Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are food service managers employed by the Independent School District 191 in Burnsville, Minnesota. In 2015, Plaintiffs signed a contract to join the union that represents service workers in the school district, the School Service Employees International Union Local 284. These contracts authorized the school district to deduct monthly union dues from the union member’s paycheck and to send those dues to Local 284 on the union member’s behalf. The employees terminated their membership in the union in March 2020 and later sued the school district and Local 284. They alleged that the deduction of dues from their paychecks violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and also contravened Minnesota law. At issue on appeal is whether a school district and a labor union violated the free speech rights of union members by deducting union dues from employee paychecks.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the school district’s employees failed to state a claim, and the court, therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing the action. The court explained that the employees’ argument mischaracterizes their choice: they were “faced with a constitutional choice—whether or not to join” the union. They chose to join the union and authorize the school district to deduct dues from their paychecks. They did so in exchange for the benefits of union membership, and they “assumed the risk that subsequent changes in the law could alter the cost-benefit balance of their bargain.” View "Pollyanna Burns v. School Svc Emp Union Local 284" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to haul freight for CTW Transportation Services. Two weeks later, CTW terminated the contract. On October 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint against CTW with the Department of Labor, alleging that his contract was terminated in violation of 49 U.S.C. Section 31105(a) for reporting safety violations. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ordered discovery to close on May 25 and set trial for July 27. At his deposition on March 30, Plaintiff testified that his attorney had not produced all the documents he had given him. Once in federal court, Plaintiff reasserted his Section 31105(a) retaliation claim. CTW moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the dismissal. The court explained that in finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the district court did not find that pre-May 5 conduct alone caused the delay. Instead, it relied almost exclusively on Plaintiff’s conduct after May 5, 2011. For example, Plaintiff’s failure to prepare the case for trial and his “heaping personal insults on the ALJ” all occurred in August and September. Such conduct could not have caused the Secretary’s failure to meet the 210-day deadline. CTW argues that we can still affirm because Plaintiff engaged in bad-faith conduct before May 5. But because the district court did not specifically find that pre-May 5 conduct alone caused the Secretary to miss the deadline, its order dismissing the case must be vacated. View "Avery Wilson v. CTW Transportation Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking to recover long-term disability benefits. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Reliance’s cross-motion. Reliance appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The court explained that the cases cited do not demonstrate that Reliance has a history of biased claims administration. Nor do they show some other systemic flaw in its claims review process that affected Reliance’s review of Plaintiff’s claim. On the other hand, Reliance does not argue that it maintained structural separations to minimize its conflict of interest. Therefore, the conflict of interest, in this case, deserves “some weight,” but the court concluded that it does not indicate that Reliance abused its discretion. The court wrote that substantial evidence supports Reliance’s decision, and neither the decisional delay in this case nor the purported conflict of interest leads us to conclude that Reliance abused its discretion. View "Melissa McIntyre v. Reliance Standard Life" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff twice lost out on a promotion, she sued Union Pacific for discrimination. The question is whether a dispute over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement required dismissal. Union Pacific to sought dismissal under the Railway Labor Act, see 45 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq., which requires disputes over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement to go to arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties agree that this case does not involve an attempt to “form” or “secure” a collective-bargaining agreement, so it does not fall into the major-dispute category. In a failure-to-promote case like this one, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she “was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion to a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she was not promoted; and (4) similarly situated employees, not part of the protected group, were promoted instead.” The sticking point is whether she actually applied for either promotion: she says she did, but Union Pacific disagreed. Whether faxed resumes count as applications under the collective-bargaining agreement is something she will have to prove to establish her prima-facie case. Perhaps the best evidence of its importance was the prominent role it played at trial, especially in the questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney. In these circumstances, the issue is one for the National Railroad Adjustment Board to decide. View "Nancy Avina v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then a conductor and now an engineer for Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”), brought this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when Union Pacific refused Plaintiff’s requests that he be allowed to bring his Rottweiler service dog on board moving Union Pacific freight trains as a reasonable accommodation to ameliorate the effects of Plaintiff’s undisputed disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and migraine headaches resulting from his prior service in the military. At the end of a week-long trial, the district court denied Union Pacific’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury then returned a verdict for Plaintiff, awarding compensatory but not punitive damages. The district court granted Union Pacific’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that “benefits and privileges of employment” (1) refer only to employer-provided services; (2) must be offered to non-disabled individuals in addition to disabled ones; and (3) does not include freedom from mental or psychological pain. Further, the court noted that mitigating pain is not an employer-sponsored program or service. As such, providing a service dog at work so that an employee with a disability has the same assistance the service dog provides away from work is not a cognizable benefit or privilege of employment. View "Perry Hopman v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

The Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust Board of Trustees (“Board”) denied Plaintiff’s application for disability pension benefits under a plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Plaintiff argued the Board’s stated reason for denying his application was unreasonable and the Board violated its fiduciary duties. The district court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board did not breach its fiduciary duty when it did not notify Plaintiff the Notice of Decision he submitted on appeal was insufficient. The initial letter the Board sent to Plaintiff noting the absence of the document clearly stated Plaintiff needed to submit a “Notice of Award.” When the plain language of the Plan and the Board’s other communications are consistent, there is no obvious unfairness to Plaintiff if his claim is denied because he submitted the wrong document. Further, the court found that there is no evidence the Board knew silence would harm Plaintiff because, in the May 2018 phone call, Plaintiff himself asked about how waiting to receive the pension would affect the annuity amount and ultimately requested estimates for retirement at later ages. Moreover, Plaintiff has not identified anything that should have caused the Board to know he misunderstood his rights. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff failed to establish a violation of the duty of loyalty. View "Adam Ruessler v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff began working for McDonnell Douglas in 1985. He stayed there until it merged with The Boeing Company (Boeing) in 1997. In 2017 and 2018, Plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for promotions within Boeing. Both times, the promotion was given to younger candidates who scored better in the interview. In 2017, the promotion went to an employee aged 33; in 2018, to one aged 34. Plaintiff alleged that Boeing discriminated against him on the basis of age, in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Plaintiff brought two separate lawsuits, now consolidated, alleging age discrimination in relation to the 2018 opening and a claim for constructive discharge.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Boeing on both claims, holding that Plaintiff (1) failed to demonstrate a material dispute as to whether Boeing’s stated rationale for the hiring decision was a mere pretext for age discrimination and (2) failed to timely file a complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights within six months of when his constructive-discharge claim accrued.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff failed to rebut the non-age-based, legitimate reasons offered by Boeing for its choice to hire the other applicant instead of him. Further, Plaintiff alleged that his termination paperwork started the clock, not his email. The court explained that Plaintiff gave his employer a little more than five weeks’ notice. But his claim still accrued then—on the day he gave notice, not the day he filed the paperwork. Because May 28, 2020, falls 185 days after November 25, 2019, Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely and thus barred. View "Jeff Bonomo v. The Boeing Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment on her claim under the Equal Pay Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Daugherty Systems, Inc. (“Daugherty”) on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case because almost all her alleged comparators were either paid less than she was or did not perform equal work.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the pay disparity was justified by a legitimate factor other than sex. The court explained that Daugherty’s explanation for the pay differential—the differences in skillsets and experience and the desire to incentivize Plaintiff to grow in the position—is sufficient to satisfy its burden of proving the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex. The court wrote that because “no reasonable jury” could find other than in Daugherty’s favor on the affirmative defense, Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute for trial, and Daugherty has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Tamara O'Reilly v. Daugherty Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Advance Auto Parts, claiming unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Advance Auto’s motion for summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that here, unlike Green v. Dillard’s Inc., there is no genuine dispute whether Advance Auto acted negligently or recklessly under Section 213. As for Section 213(a), Plaintiff does not allege that Advance Auto made improper orders or regulations. It had a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on any protected status; all employees had to read and familiarize themselves with this policy and complete annual training. The court further explained that Advance Auto is not liable under Section 1981 for discrimination based on its employee’s conduct. Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail under respondeat superior and ratification. View "Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff opposed a new collective-bargaining agreement that passed by a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff sued the union for breach of its duty of fair representation and a violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. At their core, these claims are about whether the union hoodwinked members into ratifying the new collective-bargaining agreement by concealing what would happen to the 30-and-out benefit. The district court dismissed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act claim, denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, and granted summary judgment to the union on the fair-representation claim. On appeal, Plaintiff alleged that the union concealed key information, but only nine members said it would have made a difference.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide other evidence that the outcome of the vote would have changed. The court reasoned that the ratification vote was overwhelmingly in favor: 228 to 109, a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff offers only nine members who would have voted “no” if they had known about the elimination of the 30-and-out benefit. Even assuming each would have voted the way he thinks, the agreement still would have passed by a wide margin. The court wrote that no reasonable jury could conclude that the union’s alleged bad-faith conduct was the but-for cause of the union’s ratification of the collective-bargaining agreement. View "Matthew Nagel v. United Food and Com. Workers" on Justia Law