Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Williams, an African-American began working for the Cook County Probation Department in 1995. In 2008, Williams reported an incident of racial intimidation. The co‐workers were counseled not to make such remarks again. In 2010, Williams reported that a supervisor was making phone calls about union matters. The supervisor was disciplined. In 2010, Williams was injured at work by a co‐worker, who yanked a door open while Williams was holding it, injuring her shoulder, and yelling, “report this too, b**ch?” She took a medical leave, filed a workers’ compensation claim, and received temporary total disability benefits. In December 2010, an independent medical evaluation determined she was capable of returning to work. No one noticed the report until June 2011. Human Resources asked her to return to work on August 2 and directed her to obtain releases, warning that failure to return to work would be considered an implied resignation. The county doctor approved her return to work, but noted that her personal physician stated that she was not able to return to work. The attorneys negotiating Williams’s disability benefits disputed the consequences of the disagreement. Williams was sent a termination letter on August 30, citing failure to communicate any intent to return to work, and the apparent expiration of her workers’ compensation benefits. The agreement ultimately reached concerning benefits listed Williams’s return to work date as September 6. Williams sued under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation and Whistleblower Acts, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, with breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no disputes regarding material facts. View "Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

Lord claims that he was sexually harassed by male coworkers at High Voltage Software, and that High Voltage fired him for complaining about it. Co-workers had teased him about the “audio bug” whenever a particular female coworker appeared. After Lord complained and was moved to another group, another coworker touched Lord on the buttocks four times and was fired for that behavior. High Voltage responds that the conduct Lord complained about was not sexual harassment and that it fired Lord for: failing to properly report his concerns, excessive preoccupation with his coworkers’ performance, and insubordination. The district court concluded that Lord’s claims under Title VII for hostile work environment and retaliation failed as a matter of law and entered summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lord did not show that he was harassed because of his sex, nor did he cast doubt on the sincerity of his employer’s justifications for firing him. View "Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc." on Justia Law

Cole, an African-American has worked for Northern Illinois University in the Building Services Department since 1998. He alleges that beginning with his 2009 promotion to sub-foreman, he experienced race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment, including the discovery of a hangman’s noose in his workspace. In 2011, he was again promoted. Cole was the only African-American sub-foreman or foreman. He believed that others with the same title were paid more or given more authority and that he was the subject of surveillance. In 2012, Cole filed an ethics complaint with the university about various alleged unethical practices. Cole was later demoted and twice subjected to discipline. He sued, asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The hostile work environment claim presented the closest question, but Cole did not show a basis for employer liability for the alleged harassment. Cole did not offer evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his race. His retaliation claim failed because he offered no evidence that he engaged in protected activity. View "Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Melton working in the Tippecanoe County Surveyor’s Office, asked his supervisor if he could take a class during work hours and make up the time by taking short lunches and coming in early. His supervisor responded that Melton could take the class, but due to concerns about tracking time and supervision, he would have to treat the time as unpaid or vacation time. Melton agreed. When his class began, Melton worked through lunch and came in early for a week. Melton was paid for the additional time, but was terminated for failing to follow his supervisor’s order. Melton filed suit, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a), and the Indiana Wage Claim law, claiming that when he put his actual time worked on his timecard, the secretary would reduce his hours, telling him that he could not be paid for more than 37.5 hours in a workweek. The county argued that Melton was paid for the time he certified, his recollection was “demonstrably unreliable,” and he did not pursue remedies through the county. The district court granted the county summary judgment, finding that Melton had only designated 100 minutes of uncompensated time, which did not establish a FLSA violation because Melton had not shown that he worked more than 40 hours per week. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Melton had chosen not to respond to the county’s allegation that his evidence was implausible. View "Melton v. Tippecanoe Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2013, the U.S. Soccer Team Players Association disapproved the US Soccer Federation’s proposed tequila poster advertisement, which contained player images. The Federation issued a notice, declaring that the collective bargaining agreement/uniform player agreement (CBA/UPA) did not require Players Association approval for use of player likenesses for six or more players in print creative advertisements by sponsors. The Players Association filed a grievance and demanded arbitration, arguing that the CBA/UPA did require approval, based on the past practice of the parties. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the Players Association. The district court confirmed the award. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The contractual provisions are clear and unambiguous, establishing that the parties contemplated and anticipated the use of player likenesses for six players or more and agreed only to “request, but not require” a sponsor contribution to the applicable player pool for advertisements of the type at issue. No other terms that contradict this “request, but not require” condition. View "United States Soccer Fed'n Inc. v. United States Nat'l Soccer Ass'n" on Justia Law

Ernst and four other women, all experienced paramedics from public and private providers of emergency medical services, sought employment as paramedics with the Chicago Fire Department. All five women were denied jobs because they failed Chicago’s physical-skills entrance exam. The test had first been implemented in 2000 and had a disparate impact on women. The five filed a Title VII gender-discrimination lawsuit against the city, arguing that Chicago had a discriminatory motive against women and that that improper statistical methods were used to establish the skills test. Both arguments were unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On the disparate impact claims, the jury should have been instructed on the plaintiffs’ burden of proving that Chicago was motivated by anti-female bias, when it created the exam that; instead, jurors were instructed on a different burden, which failed to address Chicago’s motive for creating the test. The physical-skills study was neither reliable nor validated under federal law; the skills that Chicago paramedics learn on the job are different than what was tested. Even if they were the same, the physical-skills entrance exam is significantly more difficult than the actual job workers perform. View "Ernst v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lawler was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) five years before the Peoria School District hired her to teach students with learning disabilities. For nine years, Lawler performed that job satisfactorily and was given tenure. In 2010, her psychiatrist concluded that Lawler had suffered a PTSD relapse and the District first learned about her impairment. After that Lawler was transferred to a different school to teach children with learning disabilities and also severe emotional and behavioral disorders. Both Lawler and her new supervisor thought she was ill-prepared for this role, but the District did not relent. After a year in the new position, Lawler was rated as “satisfactory.” At the start of her second year, she was injured by a disruptive student, sending her to the hospital with a concussion and neck injury. Her psychiatrist notified the District that this and other incidents had retriggered Lawler’s PTSD and that she needed to be transferred. The District did not transfer Lawler but accelerated her next performance appraisal, rated her as unsatisfactory, and fired her as part of an announced reduction in force that ended with all but “unsatisfactory” teachers being rehired. Lawler filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, claiming failure to accommodate her PTSD and termination in retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A jury reasonably could find that the District failed to accommodate Lawler’s PTSD. View "Lawler v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150" on Justia Law

Arrigo began working at Link’s Wisconsin convenience store in 1999. She became bookkeeper for several of Link’s businesses. In 2010, Arrigo suffered an anxiety attack and was taken to the emergency room. Arrigo was paid during a two-week leave. Link claims that he asked Arrigo to provide a return‐to‐work certification from her doctor. She failed to do so. During a meeting, Link asked Arrigo for details about her condition; Arrigo disclosed that she had been prescribed medications and ordered to attend counseling. Arrigo claims that Link began treating her differently. Several weeks later, Arrigo was in a car accident and learned that she was pregnant. She stopped taking her anti‐anxiety medication and suffered withdrawal symptoms that landed her in urgent care. Weeks later, Link issued Arrigo’s first performance warning. After a dispute about Arrigo’s request for two days off, Arrigo failed to attend work on those days. Link terminated Arrigo’s employment. Arrigo filed suit, asserting that she was fired for taking Family and Medical Leave Act leave. Six months later, she sought to add Title VII and ADA pregnancy and disability claims. The court denied that request as untimely. Arrigo filed a separate suit, which was dismissed. During the FMLA trial, the jury heard about several Link employees who took FMLA leave and about Arrigo's performance issues and rejected Arrigo's claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding evidentiary rulings and the dismissal of Arrigo’s Title VII and ADA claims. View "Arrigo v. Link Stop, Inc." on Justia Law

Lane, an African-American, began working as a hospital security guard in 1999. He had an unblemished employment record until August 2012, when a 17‐year‐old male autistic patient started hitting and kicking his caregivers. Health care professionals, afraid to approach the patient or enter the room, summoned security. Lane responded and saw the patient kick a staff member in the back. Lane tried to restrain the patient, who tried to bite him and spit in Lane’s mouth. Lane slapped him in the face. The patient settled down. Lane filed reports explaining why he thought the slap was justified with the hospital and with the Sheriff’s Department, where he had status as a special deputy as a condition of his job. The recipients concluded he had shown poor judgment. The hospital’s director of human resources recommended that Lane’s employment be terminated. After a consultation with the Sheriff’s Department, the hospital told Lane that if he did not resign, he would be fired. He resigned. After exhausting EEOC remedies, Lane filed suit for race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital. Lane intentionally struck a patient; termination was a reasonable response. “Lane’s effort to put together a mosaic of circumstantial evidence of race discrimination” did “not hold together sufficiently to present a genuine issue of material fact.” View "Lane v. Riverview Hosp." on Justia Law

Hillmann began working for the Chicago Parks District in 1973. Later he became a Department of Streets and Sanitation truck driver. In 1984 he developed cervical radiculopathy, a work-related injury. In 1995 he entered into an accommodation agreement with the city and was reassigned as chief timekeeper. He never performed all of the duties required by the job description, but he performed the essential functions and other tasks as directed by his supervisor. In 2000 a new supervisor gave Hillmann duties that required use of his injured arm.. Hillmann experienced various difficulties until his position was eliminated in 2002, in a city-wide reduction in forces. He sued, alleging that he was targeted because he asserted his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. A jury found in Hillmann’s favor on the IWCA claim and awarded damages. The judge rejected the ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city; neither claim should have been tried. To prevail on his claim that he was discharged for exercising his rights under the IWCA, Hillmann needed to prove causation. No evidence suggests that the RIF decision-maker knew about Hillmann’s claim. The ADA claim likewise fails for lack of proof of causation. Hillmann has no evidence that the city withheld raises or targeted him for the RIF based on his ADA accommodation. View "Hillmann v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law