the employee on all counts. On Airfacts first appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court found for the employee again. Airfacts filed a second appeal.The Fourth Circuit first held that AirFacts had abandoned all its contract claims except one alleging that defendant breached the employment agreement’s noncompete clause, which the court then rejected. AirFacts argued that defendant misappropriated its trade secrets by taking the flowcharts and proration documents. The circuit court found that defendant breached the employment agreement, but only immaterially because there’s no evidence his conduct harmed or prejudiced AirFacts. Thus, because AirFacts has failed to prove it suffered any harm from the defendant’s breaches, the district court did not err by awarding only nominal damages on these claims. The court further found there is no evidence that the defendant took confidential information with him. Finally, the court remanded the case back to the district court to decide what AirFacts deserves in reasonable royalty damages. View "AirFacts, Inc. v. Diego De Amezaga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race in refusing to hire another teacher in the drama department to assist him with tech work in connection with his staging of student performances or, alternatively, in refusing to provide him with additional compensation for the tech work that he performs. Plaintiff also alleged that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race when compensating him for his "extra-duty" work in connection with other events at the high school.The Fourth Circuit concluded that plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that the school board's failure to pay him a Theater Technical Director Supplement constituted race-based employment discrimination. While the court agreed that it was error for the district court to consult the School of the Arts' website in determining whether the complaint properly alleged that the School of the Arts was an appropriate comparator, the court concluded that the error was harmless. The court also concluded that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for plaintiff on his discrimination claim based on the denial of assistance. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not provide a valid comparator for purposes of supporting this racial discrimination claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a portion of the complaint for failing to state a claim. In regard to the remaining claims, the court granted the school board's motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence to support his claims. View "Tabb v. Board of Education of the Durham Public Schools" on Justia Law

Warfield, a securities broker, contended before an arbitration panel that his former employer, ICON, wrongfully terminated him without just cause. Warfield’s employment fell within the ambit of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), so arbitrators resolved the dispute under FINRA Rule 13200(a). Warfield argued the mere fact that disputes over his employment relationship had to be resolved by arbitration implied that he could only be fired for cause. The panel awarded him $1,186,975.The district court refused to enforce the award (9 U.S.C. 9), holding that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law because North Carolina is an “at-will” employment state that does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination without just cause. The Fourth Circuit reversed. ICON has not made the “exceedingly difficult showing” necessary to demonstrate that the arbitrators acted with manifest disregard of the law. ICON never cited any North Carolina case rejecting the specific proposition that the arbitrability of an employment relationship implies for-cause protections. Even if ICON had the better argument before the arbitrators, there was still an argument and the issue is “subject to reasonable debate,” View "Warfield v. ICON Advisers, Inc" on Justia Law

Labor unions and the West Virginia Pipe Trades Health and Welfare Fund, sued Nitro Construction under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, after Nitro made several tardy payments to the Fund. Nitro had paid its required contribution before the suit was filed; the suit sought $77,373.95 in liquidated damages, plus interest and attorneys’ fees, as provided for by the collection procedures.The district court granted Nitro summary judgment, holding that the liquidated damages constituted penalties and were therefore unrecoverable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Although ERISA allows punitive liquidated damages, federal common law prohibits punitive damages for breach of contract. The federal common law to be applied in LMRA Section 301 cases is ordinarily the general law of contracts. The court noted that the Fund sought almost $80,000 in liquidated damages, even though its actual damages (lost interest) are readily ascertainable and were only $3,952. Nitro’s late payments did not result in any claim being denied. Nitro never agreed to the liquidated damages provisions; the Fund unilaterally created its delinquent employer procedures under its governing document. The district court did not err by finding these liquidated damages provisions to be punitive and declining to enforce them. View "Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 625 v. Nitro Construction Services, Inc." on Justia Law

STA, an association of businesses involved with the transport of cargo at the Port of Baltimore, and the Longshoremen’s union (ILA) entered into trust agreements to create funds that provide employee benefits in accordance with the Labor Management Relations Act. The agreements provide an equal number of trustees representing the labor union and trustees representing the employers. Not all companies that do business at the Port are STA members. The Union Trustees sought to expand the definition of “Employer” in the trust agreements to include non-STA employers engaged in the same businesses as STA-affiliated employers at the Port, to include “any employer who signs a CBA [collective bargaining agreement] with the ILA or its [local affiliates] that requires contributions to the Trust.” Expanding the definition would increase the number of contributors to the trusts. The Management Trustees opposed the amendment, creating a deadlock, and refused the Union Trustees’ request to arbitrate. The Union Trustees sued to compel arbitration under 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)(B).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Although courts incorporate a “presumption of arbitrability” in employer-union arbitration disputes when an arbitration agreement exists, here the trust agreements provide a “positive assurance” that arbitration may not be compelled. View "Krueger v. Angelos" on Justia Law

Marsh, an employee of Petitioner New River Electrical Corporation, suffered severe burns when he picked up a live electrical wire at a job site. No one had tested, tagged, or grounded the transformer connected to the cable that shocked Marsh. Two supervisors attempted to conceal these breaches of New River’s standard safety protocols. They were subsequently terminated. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated the accident, determined that New River committed three serious violations of the applicable safety regulations, and fined the company $38,802. An ALJ affirmed, finding that New River had not established the affirmative defense of “unpreventable employee misconduct,” but decreased the penalty to $12,934. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined to review that decision.The Fourth Circuit reversed. The ALJ improperly relieved OSHA of the burden of proving that New River had constructive knowledge of these violations as part of the prima facie case. When the supervisory employee commits the violation, the employer loses its “eyes and ears” to detect and prevent misconduct. To avoid unfairly imposing liability on an employer for a rogue supervisor, OSHA must prove that a supervisor’s misconduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to establish the employer had constructive knowledge. View "New River Electrical Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

Nadendla, a physician, is of Indian origin. Nadendla was a member of WakeMed’s hospital's medical staff where she was granted clinical privileges in 2010, In 2017, citing “clinical concerns,” WakeMed informed Nadendla that she would not be reappointed clinical privileges; her appointment on the medical staff would expire. Nadendla requested a hearing, pursuant to the Bylaws. She alleges that WakeMed’s actions during the hearing process “exhibited an abject lack of fairness” and deprived her of adequate process in contravention of the Bylaws.Nadendla sued the hospital under 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees to all persons in the United States “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.’” The district court initially ruled that Nadendla sufficiently stated a section 1981 claim and state-law claims for breach of contract and for arbitrary and capricious conduct, but subsequently dismissed Nadendla’s section 1981 claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part. The district court had the discretion to revisit its prior order and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The complaint contained extensive, specific allegations regarding WakeMed’s failure to abide by the Bylaws but details regarding race are conspicuously absent. The court reversed the dismissal of Nadendla’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Nadendla v. WakeMed" on Justia Law

In 2000, Jessup began to work for Barnes. In 2016, he suffered a panic attack and requested a leave of absence. Barnes approved that request and a subsequent extension. Jessup was prescribed medication for depression and anxiety, underwent months of therapy, started meditating, and developed relationships and activities outside of work. Jessup alleges that, upon his return to work, Barnes subjected him to discriminatory treatment and a hostile work environment; he was placed in a new position that he regarded as a demotion and Barnes raised his sales quota. Jessup suffered another panic attached and again requested leave. Barnes denied Jessup’s request, citing “significant burden to the business” and telling him to contact Human Resources if he “believe[d] some other change to [his] work environment would assist [him] in performing [his] job functions.” He did not do so. Barnes sent a letter stating it was “clear that he cannot return to work and perform the essential functions of his job, with or without accommodation.” Barnes later sent a formal termination notice.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Jessup’s claims of wrongful termination, failure to accommodate, and a hostile work environment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Jessup did not establish that he was a “qualified individual.” View "Jessup v. Barnes Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Coffey was employed by the Railway as a locomotive engineer. In 2012, a train that Coffey was operating derailed; a drug test revealed the presence of amphetamines in Coffey’s system. Coffey was permitted to continue working, but he was subject to follow-up drug testing for five years. In 2016, a test showed the presence of amphetamines and codeine. Coffey explained that he had prescriptions for Adderall, which he took for ADHD, and codeine (Tylenol #3), which he took for a back condition. Railway requested that Coffey provide medical records. Six weeks later, Coffey ruptured his Achilles tendon and took medical leave for 10 months. When his physician cleared him to return to work, Railway again requested the records it had previously requested. After two more demands, Railway received some records but was unsatisfied because they failed to include specifically requested information such as medication side effects. In anticipation of a disciplinary hearing, Coffey submitted approximately 400 pages of medical records. Upon determining that those records still did not address much of the required information, Railway terminated Coffey’s employment.The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that Railway’s demands violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court and Fourth Circuit rejected Coffey’s subsequent suit. Railway made a lawful request under the ADA. Its inquiries were related to Coffey’s job and were required by federal regulation. Complying with federal regulations is, by definition, a business necessity. View "Coffey v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law