Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were then-current and former hourly employees in the slaughter and fabrication operations of a beef-processing plant in Greeley, Colorado, now owned by JBS USA, LLC (JBS). Plaintiffs were paid under the terms of collective-bargaining agreements negotiated between the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (the Union) and JBS. Plaintiffs filed suit against JBS in October 2010, claiming that they did not receive compensation required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The disputes concerned when the work day began, when it ended, and what, if any, compensation was due when the production lines halt for a 30-minute meal break. After a bench trial the United States District Court for the District of Colorado found that Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof and entered judgment in favor of JBS. Finding no reversible error to the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Castaneda v. JBS S.A." on Justia Law

In early 2010, when Christopher Cain was driving the BNSF Railway Company pickup truck back, he rear-ended a produce truck stopped at a red light. Cain said that the brakes failed and he couldn't avoid hitting the other truck. Cain filled out, signed, and filed BNSF’s Employee Personal Injury/Occupational Illness Report (Report), identifying as his injuries a skinned knuckle and a bruised knee. Cain never sought medical treatment for those injuries. So that it could comply with its requirements under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (Act), BNSF required its injured employees to complete this report and to notify their supervisors of any treatment received for work-related injuries. During BNSF’s subsequent investigation of the accident, Cain claimed that he had been in shock when he filled out the Report and had no memory of doing so. Cain said that chest pains worsened after the accident. Cain eventually sought medical treatment, and was later diagnosed with a rib fracture and excess fluid surrounding his lungs. Cain called the supervisor to tell him that Cain needed the next two work days off to have excess fluid drained from Cain’s lungs. The supervisor asked Cain if this medical condition related to the accident and noted later that “Cain was adamant that this had nothing to do with his on duty automobile accident.” A few months later, Cain filed an updated Report with BNSF about his January accident. As part of his doing so,his supervisors who discouraged him from filing the updated Report, noting that he was told that filing the updated Report “wasn’t going to go well for [Cain].” BNSF ultimately suspended Cain for 30 days, and later put him on probation for three years. Six days after issuing its suspension, BNSF terminated Cain's employment. In November 2010, after Cain’s union unsuccessfully sought back wages under the collective-bargaining agreement, Cain filed a complaint under FRSA with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). BNSF Railway petitioned for review of the Administrative Review Board’s decisions: (1) affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) finding that BNSF violated the FRSA when it fired Cain; and (2) the ALJ’s imposing punitive damages for the violation. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s and the Board’s holding that Cain met his prima facie case and that BNSF failed to counter this with clear and convincing evidence that it would have fired Cain had it known of his delayed reporting before he filed his updated Report. In view of the ALJ’s findings of fact and credibility, the Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to award punitive damages. The Court reversed the actual award, however, and remanded for the Board to provide a reasoned explanation for the punitive damages it awarded, and then to evaluate that award under "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.," (463 U.S. 29 (1983)). View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Administrative Review Bd." on Justia Law

Trent Lebahn sued Eloise Owens, a consultant for Lebahn’s employee pension plan, for negligently misrepresenting the amount of his monthly retirement benefits. The district court dismissed Lebahn’s negligent-misrepresentation claim, concluding it was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Lebahn then filed an untimely Rule 59 motion, arguing preemption did not apply because Owens was not a fiduciary of the pension plan. The district court construed the untimely motion as one under Rule 60(b) and denied relief, reasoning that Lebahn’s argument regarding Owens’s fiduciary status had been raised too late. Lebahn appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider Lebahn’s challenge to the district court’s underlying judgment, so its review was limited to the district court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b). Upon review, the Court found Lebahn did not demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b), and therefore the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Lebahn v. Owens" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on a whether the National Labor Relations Board could disregard interim earnings when calculating backpay awards for employees whose labor injury fell short of unlawful termination. The history of this appeal stemmed from respondent Mimbres Memorial Hospital and Nursing Home's (the Hospital) 1999 decision to reduce the hours of its full-time, respiratory-department employees. As a result of this reduction in hours, the United Steelworkers of America, District 12, Subdistrict 2, AFL-CIO, a union representing respiratory-department employees under an exclusive collective bargaining agreement, filed charges against the Hospital on behalf of the impacted employees. Based on these allegations, the Board’s General Counsel filed a complaint with the Board, asserting the Hospital had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). An ALJ rejected the Hospital’s argument that any income an employee had earned from secondary employment during the backpay period (i.e., interim earnings) should have been deducted from that employee’s backpay calculation. On appeal of that judgment, the Hospital argued to the Tenth circuit that the Board failed to provide adequate support for its decision to disregard interim earnings and therefore requested that the Tenth Circuit reverse the Board’s backpay calculation. The Tenth Circuit deferred to the Board’s policy-based rationale in support of its remedial decision and affirmed and enforced its order. View "NLRB v. Community Health Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rhonda Nesbitt filed this action claiming that defendants FCNH, Inc., Virginia Massage Therapy, Inc., Mid-Atlantic Massage Therapy, Inc., Steiner Education Group, Inc., Steiner Leisure Ltd., and SEG CORT LLC (collectively Defendants) violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and various Colorado wage and hour laws by requiring her and other students at the massage therapy school in which she was enrolled to provide massage therapy services to clients without pay. Defendants moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration, citing a paragraph in Nesbitt’s written enrollment agreement entitled “Arbitration Agreement.” The district court denied Defendants’ motion, finding that while the Arbitration Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable, the provision requiring arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association and the provision requiring each party to bear its own expenses, effectively deprived her of her rights under the FLSA. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Nesbitt v. FCNH" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Shawron Lounds appealed a district court's order granting summary judgment to her former employer Lincare, Inc. on her claims of a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lounds began working at that office as a customer-service representative in September 2011. She is African-American and, throughout the duration of her employment with Lincare, was the Wichita office’s only African-American employee. The record reflects Lounds recounting specific discussions with her co-workers and direct supervisors that Lounds alleged were racially and culturally insensitive, to the extent that she felt "bombarded" by them. Lounds notified her human resources department. Twenty days after she sent notice of her grievances to HR, she was disciplined for "excessive absenteeism." Lounds believed the discipline was in retaliation for her complaints regarding her co-workers. She would ultimately be fired a little over a year after she was hired. Lincare cited absenteeism as its grounds for termination. After the close of discovery and a full round of briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincare. The court first determined that no reasonable jury could have found the alleged race-based harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim under section 1981. It then opined, concerning the retaliation claim that “the alleged retaliatory actions against [Ms. Lounds] either were not ‘materially adverse’ or were not caused by [her] protected activity.” The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, finding Lounds carried her burden on summary judgment to create a jury question relating to whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe. Further, the Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the hostile work environment claim. The Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the retaliation issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lounds v. Lincare" on Justia Law

Plaintiff German Wilmer Saenz Mencia (Saenz), a Peruvian citizen, came to Utah to work for Phillip, Chance, Dustin and Preston Allreds’ sheep ranch. His work was authorized by an H-2A sheepherding visa, and he was paid the minimum wage for H-2A sheepherders: $750 per month plus food and lodging. He filed suit against the Allreds because he claimed this pay was inadequate because the work he performed did not qualify as sheepherding. Instead he argued he was entitled to the hourly wage for H-2A ranch hands, which he sought to recover in contract and quantum meruit. Additionally, he argued the work he performed did not qualify for the “range production of livestock” exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) minimum wage, and therefore asserted a minimum wage claim against the Allreds. The district court rejected these claims, denied Saenz’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Allreds. As grounds for its decision, the district court concluded Saenz’s claims were estopped because he did not object to his non-sheepherding work while the Allreds could have done something about it. Further, the court found that more than half of Saenz’s work qualified as “range production of livestock,” and Saenz was accordingly exempt from the FLSA minimum wage and the H-2A wage for ranch hands. Saenz appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to Saenz and the grant of summary judgment to the Allreds. "[N]either the FLSA exemption nor the Special Procedures are satisfied simply because most of an employee’s duties fall within a sheepherder’s job description. To assume they are, and to rule Mr. Saenz a sheepherder on that basis, is to misapply the relevant provisions in at least three ways. […] under the undisputed facts, Mr. Saenz spent a large majority of his time working away from the range, supervised by superiors who could have recorded his hours, performing duties that were often incidental to sheepherding but were not sheepherding themselves. He was a ranch hand, not a sheepherder, and the FLSA exemption and H-2A Special Procedures do not apply." Further, the Court concluded the Allreds were both actually and on constructive notice of Saenz's work conditions, and as such, concluded their grounds for affirming their summary judgment motion failed. View "Saenz Mencia v. Allred" on Justia Law

Blue Mountain Energy appealed a Benefits Review Board decision affirming an award of black lung benefits to Terry Gunderson. An administrative law judge (ALJ) originally denied benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), and Gunderson appealed to the Board and then to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit remanded for further proceedings because the ALJ did not sufficiently explain the basis for the denial. The ALJ again denied benefits, and the Board vacated and remanded the ALJ’s decision because it did not comply with the Tenth Circuit’s remand. On the second remand, the ALJ awarded benefits, and the Board affirmed. Blue Mountain petitions for review, arguing that the ALJ violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Specifically, Blue Mountain contended the ALJ gave the preamble to the regulations redefining compensable pneumoconiosis in 20 C.F.R. 718.201 the force and effect of law, even though the preamble had not been subject to APA notice and comment. Blue Mountain also contended its rights under the APA were violated when the ALJ refused to reopen the proceedings to allow it to submit evidence challenging the medical literature cited in the preamble. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error as Blue Mountain argued, and affirmed. View "Blue Mountain Energy v. Director OWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Weinman was the Chapter 7 Trustee for Adam Aircraft Industries (“AAI”). Defendant Joseph Walker was an officer of AAI and served as its president and as a member of its Board of Directors. Throughout his employment, Walker had neither a written employment contract nor a severance agreement with AAI. In February 2007, the Board decided it wanted to replace Walker as both president and as a board member. Since AAI did not want Walker’s termination to disrupt its ongoing negotiations for debt financing, AAI suggested that Walker could voluntarily “resign” in lieu of termination and could also continue to support the company publicly. Subsequently, Walker agreed, and the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) outlining the terms of Walker’s separation, and they also embodied these terms in two Separation Agreements and Releases. About a year after terminating Walker, AAI declared bankruptcy. It then sued in bankruptcy court to avoid further transfers to Walker, to recover some transfers previously made to Walker, and to disallow Walker’s claim on AAI’s bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court denied AAI’s claims. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirmed this ruling in its entirety. AAI appealed part of the ruling, arguing that its obligations and transfers to Walker were avoidable under the Code on two alternative bases. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. View "Weinman v. Walker" on Justia Law