Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Tonya Anderson was terminated from her position at Diamondback Investment Group, LLC after failing two drug tests. She filed a lawsuit against Diamondback, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and a violation of North Carolina law that prohibits discrimination against employees for using lawful hemp-derived products containing THC during nonworking hours.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of Diamondback on all claims. The court found that Anderson failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that she was disabled under the ADA. Even if she had, the court concluded that Diamondback had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination—failing drug tests. The court also found that Anderson did not request a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. Regarding the state law claim, the court determined that Diamondback’s drug policy was a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably related to its employment activities, thus falling under an exception to the state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Anderson did not provide adequate evidence to show she was disabled under the ADA or that she requested an accommodation. The court also upheld the district court’s finding that Diamondback’s drug policy was a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably related to its employment activities, which justified the restriction on Anderson’s use of hemp-derived products. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Diamondback on all claims. View "Anderson v. Diamondback Investment Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Krishna P. Sharma Poudel and Binod Dhakal worked as Nepalese-English interpreters for Mid Atlantic Professionals, Inc. (MAPI), serving the U.S. Department of State in Kabul, Afghanistan. They alleged that MAPI failed to pay them all contracted-for and promised wages, including overtime, per diem allowances, and reimbursement for annual trips home. Their employment agreements, executed in Maryland, included a choice-of-law provision specifying Maryland law.The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, asserting violations of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL) and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (MWPCL). MAPI moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Maryland’s Wage Laws do not apply extraterritorially, and since the plaintiffs performed no work in Maryland, their claims were barred. The district court granted MAPI’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Wage Laws lacked an express extraterritorial provision and that the plaintiffs did not perform any work in Maryland.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that Maryland’s Wage Laws do not apply extraterritorially without some work being performed in Maryland. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the choice-of-law provision in their employment agreements allowed them to bring claims under Maryland’s Wage Laws, noting that Maryland precedent does not support such an extension. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not maintain their claims under the Wage Laws because they did not perform any work in Maryland. View "Poudel v. Mid Atlantic Professionals, Inc." on Justia Law

Three licensed substance use disorder professionals, referred to as the Counselors, were employed by NCG Acquisition, LLC and NCG CARE, Inc. They allege that they were wrongfully terminated after attempting to ensure a client received appropriate care. The Counselors had recommended that a client in severe distress be moved to inpatient treatment, but their supervisor, Jessica Tewell, altered their recommendation, preventing the client from receiving the necessary care. The client subsequently died of a drug overdose. The Counselors reported their concerns internally and were terminated shortly thereafter.The Counselors filed a lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina, claiming wrongful termination in violation of public policy under the North Carolina Substance Use Disorder Professional Practice Act (SUDPPA) and its regulations. The district court dismissed their complaint, concluding that while SUDPPA constitutes an expression of public policy, the Counselors failed to allege a plausible claim that their termination contravened specific SUDPPA regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that SUDPPA and its regulations indeed represent the public policy of North Carolina. The Counselors plausibly alleged that their termination was in retaliation for actions taken in compliance with their professional obligations under SUDPPA, such as protecting client welfare and maintaining accurate records. The court concluded that the Counselors' actions were consistent with their professional duties and that their termination violated the public policy of North Carolina. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Shook v. NCG Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

Loretta Marshall applied for a nursing job with Tidelands Health using their online application process. After failing a mandatory physical agility test, she was denied employment. Marshall then sued Tidelands, alleging that the physical agility test constituted prohibited discrimination. Tidelands moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Marshall had agreed to arbitration through the online application process. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Tidelands had not shown the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the case. Initially, Tidelands argued that Marshall's 2016 arbitration agreement covered her 2020 application. The magistrate judge found that the 2016 agreement did not apply to future applications. Tidelands then argued that Marshall agreed to arbitration in 2020, but the magistrate judge found that Marshall was not required to scroll through the arbitration agreement in 2020 and was not on reasonable notice of the agreement. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge and denied Tidelands' motion to compel arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Tidelands failed to show that Marshall had reasonable notice of an offer to arbitrate in 2020. The court noted that Marshall was not required to scroll through the arbitration agreement and that the arbitration notice at the top of the webpage did not provide the actual terms of an agreement. Additionally, the court found that Marshall did not manifest her assent to the arbitration agreement by clicking the "submit" button, as it did not clearly indicate agreement to arbitration. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that no arbitration agreement was formed in 2020. View "Marshall v. Georgetown Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Michael Shipton, a middle-aged man with Type 2 diabetes, worked as an underground gas mechanic for Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE). Due to his diabetes, he periodically missed work and was granted intermittent Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave in August 2017 and January 2018 for hypoglycemia. In April 2018, Shipton took two days off for severe foot pain caused by neuropathy, but BGE informed him that his FMLA certification only covered hypoglycemia. After submitting a new medical certification for neuropathy, BGE approved his request. However, in June 2018, BGE terminated Shipton, citing conflicting medical documentation.Shipton filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in June 2020, alleging FMLA interference and retaliation against BGE, Exelon Corporation, Exelon Business Services Company (EBSC), and several individual defendants. The defendants argued that Shipton was terminated based on an honest belief that he misused FMLA leave and that his claims were time-barred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no evidence of willful FMLA violations to extend the statute of limitations and concluding that BGE had a legitimate reason for termination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Shipton failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his FMLA interference and retaliation claims. The court found that BGE had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination based on conflicting medical documentation and that Shipton did not provide sufficient evidence to show pretext. Additionally, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Exelon, EBSC, and the individual defendants, concluding they were not Shipton’s "employer" under the FMLA. View "Shipton v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (the Authority), an entity jointly created by Virginia and the District of Columbia to manage the area's two airports. The Authority disputed the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry's (the Department) power to enforce its workplace safety laws against the Authority. The Department had levied a monetary penalty against the Authority following an accident that resulted in an employee's injury. The Authority contested the Department's power to enforce these penalties, arguing that it was not subject to Virginia workplace safety regulations due to its status as an interstate compact entity.The Department's adjudicator found that the Authority was subject to Virginia workplace safety regulations, a decision adopted by the Department's Commissioner. The Authority then sued the Commissioner in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court ruled in favor of the Authority, reasoning that Virginia had surrendered its ability to exercise unilateral regulatory authority over the Authority's facilities when it created the Authority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed with the Authority that by jointly creating the Authority with the District, Virginia relinquished its control over the Authority except as otherwise provided in the Compact. The court rejected the Department's argument that the Compact expressly reserves its power to enforce Virginia’s workplace safety regulations against the Authority. The court also dismissed the Department's contention that it can enforce its workplace safety laws against the Authority because nothing in the Compact preempts Virginia law. View "Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Pan" on Justia Law

The case involves Gabrielle Barbour, who alleges that she was denied employment as a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in retaliation for her participation in a class action lawsuit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for workplace discrimination. The district court dismissed Barbour's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.The district court found that Barbour failed to establish a causal link between her protected activity (the lawsuit against the FBI) and the adverse employment action (non-selection by the DEA). The court also found that Barbour's complaint affirmatively pleaded legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her non-selection, which were not rebutted by Barbour.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the complaint's allegations and in requiring Barbour to rebut the DEA's proffered reasons for her non-selection at the motion to dismiss stage. The appellate court concluded that the complaint's allegations were sufficient to support a plausible inference of a causal link between Barbour's lawsuit against the FBI and the DEA's subsequent refusal to hire her. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Barbour v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three employees of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) alleged that their supervisors retaliated against them for whistleblowing on CBP's noncompliance with the DNA Fingerprints Act of 2005. The employees claimed that their supervisors failed to promote them and dismantled their division within the CBP. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dismissed their appeal, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The MSPB determined that the employees had not "nonfrivolously" alleged that their supervisors' actions were "personnel actions" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the MSPB's decision. The court found that while there may be a high bar for succeeding on the merits before the MSPB, its jurisdictional bar is low, and the employees' claims cleared that lower bar. The court held that the employees' allegations, if true, could establish that their supervisors took a "personnel action" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). The court concluded that the MSPB had jurisdiction to hear the employees' appeal. View "Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of incarcerated individuals who were sent from a detention center to work at a recycling facility operated by Baltimore County, Maryland. The workers alleged that they were employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Maryland state laws, and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that no reasonable adjudicator could view the incarcerated workers as "employees" under the FLSA.The district court's decision was based on the fact that the workers were part of a work detail program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), which the court found had a rehabilitative, rather than pecuniary, interest in the workers' labor. The court also found that the workers did not deal at arms' length with their putative employer, as they were not free to negotiate the terms of their employment and were under the control of the DOC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court clarified that there is no categorical rule that incarcerated workers cannot be covered by the FLSA when they work outside their detention facility’s walls and for someone other than their immediate detainer. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in granting summary judgment to the county. The court emphasized that the question under the FLSA is whether the principal or primary purpose for using incarcerated workers at the recycling center during the time frame at issue was for “rehabilitation and job training.” The case was remanded for a fresh look at the facts under these clarified standards. View "Scott v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Lonnie Billard, a former teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS), sued the school for sex discrimination under Title VII after he was fired for his plans to marry his same-sex partner. The district court granted Billard's motion for summary judgment and denied CCHS's motion, which raised several affirmative defenses, both statutory and constitutional.The district court found that CCHS had indeed fired Billard because of his plans to marry his same-sex partner, which amounted to sex discrimination as defined by Title VII. The court rejected CCHS's affirmative defenses, including its interpretation of Title VII's religious exemption, its defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and its First Amendment defenses. The court also ruled on the ministerial exception, despite CCHS's waiver of that defense, and found that Billard did not satisfy the criteria for the ministerial exception.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that because Billard played a vital role as a messenger of CCHS's faith, he falls under the ministerial exception to Title VII. Therefore, the court instructed the district court to enter judgment for CCHS. View "Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School" on Justia Law