Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Miller Plastic Products Inc. fired Ronald Vincer in March 2020, during the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic. Vincer had expressed concerns about the company's pandemic protocols and its operating status, believing it was not an essential business. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that Vincer’s termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it was motivated, at least in part, by his protected concerted activity.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and that his termination was motivated by his protected activity. The ALJ also disallowed testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage of the proceeding. Miller Plastic petitioned for review of the Board’s order, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and was a motivating factor for his termination. The court also agreed with the ALJ’s decision to disallow testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage, noting that such evidence is typically considered during compliance proceedings.However, the court found that the NLRB failed to adequately address certain evidence related to Miller Plastic’s affirmative defense that it would have fired Vincer even absent his protected conduct. The court remanded the case to the Board to address the significance of that evidence. The court denied Miller Plastic’s petition for review in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part, affirming the finding that Vincer was terminated because of his concerted activity. View "Miller Plastic Products Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Alexander Smith, a Christian firefighter in Atlantic City, was prohibited from growing a beard due to the city's grooming policy, which he claimed violated his religious beliefs. Smith sued the city, alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VII’s accommodation and anti-retaliation provisions. The District Court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment for the city on all claims.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied Smith's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that his claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all four claims, leading Smith to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the District Court’s judgment regarding Smith’s Title VII accommodation claim and his free exercise claim, finding that the city's grooming policy was not generally applicable and failed strict scrutiny. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the equal protection claim and the Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that Smith did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Additionally, the court reversed the denial of Smith’s motion for a preliminary injunction, recognizing a likelihood of success on the merits and the irreparable harm caused by the loss of First Amendment freedoms. View "Smith v. City of Atlantic City" on Justia Law

A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Charles and Grant Adler, through their business entity CM Adler LLC, distributed tortillas and other food products of Defendant Gruma Corporation to grocery stores in central New Jersey under a "Store Door Distributor Agreement" (SDDA). When Defendant terminated the relationship, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging retaliatory termination due to their organizing efforts with other distributors. Plaintiffs claimed violations of state and federal labor laws, including failure to pay minimum wages and unlawful deductions, and argued that the SDDA was a franchise agreement subject to New Jersey's Franchise Practices Act, which forbids termination without cause.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the case, concluding that Texas law governed under the SDDA and the case should proceed to arbitration. The District Court did not address the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or Plaintiffs' exemption argument under 9 U.S.C. § 1. It found the parties had contracted for Texas law, under which the arbitration agreement was enforceable, and rejected Plaintiffs' bid to apply New Jersey law instead. The District Court also decided that Charles and Grant Adler, who did not sign the contract, were estopped from challenging its arbitration provision because they acted as parties to the contract when they performed the LLC’s work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the FAA does not apply to the SDDA because Plaintiffs are transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals found that the District Court erred in its choice-of-law analysis by failing to consider the impact of New Jersey public policies on its arbitrability ruling. The Court of Appeals vacated the order compelling arbitration and remanded for the District Court to complete the choice-of-law analysis under the correct framework and to reevaluate whether the individual Plaintiffs, who did not sign the arbitration agreement, are bound by its terms. View "Adler v. Gruma Corporation" on Justia Law

Michele Cornelius sued CVS Pharmacy Inc., New Jersey CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C., and her former supervisor, Shardul Patel, alleging a hostile work environment. Cornelius claimed that Patel targeted her with negative treatment because she is a woman, including denying her promotions, overworking her, and undermining her relationships with employees. Despite her multiple complaints to CVS, no action was taken against Patel. Cornelius resigned in October 2021, but Patel did not respond, and she was subsequently fired on November 4, 2021.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted CVS's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed Cornelius's complaint. The court concluded that Cornelius's claims were not protected from arbitration under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) because her hostile work environment claim did not constitute a "sexual harassment dispute." The court also found that Cornelius and CVS had entered into a valid arbitration agreement and that the agreement was not unconscionable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the District Court that the EFAA did not cover Cornelius's claims but reached this conclusion on different grounds, determining that her dispute arose before the EFAA's effective date of March 3, 2022. However, the Third Circuit found that the District Court abused its discretion by not considering whether discovery was necessary before deciding that Cornelius and CVS had a valid agreement to arbitrate. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed in part, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings, including consideration of whether discovery on the validity of the arbitration agreement was warranted. View "Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy Inc" on Justia Law

The case involves the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (the "Fund") seeking to collect withdrawal liability payments from several companies (the "Related Employers") that were commonly controlled with Borden Dairy Company of Ohio, LLC and Borden Transport Company of Ohio, LLC (the "Borden Ohio entities"). The Borden Ohio entities had previously withdrawn from the Fund and entered into a settlement agreement with the Fund during an arbitration process, which revised their withdrawal liability payments. The Borden Ohio entities later went bankrupt and ceased making payments, prompting the Fund to seek payment from the Related Employers.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed the Fund's suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA) does not provide a statutory cause of action to enforce a private settlement agreement. The District Court also concluded that the Fund failed to meet the procedural requirements for notice and demand outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the settlement agreement is properly understood as a revision to the withdrawal liability assessment under the MPPAA. Since no employer began an arbitration with respect to the revised assessment, the Fund has a cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1). The Court also determined that the Fund met the procedural requirements for notice and demand under 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1). Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's order dismissing the Fund's suit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension v. Laguna Dairy S.de R.L. de C.V." on Justia Law

Prestige Home Care Agency, operated by Nursing Home Care Management Inc., did not compensate its employees for travel time between clients' homes. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) sued Prestige for this and other violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court found Prestige's actions to be willful violations of the FLSA and granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL. Prestige appealed the summary judgment, the exclusion of its expert witness, and the denial of its motion for sanctions against the DOL.The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania excluded Prestige’s expert witness, denied Prestige’s motion for sanctions, and granted summary judgment for the DOL on all claims. The court found that Prestige willfully violated the FLSA by not compensating for travel time, failing to pay for short breaks, improperly compensating overtime, and not keeping accurate records.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that travel time between job sites during the workday is compensable under the FLSA. It affirmed the District Court’s finding that Prestige violated the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements and acted willfully in its violations, extending the statute of limitations to three years. The court also upheld the District Court’s calculation of back wages and liquidated damages, finding the DOL’s estimates sufficient given Prestige’s inadequate records.The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s exclusion of Prestige’s expert witness, who made several legal errors in his report. The court also upheld the denial of sanctions against the DOL, as the documents in question were already in Prestige’s possession and had little impact on the case. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment in all respects. View "Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Nursing Home Care Management Inc." on Justia Law

Fair Labor Standards Act claims, not dependent on interpretation of collective bargaining agreement, need not be arbitrated, where arbitration clause does not include a clear waiver.Certified nursing assistants, sued their employer, Silver Care, for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and related New Jersey laws, claiming that Silver underpaid them for overtime by failing to include certain hourly wage differentials in the calculation of plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay, and by deducting plaintiffs’ half-hour meal breaks from their total hours worked, although they often worked through those breaks. Silver unsuccessfully moved to dismiss or to stay the proceedings, citing the arbitration clause in the governing collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Third Circuit affirmed. A court may compel arbitration of a plaintiff’s federal statutory claim when the arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably waives the employee’s ability to vindicate that right in court and the federal statute does not exclude arbitration as an appropriate forum. If no clear or unmistakable waiver exists, arbitration may be compelled if the plaintiff’s FLSA claim “depends on the disputed interpretation of a CBA provision,” which must “first go to arbitration.” Silver did not dispute that the arbitration provision lacks a clear and unmistakable waiver. Neither of the FLSA claims depend on disputed interpretations of CBA provisions. View "Jones v. SCO Silver Care Operations LLC" on Justia Law

Delaware State University hired Dr. Grevious as an associate professor and as a department chairperson in August 2010, with a contract to end in June 2011. Grevious complained that her supervising administrators were impeding her work on reaccreditation based on her gender. In 2011, the University gave Grevious a renewable contract as an associate professor for the 2011- 2012 academic year. Grevious was unable to meet the reaccreditation deadline. The University terminated her term as chairperson. Grevious filed an EEOC charge of discrimination; the investigation was closed for lack of corroborating evidence. The University revoked Grevious’s renewable contract and issued her a terminal contract ending her employment effective May 2012. Grevious claims that the Provost admitted that this was based on the EEOC charge, unrelated to her teaching or professional performance. She filed a second EEOC charge. The Provost denied making such admissions, stating that the decision was based on Grevious’s documented interpersonal conflicts at the University. Grevious sued, alleging retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court rejected her claims on summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to her contract revision claim, but otherwise affirmed, holding that at the prima facie stage, a plaintiff need only proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse employment action, not the but-for reason. View "Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University" on Justia Law

Egan worked for the Port Authority, 2008-2012, primarily managing fleet vehicles. During his first two years, only a small percentage of his work involved “economic development.” He did not perform any economic development work after 2010. Egan suffers from migraine headaches and claimed that their frequency increased with his transfer to the Engineering Department. He applied for Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave in April 2012. The Port Authority approved intermittent FMLA leave. An issue arose in July because Egan had been reporting only the “approximate” number of hours he worked. In October, Egan was informed that all “economic development functions” were being eliminated, his “temporary reassignment” to the Engineering Department was “deemed completed,” and he was terminated. Egan alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and retaliation for exercising his FMLA rights, 29 U.S.C. 2601. A jury rejected his claims. The Third Circuit vacated as to the FMLA claim; the district court erred in refusing to give a mixed-motive jury instruction. A Department of Labor regulation permits a plaintiff to rely on a mixed-motive theory if the evidence, direct or circumstantial, permits a reasonable juror to conclude that use of FMLA leave was a negative factor in the employer’s adverse employment decision. View "Egan v. Delaware River Port Authority" on Justia Law