Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (the Authority), an entity jointly created by Virginia and the District of Columbia to manage the area's two airports. The Authority disputed the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry's (the Department) power to enforce its workplace safety laws against the Authority. The Department had levied a monetary penalty against the Authority following an accident that resulted in an employee's injury. The Authority contested the Department's power to enforce these penalties, arguing that it was not subject to Virginia workplace safety regulations due to its status as an interstate compact entity.The Department's adjudicator found that the Authority was subject to Virginia workplace safety regulations, a decision adopted by the Department's Commissioner. The Authority then sued the Commissioner in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court ruled in favor of the Authority, reasoning that Virginia had surrendered its ability to exercise unilateral regulatory authority over the Authority's facilities when it created the Authority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed with the Authority that by jointly creating the Authority with the District, Virginia relinquished its control over the Authority except as otherwise provided in the Compact. The court rejected the Department's argument that the Compact expressly reserves its power to enforce Virginia’s workplace safety regulations against the Authority. The court also dismissed the Department's contention that it can enforce its workplace safety laws against the Authority because nothing in the Compact preempts Virginia law. View "Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Pan" on Justia Law

The case involves Gabrielle Barbour, who alleges that she was denied employment as a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in retaliation for her participation in a class action lawsuit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for workplace discrimination. The district court dismissed Barbour's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.The district court found that Barbour failed to establish a causal link between her protected activity (the lawsuit against the FBI) and the adverse employment action (non-selection by the DEA). The court also found that Barbour's complaint affirmatively pleaded legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her non-selection, which were not rebutted by Barbour.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the complaint's allegations and in requiring Barbour to rebut the DEA's proffered reasons for her non-selection at the motion to dismiss stage. The appellate court concluded that the complaint's allegations were sufficient to support a plausible inference of a causal link between Barbour's lawsuit against the FBI and the DEA's subsequent refusal to hire her. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Barbour v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three employees of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) alleged that their supervisors retaliated against them for whistleblowing on CBP's noncompliance with the DNA Fingerprints Act of 2005. The employees claimed that their supervisors failed to promote them and dismantled their division within the CBP. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dismissed their appeal, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The MSPB determined that the employees had not "nonfrivolously" alleged that their supervisors' actions were "personnel actions" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the MSPB's decision. The court found that while there may be a high bar for succeeding on the merits before the MSPB, its jurisdictional bar is low, and the employees' claims cleared that lower bar. The court held that the employees' allegations, if true, could establish that their supervisors took a "personnel action" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). The court concluded that the MSPB had jurisdiction to hear the employees' appeal. View "Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of incarcerated individuals who were sent from a detention center to work at a recycling facility operated by Baltimore County, Maryland. The workers alleged that they were employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Maryland state laws, and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that no reasonable adjudicator could view the incarcerated workers as "employees" under the FLSA.The district court's decision was based on the fact that the workers were part of a work detail program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), which the court found had a rehabilitative, rather than pecuniary, interest in the workers' labor. The court also found that the workers did not deal at arms' length with their putative employer, as they were not free to negotiate the terms of their employment and were under the control of the DOC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court clarified that there is no categorical rule that incarcerated workers cannot be covered by the FLSA when they work outside their detention facility’s walls and for someone other than their immediate detainer. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in granting summary judgment to the county. The court emphasized that the question under the FLSA is whether the principal or primary purpose for using incarcerated workers at the recycling center during the time frame at issue was for “rehabilitation and job training.” The case was remanded for a fresh look at the facts under these clarified standards. View "Scott v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Lonnie Billard, a former teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS), sued the school for sex discrimination under Title VII after he was fired for his plans to marry his same-sex partner. The district court granted Billard's motion for summary judgment and denied CCHS's motion, which raised several affirmative defenses, both statutory and constitutional.The district court found that CCHS had indeed fired Billard because of his plans to marry his same-sex partner, which amounted to sex discrimination as defined by Title VII. The court rejected CCHS's affirmative defenses, including its interpretation of Title VII's religious exemption, its defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and its First Amendment defenses. The court also ruled on the ministerial exception, despite CCHS's waiver of that defense, and found that Billard did not satisfy the criteria for the ministerial exception.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that because Billard played a vital role as a messenger of CCHS's faith, he falls under the ministerial exception to Title VII. Therefore, the court instructed the district court to enter judgment for CCHS. View "Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Peter Massaro, a police officer with the Fairfax County Police Department, alleged that his employer retaliated against him by transferring him to an inferior position after he filed a complaint about discrimination in promotion practices within the department. He sought relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to Fairfax County, dismissing all of Massaro's claims. The court held that Massaro failed to establish a causal connection between his initial discrimination complaint and his subsequent job transfer.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that the time gap between Massaro's complaint and his transfer was too long to support a causal inference. It found no evidence that the transfer was a result of a scheme to punish Massaro for his complaint. Instead, the court concluded that Massaro's transfer was a result of his own subsequent behavior that led to a violation of departmental policy.The court also dismissed Massaro's First Amendment claim, ruling that his promotion complaint made via an internal grievance process did not reflect a matter of public concern, and thus did not meet the threshold for First Amendment protection. View "Massaro v. Fairfax County" on Justia Law

This case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The plaintiff, David Duvall, a white man, was terminated from his position as Senior Vice President of Marketing and Communications at Novant Health, Inc. Duvall filed a lawsuit claiming he was fired due to his race and sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A North Carolina jury found in favor of Duvall, awarding him $10 million in punitive damages. Novant Health appealed this decision, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.The evidence presented at trial showed that Duvall performed exceptionally well in his role, receiving strong performance reviews. Despite his performance, Duvall was abruptly fired and replaced by two women, one of whom was a racial minority and rated a lower performer than Duvall. This occurred during a diversity and inclusion initiative at Novant Health, which aimed to achieve racial and gender diversity within its leadership.The Court of Appeals upheld the jury's verdict of liability against Novant Health, finding sufficient evidence to support the claim that Duvall's race, sex, or both were motivating factors in his termination. However, the court vacated the jury's award of punitive damages, concluding that Duvall failed to prove that Novant Health discriminated against him despite perceiving a risk that its actions would violate federal law.The court also upheld the district court's award of back pay and front pay to Duvall, rejecting Novant Health's claim that Duvall failed to reasonably mitigate his damages. The court found that Duvall exercised reasonable diligence in seeking new employment after his termination. The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment as to punitive damages. View "Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff, Kristin Cosby, claimed that the South Carolina Probation, Parole & Pardon Services (SCPPP) had discriminated against her based on her gender and retaliated against her for filing discrimination complaints in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Cosby had previously worked for SCPPP, left, and then reapplied in 2012. When she was not rehired, Cosby filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found in her favor. SCPPP rehired her, but Cosby alleged that she was subsequently subjected to gender discrimination and retaliation, including being denied a promotion, being investigated for inappropriate relationships with subordinates, and ultimately forced to resign.The court affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment to SCPPP. The court held that Cosby had failed to establish her gender discrimination claim under both the disparate treatment and hostile work environment theories. For the disparate treatment claim, Cosby failed to identify a valid comparator — a similarly situated individual of a different gender who was treated more favorably. In her hostile work environment claim, Cosby's internal complaint did not constitute protected activity under Title VII because it did not oppose an unlawful employment practice. The court also found no causal connection between Cosby's 2012 EEOC charge and any adverse employment action taken by SCPPP in 2018, defeating her retaliation claim. View "Cosby v. South Carolina Probation, Parole & Pardon Services" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Bikachi Amisi, a contract nurse, sued Officer Lakeyta Brooks and Officer Roy Townsend for violating her Fourth Amendment rights when she was mistakenly strip searched on her first day of work at Riverside Regional Jail. Amisi also brought several tort claims under Virginia state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity and good-faith immunity under Virginia law. They also argued that the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred Amisi's claims. The district court denied their motions and the defendants appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that both officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, a legal protection that shields officers who commit constitutional violations but who could reasonably believe their actions were lawful, because their actions were not reasonable and Amisi’s right to be free from unreasonable strip searches was clearly established. The court also held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act did not bar Amisi's state-law claims because her injuries did not arise out of her employment. The Court further held that Officer Townsend was not entitled to immunity under Virginia law as his belief that his conduct was lawful was not objectively reasonable. View "Amisi v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Laura Tartaro-McGowan, a clinical manager with Inova Home Health, was terminated after failing to perform direct patient care field visits by a specified date. Tartaro-McGowan, who suffers from chronic arthritis in her knees due to bilateral knee replacement surgeries, sued her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failure to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Inova Home Health, LLC and Alternate Solutions Health Network, LLC.Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, Inova Home Health experienced a severe shortage of field clinicians and informed all staff members, including clinical managers, that they would be required to perform direct patient care field visits. Tartaro-McGowan requested an accommodation to be excused from performing direct patient care field visits due to her physical limitations caused by her chronic arthritis. In response, the defendants proposed an accommodation that involved allowing Tartaro-McGowan to screen and select appropriate visits that would greatly reduce the possibility of injury. Tartaro-McGowan refused this accommodation and was later terminated for not performing any direct patient care field visits by the specified date.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court determined that Tartaro-McGowan failed to prove the defendants denied her a reasonable accommodation, an essential element of her ADA claim. The court noted that the circumstances surrounding the pandemic were exceptional, and given the severe shortage of field nurses, the defendants' proposed accommodation was reasonable. The court also found that Tartaro-McGowan failed to establish a prima facie case for her discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Tartaro-McGowan v. Inova Home Health, LLC" on Justia Law