Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Hamilton Park, a long-term care facility, belonged to a multi-employer bargaining group, Tuchman. Tuchman and the employees' union agreed to a CBA beginning in 2008 and extending through February 28, 2013, giving the union the option to reopen negotiations in November 2011 to bargain for new terms for the CBA’s last year and to submit any unresolved items to binding interest arbitration, and allowing the arbitrator to “determine his jurisdiction” and grant “all appropriate remedies.” In 2011, the union invoked its right to reopen negotiations. The parties agreed to arbitrate unresolved issues, including the cost to maintain the existing health benefits. The arbitrator, Scheinman, suggested a multi-year award to spread increased contributions over a longer period. Scheinman claims that “[b]oth sides [orally] agreed my jurisdiction permitted a multi-year Award, at my discretion.” In 2012, Scheinman issued an award that extended through June 2016, dealing with wages and health benefits contributions, and allowing the union to reopen negotiations for the contract’s last year. Scheinman did not address why he included a second generation interest arbitration provision, nor did he claim that the parties consented. Hamilton Park petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that Scheinman exceeded his authority. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Hamilton Park agreed to expand Scheinman’s jurisdiction to a multi-year award, but did not agree to inclusion of a second generation interest arbitration provision. View "Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr., Ltd.v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E." on Justia Law

Galanter, an MCPc senior solutions architect, was designing and implementing a call center at the company’s Buffalo locations. MCPc’s director of engineering visited regularly and took available employees out to lunch. On February 24, 2011, lunch included Galanter; another solutions architect; and two engineers. They discussed an engineer shortage. Galanter stated that he was working too many hours, urged the director to hire additional engineers, and stated that MCPc could hire several additional engineers with the $400,000 salary MCPc was paying a recently hired executive. CEO Trebilcock was informed of Galanter’s comments and requested an investigation. He was informed that Galanter had obtained global access privileges and could view confidential files normally restricted to human resources personnel. Galanter attributed his knowledge to what he had found on the Internet, to “water cooler” conversation, and to comments by sales representatives. Trebilcock concluded that Galanter was lying and terminated his employment. The NLRB issued a complaint alleging violation of 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by discharging Galanter for complaining about working conditions, a protected concerted activity. The Third Circuit agreed with the Board that Galanter engaged in protected concerted activity during the February 24th lunch, but vacated and remanded for the Board to consider whether that activity or MCPc’s belief that Galanter engaged in misconduct or dishonesty formed the basis for his discharge. View "MCPc, Inc v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Wiest, formerly a Tyco employee, claimed that Tyco unlawfully terminated his employment for reporting suspected securities fraud violations pertaining to the accounting treatment of two Tyco events, in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1514A. Wiest claims that for six months, he refused, as an accountant, to process payments allegedly due from Tyco that related to two Tyco employee and dealer meetings in resort settings. Tyco contends that Wiest’s involvement with the events at issue was minimal and he did not frustrate, or even inconvenience, Tyco’s management, and that ,more than eight months later, Tyco’s human resources director—who had no knowledge of, Wiest’s alleged protected activity— investigated complaints that Wiest made inappropriate sexual comments to several female Tyco employees, and that he had inappropriate sexual relationships with two subordinates, resulting in Wiest’s termination. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Tyco. Wiest failed to offer any evidence to establish that his protected activity was a contributing factor to any adverse employment action; Tyco established that it would have taken the same actions with respect to Wiest in the absence of Wiest’s accounting activity given the thoroughly documented, investigation conducted by its human resources director. View "Wiest v. Tyco Elec. Corp" on Justia Law

The Debtors own the Atlantic City Trump Taj Mahal casino. The union represents 1,136 employees. The 2011 collective bargaining agreement was to remain in effect through September 14, 2014 and continue in full force and effect from year to year thereafter, unless either party served 60 days written notice of its intention to terminate, modify, or amend. In March 2014, the Debtors gave notice of their “intention to terminate, modify or amend” and sought to begin negotiations. The Union initially declined. On August 20 the parties met. The Debtors emphasized their critical financial situation. No agreement was reached. The Debtors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On September 11, the Debtors asked the Union to extend the term of the CBA. The Union refused. The CBA expired. On September 17, the Debtors sent the Union a proposal with supporting documentation. After meetings, the Debtors successfully moved, under section 1113, to reject the CBA and implement the terms of the Debtors’ last proposal, asserting that rejection of the CBA was necessary to the reorganization.While 11 U.S.C. 1103 allows a debtor to terminate a CBA under certain circumstances, the National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from unilaterally changing CBA terms even after its expiration; key terms of an expired CBA continue to govern until the parties reach a new agreement or bargain to impasse. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding section 1113 does not distinguish between the terms of an unexpired CBA and terms that continue to govern after the CBA expires. View "In re: Trump Entm't Resorts" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lane hired Connelly as one of seven union truck drivers at its Pittsburgh facility. Connelly ranked fifth in seniority and was the only woman. In 2007, allegedly because Connelly had ended a romance with a co-worker (Nogy), her male co-workers began “curs[ing] ... and belittl[ing] her." Connelly notified supervisors. Lane suspended Nogy for three days but did not discipline or warn any other employees, who continued to harass Connelly. In 2009, Connelly learned about the company’s “Ethics Line,” which she called multiple times to report further harassment and make complaints about her male co-workers drinking on the job. In 2010, a Lane foreman made an unwanted physical advance to Connelly, which she reported to the Ethics Line and to her supervisor. In October 2010, a Lane supervisor became “incensed” at Connelly when she refused to drive a truck that had a flat tire and steering problems. Soon after, Connelly was laid off before the end of the construction season and before any other union truck driver. She was never recalled her to work. Lane did recall male truck drivers in 2011 and continues to employ them. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of Connelly’s suit, which alleged disparate treatment, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding her claims plausible. View "Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp" on Justia Law

Willis worked as a Neonatal Nurse Practitioner at Children’s from August 1993 until her termination in January 2012. From 2001 until 2011, Willis served as co-lead NNP. Lamouree, the nurse manager for the newborn intensive care unit was Willis’s supervisor. Lamouree’s supervisors were Valenta and Hupp. Starting in August 2011, Children’s issued Willis disciplinary warnings for three distinct incidents, all involving communications Willis was 61 years old at the time of her termination. After the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission closed Willis’s case, Willis sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, stating that Willis was unable to provide specifics to establish that this other employee was in fact not disciplined, and if so, any reason why she was not disciplined. In the pretext context, this type of second-hand, general rumor regarding a single substantially younger employee is insufficient as a matter of law to show pretext. While evidence demonstrating that a single member of a non-protected group received more favorable treatment can be relevant, “[a] decision adversely affecting an older employee does not become a discriminatory decision merely because one younger employee is treated differently.” View "Willis v. Childrens Hosp. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought by Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania. Babcock claimed that Butler County failed to properly compensate her and those similarly situated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). At issue in this appeal was whether a portion of time for the Butler County Prison corrections officers’ meal periods was compensable under the FLSA. The Third Circuit concluded there was no provision of the FLSA that directly addressed this issue. Two tests were suggested by other courts of appeal: one looked to whether the employee had been relieved from all duties during the mealtime; the other (more generally adopted) looked to the party to which the “predominant benefit” of the mealtime belongs. The District Court noted that the Third Circuit had not yet established a test to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA. After its review of this case, the Court adopted the “predominant benefit test” and affirmed the District Court. View "Babcock v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Faush was an employee of a temporary staffing agency. He was assigned to Tuesday Morning, Inc., where he claimed he was subjected to slurs and accusations based on his race. Ultimately he was terminated. Appellant filed suit against Tuesday Morning, claiming violations of Title VII of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Tuesday Morning on the ground that because appellant was not Tuesday Morning’s employee, Tuesday Morning was not liable for employment discrimination. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that a rational jury, applying the factors announced by the Supreme Court in “Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,” could have found on these facts that appellant was Tuesday Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII and the Human Relations Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc." on Justia Law