Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a collective bargaining agreement executed in 1998 by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the American Federation of Government Employees, Council of Prison Locals No. 33. The Bureau petitioned for a review of a decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority holding that the Bureau had a duty to bargain over its implementation of a "mission critical" standard for staffing federal correctional institutions. The court held that because the Authority unreasonably concluded the mission critical standard was not "covered by" the collective bargaining agreement between the Bureau and its employees' union, the court granted the petition and vacated the Authority's decision.

Appellant sued her former employer alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on appellant's interference claim and entered a judgment as a matter of law on her retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the interference claim where appellant's allegations "focus[ed] on precisely the sorts of de minimis, intangible, and unmeasurable aspects of a job that the regulations specifically exclude[d]" pursuant to Montgomery v. Maryland. The court also agreed with the district court that no reasonable jury, relying on the evidence presented at trial, could conclude that the 2005 realignment proximately caused appellant's termination in 2008. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim.

Appellant charged his former employer, the Small Business Administration (SBA), with discrimination and the parties subsequently entered a settlement agreement where one of the terms of the settlement agreement required the SBA to provide neutral references when potential employers inquired about appellant. Appellant claimed that the SBA materially breached that requirement and sued the SBA in district court. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the SBA, concluding that there was no material breach of the settlement agreement. The court held that, although the SBA employee's comment at issue could have constituted a breach because he did not simply refer the potential employer to Human Resources, the court agreed with the district court that the breach was not material because the employee's description of appellant was positive, or at worst, neutral. Accordingly, summary judgment for the SBA was affirmed.

Plaintiff, the former captain of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), filed a ten-count complaint charging the District of Columbia with racial and ethnic discrimination and retaliation against him because of a series of discrimination complaints he filed against the MPD. At issue was whether plaintiff's damages award constituted impermissible double recovery, represented compensation for two distinct juries, or reflected a single award apportioned between two theories of liability. The court found that the magistrate judge explicitly instructed the jury not to concern itself with double recovery because he had concluded "as a matter of law" that plaintiff could recover under both his federal and state law theories. Therefore, the court held that it could not presume that the jury intended to compensate plaintiff for a single injury without regard to the multiplicity of the theories pled. Accordingly, because the jury's award amounted to impermissible double recovery, the court reversed the magistrate's order denying the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case.

Plaintiff ("appellant"), a former official of the District of Columbia Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), was fired after five years on the job purportedly for poor performance. Appellant sued the OIG and alleged that defendants conspired to deter his testimony in a subordinate's employment discrimination trial and ultimately fired him in retaliation for his refusal to help sabotage his fellow employee. At issue was whether the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of defendants on appellant's 42 U.S.C. 1985(2) conspiracy claim, a related claim under 42 U.S.C. 1986 for failure to prevent the conspiracy, and his First Amendment retaliation claim. After a trial on appellant's Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., retaliation claim, the jury found in favor of defendants. The court vacated the dismissal of appellant's sections 1985(2) and 1986 conspiracy claims because the district court erroneously required an invidious, class-based motive for the alleged conspiracy and because the district court concluded, without support, that Title VII was the exclusive remedy for this type of retaliation. Accordingly, the court vacated these claims and remanded for further proceedings and affirmed in all other respects.

Appellant alleged that he was transferred to a position of less responsibility within the District of Columbia Department of Mental Health ("District") in retaliation for his statements corroborating a claim of racial discrimination against a District official. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the District on the ground that appellant failed to show that his transfer was a materially adverse action. The court held that appellant had provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he suffered a materially adverse employment action and to conclude that the District's proffered reasons for transferring him were pretextual and that he was transferred in retalaition for supporting his direct supervisor's complaint. Accordingly, the court erred in granting summary judgment for the District and the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act ("FTEPA"), 49 U.S.C. 44729, which allowed some pilots, but not him, to take advantage of Congress's decision to raise the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 65. Plaintiff also alleged that his former employer and former union violated a state law banning age discrimination in employment by failing to place him in a position at work that would have allowed him the benefit of the new retirement age. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's state age discrimination claims. The court concluded that plaintiff did not make clear in his complaint that he was suing his former employer for its failure to demote him to a status that might help him take advantage of the new age limit in the FTEPA and his complaint never alleged that he requested a demotion, that he was qualified for such a position, or that such positions were available, all facts he would need to prove to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination for failure to demote under the state discrimination statute. Accordingly, the court declined to pass on the merits of an argument the district court had no chance to consider and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit.

Plaintiff sued the Government Printing Office ("GPO") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., alleging race and gender discrimination when the GPO filled two positions with white men, without interviewing any candidates. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the GPO. The court concluded that the district court erred by requiring plaintiff to show not only that the GPO's nondiscriminatory reason was pretext, but also that discrimination was the actual reason plaintiff was passed over for the positions. Consequently, the court held that a reasonable jury could find in plaintiff's favor and reversed the district court's order of summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings.

NMSA, a trade association representing marine terminal operators, petitioned for review of OSHA's vertical tandem lifts ("VTLs") Standard. At issue was whether OSHA failed to demonstrate that VTLs posed a significant risk of worker safety; whether two of the Standard's requirements were not technologically feasible; whether the Standard was not reasonably necessary or appropriate in light of the "safe work zone" requirement; whether OSHA's authority was limited to requiring, not prohibiting, workplace practices; and if the Standard was otherwise valid, whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 651-678, had made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to OSHA. The court denied NMSA's petition for review in large part, granted the petition in part, vacating and remanding only that portion of the VTL Standard providing for the inspection requirement for ship-to-shore VTLs and the total ban on platform container VTLs.

New York Presbyterian Hospital ("Hospital") petitioned for review of a decision and order by the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") finding the Hospital in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), for failing to produce information requested by the labor union with which the Hospital had a collective bargaining agreement, the New York State Nurses Association ("NYSNA" or "Union"). The Hospital asserted that NYSNA failed to demonstrate the relevance of its request for information, attacked the evidentiary foundation of the Board's decision and order, and raised a number of additional arguments. The court held that NYSNA adequately demonstrated the relevance of its request for information where the nub of NYSNA's request for information was the Union's concern that non-Union NPs, licensed nurses, were performing bargaining unit work in the Hospital. The court also held that the Board's order that the Hospital be required to furnish information about shifts worked by bargaining unit NPs was supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected or declined to reach the Hospital's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied and the court granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement.