Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Employers are signatories to collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the Operating Engineers Union, providing that “the Employer shall employ Operating Engineers for the erection, operation, assembly and disassembly, and maintenance and repair of . . . Forklifts, Skidsteers.” The provision includes a penalty for violation. Employers’ CBA with the Laborers Union provides that “operation of forklifts . . . [and] skid-steer loaders . . . shall be the work of the laborer.” Employers assigned the disputed work to Laborers. Operators filed pay-in-lieu grievances and threatened to strike. The NLRB noted that Employers had assigned forklift and skidsteer work to Laborers for 15-26 years, and found no merit in Operators’ work-preservation claims, characterizing them as attempts at work acquisition. The NLRB found that Operators’ ongoing filing of grievances and threats to strike constituted unfair labor practices under NLRA section 8(b)(4) and that Laborers were entitled to perform the work. Meanwhile, Operators filed a complaint under Employee Retirement Income Security Act section 5153 seeking payment of contributions defendant allegedly owed under the CBAs, access to audit records, interest, costs, and injunctive relief. The NLRB intervened. The district court concluded and the Sixth Circuit agreed that the jurisdictional award was dispositive of, and precluded, Operators’ CBA claims. View "Orrand v. Hunt Construction Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Linkletter signed an online petition supporting a Cincinnati women’s shelter after she had accepted a position with W&S. W&S rescinded the employment agreement because she signed the petition while the company was engaged in a lengthy real estate dispute with the shelter over its location in the neighborhood. Shelter residents had previously sued W&S under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617. W&S reached a settlement with the shelter and purchased the property. After Linkletter’s employment contract was rescinded she sued W&S under the Act and Ohio law. Section 3617 states: It shall be unlawful to . . . interfere with any person . . . on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by … this title. Linkletter claimed her petition-signing encouraged the residents of the shelter in their rights granted by the Act, involving discrimination in the rental or sale of housing. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s rejection of the claim, finding that Linkletter had a plausible claim for relief. Linkletter’s petition-signing supporting the shelter fits within the meaning of the phrase “aided or encouraged” and the defendants’ rescission of their employment agreement constitutes an “interference” with that encouragement. View "Linkletter v. Western & Southern Financial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

FirstEnergy established an employee-recognition program in 1973. By 2012 the value of the awards amounted to about five to seven dollars per year of service. The company and the unions representing its employees have never bargained about the recognition program or mentioned the program in a collective-bargaining agreement. In 2012, FirstEnergy implemented various cost-cutting measures, announcing that it would reduce its cap for 401(k) matching payments by 33%, reduce its retiree life insurance benefit by 60%, and cap its educational-reimbursement benefit; employees would receive a service award every 10 years rather than every five. An unfair labor-practices asserted that FirstEnergy had violated its duty to bargain in good faith with the union, 29 U.S.C.158(a), “by making unilateral changes in 401(k) savings, future retiree benefits, educational reimbursement, and employee service awards.” An ALJ found that the employee-recognition program was a mandatory subject of bargaining and that a union representative’s general complaint about the changes amounted to a request to bargain. The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the order, reasoning that the union representative’s comments were “ambiguous” complaints, not a clear request to bargain concerning the recognition program. View "Ohio Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Michigan Campaign Finance Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 169.254, generally bars corporations and labor unions from contributing to political candidates and organizations, but permits them to form and contribute to political action committees (PACs), which may make political contributions. A recent amendment defines a prohibited expenditure to include the administrative expenses of operating a payroll deduction program unless the deductions go to the corporation’s or union’s own PAC or a PAC established by a nonprofit corporation of which that entity is a member. Unions challenged the restriction under the Contracts Clause and First Amendment. Unions do not employ the bulk of their authorized donor base. To obtain payroll deductions in the past, unions secured agreements from employers to deduct PAC contributions from union members’ wages. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the law on both grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Contracts Clause ruling and reversed the First Amendment ruling. The Contracts Clause, prohibits the state from enforcing the contested provision with respect to pre-existing PAC check-off obligations through the end of the relevant collective bargaining agreements. The state’s “decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right” did not itself infringe that right. View "Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Schuette" on Justia Law

Williams, an AT&T Customer Service Representative (CSR), since 2006, suffered from depression and anxiety attacks. AT&T terminated Williams in 2014 for job abandonment and for violating the company’s attendance policy. Williams filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, asserting failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, disparate treatment, and retaliation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of AT&T. The court noted that, from 2007-2014, Williams received warnings every year about her absences. Williams was absent for most of 2013, using Family Medical Leave Act and short-term disability leave. She was denied FMLA leave for absences beginning in December 2013 because she failed to meet the threshold requirement of having worked 1,250 hours in the preceding year, and was denied additional short-term disability leave due to insufficient medical documentation. She failed to return to work despite three warnings. Her subsequent requests for “flexible scheduling and additional breaks” were also denied for failure to timely submit medical information. The court noted “the reality that there are some jobs that a person with disabilities is simply unable to perform. … Williams who reacts to random customer calls with anxiety attacks that require her to log off of her workstation is not capable of performing the essential job functions of an AT&T CSR.” View "Williams v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Before 2013, the surviving spouse of a member of Chattanooga’s Fire and Police Pension Fund could receive benefits after the member died without incurring a proportional reduction in the member’s lifetime benefits. In 2012, the city removed this “default death benefit” for members who were not eligible to retire as of January 1, 2013. Dodd was not eligible to retire on that date and opted for a five-percent reduction in current, lifetime benefits so that his wife could receive an additional benefit upon his death. Dodd sued, asserting claims under the federal Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Takings Clause, and Tennessee’s Law of the Land Clause. Dodd also argued that the 2012 amendment was not validly enacted under local law. The district court granted the city summary judgment on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because Dodd does not have a contract or property right to the default death benefit, his constitutional claims fail. Although Dodd’s interest in some future benefits vested after 10 years of service, but Dodd did not become entitled to the default death benefit when he hit 10 years. Dodd’s challenge to the validity of the amendment’s enactment is also without merit. View "Dodd v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

During an investigation into alleged misconduct at the Bay County jail, union president Gillis received complaints that the jail’s staff felt intimidated by management’s tactics. Gillis worked with Sergeant Walraven to draft a memorandum informing staff of their rights. The memo stated “I am in no way advising you not to cooperate with management, just advising you of your rights. It is your responsibility to ask for the representation.” Sheriff Miller summoned Gillis the day after Gillis posted the memorandum, asked who wrote it, and declared: “I can have you prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation.” The investigation into Walraven began in January with an anonymous note, suggesting that administrators review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven was the supervisor. The footage showed officers playing cards, damaging jail property, conducting outside business, not monitoring security cameras, and other violations of department policy. Walraven was placed on administrative leave. His employment was terminated in April. An investigation into Gillis began in February. A former inmate alleged that Gillis engaged in a sexual relationship with her during her time in custody and under court supervision. Gillis ultimately admitted involvement and resigned. The district court rejected the officers’ First Amendment retaliation claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the memorandum was protected speech on matters of public concern, plaintiffs’ speech interests were outweighed by defendants’ interest in obtaining compliance from the correctional officers with their investigation. View "Gillis v. Miller" on Justia Law

All Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plant officers are required to maintain medical clearance as a condition of employment. Since his employment began in 2009, Hale maintained the clearance necessary for his position. In 2013, the TVA began requiring a pulmonary function test for that clearance; Hale failed the testing and was terminated because of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. Hale sued, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. In an unsuccessful motion to dismiss, the TVA argued that Title VII’s national-security exemption applies to the Rehabilitation Act and precludes the court from reviewing the physical-fitness requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the interests of national security and that the Egan doctrine precludes the judiciary from reviewing the TVA’s determination that Hale lacked the physical capacity to fulfill his job duties because this decision was one of national security. The Sixth Circuit denied an interlocutory appeal; the national security exemption does not apply to Hale’s Rehabilitation Act claim. The court declined to extend Egan to preclude judicial review of an agency’s determination regarding an employee’s physical capability to perform the duties of his position. View "Hale v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The union was charged with violating its duty of fair representation in processing the grievance of a union member, Powell, who was terminated from her position as an automotive plant janitor. The charge alleged that Faircloth, Powell’s union steward, had submitted a false statement that she had witnessed an incident in which Powell threatened a fellow employee, and that Faircloth was subsequently involved in Powell’s grievance process. An Administrative Law Judge dismissed the charge. The National Labor Relations Board reversed, finding that the union had violated its duty of fair representation by acting arbitrarily or in bad faith. The Board emphasized that: Faircloth had submitted a statement against Powell that was partly false; Faircloth had represented Powell in the first stage of the grievance process without disclosing the fact that she had submitted a statement; and Powell was unaware of Faircloth’s statement throughout the grievance process. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Board’s finding regarding the falsity of Faircloth’s statement was not supported by substantial evidence, and that there was an insufficient basis to find a breach of duty of fair representation. There was nothing to contradict Faircloth’s assertion that she witnessed the threat. View "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Fleming had a sporadic work history in the coal industry. Between 1970 and 1991, Fleming worked for 25 different employers. In 2010, Fleming sought Black Lung Benefits Act payments. The DOL Office of Workers’ Compensation calculated that Fleming was employed as a miner for nine and one-quarter years and that he had contracted pneumoconiosis as a result of that employment. Aberry was designated as the employer responsible for payment of benefits. On appeal, an ALJ determined that Fleming could show he had worked 273.50 weeks in the industry (about 5.25 years), but that Fleming was credible and established that he had either been paid under the table or without proper records having been kept. Based on that determination, the ALJ found that Fleming engaged in coal-mine employment “for at least 15 years,” which entitled Fleming to the presumption of total disability under 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). The Benefits Review Board remanded, stating that the ALJ had neither explained how he resolved the conflict between Fleming’s “not [being] a good historian” and the ALJ’s crediting of Fleming’s testimony, nor resolved the conflicting evidence. The ALJ's second Decision again awarded benefits. finding that Fleming worked more than 15 years in coal-mine employment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Fleming had 15 years of employment. View "Aberry Coal, Inc. v. Fleming" on Justia Law