Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging retaliation, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against plaintiff's former employer, Workforce Development and the state of Iowa, as well as against certain former supervisors and coworkers. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her termination as an ALJ based on allegations that she fraudulently filed insurance enrollment forms and had deliberately falsified her daughter's marital status. Plaintiff alleged that her termination was based on retaliation for her testimony before the Oversight Committee and that the insurance fraud investigation constituted a mere pretext.In regard to the whistleblower retaliation claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that she was suspended or terminated in reprisal for her testimony. In regard to the defamation claim, the court concluded that Defendant Wahlert was entitled to summary judgment with respect to her allegedly defamatory testimony to the Oversight Committee where her testimony and related actions were within the scope of her employment. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to establish any constitutional violation as to the First Amendment retaliation claim; defendants' conduct was not sufficiently egregious to satisfy the outrageousness prong of the Iowa tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim based on the Iowa Constitution's free speech clause. View "Ackerman v. Iowa" on Justia Law

Avenoso, a maintenance supervisor, had long-term disability insurance under a Reliance policy, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The policy provided two years of benefits if the claimant showed that he was unable to perform the material duties of his current occupation and provided continued benefits if the claimant showed that he was unable to perform the material duties of any occupation. Avenoso left his job due to lower-back pain and underwent back surgery. Reliance approved two years of benefits. At the end of the two years, Reliance informed Avenoso that it would discontinue benefits because Avenoso had not shown that he was unable to perform the material duties of any occupation.Avenoso had an MRI; the results appeared relatively mild. Avenoso sent Reliance a note from his physician, recommending that Avenoso “avoid lifting, bending and prolonged sitting” due to his lower back condition. He was receiving Social Security disability benefits. Following a “functional-capacity evaluation,” a physical therapist concluded Avenoso did not demonstrate an ability to tolerate an 8-hour workday. An independent medical evaluation concluded that Avenoso retained sedentary-work capacity and was “able to work 8 hours a day but was engaging in “symptom magnification.” A vocational-rehabilitation specialist identified five “viable sedentary occupational alternatives” consistent with Avenoso’s physical capacities. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Avenoso. The district court’s finding that Avenoso lacks sedentary-work capacity was not clearly erroneous. View "Avenoso v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co" on Justia Law

Dr. Placzek, a physician, entered into an employment agreement with MCHS In 2015, Placzek had a miscarriage, which required time off. MCHS provides Short-Term Disability (STD) benefits but Placzek did not submit an STD claim. MCHS later gave her five days of STD benefits. In 2016, Dr. Placzek took 12 weeks of maternity leave; she used STD benefits for the first six weeks. For the last six weeks of maternity leave, Placzek wanted to use vacation time. Placzek was eligible for an educational-loan reimbursement of $15,000 per year; if the physician terminates the agreement “except for a breach by the Medical Center,” the physician must repay two reimbursements. In 2017, Placzek resigned; her appointment at Mayo Clinic had been terminated unilaterally by Mayo in 2016. Placzek brought a Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA) claim against Mayo, alleging retaliation for reporting a violation of law and a breach-of-contract claim against MCHS for failing to provide additional STD benefits for her miscarriage, improperly paying her STD benefits for her maternity leave, and not allowing her to use paid vacation for her maternity leave. She sought a declaratory judgment that she need not repay her educational-loan reimbursement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the rejection of all of her claims. Although she worked some of her full-time hours at a Mayo Clinic site, Placzek was an independent contractor, not a Mayo employee for MWA purposes. MCHS did not breach the employment agreement in calculating her benefits or in denying her paid vacation time. View "Placzek v. Mayo Clinic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, formerly employed as deputy sheriffs, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that defendants violated their First Amendment rights based on Defendant Cole's retaliatory employment actions taken after plaintiffs supported his political opponent. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaints.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in interpreting Curtis v. Christian County, 963 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2020), by concluding that even if plaintiff is a first responder and other provisions of Missouri law protect against discharge for engaging in political activity, because he was a Missouri deputy sheriff, plaintiff was legally terminated and Cole did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. The court explained that whether Cole violated plaintiffs' state statutory political activity rights is an inquiry separate from whether he violated their First Amendment rights. The court's conclusion that Cole committed no unconstitutional act necessarily resolves the municipal liability issue involving Christian County and the Christian County Commissioners, sued in their official capacities. Because Cole is entitled to qualified immunity under Curtis, the court did not address plaintiffs' second argument about affirmative defenses. View "Burns v. Cole" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) when it discharged him for reporting, in good faith, a hazardous safety condition. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded back pay. The district court denied plaintiff's request for reinstatement and instead awarded three years of front pay, thereafter granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law.The Eighth Circuit concluded that BNSF's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law was timely and therefore fell within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)'s 28-day time period; there existed a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support the jury's finding that plaintiff's report regarding the danger of wearing a seatbelt while hy-railing is a report of a hazardous safety condition; and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that BNSF intentionally retaliated against plaintiff. Finally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting BNSF's conditional motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of BNSF, reversed the order granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and remanded for the reinstatement of the jury verdict and for the entry of such further relief. View "Monohon v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, female truck drivers, filed suit against CRST alleging Title VII claims of retaliation and hostile work environment on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as well as individual constructive discharge claims on behalf of themselves. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CRST on the class and individual retaliation claims, as well as on the individual hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims.The Eighth Circuit concluded that CRST's removal policy does not constitute per se retaliation. With respect to the pre-2015 members of the class, the court concluded that the removal policy led to a net decrease in the women's pay; the removal policy was materially adverse; but there was no direct evidence that CRST had any motivative discriminatory bias. With respect to the post-2015 members of the class, the court concluded that these members were subject to adverse employment and the district court should address in the first instance the question whether direct or circumstantial evidence establishes that CRST took this adverse employment action in retaliation for the post-2015 class members' Title VII-protected activity.In regard to plaintiffs' individual hostile work environment claims, the court concluded that Plaintiff Fortune has not created a genuine factual dispute whether CRST's response was actionably deficient; plaintiffs have not established the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact whether CRST knew or should have known about ongoing coworker-on-coworker harassment and thereafter failed to take prompt remedial action that was reasonably calculated to end it; and plaintiffs have failed to show such discrimination on the part of CRST itself and therefore have failed to show that the employer created intolerable working conditions or took otherwise discriminatory action. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff left her employment at HKFS, she filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenants in her various employment contracts were unenforceable. HFKS brought counterclaims against plaintiff and a third-party complaint against plaintiff's new employer, Mariner.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining plaintiff from breaching the non-compete and nonsolicitation provisions in her employment contracts. The court agreed with plaintiff and Mariner that the non-compete provision did not survive her termination of the Employment Agreement. Because HKFS is not likely to prevail on the merits of its breach of contract claim with respect to the non-compete provision, the district court erred in enjoining plaintiff from violating that provision. In regard to the non-solicitation provision in plaintiff's contract, the court concluded that South Dakota law applies under the agreement's choice-of-law provision, and such provisions cannot prevent a former employee from accepting unsolicited business. Therefore, the non-solicitation agreement, in part, violates South Dakota law and public policy and it is at least in part unenforceable. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. Honkamp Krueger Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against CJS Solutions, a Florida entity doing business as The HCI Group, in the District of Minnesota. Plaintiffs moved to certify a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The putative class of plaintiffs was composed of all HCI employees hired on a per-project basis who were not paid wages for out-of-town travel to and from remote project locations. After the district court conditionally certified a collective action limited to claims arising out of travel to and from Minnesota, it granted summary judgment for HCI on the ground that plaintiffs were not employees when traveling.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in finding defendant had not waived its jurisdictional defense to plaintiffs' claims for certification of collective actions covering all of defendant's employees for all of their travel time anywhere in the United States; the district court properly excluded all claims with no connection with the forum state of Minnesota; and, in regard to the out-of-town travel claims, the district court did not err in finding that two plaintiffs were not employees when traveling and that defendant had no obligation to pay for their time. View "Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed an arbitration award that reinstated a member of the union to her former position after she was discharged by the company. The court concluded that the parties agreement authorized the arbitrator to determine whether there has been a violation of the parties' agreement within the allegations set forth in the grievance. In this case, the parties bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement's just cause provision and the provision does not specify that the same just cause is sufficient to justify all types of adverse action.The court also concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement. Finally, the court concluded that the record does not establish that the employee committed abuse as defined by the cited statutes, or that allowing her to return to work after a suspension violates public policy. View "WM Crittenden Operations, LLC v. United Food and Commercial Workers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, filed suit in state court against her former employer, Ferrellgas, a propane supplier, as well as James Ferrell and Pamela Brueckmann, Kansas residents and employees and officers of Ferrellgas. Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act against Ferrellgas (Counts I and II), and tort claims against all defendants (Counts IIIVI). After removal to the district court, the district court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration in part.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that no language in plaintiff's employment agreement suggested that she consented to arbitrate tort claims arising from actions which predated her employment. The court explained that, though plaintiff's claims are based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions made before and at the time she accepted employment, they are subject to arbitration because they arise out of and relate to the resulting employee agreement and employee relationship. The court also concluded that Ferrell and Brueckmann, officers and agents of Ferrellgas who were not parties to the Employee Agreement, may enforce the arbitration clause. The court concluded that a signatory plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration when she treated signatory and non-signatory defendants as a single unit. In this case, each of plaintiff's tort claims against defendants is a single one that should be referred in its entirety to arbitration. View "Morgan v. Ferrell" on Justia Law