Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A former employee of a county health department brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that her employer discriminated against her based on her night blindness, retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation, and failed to accommodate her asthma. She had been promoted to a position requiring some nighttime driving, which became increasingly difficult due to her night blindness. Later, she was reassigned to a shift that required her to work alone at night at a location she considered unsafe, and she raised concerns about both her vision and personal safety. She also experienced a severe asthma flare-up when she temporarily lost access to her medication, which affected her ability to work.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee dismissed her constitutional claims but allowed her ADA claims to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found in her favor on all three ADA claims: failure to accommodate her asthma, discrimination based on her night blindness, and retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The county moved for judgment as a matter of law at several points, arguing that her conditions did not qualify as disabilities under the ADA and that the evidence was insufficient, but the district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The appellate court held that the jury reasonably found that both night blindness and asthma could qualify as disabilities under the ADA, given the broad and individualized inquiry required by the statute and its amendments. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff on all ADA claims. View "Edwards v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn." on Justia Law

A shift supervisor at a coffee shop in Ann Arbor, Michigan, led efforts to organize a union at her workplace. She was a prominent organizer, engaging in various activities such as wearing union buttons, speaking to customers about unionization, and attending a labor board hearing. Several months into the campaign, she was terminated by her employer, who cited her violation of a company policy requiring at least two employees to be present in the café. The supervisor had left a barista alone at the store at the end of her shift without notifying management, which the company claimed was the reason for her discharge.After her termination, Workers United filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that the discharge was motivated by anti-union animus. An Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the union, concluding that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual and that the discharge was unlawfully motivated. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision and expanded the remedy, ordering the employer to compensate the supervisor not only for lost earnings and benefits but also for any “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms” resulting from the discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s finding that the supervisor’s discharge was motivated by anti-union animus and thus constituted an unfair labor practice. However, the court determined that the NLRB exceeded its statutory authority under the National Labor Relations Act by awarding compensation for “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms” beyond lost earnings and benefits. The court granted enforcement of the unfair labor practice finding but vacated the expanded remedy and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization in Detroit, which provides educational and family services to at-risk youth, employed the plaintiff as a full-time case manager after she had previously worked as an independent contractor. The plaintiff’s responsibilities included monitoring students and managing case files, a task that required onsite work due to funding and audit requirements from a key county contract. After a building flood, the plaintiff raised health concerns about mold exposure and requested to work remotely, providing doctor’s notes that did not explicitly require remote work. The employer accommodated her request temporarily by shifting her to part-time remote work, but emphasized that onsite file management was essential. The plaintiff later returned to full-time onsite work. Over the following year, she filed several complaints with state agencies regarding workplace safety, pay, and reimbursement issues. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the organization faced financial difficulties, leading to a restructuring that offered the plaintiff a choice between an independent contractor role with reduced hours and benefits or a severance package. She declined both, ending her employment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on all claims, finding insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination, retaliation, failure to accommodate, and wrongful termination. The court determined that the plaintiff could not perform essential job functions remotely and that the employer’s actions were based on legitimate business reasons.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence of a hostile work environment, disability-based discrimination, or retaliation under federal and state law. The court also found that the employer’s restructuring and accommodation decisions were not pretextual and that the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim was inadequately developed and unsupported by the record. View "Kellar v. The Yunion, Inc." on Justia Law

A former correctional officer with the Michigan Department of Corrections was terminated after a coworker accused him of making harassing and inappropriate comments. The officer, after being served with a misconduct charge and attending a disciplinary conference with his union representative, was formally terminated in July 2019. He challenged his termination through arbitration, which concluded in December 2020 with a decision upholding his dismissal. Nearly three years later, he filed a federal lawsuit against two department officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, specifically focusing on procedural due process.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially dismissed the officer’s first complaint without prejudice for lack of prosecution after he failed to respond to a motion to dismiss. When he refiled a similar complaint, the district court dismissed it again, this time on the grounds that the claim was untimely under Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions and that, except for his procedural due process claim, he had forfeited his other constitutional arguments. The court also found that his procedural due process claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the officer’s procedural due process claim accrued, at the latest, on the date of his post-termination arbitration hearing in December 2020, making his June 2024 complaint untimely. The court further held that Michigan law does not permit equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this context and that the officer failed to plausibly allege inadequate process either before or after his termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Bozzo v. Nanasy" on Justia Law

A married couple, both employees of UT-Battelle, objected to their employer’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate on religious grounds, specifically because of their belief that the vaccines’ development involved the use of fetal cell lines from abortions, which conflicted with their Christian faith. UT-Battelle required employees seeking religious exemptions to undergo a panel interview and read a “fact sheet” presenting religious leaders’ support for vaccination. Employees granted religious accommodations were placed on unpaid leave, while those with medical accommodations were not. Mrs. Bilyeu ultimately received a medical exemption before the policy took effect and did not lose pay or work time. Mr. Bilyeu, however, was placed on unpaid leave after exhausting his vacation days, returning to work only after the policy was rescinded.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to UT-Battelle on all claims except Mrs. Bilyeu’s retaliation claim, which was later settled. The court found that Mrs. Bilyeu lacked standing and that Mr. Bilyeu had not suffered a materially adverse employment action under Title VII.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to Mrs. Bilyeu, holding she lacked Article III standing because she suffered no cognizable injury after receiving her medical accommodation. For Mr. Bilyeu, the Sixth Circuit vacated the summary judgment on his disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims, instructing the district court to reconsider them in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, which eliminated the “materially adverse” requirement for adverse employment actions under Title VII. The court reversed the summary judgment on Mr. Bilyeu’s retaliation claim, finding sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the interview process could dissuade a reasonable worker from seeking a religious accommodation, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC" on Justia Law

Two African American truck drivers employed by a large transportation company in Nashville alleged that their supervisors subjected them to a racially hostile work environment. The plaintiffs claimed they were assigned longer routes and more hours than their non-African American colleagues for the same pay, denied certain benefits, and given older or more damaged trucks. They also testified that their supervisors, one of whom was also African American, repeatedly called them “monkey” and “monkey ass,” used demeaning language, and threatened or criticized them in ways not directed at white coworkers. The plaintiffs reported this conduct to company liaisons and managers, but the alleged harassment continued. One plaintiff resigned due to the conditions, while the other was terminated for alleged performance issues, which he disputed.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence of race-based harassment to support a hostile work environment claim. The court reasoned that the terms used by the supervisors were not inherently racist, that the plaintiffs had not shown the terms were used only against African Americans, and that the plaintiffs’ comparative evidence was insufficient because it did not establish the race of the relevant comparators with the required specificity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ testimony regarding the use of “monkey” and “monkey ass” by supervisors constituted evidence of race-based harassment, given the well-established history of those terms as racial slurs against African Americans. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ comparative and other evidence was admissible and sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment and the employer’s liability. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Smith v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

A tenured English professor at a public university in Ohio, who identifies as transgender, became involved in discussions about leading the university’s Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality during a period of departmental restructuring. Although the professor expressed interest in directing the Center and was considered a strong candidate, the position was not open as the Center had gone dormant. The professor was offered a partial teaching load reallocation to help develop a new gender-studies major, but after a series of profanity-laden and disparaging social media posts targeting colleagues and administrators, the offer was rescinded. The professor also sought a tenure transfer to the main campus, which was denied by faculty committees after considering collegiality and departmental needs, with no discussion of gender identity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the university and individual defendants on all claims. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and concluded that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, including the professor’s unprofessional conduct and the department’s academic requirements. The professor appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings on claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and perceived-disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation, that the professor’s social media posts did not constitute protected speech on matters of public concern under the First Amendment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a perceived-disability claim. The court clarified that adverse employment actions under Title VII need only cause some harm, but found the university’s reasons for its decisions were not pretextual. View "GPat Patterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Christina Henry, a Licensed Practical Nurse at Southern Ohio Medical Center (SOMC), refused to comply with SOMC’s COVID-19 policy requiring either vaccination or weekly nasopharyngeal testing, citing religious objections. SOMC granted her a religious exemption from vaccination but denied her request for an exemption from all forms of COVID testing. Henry maintained that her religious beliefs prohibited her from undergoing any COVID test, including non-invasive methods, and proposed self-screening as an alternative. After continued refusal to test or vaccinate, SOMC placed her on unpaid leave. Henry did not request alternative testing methods during her leave and later declined to return to SOMC after the testing requirement was lifted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of SOMC. The court found that Henry’s communications to SOMC indicated she sought exemption from all COVID testing, not just nasopharyngeal testing. It held that accommodating her request would impose an undue hardship on SOMC by endangering vulnerable patient populations. The court also determined that even if Henry had requested saliva testing, this would still constitute an undue hardship due to delays in obtaining test results and reduced effectiveness. Additionally, the court found that Henry failed to show SOMC’s stated reasons for placing her on unpaid leave were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that Henry did not provide sufficient notice to SOMC of a limited objection to only certain types of testing and that either exempting her from all testing or providing saliva testing would impose an undue hardship on SOMC. The court also held that Henry failed to establish pretext in her retaliation claim. View "Henry v. Southern Ohio Medical Center" on Justia Law

Samantha Graf worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant Technician at Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association (MHHA). She alleged that during a lunch break on hospital grounds, a security guard employed by a third-party firm raped her. Graf reported the incident to hospital human resources, but after a limited investigation, HR concluded the sexual encounter was consensual. MHHA terminated Graf for violating hospital policy by having intercourse while on the clock and in an unauthorized area. Graf continued to communicate with the security guard after the incident, and both parties disputed the nature of their relationship and the encounter.Graf filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, asserting claims under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), as well as state tort claims. The district court dismissed several claims and one defendant, Shield and Buckler Security, Inc., on statute of limitations grounds. After summary judgment, only Graf’s retaliation claims under Title VII and THRA, and her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, proceeded to trial. Before trial, the district court ruled on the admissibility of evidence regarding Graf’s sexual history, allowing some communications with the security guard but excluding other evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The jury found in favor of MHHA on all counts, and judgment was entered against Graf.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Graf argued that the district court erred in requiring her to prove she did not consent to the alleged rape for her Title VII retaliation claim, and in admitting evidence of her sexual history. The Sixth Circuit held that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable and good-faith belief that the conduct opposed was unlawful, and that evidence regarding consent was relevant to this inquiry. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The judgment was affirmed. View "Graf v. Morristown-Hamblen Hospital" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term employee of a brewery, suffered two work-related back injuries, the second of which led to significant physical restrictions. The brewery accommodated him with light duty work for a period, but when such work was no longer available, he was placed on leave and later participated in a transitional work program. The plaintiff requested the creation of a new position to accommodate his restrictions, which the brewery declined. After his restrictions were lifted, he returned to his original position. During his employment, the plaintiff also applied unsuccessfully for other internal positions and was later suspended following allegations of inappropriate workplace conduct. He was offered a choice between a last chance agreement and a severance package, ultimately declining both and leaving the company.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust or timely exhaust administrative remedies for certain claims, and for others, lacked evidence to establish pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court’s findings regarding the adequacy of his EEOC charge and the sufficiency of his evidence for disability and age discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, as it was neither explicitly included in his EEOC charge nor reasonably related to the facts alleged, and was also untimely. The court further held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or pretext for his remaining ADA, state law disability, and age discrimination claims. The court also found that the plaintiff forfeited his Title VII and motion for reconsideration arguments by failing to adequately brief them. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed in full. View "Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc." on Justia Law