Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Strategic Technology Institute, Inc. ("STI") and the National Labor Relations Board. STI had a contract to maintain engines and propellers for the U.S. Air Force from August 2017 until July 2020. During this time, STI's employees at a Little Rock facility began discussing unionizing. In response to this, Tyler Boyd of STI fired 17 employees — three on September 27, 2019, and fourteen on October 9, 2019. The administrative law judge and the Board found that these terminations violated subsections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in their right to engage in union activities and from discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.STI petitioned for a review of the Board's order, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the order, and remanded the case. The court found that there was no substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the terminations were motivated by anti-union animus. The court noted that the only evidence of STI's knowledge of the union activities were two phone calls informing Tyler Boyd that the employees were considering unionizing and the timing of the firings. The court held that this was not sufficient to establish that STI acted with an anti-union motive when it terminated the employees. The court also found that the Board's reliance on the "small plant doctrine" to infer employer knowledge of union activity was not applicable in this case since there was no other evidence indicating a likelihood that Boyd knew of the union activities. Furthermore, the court held that the Board erred in finding that STI's reasons for the firings were pretextual because they were based on legitimate factors such as performance, attendance, and interpersonal skills. The court concluded that the General Counsel failed to meet its burden of providing substantial evidence that STI harbored anti-union animus and that the terminations were motivated by animus. Consequently, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Strategic Technology Institute v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired as a Law Enforcement Officer by the Sisseton, South Dakota, Police Department. Plaintiff and the City signed a Sisseton Police Department Employment Contract (the “Contract”) requiring Plaintiff to reimburse the City for the cost of her training if she left the Department before completing 36 months of employment. In January 2022, Defendant, the City’s Chief of Police, informed Plaintiff that the Police Commission had lost confidence in her, and Defendant asked Plaintiff to resign, which she did. Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, asserting, along with other claims, that the City and numerous individual defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her due process claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court the Supreme Court of South Dakota would rule that the Contract did not change an at-will employment relationship. The court explained that for Plaintiff’s claim against the City to survive a motion to dismiss, her complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” The court agreed with the district court that the Complaint “failed to allege any unconstitutional policy or custom that enabled” Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of her alleged federal due process rights. Counsel for Plaintiff could only respond that the Complaint plausibly alleged the practice of violating the three-year term in the City’s employee reimbursement contracts. That practice was not alleged in the Complaint and, in any event, is nothing more than a “facially lawful municipal action.” View "Samantha LaCoe v. City of Sisseton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims that his former employer, ADESA Missouri, LLC (ADESA), discriminated against and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ADESA’s reasons for terminating him were pretext for disability discrimination and retaliation. The court agreed with Plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable jury could determine that the company’s VP made the decision to terminate Plaintiff  because of his medical restriction and only retroactively claimed a performance-based concern after HR advised her that terminating an employee due to his disability could be “an issue.” The evidence shows that the VP sent an email to HR about an employee with a “medical restriction” who had been “identified” for termination, asking if this could be “an issue.” Only after she learned that it could be a problem did the VP respond with specific criticisms of his performance. ADESA argues that because Plaintiff does not dispute he was underperforming compared to his peers, there can be no pretext. But neither the sales director nor the VP was able to say when they took these performance assessments into consideration. Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised genuine doubt as to ADESA’s proffered reasons for his termination. View "Roby Anderson v. KAR Global" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Director of the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services (“DWS”) in her official capacity, alleging discrimination on the ground of national origin under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Director.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff insists her prima facie case is strong enough to establish pretext. However, the court wrote that even if Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, she has nonetheless failed to carry her burden under McDonnell Douglas of showing the reasons for her bureaucratic troubles were a pretext for intentional discrimination. Plaintiff also argued the district court erred by rejecting her alternative request to apply a deliberate indifference standard when analyzing her Title VI claim. However, the court wrote that even assuming for the sake of argument that the deliberate indifference standard applies, in light of the court’s conclusion under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact under the “high standard” of deliberate indifference. View "Maria Murguia v. Charisse Childers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the City of Clarendon, Arkansas, as a full-time police officer. After he was terminated, he sued the City, then-Chief of Police Laura Rash, and then-Clarendon Mayor James L. Stinson, alleging a violation of the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act and retaliation for the exercise of his free speech rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the free speech claim, and the case proceeded to trial on the whistleblower claim. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the district court erred in its pre-trial discovery rulings, its grant of summary judgment to the defendants, and its denial of his motion for a new trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that at summary judgment, there was no evidence that Plaintiff sought to convey that message when he gave the video to Deputy Thorne. Instead, the record showed that Plaintiff asserted the opposite, telling Whitcomb and Times that he was trying to “protect” them and expressly denying any intent to give the video to Thorne for investigatory purposes. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s free speech claim. View "John Marlow v. City of Clarendon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee, sued on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, claiming that St. Luke’s violated the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime provisions by failing to fully compensate employees for work performed. She also brought an unjust-enrichment claim under state law. The district court certified two classes with different lookback periods: (1) an FLSA collective comprised of employees who worked for St. Luke’s between September 2016 and September 2018, 1 and (2) an unjust-enrichment class comprised of all employees who worked for St. Luke’s in Missouri between April 2012 and September 2018. Houston also asserted individual claims, one under the Missouri Minimum Wage Law, and one for breach of her employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment to St. Luke’s on all claims.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute that the rounding policy does not average out over time. The court explained that no matter how one slices the data, most employees and the employees as a whole fared worse under the rounding policy than had they been paid according to their exact time worked. Here, the rounding policy did both. It resulted in lost time for nearly two-thirds of employees, and those employees lost more time than was gained by their coworkers who benefited from rounding. The court concluded that the employees have raised a genuine dispute that the rounding policy, as applied, did not average out over time. The district court, therefore, erred in granting summary judgment on the FLSA and Missouri wage claims. View "Torri Houston v. St. Luke's Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a physician who provided medical care to Arkansas correctional facility inmates through her employer, Wellpath, LLC. Wellpath terminated Plaintiff’s employment, and she sued, claiming it unlawfully terminated her employment because she reported suspected alterations to her electronic patient medical records. The district court granted Wellpath’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly interpreted Arkansas law regarding what constitutes legally protected conduct under the public policy exception to at-will employment and improperly determined at the summary judgment stage that Plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between her tampering reports and her termination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Arkansas’s employment-at-will doctrine, employers may generally discharge employees whose employment is for an indefinite term “for good cause, no cause, or even a morally wrong cause.” Further, Arkansas recognizes a limited exception to this doctrine providing a cause of action to an at-will employee “for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the State.” The court explained that Plaintiff failed to show anything beyond mere speculation or her own conclusory allegations that call into question the legitimacy of Wellpath’s stated cause for her termination. The court wrote that reasonable minds could not believe an employer would see into the future and begin preemptively generating evidence to support an impermissible basis for terminating a whistleblower-to-be. Simply because Plaintiff reported suspected suspicious electronic activity while Wellpath administrators labored to resolve ongoing employment disputes does not abrogate Wellpath’s broad right to terminate her at-will employment. View "Melanie Jones v. WellPath, LLC" on Justia Law

Four employee benefit funds and their Boards of Trustees, as well as two labor unions (collectively, “Boards”), sued B.F.W. Contracting, LLC and B.F.W. Contractors, LLC (collectively, “Contractors”) to compel an audit and recover money damages pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) signed onto by Contractors. The district court granted summary judgment for the Boards and found damages in the amount of $48,568.76.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Boards argued that the Contractors forfeited the argument about supplemental dues because they failed to raise it before the district court. The court concluded that the Boards are incorrect. The Contractors made this argument in their Response to the Statement of Material Facts by Plaintiff, as well as in their Supplemental Reply Memorandum. The court found that this was enough to avoid forfeiture and allowed the court to consider the issue on appeal.   Additionally, the Boards argue that failure to pay the supplemental dues resulted in a breach of the CBA provision, which authorized the dues under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 186(c)(2). However, as the plain language of the CBA makes clear, there is no violation of that provision if the Contractors never received the employee authorization cards as required by both the CBA and 29 -6- U.S.C. Section 186(c)(4). Without a breach of this subsection of the CBA, these statutory provisions are inapplicable. View "Greater St. Louis Const. Laborers Welfare Fund v. B.F.W. Contracting, LLC" on Justia Law

A former BNSF Railway Company employee died from lung cancer in 2018. Plaintiff, on behalf of her late husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that her husband’s cancer was caused by his exposure to toxins at work. The district court excluded Plaintiff’s expert witness testimony and granted summary judgment to BNSF.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that there is no direct evidence that Plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos or diesel combustion fumes. Even if a jury could infer that Plaintiff’s husband had been exposed, there is no evidence of the level of exposure. The court explained that while a quantifiable amount of exposure is not required to find causation between toxic exposure and injury, there must be, at a minimum, “evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of that agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered,” There is no such evidence here. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion by determining that the expert’s opinion lacked a sufficient foundation and that, in turn, his methodology for proving causation was unreliable. View "Rebecca Lancaster v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

Lake Elmo Bank fired Plaintiff after receiving a report that she sexually harassed another employee. Plaintiff sued the Bank, claiming her termination was based on sex in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. Sections 363A.08, subd. 2(2) and (3). She also sued the Bank and the reporting employee for defamation. On both claims, the district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, the court explained that even assuming the complainant was not credible about some details, the Bank had sufficient information to reasonably believe that Plaintiff violated the harassment policy. The details at issue here are not significant enough to convince a jury that the Bank’s explanation was an attempt to cover up a discriminatory motive for Plaintiff’s termination.   Further, the court explained that here, unlike the employee in Bahr, the complainant’s complaint focused on only the conduct related to the harassment. There is also no evidence that the complainant, unlike the employee in Bahr, made any knowingly false statements or expressed an improper motive for making the complaint. In her interview, the complainant said that as a remedy, she sought to be moved off the teller line, away from Plaintiff, or switched to a different location. There is no evidence to show that the complainant made her statements causelessly and wantonly to injure Plaintiff’s employment. View "Heidi Nelson v. Lake Elmo Bank" on Justia Law