Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
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Entities (Cencast) that remit payroll and employment taxes on behalf of motion picture and television production companies filed Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act employment tax returns, treating each employee as being in an “employment” relationship with Cencast rather than with the production companies. This reduced the overall tax payments because of statutory caps on FUTA and FICA taxes. The amount of tax that was avoided is equal to the additional amounts of FUTA and FICA tax that individual production companies would have been liable for had they conducted their own payroll services and filed their own returns. The United States Court of Federal Claims rejected Cencast’s refund claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the scope of Cencast’s liability for employment taxes under the (FICA) is determined by reference to the employees’ “employment” relationships with the common law employers for which Cencast remits taxes (the production companies). Those common law employers cannot decrease their liability by retaining entities such as Cencast to actually make wage payments to the employees. The court further noted that some of the individuals classified as employees were independent contractors, so that Cencast was barred from seeking refunds. View "Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Based on misconduct that he allegedly committed in his previous positions as a police officer and deputy sheriff, the Transportation Security Administration suspended and ultimately revoked Gargiulo’s security clearance, which was necessary for his job as a Federal Air Marshall. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. On appeal, Gargiulo argued that the agency deprived him of constitutional due process by not timely providing him with documentary materials relied upon in deciding to suspend his security clearance. Although he was given notice of the reasons for the suspension of his security clearance as early as August 2008, he was not provided with copies of the documentary materials until May 2009, three months after he was suspended from his job. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that security clearance decisions do not implicate any due process rights. View "Gargiulo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

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Gallo was an FAA air traffic control specialist until 1995 when she experienced a job-related injury for which she received benefits. Gallo recovered enough to return to light duty. In 1996 she lost her medical certification to continue as an ATCS. Until 2000 she was assigned to a “non-operational” automation specialist position, which did not provide the same retirement credit or weekend pay. She received OWCP benefits for the differential. Gallo fully recovered in 2000 and received medical clearance; the agency terminated OWCP benefits. She applied for restoration under 5 U.S.C. 8151(b)(2), which provides the right to priority consideration to federal employees who have overcome a compensable injury. Gallo was assigned a supervisory ATCS position with a salary did not take into account pay increases granted to operational ATCS employees while Gallo was working as an automation specialist. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied her claim. The Federal Circuit reversed. On remand, an AJ ordered back pay, with interest, and adjustment of benefits under the Back Pay Act. Gallo then sought attorney fees under the Act, 5 U.S.C. 5596. The Federal Circuit denied the request, holding that it lacks authority to award attorney fees under the Act to Federal Aviation Administration employees. View "Gallo v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

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Antonellis, a member of the Navy Reserve since 1986, is a member of boththe Selected Reserve, a paid unit, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which is unpaid. From 2009 through 2011, Antonellis submitted 69 applications, but he was not assigned to any Selected Reserve billet and was instead assigned to a Volunteer Training Unit in the Individual Ready Reserve. He performed those duties without pay. In 2011 Antonellis filed suit under the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. 206(a), asserting that, based on his outstanding service record and the standards described in the Commander’s guidance letter, he “has been clearly entitled to a pay billet” and that the decision not to assign him to a Selected Reserve pay billet was arbitrary. He sought more than $64,700 in back pay. The Claims Court dismissed the claim as nonjusticiable, because there were no standards by which it could review the Navy’s assignment decisions. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Antonellis v. United States" on Justia Law

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Federal employees who are members of the National Guard are entitled to up to 15 days of annual military leave “without loss in pay, time, or performance or efficiency rating,” 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). Before a 2000 amendment, the Office of Personnel Management interpreted the section as providing 15 calendar days of leave, rather than 15 workdays; federal employees who attended reserve training on non-work days were charged military leave. The Federal Circuit held that even before 2000, federal agencies were not entitled to charge employees military leave on non-workdays. Tierney worked at the DEA, 1974-2001, and was a member of the Air National Guard. He filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim that the DEA charged him military leave for reserve duty on 44 non-workdays, so that he took annual leave or unpaid leave for military duty. An AJ ordered DEA to compensate Tierney for 17 days. The full Board reversed, finding that the Military Leave Summary and Tierney’s testimony were based solely on his military records and on speculation that DEA improperly charged military leave on intervening non-workdays and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that DEA charged him military leave on non-workdays or that he used annual leave for reserve duties. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tierney v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

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Crawford began working for the Department of the Army in 1986, with credit for military service. In 2006, when called to uniformed service, Crawford was an IT Specialist, GS-2210-11, in the Corps of Engineers. The Army subsequently outsourced many IT functions and abolished Crawford’s position, but formed a new organization, the Corps of Engineers Information Technology (ACE-IT). When Crawford completed uniformed service, the Army briefly returned him to an IT Specialist position, but reassigned him as Program Support Specialist, GS-0301-11. Crawford claimed violation of reemployment protections for those in uniformed service under 38 U.S.C. 4313(a)(2). The administrative judge ordered the Army to place Crawford in a position of “like status” to an IT Specialist. The Army later submitted notice that it was not able to find a position of “like status” and had requested the Office of Personnel Management’s placement assistance. Crawford sought enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that the search for positions was limited to vacant positions. The AJ agreed. The Army then reassigned Crawford to a position as an IT Specialist within ACE-IT, with the same duty station, title, and grade as his old position. The Board concluded that the Agency was in compliance and dismissed Crawford’s appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Crawford v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law

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In 2003 Federal Air Marshals were told of a potential hijacking plot. Soon after that, the Agency sent an unencrypted text message to the Marshals’ cell phones temporarily cancelling missions on flights from Las Vegas. Marshal MacLean became concerned that this created a danger. He unsuccessfully complained to his supervisor and to the Inspector General, then spoke to an MSNBC reporter. MSNBC published an article, and the Agency withdrew the directive after members of Congress joined the criticism. In 2004, MacLean appeared on NBC Nightly News in disguise to criticize Agency dress code, which he believed allowed Marshals to be easily identified. During the subsequent investigation, MacLean admitted that he revealed the cancellation directive. MacLean was removed from his position for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information (SSI). Although the Agency had not initially labeled the message as SSI, it subsequently ordered that its content was SSI. The Ninth Circuit rejected MacLean’s challenge to the order. MacLean then challenged termination of his employment, arguing he had engaged in protected whistleblowing activity. An ALJ and the Merit Systems Protection Board concluded that the disclosure was specifically prohibited by 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A) and that unauthorized disclosure of SSI was a non-retaliatory reason for removal. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the Board incorrectly interpreted the Whistleblower Protection Act. View "MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

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Conforto worked for the Department of the Navy for 39 years; she alleges that she was forced to retire in 2010 because of events motivated by age and sex discrimination, and retaliation for prior equal employment opportunity activity. Her parking space was taken away; her subordinate was promoted over her; and she was denied permission to attend training. After Conforto submitted retirement papers but before her retirement became effective, her supervisor criticized her work, issued a formal letter of reprimand, denied a request for sick leave, and proposed to suspend her. After her retirement the agency charged her with improperly copying materials from her work computer, gave her a negative appraisal, and denied a bonus or raise for 2010. The Department concluded that she had not been subjected to discrimination or retaliation and had retired voluntarily. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding her retirement voluntary. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction under the Supreme Court’s decision in Kloeckner v. Solis (2012). Jurisdiction exits under 5 U.S.C. 7702(a)(1) in “mixed cases,” in which an employee has been affected by an action which the employee may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board and alleges discrimination. View "Conforto v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

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Young served as a Public Housing Revitalization Specialist in the Office of Public Housing in the Cleveland office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development for 10 years. Young was representing himself at an arbitration hearing, appealing his five-day suspension for disruptive behavior, misrepresentation of authority, and use of insulting language to and about other employees. One of the witnesses testifying against him was Darr, Executive Director of the Coschocton Metropolitan Housing Authority and a HUD client. Following Darr’s testimony, there was a recess; Darr claims that while he was walking down the hallway, about 25-30 feet away from Young, Young shouted from immediately outside the door of the hearing room, “[y]ou are a racist. You are a member of the KKK, and you should be shot.” Young was later placed on administrative leave; notice of proposed removal issued. Interviews were conducted after Young submitted his oral and written statements, so that Young was unaware of the content and substance of the interviews and was unable to respond to anything unearthed during those interviews. An arbitrator rejected a challenge to Young’s termination. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the agency violated Young’s due process rights and its own procedures.View "Young v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

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Prasch worked as a mail carrier for the Postal Service until suffering a work-related injury, compensable under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. He received benefits from the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs from December 2007 until October 2008. Prasch applied for disability retirement. OPM approved his application and deposited $14,640.27, representing retroactive retirement annuity payments from December 2007 through the approval of his application. OPM paid him another $5,869.60 in retirement annuity benefits before determining that Prasch had received FECA disability benefits from OWCP during the period that OPM was paying him retirement annuity benefits. Because governing statutes prohibit dual benefits, OPM adjusted the commencement date of Prasch’s retirement annuity and computed an overpayment of $14,703.62.and sent a proposed repayment schedule. Prasch requested a waiver of the repayment obligation, lower installments, or a compromise payment, but he did not ask for reconsideration of OPM’s decisions as to the existence of the overpayment or its amount. OPM affirmed its initial decision, finding that Prasch should have known that he could not receive dual benefits and rejecting his claim of financial hardship, but extended the time for repayment. The Merit Systems Protection denied an appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Prasch v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law