Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

During an investigation into alleged misconduct at the Bay County jail, union president Gillis received complaints that the jail’s staff felt intimidated by management’s tactics. Gillis worked with Sergeant Walraven to draft a memorandum informing staff of their rights. The memo stated “I am in no way advising you not to cooperate with management, just advising you of your rights. It is your responsibility to ask for the representation.” Sheriff Miller summoned Gillis the day after Gillis posted the memorandum, asked who wrote it, and declared: “I can have you prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation.” The investigation into Walraven began in January with an anonymous note, suggesting that administrators review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven was the supervisor. The footage showed officers playing cards, damaging jail property, conducting outside business, not monitoring security cameras, and other violations of department policy. Walraven was placed on administrative leave. His employment was terminated in April. An investigation into Gillis began in February. A former inmate alleged that Gillis engaged in a sexual relationship with her during her time in custody and under court supervision. Gillis ultimately admitted involvement and resigned. The district court rejected the officers’ First Amendment retaliation claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the memorandum was protected speech on matters of public concern, plaintiffs’ speech interests were outweighed by defendants’ interest in obtaining compliance from the correctional officers with their investigation. View "Gillis v. Miller" on Justia Law

All Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plant officers are required to maintain medical clearance as a condition of employment. Since his employment began in 2009, Hale maintained the clearance necessary for his position. In 2013, the TVA began requiring a pulmonary function test for that clearance; Hale failed the testing and was terminated because of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. Hale sued, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. In an unsuccessful motion to dismiss, the TVA argued that Title VII’s national-security exemption applies to the Rehabilitation Act and precludes the court from reviewing the physical-fitness requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the interests of national security and that the Egan doctrine precludes the judiciary from reviewing the TVA’s determination that Hale lacked the physical capacity to fulfill his job duties because this decision was one of national security. The Sixth Circuit denied an interlocutory appeal; the national security exemption does not apply to Hale’s Rehabilitation Act claim. The court declined to extend Egan to preclude judicial review of an agency’s determination regarding an employee’s physical capability to perform the duties of his position. View "Hale v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The union was charged with violating its duty of fair representation in processing the grievance of a union member, Powell, who was terminated from her position as an automotive plant janitor. The charge alleged that Faircloth, Powell’s union steward, had submitted a false statement that she had witnessed an incident in which Powell threatened a fellow employee, and that Faircloth was subsequently involved in Powell’s grievance process. An Administrative Law Judge dismissed the charge. The National Labor Relations Board reversed, finding that the union had violated its duty of fair representation by acting arbitrarily or in bad faith. The Board emphasized that: Faircloth had submitted a statement against Powell that was partly false; Faircloth had represented Powell in the first stage of the grievance process without disclosing the fact that she had submitted a statement; and Powell was unaware of Faircloth’s statement throughout the grievance process. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Board’s finding regarding the falsity of Faircloth’s statement was not supported by substantial evidence, and that there was an insufficient basis to find a breach of duty of fair representation. There was nothing to contradict Faircloth’s assertion that she witnessed the threat. View "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Fleming had a sporadic work history in the coal industry. Between 1970 and 1991, Fleming worked for 25 different employers. In 2010, Fleming sought Black Lung Benefits Act payments. The DOL Office of Workers’ Compensation calculated that Fleming was employed as a miner for nine and one-quarter years and that he had contracted pneumoconiosis as a result of that employment. Aberry was designated as the employer responsible for payment of benefits. On appeal, an ALJ determined that Fleming could show he had worked 273.50 weeks in the industry (about 5.25 years), but that Fleming was credible and established that he had either been paid under the table or without proper records having been kept. Based on that determination, the ALJ found that Fleming engaged in coal-mine employment “for at least 15 years,” which entitled Fleming to the presumption of total disability under 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). The Benefits Review Board remanded, stating that the ALJ had neither explained how he resolved the conflict between Fleming’s “not [being] a good historian” and the ALJ’s crediting of Fleming’s testimony, nor resolved the conflicting evidence. The ALJ's second Decision again awarded benefits. finding that Fleming worked more than 15 years in coal-mine employment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Fleming had 15 years of employment. View "Aberry Coal, Inc. v. Fleming" on Justia Law

In 2015, the legislative body for Hardin County, Kentucky passed an ordinance, providing that no employee could be required to join or pay dues to a union. Labor organizations claimed that the National Labor Relations Act preempts right-to-work laws not specifically authorized in section 14(b) of the Act; regulation of “hiring-hall” agreements, which require prospective employees to be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared by or through a labor organization; and regulation of “dues-checkoff” provisions, which require employers to automatically deduct union dues, fees, or other charges from employees’ paychecks and transfer them to the union. The county argued that the ordinance constitutes state law within the meaning of section 14(b) and is not preempted by 29 U.S.C. 164(b). The district court rejected the “state law argument and found the ordinance preempted and unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The ordinance’s right-to-work protection, prohibiting employers from requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, is expressly excepted from preemption in section 14(b), but the other challenged sections are unenforceable. The court reasoned that sections 14(b)’s explicit exception of state right-to-work laws from preemption trumps operation of implicit field preemption. View "United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Hardin County" on Justia Law

The City of Chattanooga added a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) to its Fire and Police Pension Fund in 1980. In 2000, the city amended the COLA for a third time to create a fixed three-percent annual increase in retirement benefits. The city amended the COLA again in 2014 to a lower, variable annual increase. Fund participants challenged the 2014 amendment under the Contract Clause, claiming a right to the fixed three-percent COLA. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no unmistakable evidence of the city’s intent to be bound to the fixed COLA, because the COLA is neither vested nor accrued within the meaning of the City Code. Absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, a statute does not create a contractual relationship. The City Code contains one vesting provision: After 10 years of service, a participant has the right either to a full refund of her contributions or to retirement benefits upon turning 55. The section does not mention the COLA. The fact that the Fund described the fixed three-percent COLA as “guaranteed” when enacting the 2000 amendment does not prove that the city intended to be bound to the fixed COLA. View "Frazier v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tennial, an African-American began working as the Business Manager of a UPS Packaging Center. His supervisors noted serious performance deficiencies at that facility over the next two years. Tennial contends that his performance was on par with Caucasian managers. After moving to a new position, Tennial’s deficiencies persisted. There was one incident in which over 200 packages were not sorted in a timely manner. He refused to step down. Tennial claims that an extremely hostile work environment ensued. As a result, Tennial requested and was granted leave for stress, depression, and anxiety under the Family Medical Leave Act. He missed UPS’s peak holiday season. When he returned to work, new supervisors noted numerous service failures. Tennial was placed on a Management Performance Improvement Plan and eventually demoted to a position that he currently holds. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Tennial argued that the Plan and his subsequent demotion were motivated by race, age, and disability discrimination, and by retaliation for taking medical leave. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Caucasian managers identified by Tennial were not valid comparators; the reasons for his demotion were not pretextual. View "Tennial v. United Parcel Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Before accepting a transfer to a Bridgestone facility in North Carolina, Deschamps expressed concern about losing pension credit for his 10 years of employment with Bridgestone in Canada. After receiving assurances from Bridgestone’s management team that he would keep his pension credit, Deschamps accepted the position. For several years, Deschamps received written materials confirming that his date of service for pension purposes would be August 1983. He turned down employment with a competitor at a higher salary because of the purportedly higher pension benefits he would receive at Bridgestone. In 2010, Deschamps discovered that Bridgestone had changed his service date to August 1993, the date he began working at the American plant. After failed attempts to appeal this change through Bridgestone’s internal procedures, Deschamps filed suit, alleging equitable estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and an anti-cutback violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Deschamps on all three claims. The text of the plan “is at worst ambiguous, but at best, favors Deschamps’s argument that he was a covered employee in 1983” and, as a result of the change in the interpretation of this provision that excluded foreign employees from being classified as covered employees, Deschamps’s benefits were decreased. View "Deschamps v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc." on Justia Law

The Michigan office of Alix, an international company, administers payroll and benefits for U.S. employees and is directly involved in U.S. hiring. In 2013, Alix hired Brewington, a Texas resident, for its Dallas Corporate Services team. The employment agreement provides that it “will be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Michigan” and states, “any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of this Agreement and/or any termination of employment . . ., shall be exclusively subject to binding arbitration under the . . . American Arbitration Association . . . decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding as to both parties.” In 2014, Brewington was terminated. He filed a demand for arbitration, asserting claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, on behalf of himself and a purported nationwide class of current, former, and potential Alix employees. The Michigan district court ruled that Brewington was precluded from pursuing arbitration claims on behalf of any purported class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that court’s refusal to dismiss, finding that Brewington had sufficient contacts with Michigan to establish personal jurisdiction, and upheld summary judgment in favor of Alix. An agreement must expressly include the possibility of classwide arbitration to indicate that the parties agreed to it. This clause is silent on the issue and is limited to claims concerning “this Agreement,” as opposed to other agreements. It refers to “both parties.” View "AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington" on Justia Law

Richardson, then age 50, began working at Wal-Mart in 2000. Richardson’s evaluations were generally positive. Wal-Mart’s first three levels of employee discipline are “written coachings,” the fourth is termination. The second and third levels require a plan of action and electronic acknowledgement of the coaching. Richardson’s first coaching, in 2011, involved her attempt to influence the exchange of her daughter’s computer. Her second coaching involved failure to package properly a hazardous-material item. Richardson drafted an action plan. Richardson's third coaching, in August 2012, involved violating Wal-Mart’s attendance policy, with four unscheduled absences in six months. Richardson drafted another action plan. Richardson claimed a medical excuse, but did not provide documentation. Richardson claims that in late 2012, she perceived that she was mistreated by management, based on her age. In March 2013, Richardson was stacking merchandise when she fell and broke her wrist. Store manager Darby reviewed a surveillance video and concluded that Richardson had created a safety hazard through her placement of equipment. Other managers reached a similar conclusion. Darby concluded that the coaching for unsafe work practices would result in termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, rejecting claims of age discrimination under Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Richardson lacked direct evidence that her termination was based on her age and failed to establish that Wal-Mart’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge was pretextual. View "Richardson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law