Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After taking time off under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, for mental-health problems, which are a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, Marshall was demoted and then fired by the Rawlings Company. The district court rejected, on summary judgment, Marshall’s claims of FMLA interference, FMLA retaliation, ADA retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to Marshall’s claims of FMLA interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but reversed as to the FMLA retaliation and ADA retaliation claims, applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test. There are genuine disputes of material fact concerning whether specific individuals were biased against Marshall and whether those individual influenced the decision-maker. View "Marshall v. Rawlings Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Medicare-eligible retirees from Kelsey-Hayes' Detroit automotive plant, retired before the plant’s 2001 closing and were members of a UAW bargaining unit. The final (1998) collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provided for comprehensive healthcare for retirees. A Plant Closing Agreement stated that it did not extinguish pension or retiree healthcare obligations. Kelsey-Hayes continued to provide retiree healthcare coverage for 10 years, consistent with the 1998 CBA. In 2011, Kelsey-Hayes announced that it was replacing the retirees’ group-insurance plan with company-funded health reimbursement accounts (HRAs) from which retirees could purchase individual Medicare supplemental insurance plans. In 2012, Kelsey-Hayes contributed $15,000 to each participant’s HRA; in 2013 and 2014, it contributed $4,300 per year. Plaintiffs sued under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The Sixth Circuit stayed litigation pending the Supreme Court’s 2015 Tackett decision. The district court then granted the plaintiff-retirees partial summary judgment and ordered defendants to reinstate the group insurance plan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, distinguishing the language and history of the Kelsey-Hayes CBAs from the language at issue in Tackett. Tackett explicitly overruled Sixth Circuit precedent and held that a presumption toward lifetime benefits violates basic principles of contract interpretation; however, pre-Tackett courts’ interpretation of language that parties subsequently agree to maintain can inform interpretation of their intent at the time they entered into the CBA. View "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Sixth Circuit held that the retired employees of Meritor and Meritor’s predecessors had a vested right to lifetime healthcare benefits. A petition for rehearing was held in abeyance for eight years while the parties attempted to settle their dispute. During the intervening eight years, the Supreme Court abrogated precedent on which the Sixth Circuit had relied, holding that a series of collective bargaining agreements materially indistinguishable from those involved in the Meritor case did not provide the retirees with lifetime healthcare benefits. On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit entered a superseding opinion and reversed, acknowledging that the case is now controlled by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tackett (2015) and Gallo (2016) and that the language of the documents does not guarantee lifetime benefits. View "Cole v. Meritor, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillips worked at the MGM Detroit casino from 1999-2015. Beginning in 2001, she belonged to Local 7777, a UAW International affiliate. In 2002, she became the Local’s chairperson. Phillips, an African-American, claims that UAW employees Johnson and Kagels, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Phillips described “a smattering of offensive conduct” from 2012-2014, including an alleged statement that the “problem with the Union was that there are too many blacks” and speaking “in a condescending tone when dealing with black union members as compared to white members.” Phillips claims that, in a 2013 meeting, Johnson demanded to know the race of each grievant and then separated the grievances into piles based on whether they were filed by “white” or “black” union members and said he intended to withdraw the grievances filed by African-American union members. Johnson and Kagels denied all of the alleged misconduct. The district court dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that no matter who can be held liable for hostile work environment claims under Title VII, Phillips fails to create a genuine issue of material fact that she was subjected to one. View "Phillips v. UAW International" on Justia Law

Online retailers (Amazon) operate a Shepherdsville, Kentucky warehouse fulfillment center, where hourly workers fill orders, track merchandise, and process returns. Plaintiffs regularly worked at least 40 hours a week. Amazon tracked their hours with a “time clock” system; before permitting “clocked out” employees to leave, Amazon required them to “proceed through a lengthy theft-prevention security screening operation,” which took 10-30 minutes. Plaintiffs sued, alleging that nonpayment for the time spent in security screening violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and its state-law counterpart. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred five related actions to the Western District of Kentucky for consolidation. While the cases were pending, the Supreme Court held, in Integrity Staffing v. Busk (2014), that security screenings were noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act, which excludes certain “preliminary” and “postliminary” activities from the FLSA’s compensation requirements. Plaintiffs withdrew their FLSA claims, but argued that Integrity Staffing did not foreclose their claim to overtime under the Kentucky Wages and Hours Act. The district court granted Amazon judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Integrity Staffing was not an FLSA decision but rather a Portal-to-Portal Act decision and that Kentucky never enacted a Portal-to-Portal Act of its own. View "Vance v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Employers are signatories to collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the Operating Engineers Union, providing that “the Employer shall employ Operating Engineers for the erection, operation, assembly and disassembly, and maintenance and repair of . . . Forklifts, Skidsteers.” The provision includes a penalty for violation. Employers’ CBA with the Laborers Union provides that “operation of forklifts . . . [and] skid-steer loaders . . . shall be the work of the laborer.” Employers assigned the disputed work to Laborers. Operators filed pay-in-lieu grievances and threatened to strike. The NLRB noted that Employers had assigned forklift and skidsteer work to Laborers for 15-26 years, and found no merit in Operators’ work-preservation claims, characterizing them as attempts at work acquisition. The NLRB found that Operators’ ongoing filing of grievances and threats to strike constituted unfair labor practices under NLRA section 8(b)(4) and that Laborers were entitled to perform the work. Meanwhile, Operators filed a complaint under Employee Retirement Income Security Act section 5153 seeking payment of contributions defendant allegedly owed under the CBAs, access to audit records, interest, costs, and injunctive relief. The NLRB intervened. The district court concluded and the Sixth Circuit agreed that the jurisdictional award was dispositive of, and precluded, Operators’ CBA claims. View "Orrand v. Hunt Construction Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Linkletter signed an online petition supporting a Cincinnati women’s shelter after she had accepted a position with W&S. W&S rescinded the employment agreement because she signed the petition while the company was engaged in a lengthy real estate dispute with the shelter over its location in the neighborhood. Shelter residents had previously sued W&S under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617. W&S reached a settlement with the shelter and purchased the property. After Linkletter’s employment contract was rescinded she sued W&S under the Act and Ohio law. Section 3617 states: It shall be unlawful to . . . interfere with any person . . . on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by … this title. Linkletter claimed her petition-signing encouraged the residents of the shelter in their rights granted by the Act, involving discrimination in the rental or sale of housing. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s rejection of the claim, finding that Linkletter had a plausible claim for relief. Linkletter’s petition-signing supporting the shelter fits within the meaning of the phrase “aided or encouraged” and the defendants’ rescission of their employment agreement constitutes an “interference” with that encouragement. View "Linkletter v. Western & Southern Financial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

FirstEnergy established an employee-recognition program in 1973. By 2012 the value of the awards amounted to about five to seven dollars per year of service. The company and the unions representing its employees have never bargained about the recognition program or mentioned the program in a collective-bargaining agreement. In 2012, FirstEnergy implemented various cost-cutting measures, announcing that it would reduce its cap for 401(k) matching payments by 33%, reduce its retiree life insurance benefit by 60%, and cap its educational-reimbursement benefit; employees would receive a service award every 10 years rather than every five. An unfair labor-practices asserted that FirstEnergy had violated its duty to bargain in good faith with the union, 29 U.S.C.158(a), “by making unilateral changes in 401(k) savings, future retiree benefits, educational reimbursement, and employee service awards.” An ALJ found that the employee-recognition program was a mandatory subject of bargaining and that a union representative’s general complaint about the changes amounted to a request to bargain. The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the order, reasoning that the union representative’s comments were “ambiguous” complaints, not a clear request to bargain concerning the recognition program. View "Ohio Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Michigan Campaign Finance Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 169.254, generally bars corporations and labor unions from contributing to political candidates and organizations, but permits them to form and contribute to political action committees (PACs), which may make political contributions. A recent amendment defines a prohibited expenditure to include the administrative expenses of operating a payroll deduction program unless the deductions go to the corporation’s or union’s own PAC or a PAC established by a nonprofit corporation of which that entity is a member. Unions challenged the restriction under the Contracts Clause and First Amendment. Unions do not employ the bulk of their authorized donor base. To obtain payroll deductions in the past, unions secured agreements from employers to deduct PAC contributions from union members’ wages. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the law on both grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Contracts Clause ruling and reversed the First Amendment ruling. The Contracts Clause, prohibits the state from enforcing the contested provision with respect to pre-existing PAC check-off obligations through the end of the relevant collective bargaining agreements. The state’s “decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right” did not itself infringe that right. View "Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Schuette" on Justia Law

Williams, an AT&T Customer Service Representative (CSR), since 2006, suffered from depression and anxiety attacks. AT&T terminated Williams in 2014 for job abandonment and for violating the company’s attendance policy. Williams filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, asserting failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, disparate treatment, and retaliation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of AT&T. The court noted that, from 2007-2014, Williams received warnings every year about her absences. Williams was absent for most of 2013, using Family Medical Leave Act and short-term disability leave. She was denied FMLA leave for absences beginning in December 2013 because she failed to meet the threshold requirement of having worked 1,250 hours in the preceding year, and was denied additional short-term disability leave due to insufficient medical documentation. She failed to return to work despite three warnings. Her subsequent requests for “flexible scheduling and additional breaks” were also denied for failure to timely submit medical information. The court noted “the reality that there are some jobs that a person with disabilities is simply unable to perform. … Williams who reacts to random customer calls with anxiety attacks that require her to log off of her workstation is not capable of performing the essential job functions of an AT&T CSR.” View "Williams v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC" on Justia Law