Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a customer service representative, was in an automobile accident in 2011, after which she used a cane and limped. She was fired in 2012, allegedly because of a perceived disability that had required her to take time off and to use her health insurance. Represented by counsel, she filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, citing failure to submit a charge of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the 300-day statutory deadline, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). Six months after being fired she had filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) a “Complainant Information Sheet” (CIS). A charge filed with IDHR is automatically cross-filed with EEOC. Despite the EEOC amicus curiae brief, arguing that the CIS was the equivalent of a charge, the court concluded that it was not. A charge is the administrative equivalent of a judicial complaint; a CIS is not unless it asks for relief. Without such a request the CIS is a pre-charge screening form, which does not prompt IDHR to notify the employer, launch an investigation, or sponsor mediation. Although the CIS form does say that IDHR will cross-file the complainant’s “charge of discrimination” with EEOC, it also says “THIS IS NOT A CHARGE,” followed by the statement that “if IDHR accepts your claim, we will send you a charge form for signature.” View "Carlson v. Christian Brothers Services" on Justia Law

Dr. Wesbrook, a former employee of the Marshfield Clinic Research Foundation, sued Dr. Belongia, a former colleague, and Dr. Ulrich, the chief executive officer of the Marshfield Clinic. Wesbrook claimed that Belongia and Ulrich tortiously interfered with his at-will employment, engineering his termination by publishing defamatory statements about him to the Marshfield Clinic board of directors. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants’ statements about the plaintiff were true or substantially true and therefore privileged. Wesbrook’s time with the Clinid was marked by conflict and complaints about his “management style.” The statements concerned those conflicts and complaints. Under Wisconsin law, an at-will employee cannot recover from former co-workers and supervisors for tortious interference on the basis of their substantially truthful statements made within the enterprise, no matter the motives underlying those statements. View "Wesbrook v. Ulrich" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lend Lease, the construction manager of the Chicago River Point Tower Project, hired Cives as a subcontractor. Cives hired Midwest Steel. Midwest had, years before, hired AES to supply Midwest with additional workers, who were co‐employed by Midwest and AES. Lend Lease entered into a “contractor-controlled insurance program” with Starr Liability with a $500,000 deductible. All subcontractors were to join in the policy. AES had, several years earlier, obtained workers’ compensation for its workers from TIC, so that injured AES‐Midwest workers could obtain workers’ compensation from either Starr (or Lend Lease under the deductible) or TIC. Four ironworkers, jointly employed by Midwest and AES and performing work for Midwest were injured on the job and sought workers’ compensation. The claims exceeded $500,000, so Lend Lease had to pay its full deductible. Starr paid the remaining claims. Lend Lease filed suit against TIC, AES’s insurer, and AES, seeking reimbursement of the $500,000. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lend Lease made a deal with Starr and is bound by it. The court rejected an argument that AES has been unjustly enriched; AES was not obligated to purchase an insurance policy that would cover Lend Lease's deductible. View "Lend Lease (US) Construction, Inc. v. Administrative Employer Services, Inc." on Justia Law

For weekday shifts, Antioch Rescue (ARS) used paid EMTs through subcontracts with private ambulance companies. For evening and weekend shifts, ARS used unpaid volunteers. Volling began as an unpaid EMT in 2008. In 2010, she transitioned to paid shifts under ARS and Metro. Springer began working for ARS and Metro in 2009. In 2011, Volling filed charges with the EEOC, alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation; she later filed suit, alleging violation of the Emergency Medical Services Act, including physical abuse of patients and on-duty alcohol and drug abuse. Volling’s report to the Illinois Department of Public Health resulted in fines and EMT license suspensions. Plaintiffs also spoke at public meetings. Springer filed a supporting declaration in Volling’s lawsuit and assisted in the investigation. ARS terminated its subcontract with Metro, replacing Metro with Kurtz. Kurtz immediately began hiring former Metro EMTs, without publicizing its vacancies. ARS instructed every former Metro EMT—except plaintiffs— on how to apply under the new contract. Kurtz asked ARS for the former Metro EMTs’ contact information. ARS and Kurtz rehired every other Metro EMT. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and the Illinois Human Rights and the Illinois Whistleblower Acts. ARS settled with plaintiffs. The district court granted Kurtz’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Title VII and IHRA. Plaintiffs adequately pled both an adverse employment action and a causal link between that action and their protected activity. View "Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Services, Inc." on Justia Law

At the Stockton, California inland seaport, FedEx employs 50 truck drivers and 27 dockworkers, who use forklifts to load and unload trucks. A Teamsters Local wanted to organize the drivers. FedEx argued that the local should also represent the dockworkers because the drivers and the dockworkers share a community of interest. The NLRB concluded that a drivers-only unit was proper and submitted the issue to a secret-ballot election of the drivers, who voted to be represented by the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed certification of the bargaining unit, citing 29 U.S.C. 159(a). The court noted the dissimilarity in working conditions; drivers work full time, dockworkers only part time; drivers are paid about twice as much as and have better benefits than dockworkers though they have less-strenuous, safer work. The court characterized dockworkers as “second‐class citizens" of the Stockton employment force and stated that “it is evident that the community of interest between the truck drivers and the dockworkers not only is in no sense overwhelming but in fact is slight, owing to the differences in working conditions and benefits between the two types of worker and the undeniable danger of strife between the drivers and the dockworkers should they be placed in the same bargaining unit.” View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. FedEx Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Uhlig brought False Claims Act and retaliation claims against his former employer, Flour, which had contracted with the U.S. Army to provide electrical engineering work in Afghanistan. Uhlig says Fluor knowingly breached the terms of its Army contract by using unlicensed electricians as journeymen and billing the government for the services. Uhlig also contends Fluor wrongfully terminated Uhlig as a whistleblower in violation of 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The district court granted summary judgment for Fluor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A plain reading of the contract documents is that Fluor needed to ensure that its electricians were qualified for the duties to which they were assigned by virtue of license, certification, training, or education. Nothing in the contract suggests that Fluor was required to elect one method of verifying its electricians’ qualification and that Fluor would then be limited to that method. Uhlig’s retaliation claim failed because he did not show that, at the time of the incidents at issue, a reasonable employee in Uhlig’s position would have believed Fluor was defrauding the government. View "Uhlig v. Fluor Corp." on Justia Law

Williams, an African-American began working for the Cook County Probation Department in 1995. In 2008, Williams reported an incident of racial intimidation. The co‐workers were counseled not to make such remarks again. In 2010, Williams reported that a supervisor was making phone calls about union matters. The supervisor was disciplined. In 2010, Williams was injured at work by a co‐worker, who yanked a door open while Williams was holding it, injuring her shoulder, and yelling, “report this too, b**ch?” She took a medical leave, filed a workers’ compensation claim, and received temporary total disability benefits. In December 2010, an independent medical evaluation determined she was capable of returning to work. No one noticed the report until June 2011. Human Resources asked her to return to work on August 2 and directed her to obtain releases, warning that failure to return to work would be considered an implied resignation. The county doctor approved her return to work, but noted that her personal physician stated that she was not able to return to work. The attorneys negotiating Williams’s disability benefits disputed the consequences of the disagreement. Williams was sent a termination letter on August 30, citing failure to communicate any intent to return to work, and the apparent expiration of her workers’ compensation benefits. The agreement ultimately reached concerning benefits listed Williams’s return to work date as September 6. Williams sued under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation and Whistleblower Acts, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, with breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no disputes regarding material facts. View "Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

Lord claims that he was sexually harassed by male coworkers at High Voltage Software, and that High Voltage fired him for complaining about it. Co-workers had teased him about the “audio bug” whenever a particular female coworker appeared. After Lord complained and was moved to another group, another coworker touched Lord on the buttocks four times and was fired for that behavior. High Voltage responds that the conduct Lord complained about was not sexual harassment and that it fired Lord for: failing to properly report his concerns, excessive preoccupation with his coworkers’ performance, and insubordination. The district court concluded that Lord’s claims under Title VII for hostile work environment and retaliation failed as a matter of law and entered summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lord did not show that he was harassed because of his sex, nor did he cast doubt on the sincerity of his employer’s justifications for firing him. View "Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc." on Justia Law

Cole, an African-American has worked for Northern Illinois University in the Building Services Department since 1998. He alleges that beginning with his 2009 promotion to sub-foreman, he experienced race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment, including the discovery of a hangman’s noose in his workspace. In 2011, he was again promoted. Cole was the only African-American sub-foreman or foreman. He believed that others with the same title were paid more or given more authority and that he was the subject of surveillance. In 2012, Cole filed an ethics complaint with the university about various alleged unethical practices. Cole was later demoted and twice subjected to discipline. He sued, asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The hostile work environment claim presented the closest question, but Cole did not show a basis for employer liability for the alleged harassment. Cole did not offer evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his race. His retaliation claim failed because he offered no evidence that he engaged in protected activity. View "Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Melton working in the Tippecanoe County Surveyor’s Office, asked his supervisor if he could take a class during work hours and make up the time by taking short lunches and coming in early. His supervisor responded that Melton could take the class, but due to concerns about tracking time and supervision, he would have to treat the time as unpaid or vacation time. Melton agreed. When his class began, Melton worked through lunch and came in early for a week. Melton was paid for the additional time, but was terminated for failing to follow his supervisor’s order. Melton filed suit, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a), and the Indiana Wage Claim law, claiming that when he put his actual time worked on his timecard, the secretary would reduce his hours, telling him that he could not be paid for more than 37.5 hours in a workweek. The county argued that Melton was paid for the time he certified, his recollection was “demonstrably unreliable,” and he did not pursue remedies through the county. The district court granted the county summary judgment, finding that Melton had only designated 100 minutes of uncompensated time, which did not establish a FLSA violation because Melton had not shown that he worked more than 40 hours per week. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Melton had chosen not to respond to the county’s allegation that his evidence was implausible. View "Melton v. Tippecanoe Cnty." on Justia Law