Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the U.S. Soccer Team Players Association disapproved the US Soccer Federation’s proposed tequila poster advertisement, which contained player images. The Federation issued a notice, declaring that the collective bargaining agreement/uniform player agreement (CBA/UPA) did not require Players Association approval for use of player likenesses for six or more players in print creative advertisements by sponsors. The Players Association filed a grievance and demanded arbitration, arguing that the CBA/UPA did require approval, based on the past practice of the parties. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the Players Association. The district court confirmed the award. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The contractual provisions are clear and unambiguous, establishing that the parties contemplated and anticipated the use of player likenesses for six players or more and agreed only to “request, but not require” a sponsor contribution to the applicable player pool for advertisements of the type at issue. No other terms that contradict this “request, but not require” condition. View "United States Soccer Fed'n Inc. v. United States Nat'l Soccer Ass'n" on Justia Law

Ernst and four other women, all experienced paramedics from public and private providers of emergency medical services, sought employment as paramedics with the Chicago Fire Department. All five women were denied jobs because they failed Chicago’s physical-skills entrance exam. The test had first been implemented in 2000 and had a disparate impact on women. The five filed a Title VII gender-discrimination lawsuit against the city, arguing that Chicago had a discriminatory motive against women and that that improper statistical methods were used to establish the skills test. Both arguments were unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On the disparate impact claims, the jury should have been instructed on the plaintiffs’ burden of proving that Chicago was motivated by anti-female bias, when it created the exam that; instead, jurors were instructed on a different burden, which failed to address Chicago’s motive for creating the test. The physical-skills study was neither reliable nor validated under federal law; the skills that Chicago paramedics learn on the job are different than what was tested. Even if they were the same, the physical-skills entrance exam is significantly more difficult than the actual job workers perform. View "Ernst v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lawler was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) five years before the Peoria School District hired her to teach students with learning disabilities. For nine years, Lawler performed that job satisfactorily and was given tenure. In 2010, her psychiatrist concluded that Lawler had suffered a PTSD relapse and the District first learned about her impairment. After that Lawler was transferred to a different school to teach children with learning disabilities and also severe emotional and behavioral disorders. Both Lawler and her new supervisor thought she was ill-prepared for this role, but the District did not relent. After a year in the new position, Lawler was rated as “satisfactory.” At the start of her second year, she was injured by a disruptive student, sending her to the hospital with a concussion and neck injury. Her psychiatrist notified the District that this and other incidents had retriggered Lawler’s PTSD and that she needed to be transferred. The District did not transfer Lawler but accelerated her next performance appraisal, rated her as unsatisfactory, and fired her as part of an announced reduction in force that ended with all but “unsatisfactory” teachers being rehired. Lawler filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, claiming failure to accommodate her PTSD and termination in retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A jury reasonably could find that the District failed to accommodate Lawler’s PTSD. View "Lawler v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150" on Justia Law

Arrigo began working at Link’s Wisconsin convenience store in 1999. She became bookkeeper for several of Link’s businesses. In 2010, Arrigo suffered an anxiety attack and was taken to the emergency room. Arrigo was paid during a two-week leave. Link claims that he asked Arrigo to provide a return‐to‐work certification from her doctor. She failed to do so. During a meeting, Link asked Arrigo for details about her condition; Arrigo disclosed that she had been prescribed medications and ordered to attend counseling. Arrigo claims that Link began treating her differently. Several weeks later, Arrigo was in a car accident and learned that she was pregnant. She stopped taking her anti‐anxiety medication and suffered withdrawal symptoms that landed her in urgent care. Weeks later, Link issued Arrigo’s first performance warning. After a dispute about Arrigo’s request for two days off, Arrigo failed to attend work on those days. Link terminated Arrigo’s employment. Arrigo filed suit, asserting that she was fired for taking Family and Medical Leave Act leave. Six months later, she sought to add Title VII and ADA pregnancy and disability claims. The court denied that request as untimely. Arrigo filed a separate suit, which was dismissed. During the FMLA trial, the jury heard about several Link employees who took FMLA leave and about Arrigo's performance issues and rejected Arrigo's claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding evidentiary rulings and the dismissal of Arrigo’s Title VII and ADA claims. View "Arrigo v. Link Stop, Inc." on Justia Law

Lane, an African-American, began working as a hospital security guard in 1999. He had an unblemished employment record until August 2012, when a 17‐year‐old male autistic patient started hitting and kicking his caregivers. Health care professionals, afraid to approach the patient or enter the room, summoned security. Lane responded and saw the patient kick a staff member in the back. Lane tried to restrain the patient, who tried to bite him and spit in Lane’s mouth. Lane slapped him in the face. The patient settled down. Lane filed reports explaining why he thought the slap was justified with the hospital and with the Sheriff’s Department, where he had status as a special deputy as a condition of his job. The recipients concluded he had shown poor judgment. The hospital’s director of human resources recommended that Lane’s employment be terminated. After a consultation with the Sheriff’s Department, the hospital told Lane that if he did not resign, he would be fired. He resigned. After exhausting EEOC remedies, Lane filed suit for race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital. Lane intentionally struck a patient; termination was a reasonable response. “Lane’s effort to put together a mosaic of circumstantial evidence of race discrimination” did “not hold together sufficiently to present a genuine issue of material fact.” View "Lane v. Riverview Hosp." on Justia Law

Hillmann began working for the Chicago Parks District in 1973. Later he became a Department of Streets and Sanitation truck driver. In 1984 he developed cervical radiculopathy, a work-related injury. In 1995 he entered into an accommodation agreement with the city and was reassigned as chief timekeeper. He never performed all of the duties required by the job description, but he performed the essential functions and other tasks as directed by his supervisor. In 2000 a new supervisor gave Hillmann duties that required use of his injured arm.. Hillmann experienced various difficulties until his position was eliminated in 2002, in a city-wide reduction in forces. He sued, alleging that he was targeted because he asserted his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. A jury found in Hillmann’s favor on the IWCA claim and awarded damages. The judge rejected the ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city; neither claim should have been tried. To prevail on his claim that he was discharged for exercising his rights under the IWCA, Hillmann needed to prove causation. No evidence suggests that the RIF decision-maker knew about Hillmann’s claim. The ADA claim likewise fails for lack of proof of causation. Hillmann has no evidence that the city withheld raises or targeted him for the RIF based on his ADA accommodation. View "Hillmann v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Union erected a giant inflatable rat and an inflatable fat cat during a labor dispute in Grand Chute, Wisconsin. Both are staked to the ground in the highway median, to prevent the wind from blowing them away. Grand Chute forbids private signs on the public way and defines signs to mean “[a]ny structure, part thereof, or device attached thereto” that conveys a message. The Union removed them at the town's request and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the First Amendment. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and, a year later, granted the town summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the case may be moot because the construction that led to the use of demonstrative inflatables was complete; the Union was no longer picketing. The court also noted that the town amended its code and changed the definition of a sign. If the Union persists in seeking damages, the district court must weigh the probability of a fresh dispute between this union and Grand Chute and the risk that it would be over too quickly to allow judicial review to apply the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine and must address the validity of current ordinances, rather than one that was changed before the final judgment. View "Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Local Union v. Town of Grand Chute" on Justia Law

Rupcich was fired from her job of 25 years at a Jewel Food Store in 2012 for wheeling a 25-pound bag of birdseed in a grocery cart past the last cash register without paying for it. Rupcich said that she wheeled the birdseed past the last cash register by accident, as she rushed home to care for her sick grandson after her shift ended. Jewel claimed to define “misappropriation” and theft to be strict liability violations that do not require a showing of intent. Her union decided not to dispute Rupcich’s termination with Jewel in arbitration or even process it through the collectively bargained grievance procedure. Local 881 abandoned her case because Rupcich admitted she took the bag of birdseed past the last cash register in her store without paying for it, despite substantial evidence that Rupcich had made an inadvertent mistake. The district court granted Local 881 summary judgment on breach of fair duty of representation and breach of contract claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a reasonable juror could determine that Local 881’s actions were arbitrary and outside the “wide range of reasonableness” afforded unions in the grievance process, View "Rupcich v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Riano was a hospital corpsman in the Navy. As a civilian, he became a registered nurse. In 2004 he began working as a registered nurse for the Veterans Health Administration, While examining male patients for genital warts, Riano manipulated their penises with his hands, attempting to induce erections. He used words like “pecker” and “balls,” rather than medical terms. The agency found his examination technique and his language to be inappropriate. His employment was terminated. He appealed and was given a hearing that included representation by counsel, live testimony from medical experts, written testimony from patients, and a written report from an investigator who had interviewed the patients. The appeals board affirmed his termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Riano’s argument that he was not allowed to call patients to testify live to show that some patients were comfortable with his technique and language or that complaining patients had ulterior motives. The board’s decision to affirm Riano’s termination was based on its determination that his technique and language were inappropriate. That was a professional judgment that did not turn on the patients’ subjective views. View "Riano v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Amglo’s President, Christian, visited Amglo’s Illinois facility. Employees complained to her and to the Illinois manager, Czajkowska, about low wages. Christian stated that Amglo would not raise wages. The next morning, the 94 employees went on strike and asked to speak to Amglo’s owner. Christian responded: “He will tell us to get rid of half of you.” Czajkowska offered resignation forms and stated that they could quit. Christian explained that companies can move production to China and Mexico (where Amglo had plants). The next morning, Christian and Czajkowska ordered employees to return to work or get off the company’s property. Several employees returned to work, with no raise. Weeks later, the 50 striking employees signed an unconditional offer to return to work without a raise. Christian said that she could not say how many would be recalled; Amglo was transferring work to Mexico “because of the situation.” Amglo soon recalled all but 22 employees, telling those people that there were no jobs available, but, if jobs opened, they would be recalled before any new hiring. The NLRB charged Amglo with unfair labor practices by threatening to fire employees for striking and transferring work in retaliation for the strike. The Board ordered Amglo to return the transferred work to Illinois, to offer full reinstatement, and to make employees whole for earnings and benefits lost because of the transfer. The Seventh Circuit enforced the order as supported by substantial evidence. View "Amglo Kemlite Labs., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law