Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff, a York County Sheriff's Office (YCSO) employee, disclosed confidential information about an ongoing investigation into an inmate's death to his wife, who worked at a local news station, and then lied to internal investigators about the disclosure, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff, but the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiff's speech was not protected speech after applying the proper standard. The district court found the speech in question caused a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO and that defendant's interest in avoiding such a disruption outweighed plaintiff's circumstantially diminished First Amendment interest. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court's balancing of the parties' interests.The Fourth Circuit afforded diminished weight to plaintiff's First Amendment interest and concluded that it was outweighed by defendant's reasonable apprehension of disruption. In this case, plaintiff acted on limited and unconfirmed information when disclosing confidential details, and did so knowing that an investigation into the incident was underway, making no effort whatsoever to proceed through the chain of command or any law enforcement channel. Furthermore, the record reveals a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO, particularly considering plaintiff's speech propelled a frenzy of media attention about unconfirmed facts related to the inmate's death. The court explained that the disruption ballooned into separate internal investigation into the unauthorized disclosure, undercutting manpower and resources to continue the ongoing investigation into the incident. Accordingly, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed and the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Billioni v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Industrial hired Roberts as a diver’s assistant. Roberts received and acknowledged the company handbook, which included a policy, requiring that all complaints of sexual harassment be reported to the CEO, Glenn. Roberts’ supervisor, Rhyner repeatedly called Roberts “gay,” made sexually explicit and derogatory remarks toward him, and physically assaulted Roberts at least twice. Roberts complained to Rhyner’s supervisor, to another supervisor, Neal, who witnessed some of Rhyner’s conduct, and to the company’s Human Resources Manager (wife of the CEO) but did not complain directly to Glenn. Rhyner was not disciplined or counseled; the harassment continued. Roberts was involved in a work-related accident in which he suffered burns. Later, Roberts was on an assignment when Neal removed him from the site for being “disruptive and acting erratic,” working in the wrong area, and wearing earbuds. Glenn contends that he terminated Roberts based on the two safety incidents.Roberts sued, alleging same-sex sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e). The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the company on Roberts’ retaliation claim, but vacated summary judgment on his sexual harassment claim. A plaintiff may prove same-sex harassment where the plaintiff was perceived as not conforming to traditional male stereotypes. A reasonable jury could conclude that Roberts was subjected to conduct based on his sex and that the conduct was unwelcome, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment, and was imputable to Glenn Industrial. Roberts did not establish a causal relationship between his protected activity and his termination. Glenn did not have actual knowledge of Roberts’ complaints and there was a lack of temporal proximity between Roberts’ last complaint and his termination. View "Roberts v. Glenn Industrial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a whistleblower-retaliation complaint under 42 U.S.C. 5851 after the NRC rejected his applications for promotions. Petitioner is an NRC employee who made disclosures to Congress and the NRC's Inspector General regarding health and safety risks at a nuclear power plant. The ALJ dismissed the case because the United States had not waived sovereign immunity for such whistleblower actions against the NRC, and the ARB affirmed.After determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, agreeing with the ARB that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for complaints against the NRC. In this case, petitioner failed to make the necessary affirmative showing of waiver with the required unequivocal expression. The court explained that the lesson in its recent decision in Robinson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 917 F.3d 799 (2019), is that the substantive and remedial provisions of a statute may not be coextensive. The court concluded that there is no doubt that the NRC is bound by the prohibitions of section 5851, but that fact alone is simply insufficient to form the basis of an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. View "Peck v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the City of Newport News, alleging that it failed to accommodate his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff alleged that the City concluded that he could not perform the essential functions of his job as a detective and then offered him the options of either retiring early or accepting reassignment to a civilian position he did not want. Plaintiff reluctantly retired.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that it is generally inappropriate for an employer to unilaterally reassign a disabled employee to a position the employee does not want when another reasonable accommodation exists that would allow the disabled employee to remain in their current, preferred position. The court clarified that it did not hold that an employer can never reassign an employee when there exists a reasonable accommodation that will keep the employee in their current and preferred position. This broad question was not before the court. Nor should this opinion be read in any way to restrict the ability of employers and employees to agree to a voluntary transfer. Rather, the court simply reiterated that reassignment is strongly disfavored when an employee can still do their current job with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation, and that reassignment should therefore be held "in reserve for unusual circumstances." View "Wirtes v. City of Newport News" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to forced labor, in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution of roughly $273,000, representing unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation computed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In this case, defendant forced the victim to work at his restaurant over 100 hours per week without pay from 2009 to 2014.The Fourth Circuit vacated the award of restitution and concluded that the district court erred in failing to include liquidated damages under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for when minimum wages and overtime compensation have not been paid as required, in the restitution award. At bottom, the court concluded that the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the FLSA includes liquidated damages provided by the FLSA. The court explained that this fulfills defendant's obligation to compensate the victim for the full amount of the victim's losses, which includes the full value of his labor. Accordingly, the court remanded for recalculation of the restitution award. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

After the DEA terminated Darek and Lisa Kitlinski's employment based on their refusal to participate in an internal investigation into their own allegations of misconduct by the DEA, the Kitlinskis alleged that the DEA terminated Darek in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), and that the DEA terminated Lisa in retaliation for her support of Darek’s USERRA claims against the DEA. The Kitlinskis also claim that the DEA retaliated against them for their prior protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DEA, concluding that the Kitlinskis offer no evidence that Darek's military service or his prior USERRA-protected activity was a motivating factor in his termination. Furthermore, even assuming that Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1981), applies here, the court has little difficulty concluding that the DEA's interest in ensuring its employees' full participation in internal investigations outweighs any interest Lisa had in promoting USERRA's nondiscriminatory purpose. The court also concluded that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the DEA terminated the Kitlinskis' employment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The court explained that the Kitlinskis offer no evidence showing that the DEA terminated their employment for any reason other than their conduct during the OPR investigation. The court rejected the Kitlinskis' remaining claims. View "Kitlinski v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two Maryland public school teachers, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims against the union defendants, a county school system, and various public officials, seeking relief for themselves and other non-union Maryland public school teachers who were compelled to pay "representation fees" to unions in order to be employed as Maryland public school teachers. Specifically, plaintiffs seek a refund of representation fees that they paid to the unions prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). In Janus, the Supreme Court decided that requiring non-union employees to pay representation fees to public-sector unions contravenes the First Amendment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action based on failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Assuming without deciding that Janus is entitled to retroactive application, the court agreed with its six sister circuits and recognized that the good-faith defense is available to a private-party defendant under section 1983; union defendants are entitled to utilize the good-faith defense with respect to plaintiffs' Janus claim; and defendants are not required to refund the representation fees that plaintiffs paid to the union defendants prior to the Janus decision. In this case, because plaintiffs are unable to point to any identifiable fund in the union defendants' possession, the court followed the reasoning of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and concluded that, in substance, plaintiffs' claim for relief is a claim for damages. Therefore, the union defendants are entitled to interpose the good-faith defense against that claim. Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the good-faith defense is not available to the union defendants because it was not recognized as a defense to the most closely analogous tort — the tort of conversion — in 1871 when Congress enacted section 1983. Rather, abuse of process most closely corresponds to the union defendants' use of a Maryland statute to collect representation fees from non-union teachers, like plaintiffs. View "Akers v. Maryland State Education Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by former ICE civil detainees, seeking wages owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for work performed while detained. The district court dismissed based on the grounds that this circuit and others have declined to extend the FLSA to custodial settings.The court concluded that appellants' claims are foreclosed by this circuit's precedent and the well-established principles governing the interpretation of the FLSA. The court explained that the FLSA was enacted to protect workers who operate within "the traditional employment paradigm," and persons in custodial detention—such as appellants—are not in an employer-employee relationship but in a detainer-detainee relationship that falls outside that paradigm. The court noted that the FLSA was a congressional creation, and its expansion is a matter for Congress as well. The court explained that what appellants propose is a fundamental alteration of what it means to be an "employee," and if Congress wishes to apply the FLSA to custodial detentions, it is certainly free to do so. View "Ndambi v. CoreCivic, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion seeking to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses from Montgomery County, Maryland. This case arose from the County's failure to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's disability. The district court concluded that plaintiff is not eligible for such an award because she was not a prevailing party under 29 U.S.C. 794a(b).The court found this case similar to Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), and concluded that plaintiff is even more of a prevailing party than the Parham plaintiff. The court explained that plaintiff is not a prevailing party because she catalyzed the County to change its behavior by filing a lawsuit; rather, she is a prevailing party because she proved her claim to a jury before the County capitulated by transferring her to another call center. Furthermore, the transfer was key to the district court's subsequent finding that the County reasonably accommodated plaintiff and thus the district court's ultimate denial of plaintiff's request for equitable relief. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of race- and gender-based discrimination under Title VII and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of her action for failure to state a claim, because plaintiff was not an "employee" of the firm she sought to sue. The court explained that plaintiff was a partner and equal owner of the firm, not an employee, and thus she is not within the scope of Title VII's coverage.In regard to plaintiff's section 1981 claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead specific factual allegations tending to corroborate her claim of eligibility for leave. In this case, plaintiff declined to indicate the nature of the medical conditions or events that allegedly qualified her for leave, despite being the individual best-positioned to do so. Furthermore, even if plaintiff's qualification for leave was assumed, plaintiff failed to allege that her race was the but-for cause of the Board's denial of her leave application as required by the Supreme Court's recent holding in Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009 (2020). As to plaintiff's one factually-specific, non-conclusory allegation of racially-motivated conduct, she failed to allege any facts linking it to the Board vote denying her short-term leave. View "Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A." on Justia Law