Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a mail clerk with sickle cell anemia, was employed by the United States Postal Service (USPS) and had a history of attendance issues, some of which were covered by the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). To avoid termination, he entered into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) that limited unscheduled absences and specified that FMLA-approved absences would not count against him if properly documented. After several disputed absences, some of which the plaintiff claimed were FMLA-protected, USPS terminated his employment for violating the LCA.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of USPS on most of the plaintiff’s claims, finding that he failed to establish FMLA coverage for all but one disputed date and did not sufficiently notify USPS of a need for accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that the plaintiff’s FMLA medical certification, which estimated two days of intermittent leave per month, created a hard cap on his FMLA leave. The plaintiff’s claims regarding one date were settled, and his motion for reconsideration was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the December 26, 2018 absence and the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding no evidence of a request for accommodation. However, it reversed the district court’s holding that the FMLA medical certification imposed a strict monthly limit on unforeseeable intermittent leave, clarifying that such certifications provide only estimates, not hard caps. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff gave proper notice for FMLA leave on certain dates and vacated the district court’s summary judgment on FMLA interference and retaliation claims related to the LCA, pending resolution of factual disputes. View "Jackson v. Postal Service" on Justia Law

Dorothy Bivens worked as a territory sales representative for a company that manufactures and distributes cleaning products. During a visit to a client’s motel, the client locked the office door and propositioned her, making her uncomfortable. Bivens reported the incident to her supervisor, who reassigned the client so she would not have further contact. Around the same period, the company’s president decided to reduce staff due to cost concerns, targeting positions in low-revenue territories, including Bivens’s. She was subsequently terminated.After her termination, Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging a hostile work environment, retaliation for reporting harassment, and racial discrimination under both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court denied her motion to compel production of certain documents and granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims, finding insufficient evidence to support her allegations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The appellate court held that, under Title VII, an employer can only be held liable for harassment by a non-employee (such as a client) if the employer itself intentionally caused or was substantially certain harassment would occur, rejecting the negligence standard adopted by most other circuits and the EEOC. The court found no evidence that the employer intended for Bivens to be harassed. The court also found that Bivens’s retaliation claim failed because the decisionmaker who terminated her was unaware of her complaint, and her racial discrimination claim failed due to lack of evidence that she was singled out because of her race. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Bivens v. Zep, Inc." on Justia Law

A multiemployer pension fund managed by the Operating Engineers Local 324 Pension Fund assessed withdrawal liability against Ace-Saginaw Paving Company after Ace partially withdrew from the fund in December 2018. The dispute centered on the interest rate assumption used to calculate the withdrawal liability. Ace argued that the rate should match the fund’s minimum funding interest rate of 7.75%, resulting in a lower liability, while the fund’s actuary used a much lower rate of 2.27% (the PBGC rate), resulting in a significantly higher liability. The actuary’s choice of rate was based on policy considerations and a desire to protect the fund’s remaining employers, rather than his best estimate of the fund’s anticipated investment experience.The parties proceeded to arbitration, as required by ERISA. The arbitrator found that the actuary’s use of the 2.27% rate violated 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1) because it was not the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan. The arbitrator ordered the fund to recalculate Ace’s withdrawal liability using a rate that complied with the statutory requirements. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan affirmed the arbitrator’s findings and granted summary judgment to Ace on the statutory violation, but declined Ace’s request to require use of the minimum funding rate as the remedy, instead allowing the fund’s actuary another opportunity to select a compliant rate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the actuary’s use of the PBGC rate was not his best estimate and thus violated ERISA. The court also held that, on remand, the actuary may use a different rate from the minimum funding rate only if it is justified by factors that improve the accuracy of the withdrawal liability calculation, not by policy considerations. The court denied both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. View "Ace-Saginaw Paving Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 324" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the management of an ERISA fund, specifically the Southern Ohio Painters Health and Welfare Plan and Trust. Plaintiffs, including union-appointed trustees and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 6, allege that two union-appointed trustees, Smith and Clark, have engaged in actions that violate their fiduciary duties. These actions include procedural changes that benefit themselves and undermine the union's authority, such as amendments to the Trust Agreement that make it difficult to remove trustees and provide benefits to retired trustees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the employer-appointed trustees and denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to remove Smith and Clark as trustees, terminate their employment with the Fund, and prevent the Fund from paying their legal expenses, among other relief. The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not show they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court noted that the plaintiffs' concerns about self-dealing and the inability to exercise fiduciary duties were speculative and could be addressed through monetary damages. The court also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the district court's dismissal of the claims against the employer-appointed trustees, as the issues were not inextricably intertwined with the appeal of the preliminary injunction denial. View "Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and its employee welfare plan (the Plan) alleged that Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue Cross) breached fiduciary duties under ERISA and related duties under Michigan state law. The Tribe claimed that Blue Cross submitted false claims, causing the Tribe to overpay for hospital services. The Tribe also alleged violations of the Michigan Health Care False Claims Act (HCFCA) and sought to amend its complaint to include additional facts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the Tribe’s ERISA and common-law fiduciary duty claims as time-barred, granted summary judgment to Blue Cross on the HCFCA claim, and denied the Tribe’s motion for leave to amend its complaint a second time. The court found that the Tribe had actual knowledge in 2009 that it was not receiving Medicare-Like Rates (MLR) and thus the claims were time-barred. The court also concluded that Blue Cross was not directly governed by the MLR regulations, and therefore, the Tribe could not prove a violation of the HCFCA based on Blue Cross’s failure to apply MLR.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that the Tribe’s fiduciary duty claims were time-barred because the Tribe knew in 2009 that it was not receiving MLR. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the HCFCA claim, finding that the MLR regulations did not apply to Blue Cross. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s denial of the Tribe’s motion for leave to amend its complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the ERISA claim. View "Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan" on Justia Law

Monica Gray, a long-time employee of State Farm, assisted a colleague, Sonya Mauter, in securing an ADA accommodation. Mauter's supervisor, Joe Kyle, opposed the accommodation and later reported Gray for timecard falsification. State Farm investigated and terminated Gray. Gray sued for retaliation under the ADA and Ohio law, alleging that Kyle targeted her due to her assistance to Mauter.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to State Farm, concluding that the company had an honest belief that Gray engaged in misconduct, thus negating her retaliation claim. Gray appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Gray presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, including her protected activity, State Farm's knowledge of it, and a causal connection between her activity and termination. The court also determined that Gray raised a genuine dispute over whether State Farm's stated reason for her termination was pretextual, particularly given the differential treatment between Gray and another employee, Diane Parker, who had similar timekeeping discrepancies but was not reported.The Sixth Circuit held that Gray could proceed on a theory of vicarious liability, as Kyle's alleged bias and selective reporting could have influenced State Farm's decision to terminate her. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gray v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Dawn Hayes was employed by Clariant Plastics & Coatings USA, Inc. for 25 years as a warehouse logistics clerk. In 2018, she was terminated as part of a workforce reduction program. Hayes contended that her termination was due to gender and age discrimination, and she also alleged unequal pay and a hostile work environment. She filed a lawsuit in federal court asserting these claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of Clariant on all claims. The court found that Hayes did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and that her hostile work environment claim was time-barred and not administratively exhausted. The court also dismissed her state-law claims without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that Clariant was entitled to summary judgment on the age discrimination and hostile work environment claims. However, the court found that Hayes had presented a genuine issue of material fact on her gender discrimination and unequal pay claims. The court noted that Hayes had superior qualifications compared to a similarly situated male employee who was retained, and there was evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere at Clariant.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the gender discrimination and equal pay claims. The court also instructed the district court to reconsider its decision to dismiss the state-law claims in light of the reinstated federal claims. View "Hayes v. Clariant Plastics & Coatings USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Officer Jeff Smith, the oldest and longest-tenured police officer in the City of Union, Ohio, was terminated after allegedly violating several police department policies over a two-day period. An arbitrator later ordered his reinstatement, finding the termination to be an overreaction to minor and excusable mistakes. However, the City delayed his return for two months, requiring a fitness-for-duty examination and acting slowly once he passed it. During this delay, a younger officer was promoted, and raises were secured for all officers except Smith.Smith sued the City under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and its Ohio counterpart, alleging age-based termination and retaliatory delay in his return for filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the City on both claims, leading Smith to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that a jury could view the facts and agree with Smith, particularly given the arbitrator's decision and a comment by the police chief about "younger officers." The court held that Smith presented enough circumstantial evidence to raise a triable question of whether the City terminated him due to his age. Additionally, the court found that the City's delay in reinstating Smith, which caused him to miss a promotion and a raise, could be seen as retaliatory.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Smith's claims of age discrimination and retaliation to proceed. View "Smith v. City of Union" on Justia Law

A group of former managers of Ruby Tuesday, Inc. participated in two top-hat retirement plans administered by Regions Bank. These plans were unfunded and designed for high-level employees, meaning they were exempt from certain ERISA fiduciary duties. When Ruby Tuesday filed for bankruptcy, the managers lost their benefits and sued Regions Bank, alleging breaches of state-law fiduciary, trust, contract, and tort duties. They also sought equitable relief under ERISA to recover their lost benefits.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed the state-law claims, ruling that ERISA preempted them. The court also granted summary judgment to Regions Bank on the ERISA claim, concluding that the requested monetary relief did not qualify as equitable relief under ERISA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that ERISA preempted the state-law claims because they related to an ERISA-covered plan. The court emphasized that allowing state-law claims would undermine ERISA's uniform regulatory scheme. Additionally, the court held that the monetary relief sought by the plaintiffs did not qualify as equitable relief under ERISA. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' request for an "equitable surcharge" was essentially a request for legal damages, which ERISA does not permit under its equitable relief provision.Thus, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Regions Bank, concluding that the plaintiffs could not pursue their state-law claims or obtain the requested monetary relief under ERISA. View "Aldridge v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law

Aaron Pulsifer was terminated from his position as Dean of Students and Assistant Principal at Westshore Christian Academy. He subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Academy, alleging various state and federal employment discrimination claims based on race and sex. Pulsifer claimed that his termination was retaliatory, following his complaints about unequal treatment and concerns regarding the school's main funder. The Academy argued that Pulsifer's role involved significant religious functions, invoking the ministerial exception to preclude judicial review of his claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the Academy. The court held that Pulsifer's position involved important religious duties, thus falling under the ministerial exception, which prevents courts from intervening in employment disputes involving key religious employees. Pulsifer appealed the decision, arguing both procedural and substantive errors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the district court had properly converted the Academy's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and provided Pulsifer with a reasonable opportunity to respond. On the substantive issue, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court, holding that Pulsifer's role at the Academy included vital religious duties such as leading devotions, conducting prayers, and guiding students' spiritual development. These responsibilities placed him within the ministerial exception, precluding judicial review of his employment discrimination claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, emphasizing that the ministerial exception applies to employees who perform essential religious functions, regardless of their involvement in secular administrative tasks. View "Pulsifer v. Westshore Christian Academy" on Justia Law