Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the BBG pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., after she did not receive a promotion. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the BBG. The court agreed with the district court's finding that no reasonable employee could believe that the objected-to conduct was unlawful under Title VII and therefore, summary judgment was appropriately granted on plaintiff's retaliation claims. Although the court had not held that bad faith was required for a party to be entitled to a spoliation inference where, as here, there was a duty of preservation, the error was harmless. Plaintiff's objections to the selection process, even applying a spoliation inference, failed to demonstrate that summary judgment was inappropriately granted on her discrimination claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Grosdidier v. Broadcasting Board of Governors" on Justia Law

The Union asserted unfair labor practice charges (ULPs) against the VA on behalf of two nurses at a VA medical center. The VA determined that the charges were covered by the nurses' statutory right of collective bargaining but that they arose out of professional conduct or competence within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. 7422(a)-(b). Therefore, the VA decided that the charges were excluded from review by the FLRA. Given the clear definition of collective bargaining, the court held that the district court correctly held that the VA Under Secretary lacked authority under section 7422(d) to exclude these ULPs from the FLRA's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Amer. Fed. of Govt. Employees v. Shinseki, et al" on Justia Law

Appellees sued the District, their employer, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The District argued on appeal, inter alia, that it was entitled to a new trial because of improper closing arguments. Appellees' counsel made four inappropriate arguments: three after the district court had sustained objections. The first three arguments were "golden rule" arguments and the fourth argument was a "send a message" argument. As the district court's efforts to cure the resulting prejudice were insufficient, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Caudle, et al v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Code 2-1404.01 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a, against the City, alleging that she had suffered sexual harassment during the course of her employment with the DCFEMS. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claim with prejudice because she had not filed a timely Charge with the EEOC, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C. Human Rights Act claim. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff neither pursued her rights diligently nor proved that some extraordinary circumstance prevented her from satisfying the statute of limitations. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dyson v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Board's decision finding that petitioner violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5), by refusing to reduce to writing and execute a collective bargaining agreement reached with the Union. The Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order. Because the Board lacked a quorum of three members when it issued its decision in this case, the court concluded that its decision must be vacated. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and denied the cross-petition for enforcement of the Board's invalid order. View "Noel Canning, A Division of the Noel Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In this case, participants in the Thunderbird Mining Company Pension Plan sought "shutdown" pension benefits. The PBGC, the government agency that administered pension termination insurance under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, denied the participants' request. These early retirement benefits were triggered by a permanent shutdown of a plant and were payable to plan participants who met certain age and years-of-service requirements. The court held that the agency's determination was not arbitrary or capricious where the record provided sufficient support for the agency's judgment that a permanent shutdown had not occurred before Eveleth's pension plan was terminated on July 24th, 2003. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the agency. View "United Steel, et al. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp." on Justia Law

After the union and a former newsroom supervisor filed complaints against Ampersand, the ALJ found - and the Board affirmed - that each of these actions violated section 8(a)(1) and/or 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3). The ALJ and Board further concluded that Ampersand violated section 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating employees about union activity, surveilling union activity, and requiring employees to remove buttons and signs with a certain message. The court held that the Board did not protect the bulk of the employees' activity and that the Board's misconception of the line between protected and unprotected activity tainted its analysis. Because the court could conceive of no principle by which the Board could cleanse that taint, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision and order, and denied the cross-application for enforcement. View "Ampersand Publishing, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In an effort to encourage superior performance, Medco introduced what it called the "WOW" program. This dispute arose when an employee wore a shirt with the Union's logo on the front and a message on the back that stated, "I don't need a WOW to do my job." Medco subsequently asked the employer to remove the shirt. Out of these events sprang charges of violations of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), charges that the Board upheld in almost every aspect. At the same time another dispute arose, unrelated except that it involved a dress code provision, Medco, and the same general time period. Medco subsequently petitioned for review of the Board's order as to both matters. The court denied the petition in regards to the Board's determination that Medco committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain on its amendment of the dress code. However, the court set aside the Board's determination that Medco violated the Act in ordering the employee to remove his shirt, and on its ban on insulting, provocative, and confrontational expressions on clothing. View "Medco Health Sol. of Las Vegas v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant brought suit against officials of the Administrative Office, solely in their official capacities, alleging that they rejected her job application in violation of her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed appellant's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Administrative Office had sovereign immunity from suit. The court reversed the judgment and held that appellant's claim fell within the Larson-Dugan exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity. Since the district court did not address appellees' alternative jurisdiction arguments, the court left all of these arguments for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pollack v. Duff, et al" on Justia Law

When an employee's name and Social Security number listed on Form W-2 do not match in the SSA's database and this happens to a sufficient number of employees, the SSA sends the employer a "no-match" letter. In 2006, Judicial Watch filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request with the SSA seeking the names of the 100 U.S. employers that generated the most no-matches from 2001 through 2006. The agency declined to produce such records, concluding that they were exempt under FOIA Exemption 3. The district court agreed with the SSA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the records sought by Judicial Watch would disclose "return information" and were protected from disclosure by the Tax Code, 26 U.S.C. 6103(a). Moreover, the Haskell Amendment was not applicable here because Judicial Watch sought data that could be associated with a particular taxpayer, the employer. View "Judicial Watch, Inc. v. SSA" on Justia Law